



[DOI: 10.35549/HR.2025.2025.55.006](https://doi.org/10.35549/HR.2025.2025.55.006)

Original paper



Dmitry R. Zhantiev

Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University. Moscow, Russian Federation. E-mail: zdimitry@mail.ru

The Middle East in the 1960s–1970s in the Working Notes of Y.M. Primakov



The source presented to the readers consists of the working notes of the Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov (1929–2015), in those sections devoted to the situation in South Yemen in 1968, the Arab–Israeli War of 1973, and the initial period of the Lebanese Civil War (1976). This source should be regarded as unique for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it was written by an outstanding Russian scholar and specialist in Oriental studies who worked for many years in several Arab countries of the Middle East – Egypt, South Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria – and represents the result of daily, thoughtful observations and conversations with many Arab state and political figures, as well as with fellow journalists. At the same time, the text of the notes does not resemble a conventional diary: they are working notes in the true sense of the word, recording both what was seen and heard during trips and business meetings and deep personal reflections on ongoing events in the context of the current political situation in the region. It is also important to note that Primakov’s notes had never been published before and, apparently, were not intended for publication; rather, they served as valuable working material. Thanks to the heirs of Yevgeny Maksimovich, they have now been brought to light and constitute a valuable primary source on the contemporary history of the countries of the Arab East.



Having graduated in 1953 from the Arabic Department of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies with a specialization “country specialist on Arab states”, and in 1956 from the graduate program of the Faculty of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU), Y. M. Primakov defended in 1959, at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, a PhD dissertation entitled “The Export of Capital to Certain Arab Countries as a Means of Ensuring Monopoly Superprofits”. Combining academic research with practical work, Yevgeny Maksimovich worked in the Arabic editorial office of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, rising from correspondent to editor-in-chief of the Main Directorate for Broadcasting to Arab Countries. From December 1962 he became an observer on Asian and African countries for Pravda, the newspaper of the CPSU Central Committee. From 1965 to 1969 he worked as Pravda’s own correspondent in the Middle East.

The correspondent office was based in Cairo, the capital of Egypt, but the events that attracted Primakov’s attention were not limited to this key Arab country; rather, they encompassed the region as a whole. This is evidenced, in particular, by the first part of the published working notes of Yevgeny Maksimovich, which reflect the complex and highly dynamic situation in South Yemen in 1968. Beginning in 1962, the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula experienced revolutionary upheavals. At that time, North Yemen (the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen) was a monarchical state headed by a king-imam from the Zaydi Shiite community, while South Yemen was still under British colonial rule. Following the example of the Egyptian “Free Officers” revolution and under the influence of the anti-imperialist course of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, in September 1962 a group of officers of the North Yemen army seized power in the capital, Sana’a, and proclaimed the creation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal, who enjoyed Egyptian support, became the head of the revolutionary leadership. During the ensuing civil war between republicans and monarchists in the YAR, Egyptian troops were sent to assist the republicans, while their monarchist opponents began to receive aid from Saudi Arabia. Thus, events in North Yemen turned into a large-scale regional conflict which, given Soviet assistance to Egypt and the YAR on the

one hand, and Saudi Arabia's close cooperation with the United States on the other, fit squarely into the logic and context of the Cold War.

Meanwhile, in South Yemen, the British colonial authorities attempted to play a "preemptive" game in order to disguise their colonial protectorate regime over the numerous local sultanates and sheikhdoms that formed a kind of security belt around the key strategic point – the British Crown Colony of Aden. To this end, in 1959 Great Britain formed from the monarchies of South Yemen under its control the Federation of the Arab Emirates of the South, later renamed the Federation of South Arabia (FSA). In 1963 Aden also became part of this structure, which, while possessing certain attributes of sovereignty, in fact remained under British protection. The revolution and overthrow of the monarchy in North Yemen in 1962 led to the activation of the anti-colonial movement in the British-controlled territories of South Yemen as well. The key role in this struggle was played by the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (the National Front, NF), which launched guerrilla warfare, including in Aden itself. The second most significant organization was the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), based in the territory of the YAR (North Yemen) and oriented toward Egypt. Both groupings of Yemeni patriots waged armed struggle against the British and the FSA armed forces under their control, but subsequently turned their weapons against each other. On 30 November 1967, having lost control of the situation in South Yemen, Great Britain was forced to transfer power to the National Front and withdraw its troops from Aden. The NF leadership proclaimed the People's Republic of South Yemen (PRSY), with Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi, a representative of the NF, becoming the first president of the young state. On 3 December 1967 diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the PRSY.

At the same time, independence confronted South Yemen with serious political and economic problems. Socialist transformations began in the country, including the nationalization of lands belonging to the overthrown pro-British monarchies and of foreign capital, but the new government lacked sufficient economic resources. After the closure of shipping through the Suez Canal as a result of the 1967 Six-Day Arab–Israeli War, the port of Aden temporarily lost its significance, while the evacuation of British troops and wealthy local entrepreneurs associated with the colonizers deprived many residents of their livelihoods. In this difficult situation, the leadership of the PRSY looked to the USSR for support and assistance, seeing it as a fortress of justice and progress, a friend and defender of na-

tional liberation movements and of the young states of Asia and Africa that had embarked on a path of non-capitalist development. It was in this highly complex environment (further exacerbated by a struggle for power between moderate and ultra-left groups within the NF leadership, against the backdrop of sharp contrasts between the capital Aden and the country's tribal agrarian periphery) that Primakov undertook his working trip to South Yemen in 1968. As subsequent events showed, his deeply analytical and farsighted assessments of the situation in the PRSY, reflected in his working notes, proved accurate: the revolutionary leadership of South Yemen sincerely sought socialist transformations, but at the same time relied on Soviet assistance and found itself in very difficult relations with the republican authorities of the YAR. It is important to note that Primakov's trip to South Yemen in 1968 and his conversations with the PRSY leadership took place even before the opening of the Soviet embassy in Aden, which makes his view of events in the country an invaluable primary source written "hot on the trail" of the fateful revolutionary events in southern Arabia.

The second part of Primakov's working notes published in the *Historical Reporter* is devoted to assessments of the situation in the Middle East during the Arab–Israeli War of 1973 (the October War, the Yom Kippur War). By that time, Yevgeny Maksimovich had already defended his D.Sc. dissertation entitled "Social and Economic Development of Egypt", had been awarded the academic title of professor, and held the position of Vice Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. His academic career continued to be combined with practical work during trips to Arab countries and numerous meetings with Arab state and political figures, scholars, and journalists. As is evident from the text of the notes, in October 1973 (when the Egyptian and Syrian armies managed to achieve limited successes in offensive operations against Israeli forces on the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt) and the Golan Heights (Syria), occupied by Israel in 1967), Yevgeny Maksimovich traveled to Beirut and Damascus, thoughtfully analyzing, on the basis of various sources, the sentiments prevailing in Arab ruling and political circles. The focus of his attention included the actions of the leaderships of Egypt and Syria, as well as of the leading Palestinian military-political organizations within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Among Primakov's interlocutors during those anxious days were Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam; Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and leader of the Fatah movement Yasser Arafat; Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine George Habash; Secretary-General of the

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Nayef Hawatmeh; as well as Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian journalists.

The next section of Primakov's notes, dated April 1976, constitutes a highly valuable and informative primary source on the early stage of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–1990. The main opposing sides in this conflict were, on the one hand, the militias of the right-wing nationalist Kataeb Party and its allied parties, composed mainly of Maronite Christians, and, on the other hand, the armed detachments of the PLO and the coalition of the National Patriotic Forces (NPF) led by the leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party, Kamal Jumblatt. The fratricidal war assumed a particularly brutal character in January 1976, when the Kataeb militias and their allies began a blockade of Palestinian refugee camps in the suburbs of Beirut. In response, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad undertook a mediation mission to settle the conflict and sent to Lebanon the Damascus-controlled Yarmouk Brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army. Against the backdrop of escalating tragic events, young Muslim officers of the Lebanese Army staged a mutiny, and in March 1976 the armed forces of the Lebanese Republic effectively disintegrated. The Syrian leadership, while attempting to force the warring sides to cease fire by military means, simultaneously sought to strengthen its direct influence in Lebanon and to use the PLO in the interests of its Middle Eastern policy — actions that increasingly met with dissatisfaction and growing resistance from a number of Palestinian organizations as well as from the Progressive Socialist Party. At the beginning of June 1976, against the backdrop of mediation efforts by various Arab countries, a large-scale deployment of Syrian troops into Lebanon began.

The dramatic, tense pace of the Lebanese civil war and the atmosphere of anxious uncertainty in April 1976 are clearly felt in the pages of the notes of Y. M. Primakov, who by that time had been elected a Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences — a recognition of his high scholarly achievements and his deep understanding of the mechanisms of Middle Eastern politics. His view of the situation reflects the official position of the USSR, which was interested in restoring stability in Lebanon primarily through the efforts of the Lebanese themselves.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership sought to prevent a confrontation between the PLO and Syria, which could only weaken them in the context of their confrontation with Israel, which enjoyed extensive support from the United States. As is evident from the text of the notes, Yevgeny Maksimovich, while analyzing a vast flow of information during personal meetings and conversations with a number of key participants in the con-

flict (including Yasser Arafat and Pierre Gemayel), diplomatically sought to maintain amicable contacts and opportunities for continued dialogue with each of them. This working style was consistently facilitated by his high personal authority, tact, and long-standing relations of trust with Arab politicians, diplomats, and influential journalists.

It is also noteworthy that Primakov, already at an early stage of the Lebanese civil war, correctly assessed the intentions and potential risks of one or another scenario of developments for the parties involved. For example, the unofficial consent of the United States to the entry of Syrian troops into Lebanon is interpreted not as a concession to Damascus, but as a long-term trap aimed at discrediting the leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic in the eyes of other Arab leaders and provoking a conflict between Syria and the PLO, which, in turn, clearly worked to Israel's advantage. As subsequent events showed, this assessment of the situation proved to be entirely accurate.

The publication of fragments of the working notes of Yevgeny Primakov constitutes a kind of invitation to further the study of this most valuable primary source and to its introduction into scholarly circulation. Objective technical difficulties associated with deciphering the manuscript and interpreting the numerous names and abbreviations cited in the text leave room for further source-critical research.



Manuscript Decipherment

 **Grigoriy N. Lanskoj** 

D.Sc.(History), professor of the department of Foreign Regional Studies at the faculty of International Relations, Politology and Foreign Regional Studies of Russian State University for the Humanities. Moscow, Russian Federation.

SPIN-код: 8055-2095

AuthorID: 364719

Preparation of the text for publication and commentary

 **Dmitry R. Zhantiev** 

C.Sc. (History), Associate Professor of Middle and Near East History, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University

SPIN-code: 7825-3269

AuthorID: 320761



Original paper



South Yemen, 1968

Aden. January 22, 1968.

External observations.

The airfield is very heavily guarded. Everywhere everything is wrapped with coils of barbed wire. At the entrance to the building there is a policeman who (we were told: as under the British) searches everyone – his hands slide over the body from top to bottom. They checked the ticket – a general rule. It’s also probably “punctuality” inherited from the British. Although the reception was very warm.

Next to the airfield is a former British military base. Barbed wire there as well. On the right, Aden officers now live there. On the left side of the road – empty houses. Everywhere on the houses there are inscriptions: FLM – FLM only. And in another place, clearly crossed out: FLOSY only¹.

They are working actively. In the ministries, for example. Young guys, enterprising, energetic. Not like in Damanhur² – the leaders are *all*³ officials. Was it like this in Egypt after the revolution? Or did the officer corps there support a certain respectability?

The essence of the nat[ional] lib[eration] movement in the Arab world is nevertheless changing. The general tendency is toward democratism.

Conversation with Abdallah Badheeb⁴ on the evening of 22 January 1968, on the balcony of the department.

¹ The “Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen” (FLOSY) was a militant political organization active in the British-controlled Federation of South Arabia (South Yemen) in the 1960s. It adhered to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist left-nationalist positions and was influenced by the ideas of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser

² Damanhur is a city in Lower Egypt.

³ *Sic.* (in English)

⁴ *Abdallah Badheeb* (1931–1976) was a Yemeni socialist writer, Marxist theoretician, journalist, and politician, and one of the leaders of the Marxist faction of the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (known

1. The tribal problem. Not as acute as in the North⁵, although it is necessary, with the PDRY⁶, to take into account the lessons of the North. During British rule, the tribal structure turned out to be blurred to a much greater degree than in the North.

The sultans are the largest feudal landlords, but they became such after the British presence. A law on private ownership of land was introduced. The sultans are an exception only in Lahej⁷, where there really was sultanic power — elsewhere they were ordinary tribal chiefs. It was the British who endowed them with enormous power and helped redistribute communal tribal lands in their favor.

After the proclamation of the PDRY — expropriation of property, including that of the sultans. But what next is the question! For now, it is in the hands of the state, and with the exception of Hadhramaut, where rental payments for buildings were reduced by 40 percent, everything remained at the same level. Dissatisfaction.

since 1967 as the National Front, NF), which fought for the liberation of South Yemen from British colonial rule. He played an important role in dialogue among various nationalist groupings, which led to their unification within the framework of the National Front.

⁵ This refers to North Yemen, i.e., the Yemen Arab Republic, which was established as a result of the anti-monarchical revolution of 26 September 1962 and existed until the unification of the two Yemeni states on 22 May 1990.

⁶ PRSY — the People's Republic of South Yemen, established on 30 November 1967 in southern Yemen as a result of armed national liberation struggle against British colonial rule and following the withdrawal of British troops from Aden. In 1970 the state was renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The ruling political force in South Yemen was the National Front (NF). The main political rival of the NF was FLOSY, which operated from the territory of North Yemen with Egyptian support.

⁷ The Sultanate of Lahej (also known as the Abdali Sultanate) was an Arab state that existed from 1728 to 1967 on the territory of what is now Lahej Governorate in South Yemen. From 1839 to 1967 the Sultanate of Lahej, ruled by the Abdali dynasty, was under British protection (from 1962 to 1967 as part of the Federation of South Arabia). In 1967 the Sultanate of Lahej was abolished by Yemeni revolutionaries during the creation of the PRSY.

They believe that the NLF⁸ Congress on the 15 of February, 1968, will determine the path. N. cooperated with the sultans. He even said that Fadh⁹ – the Sultan of Lahej – was stronger than Great Britain. Now he is in S[audi] A[rabia].

2. The working class is a fairly large force. It began to develop especially after 1956, when an oil refinery was built in Aden. It employs 7,000 people. Now the British want to exert pressure on the Aden government and, putting forward the closure of the Suez Canal as an argument, have left 20,000 people without work. Such a number of unemployed is very large for Aden.

Of course, during its regime England placed its main emphasis on freedom of activity for reactionary forces, but in a certain sense the 20th century was introduced into Aden. Therefore, progressive figures here also received fairly good opportunities at various stages. Newspapers, radio – this did not exist in the North, either. Growth of national self-awareness.

3. Britain's positions.

The first step was FLOSY, since they feared Egyptian influence. At a certain stage Q. Sh.¹⁰ evolved, ceasing to be a lackey of N¹¹. The army – that was the support. Of course, the army is peculiar. The British more than once managed to throw it against the people. And yet. Before leaving, they tripled the salaries of officers and soldiers. Now officers receive more than 200 pounds, soldiers 60–80 pounds, being fully provided for. Try now, under the new regime, to reduce anything. And not to reduce it means to have created a caste.

The British deliberately established this caste system.

In Hadhramaut they managed to unite the army and the national guard into security forces. In Aden, where the main mass refuses outright, the army wants to remain an independent force.

At first the British helped ensure that the army together with the NLF acted against FLOSY. This was also facilitated by the sentiments within

⁸ From the English “National Liberation Front”, referring to the National Front (NF).

⁹ This refers to the last Sultan of Lahej, Fadh^l VI ibn Ali al-Abdali, who ruled from 1958 to 1967. After the abolition of the sultanate, he fled to Saudi Arabia.

¹⁰ This refers to Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi (c. 1920–1981), a Yemeni political and statesman figure, leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (known since 1967 as the National Front), and the first president of the PRSY (1967–1969). In 1969 he was deposed and arrested.

¹¹ This likely refers to Gamal Abdel Nasser.

the army itself. With Egyptian help, FLOSY created its own posts on Yemeni territory — 800–900 people. The Aden army feared (just like in Algeria) the return of these organized forces into the country.

There was a danger that the army would now turn against the NLF. However, they believe that the tactics are being modified. (Apparently this also happened as a result of a certain purge and the growth of patriotic sentiments among junior officers.) They think that this is now the line of division within the NLF: right and left. Not against the NLF with a bet on others, but internally — toward a split while keeping part of it in power. And to ensure the victory of the right, right-wing elements in the army are being used.

Again the question to the Congress, 15th of February, 1968.

4. Within the NLF there are three major forces — now everywhere in Arab countries in all fronts, apparently, it is the same: Arab nationalists, Nasserists, and communists. The NLF is not a party but a front. One of the questions at the congress is whether it will become a vanguard party or remain a front.

At present, the influence of the nationalists has increased. After the break between the NLF and FLOSY, the creation of a Supreme Command of the NLF consisting of 7 people was announced. Now another 14 have been “illegally” co-opted. A total of 21. Almost all are nationalists. Friends have close ties with Nasserists and left nationalists (who themselves are also not homogeneous).

5. S[audi] A[rabia] is operating at full speed. One of the channels is religious penetration. Every Friday, radio broadcasts speeches by a major religious figure, Muhammad bin Salim al-Bayhani (from Bayhan¹²). He speaks against social transformations that could promote atheism (the government apparently allows all this, thus shielding itself from criticism), and for alliances primarily with Muslim countries: with Pakistan, Somalia, and the UAR (in that order).

They are also active in Hadhramaut.

But there progressive elements are stronger than in other parts. However, there are also leftist tendencies. Trotskyists and the Chinese also exert influence.

Nevertheless, according to him, the Chinese do not exert deep influence and do not hold strong positions. But they are active.

¹² Bayhan/Beihan is a city in western Yemen, the administrative center of Bayhan District in Shabwah Governorate.

10 (according to other information, 5) people were sent by the NLF to study in China — to a party school.

Additional: the army numbers 10,000 men.

Observation: Abdallah Salafi. Father — Abdelmejid Salafi. Three children of the murdered man. They think it was FLOSY. (...) his name. The [rifle] butt — a table lamp. He invited. Immediately showed magazines — says: they're yours. Most of them are Korean. He carefully changed clothes before being photographed.

In Hadhramaut there are strong pro-Chinese sentiments, since many people came there from Zanzibar (therefore, these are not purely pro-Chinese).

And NB! — differentiation in attitudes toward FLOSY.

Asnag¹³ — in his opinion, already a political corpse. But Me(...)awi — far from it. Very many want an agreement to be reached with him. Possibly corresponding talks are already underway.

We saw his house — it has merged into a row of others, the walls riddled with bullets — his sister and three children were killed there — by whom? — unknown.

January 23rd, 1968.

Abdel Fattah Ismail¹⁴ — Minister of Culture and N[ational] Orientation. The problems are difficult, inherited from British imperialism.

We must clearly realize that the country is backward and semi-feudal. The country was bound by many ties to imperialism and colonialism.

¹³ Abdallah al-Asnag (1937–2014) was a Yemeni trade-union and political figure, leader of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), and from 1965 head of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), which he organized following a split within the anti-colonial movement in South Yemen. He was a supporter of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.

¹⁴ Abdul Fattah Ismail (1939–1986) was a political and statesman figure of South Yemen and leader of the left wing of the National Front. In 1967–1968 he served as Minister of Culture, National Guidance, and Yemeni Unity Affairs. In March 1968 he was arrested by the right-wing faction of the National Front and went into exile. In 1969, together with Salim Rubai Ali, he led a bloodless coup against President Qahtan al-Shaabi and became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the National Front. In 1978–1980 he was the de facto leader of South Yemen, serving as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. He was regarded as the main pro-Soviet figure in the leadership of the Yemeni Socialist Party and the PDRY. He was killed in January 1986 during armed clashes between supporters and opponents of the General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party and Prime Minister Ali Nasir Muhammad.

The British wanted to preserve the country as a military base and a market for their goods. Imperialism also bound our country to the “culture” of the West, the culture of the colonizers. A mass of complex problems has remained. We see no other way out than the path of scientific socialism (he now emphasizes the word “scientific!”).

Of course, we must carry out scientific elaboration in order to create a program.

At present we are engaged in studying the program of national action. At present the task is to study. That is the stage. When it is completed, we will announce it in order to mobilize the people.

I will speak frankly about the most important problem.

1. The current situation forces us to choose a definite orientation in our development: to seek solutions to the unresolved problems and the tasks facing us. Since we have chosen the path of scientific socialism, the socialist countries are our revolutionary ally. I believe that no one except the socialist camp can adequately understand our problems.

When we say that our friends are from the socialist camp, we mean first and foremost the Soviet Union, which stands at the head of the socialist camp. We hope that the USSR will quickly understand the difficulties we are experiencing and will take prompt measures so that cooperation may be established both with the state and with the people. Previously we had no opportunity to make direct contact; now the situation has changed. There are very broad possibilities. All the more so because both the old colonizers and the local reactionary force do not abandon their attempts to undo our progress.

Our people have already proved that they are capable of resisting attacks; now they want to withstand internal difficulties.

Frankly speaking, we believe that providing assistance to liberated countries is the duty of the Soviet Union. By doing so, it also helps itself. Of course, this is not a demand. We see with regret the fact that disagreements and contradictions exist within the socialist camp. We believe that imperialism benefits from (these) contradictions.

Despite the contradictions, the entire socialist camp is our natural ally. The USSR is the mother of all socialist countries. We are proud of the achievements attained by the Soviet Union. There are sufficient possibilities to support the struggle for peace and progress. Throughout the entire socialist camp, the USSR assumes the main burden of responsibilities—we see this.

We believe that relations between our countries should not be classical diplomatic relations, but revolutionary ones. We believe that there

[should be] not only state, but also party [ties] between the CPSU and the NLF¹⁵.

2. The situation itself makes it necessary to consider the creation of an avant-garde of the people — a party. The requirement of social transformations to defend the revolution compels us to create a party.

Over the course of the nat[ional]-lib[eration] struggle, the Front turned into a broad base for consolidating all the forces of the people. But under no circumstances do we yet consider it a party. During the nat[ional]-lib[eration] struggle there were few opportunities to create a party. The main goal was to organize the struggle. In addition, the political preparation of the members of the NLF was not yet sufficiently high. Of course, all this is a consequence of objective conditions.

I think that we were not the only ones to go through all this. The need to achieve unity among the fighters forced us at the previous stage not to put forward such demands¹⁶. At that time, we set the goal of maximally expanding the ranks of the Front, increasing the number of its members — a path to expanding the nat[ional]-lib[eration] struggle. This could not but have a negative effect on the actions of the Front. There were mistakes, misconceptions, and disagreements. Naturally, today there are sufficient possibilities to move to a qualitatively new stage. Having a broad popular base within the Front, we can create a political organization.

The forthcoming congress will be engaged in studying and developing this fundamental question. After this congress there will be a clearer understanding.

We hope to derive great benefit from the experience of the CPSU's struggle.

3. The problem of the unity of Yemeni land. Imperialists and reactionaries did everything to prevent the creation of progressive regimes. American imperialism has enormous interests here and strives to preserve the "status quo".

Therefore, [there are] close relations between Saudi Arabia and imperialism. S[audi] A[rabia] is trying to appropriate these lands.

We can consider that the imp[erialists] and the Arab reactionary forces are actively trying to overthrow the rep[ublican] regime in the North. And this is preparation for an action against the People's Republic

¹⁵ That is, the National Front for Liberation (NFL).

¹⁶ That is, demands for the creation of a single ruling party.

of South Yemen. We believe that this is not simply an attack on Sana'a¹⁷. It is an attempt to put an end to the entire progressive regime on the Arabian Peninsula.

The North and the South share a unity of interests. Our strategic goal is unification. The tactical goal is also clear. We must with all our strength support the republican regime in the North – thus defending ourselves as well! Our duty is the most active participation in the defense of the republican regime in the North (they constantly speak simply of “the North”). We believe that the experience of development in the North is erroneous. Reliance solely on military force cannot decide the fate of the people. Only the people’s awareness of their goals and tasks, only the people themselves, can defend revolutionary transformations. The republican regime in the North mistakenly prohibited the young forces of the people from creating an organization to defend the republic. Also erroneous are the relations between the republican regime and the nor[thern] tribes, the mistake is the carrying out of arrests among republicans and the penetration of opportunist elements. The problem is not a military one. It is not a matter of the quantity of weapons or soldiers. I believe that it would have been more correct to provide greater opportunities to the people to put republican revolutionary slogans into practice.

We cannot accept for ourselves the methods and means used in the North. Only reliance on the broad masses of the people is capable not only of defending the revolutionary regime but also of developing it.

Our experience is vivid proof of this. We fought against the colonial regime and the regime of the sultans by all means. We opposed FLOSY as a counterrevolutionary force. We achieved these victories not because of a certain quantity of weapons, but as a result of the decisive support of the masses of the people.

The conscious will of the entire people cannot be defeated by any forces. An example is Cuba. The only way out in the North is reliance on the people, on the organization of popular resistance. An example is the defenders of Sana'a. The creation and strengthening of an organization

¹⁷ This refers to the siege of Sana'a, the capital of North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic), by royalist forces during the North Yemeni Civil War. The royalists (supporters of the imam and king Muhammad al-Badr, overthrown in the 1962 revolution) acted with active support from Saudi Arabia against republican forces, which were assisted by Egypt and the USSR. The siege of Sana'a was lifted by February 1968, which effectively marked the victory of the republicans.

of popular resistance — that is the way out. This is what we are discussing with our brothers in the North. Of course, popular resistance in the North is close to us. It is necessary that the struggle in the North and in the South be coordinated, insofar as there are common problems.

Relations and cooperation between the CPSU and the NLF in various directions.

1. Exchange of delegations. A delegation of our Front could go to the Sov[iet] Union to familiarize itself with the experience of party building. After that — concrete decisions. One could also come here to become acquainted with the activity of the NLF. To give some advice on party building: experience of party registration, party structure, party work.

2. Sending trainees for party education.

3. If there is readiness to act quickly, then quickly make proposals.

1) The opening of the embassy is delayed. Constant contact of ideas would demonstrate promptness. Delay with delegations. 2) Will provide support.

Many questions were raised when the comrades were here.

Cultural problems. The propaganda apparatus is old. a) Films (cow-boy films) are being shown. We need Soviet ones. Libraries — serious books. The embassy — first of all. It is necessary to prepare a cultural center, and so on. Films, like ours.

24 January 1968. Aden.

General Secretary of the Congress of Trade Unions, Muhammad Ahmad Saleh Aulaqi¹⁸.

Trade unions. Previously the work of the movement was limited only to Aden, unfortunately. The former leadership acted according to Western methods. Abdullah Asnag, a creature of the Labour Party. But even the English system was not allowed to manifest itself as it should have.

Such behavior led to the leadership becoming isolated from the rank-and-file members. The leadership spent most of its time in Aden, trying to use the movement for its own pol[itical] purposes. They declared that the Congress of Trade Unions was open to all Yemenis, but in reality it was only for Adenis. The former leadership did everything possible to prevent the penetration of dissenters — communists, progressives. But

¹⁸ More precisely: *Muhammad Ahmad Saleh al-Aulaki* (1940–1973), a trade-union, political, and state figure of South Yemen and a member of the National Front leadership. From 1969 to 1971 he served as acting Minister of Defense, and from 1971 to 1973 as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PDRY. He was killed in a plane crash.

over time this policy was exposed. The armed uprising contributed especially to this.

I will say frankly that the NLF did a great deal to bring this about. Asnag's group did everything to discredit the NLF, asserting that the arm[ed] uprising was meant to improve the position of the tribes, and doing everything possible to promote peaceful forms of development.

Subsequently it became clear that Asnag, by his methods, was tied to Britain. Over time he moved farther and farther away. This is a long story. It ended with him remaining isolated and beginning to make statements in support of the revolution.

Egyptian assistance was provided on the condition that everyone must obey their orders. I believe that the clash between FLOSY and the NLF was because of the Egyptians. As a result of such a policy by the pr[evious] leadership, the trade-union movement was isolated both externally and internally. Unfortunately, despite complete isolation within Aden, Asnag enjoyed recognition from some externally. In the socialist countries Asnag was being promoted (?), because they did not know the real situation on the ground. Of course, everyone perceived Asnag not as an individual, but as a representative.

In 1965, during the elections, he did not get through anymore. It began with the airline workers' union, which did not support him. Prolonged disputes and struggle took place within the leadership between the group for trade-union democracy and those opposed to it. Those who, to one degree or another, adhered to socialist views (including spontaneously) prevailed.

They insisted on withdrawing from the confederation of th[eir own] (?) trade unions, something Asnag obstructed.

Our aspiration to become members of the WFTU¹⁹ — we want to become closer to the real trade-union movement.

Other regions are even more backward than Aden. We are now striving to bring the trade-union movement out of isolation.

There are no more than 25,000 [union members] now in Aden itself. Of these, 5,000 are in the five prov[inces] — in Hadhramaut. The strongest union is that of the oil refinery (not in terms of numbers, but in

¹⁹ WFTU — the World Federation of Trade Unions, an international trade-union organization associated with communist parties. It was founded in October 1945 at the First Constituent Conference in Paris. The WFTU was influenced by the USSR and today unites more than 100 million workers in many countries around the world.

effectiveness); in terms of membership, the largest are the dockworkers' union and the transport workers' [union].

Difficulties:

1. Sending trade-union spec[ialists] and do exchanges: sending two people to each location.

2. Abdul Malik Ismail — Minister of Labor and Soc[ial] Security. He was chairman of the oil workers' union.

3. Mahmoud A. (...) — Minister of Finance — a trade-union activist, also formerly president.

4. Abdel Qader Amin²⁰ (?) — chairman of the trade union, member of the High Command.

Our interlocutor himself. Son of a peasant from the eastern part of Aulaqi²¹. Studied in Aden at a college, graduated. Worked at British Petroleum for one year in 1965. One week after his marriage, in October 1965, was imprisoned. The Front's leadership was in Taiz²², while he was in the field. Twenty-six years old. Came to Aden [at the age of] nine, knowing only the Quran. Married a fourteen-year-old.

Photo.

Saleh Muhammad. Member of the executive committee of the dockworkers' union.

24 January 1968.

Minister of For[eign] Affairs Saif Ahmed Dali²³. Meeting at the ministry — city of Shaab²⁴. In the building of the Council of Ministers of the former federation.

Also a young man. He himself wanted to meet — was looking for us near (...?). Said he had deliberately scheduled it for 2 p.m. so that everyone would leave and no one would interfere.

²⁰ This likely refers to Abd al-Qadir Amin.

²¹ This refers to the territory of the Upper Aulaki Sheikhdome (northeast of Aden). The sheikhdome was part of the Aden Protectorate and its successors — the Federation of Arab Emirates of the South (1959–1963) and the Federation of South Arabia (1963–1967). It was abolished in 1967 during the formation of the PRSY.

²² A city in the southwestern part of North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic).

²³ Saif Ahmad Salih al-Dali (1931–1973) served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRSY in 1967–1969 and as Ambassador of the PDRY to Iraq in 1972–1973. He was killed in an airplane crash.

²⁴ Madinat Asha'ab (literally "City of the People") was originally called Madinat al-Ittihad; it is one of the new districts of Aden where, prior to the establishment of the PRSY, government institutions of the Federation of South Arabia were located.

1. History of relations with FLOSY. On 16 January 1966 FLOSY was created. After that N.²⁵ stopped providing the National Liberation Front with both money and weapons. A system of twisting arms.

He was in Moscow — September 1965 to January 1966, en route to Cuba. The political climate did not allow him the opportunity to meet with the necessary people.

On 16 January 1966 FLOSY was created. Assistance stopped. In September there was a secret meeting of the NLF in Yemen, in Kib/Qib(...?). They considered withdrawing if the Alexandrian summit continued — a demand for capitulation, to surrender weapons.

Ahmad Saleh Sha'ir²⁶.

Minister of Agriculture (secretary in the ministry).

The country is agricultural. Small landholdings.

This is mine: Sultans and sheikhs were connected with Britain. In Yemen — against Ahmad²⁷. Different attitudes toward the tribes. There was no agrarian law regulating relations between ...

Compared these ministers with those ministers — in Yemen.

12,000 guineas (?) for the purchase of potatoes (?), 18,000 for onions (?). Over half a year, from April to December, 25,000 for oranges.

About 1 million feddans²⁸ are suitable for cultivation. But only 200,000 are cultivated, that is, one-fifth. The problem of water. Agrarian reform. To those who cultivate it?

Law on agrarian relations: taking into account Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Iraq²⁹.

Mine. Ministers are using Marxist terminology — a new development! At the congress they will present their proposals well.

²⁵ This refers to President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

²⁶ Ahmad Salih al-Sha'ir (1943–1973) was a member of the National Front leadership; at the time in question he served as Minister of Agriculture and from 1969 to 1973 as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the USSR. He was killed in 1973 in an airplane crash together with Saif Ahmad al-Dali and Ahmad Salih Aulaki.

²⁷ This likely refers to Imam and King of North Yemen Ahmad ibn Yahya Hamidaddin, who ruled from 1948 to 1962.

²⁸ A feddan is a unit of land area used in Arab countries. In Yemen, one feddan equals 4,600 square meters.

²⁹ In the aforementioned Arab countries, agrarian reforms were carried out by establishing a maximum limit on landownership per individual and per family. Surplus land was compulsorily purchased by the state at prices below market value.

One can only assume that 20% of the 200,000 feddans were in the hands of sultans. Those lands that can be cultivated, the state has taken them into its own hands.

They will approach maximums and minimums differentially by regions. Two forms. They will try both, proceeding from local conditions.

With regard to the tribes — it creates difficulties. Half a month ago, four families argued over half a feddan. Tribal attachment to land will hinder collectivization.

Land is owned on an individual basis. Stratification has already occurred. Sharecropping at one-quarter exists. Half-share tenancy also existed. Seventy percent on a tribal basis.

NB! The expulsion of the sultans had a strong impact. Some left, others stayed. They largely lost power. They fear that after the sultans [they will be next]. Four years have had a strong effect.

The tribes themselves deprived many of privileges. In practice, the Front often did not intervene.

Tribal relations in the North are much stronger. NB!

Incr[ease] of export crops. Increase tariffs — protectionism.

Again regarding our assistance.

2. The problem of the tribes. NB! Well known. Religious foundations, s[ocio]-econ[omic] and political. The four-year struggle greatly contributed to their erosion. The Lib[eration] Army consisted of representatives of different tribes. Connection with the city. They began to read and listen more.

People from the city went into the tribes. The petty bourgeoisie — workshops. The Front sent people into the tribes.

British imperialism tried to exacerbate tribal relations. Officers from one [tribe] were placed above soldiers from another. The Front, on the contrary, worked on an inter-tribal basis. Explanatory work continues even now by the NLF, in order to weaken internal tribal ties as much as possible. They convince people that they are all participants in the revolution. Over the last four months they have faced very difficult trials.

Starting on 20 June, the Egyptians began withdrawing their troops to Aden. Also with a purpose. The NLF was seizing positions. Previously they gave to Asnag (support?). Now they said: take this! But the Front.

But the self-awareness of the tribes turned out to be higher. People's militia — no troops. They guard everything themselves.

This was the first post-revolutionary test!!! But (this is mine) nothing is yet known.

There is no religious criticism. Everyone is Shafi i³⁰! In the North there are Zaydis³¹ and Shafi is.

25 January 1968. Lahej³². Ali Abd al-Alim³³.

Centralization in the governorate. Previously incorporated districts — autonomous.

Lahej, Dali, part of Haushabi, Subeihi, Maflahi, Sha(?)³⁴.

Houta³⁵ — before the revolution, the name of the capital of Lahej.

Centralization.

The governor is the s[enior] representative of the NLF. In the building of Fadhl ibn Ali³⁶ (the Sultan of Lahej).

Previously there was a British adviser. There were no British troops, but they were constantly passing through to the south. In the future, when there is a party, the representative of the Front will have supervisory and educational functions.

About 30 years old. He was a teacher in a pr[ivate] school in Lahej. Born here. He helped create the Front's organization. There was no question of a par(...) — he himself created the organization. He spent two years imprisoned in Mansura³⁷.

³⁰ Shafi is are followers of the Shafi i madhhab, one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law.

³¹ Zaydis are followers of Zaydism, one of the Shi i branches of Islam.

³² Lahej is one of the provinces (governorates) of South Yemen; prior to 1967 it was the Sultanate of Lahej.

³³ *Ali Abd al-Alim* (1935–1970) was a South Yemeni revolutionary and one of the activists of the National Liberation Front. In 1968 he was a member of the General Leadership and the Organizational Committee of the National Front. He made a major contribution to the establishment of the National Front as the ruling political party in South Yemen and to the formation of its ideological course. Following the coup within the party and state leadership of the People's Republic of South Yemen in 1969, he was arrested together with supporters of the deposed leader Qahtan al-Shaabi. In 1970 he was sentenced to death on charges of attempting a coup d'état and was executed.

³⁴ The names of former sheikhdoms whose territories became part of Lahej Governorate in the People's Republic of South Yemen are listed.

³⁵ Al-Houta is the historical name of the administrative center of Lahej Governorate; it is synonymous with the city of Lahej.

³⁶ This likely refers to the building of the former palace of Sultan Fadhl VI ibn Ali, who ruled from 1958 to 1967.

³⁷ Al-Mansura is an urban district in Aden Governorate, effectively one of Aden's suburbs. The prison in al-Mansura, built by the colonial government of

He was dismissed from the school as soon as he was arrested. He was imprisoned by the British in 1965. At that time he was working in Aden. British intelligence exposed him as an underground activist. He was arrested in Aden in October 1965. He was interrogated “with particular severity”. In 1965 the British began discovering secret caches. Several people were caught, but not from the leadership.

In October they gave him salt water to drink, then did not allow him to drink at all. They beat him with sticks, dragged him by the hair. They stubbed out cigarettes [on him]. In Mansura — preliminary “processing”. A pit. They kept him in a pit for several days in a contorted position. They beat him with boots. They turned on powerful conditioning³⁸. Hands bent into a (figure) “seven”, legs into an “eight”. Torture by cold.

Criminal commission. Not a court, but a repeated interrogation: “Are you a terrorist — yes or no?” A judge, a prosecutor, an intelligence [officer], and a defense attorney.

Abdullah Asnag’s uncle acted as translator.

Previously Yemen was a single state. The Imam sent his governors. Remote [provinces] became independent. He imposed taxes. The Bedouins were outraged by tax increases, broke away and isolated themselves. At the same time, each tribe had its own sheikh. But he was not a dictator, because he was elected. Before the arrival of the British, [sheikhs] did not possess power. There was no hereditary [rule], even though he was called a sultan.

Previously Aden and Lahej were together. Later the [sultan] moved to Lahej.

The British supported [sheikhs] who broke away from the tribe and rose above it — this was British assistance. Previously the tribal sheikh had no property at all. Strengthening the real power of the sultans, the British supplied them with weapons and money and, using their position, they began to seize land. The sultan himself di[srup]ted (...) NB! — he did not allow tribal sheikhs. He was a shadow of the High Commissioner.

This is an agricultural region, and therefore tribal ties are weaker here.

The sultan deprived tribal sheikhs of any influence. He began to transfer power by inheritance — this was a most serious blow to the sheikhs.

Aden in the first half of the 1960s, was used as a political prison for Yemeni fighters against British colonialism.

³⁸ Air conditioner.

Sultan Abdel Kerim Fadhl³⁹ personally directed the cultivation of the land. He used hired labor (there was no serfdom — there was freedom, one could leave).

Our interlocutor knows the history of Russia! He says — this is not like serfdom.

In 1910 the sultan⁴⁰ wanted to become, following the example of Russia, a tsar. But when he became sultan he changed his mind, and died > [owning more] than 7,000 feddans. His son was less interested in land and began leasing it out. The last sultan⁴¹ in Cairo — leased out [his own land].

!Selector!

There were three main systems of tenancy: a) the harvest split in half; b) hiring as workers with fixed pay; c) any harvest, but fixed payment for leasing the land.

But the peasants still do not feel better! — this is mine!

At first we thought it was necessary to lay our hand on it, [to take the land] under our control. Now the situation is being studied. They believe that the land problem is harmful. Now they will divide it up. If land is given [to peasants] and then they are later cooperativized — it will be worse. As for agricultural workers, they come from the North⁴². Now the peasant is guaranteed that he will remain on the land. Already the arbitrariness in the distribution of income has been eliminated. In the event of a crop failure, peasants are exempt from paying rent.

The feeling of “one’s own land” is not very strong here.

The militia is a people’s militia. Locally it is led by the governor and the [National] Front’s branch. All militiamen are members of the Front. The overwhelming majority are illiterate. When the Front was being created, the basis [was] only the liberation struggle. From January 1966 there was propaganda against the NLF.

In the photo — Abdel Rahman Anwar Hasan (secretary of the NLF Representative Office) and NLF representative Ali Abd al-Alim. Abdel Qader Ali Nasr — chief. Ahmed Salem Obeid⁴³ — head of the mili-

³⁹ This likely refers to Sultan of Lahej Abd al-Karim II ibn al-Fadhl, who ruled from 1915 to 1947.

⁴⁰ In 1910 the Sultan of Lahej was Ahmad III ibn Fadl, who ruled from 1898 to 1914.

⁴¹ This likely refers to Fadhl VI ibn Ali, the last Sultan of Lahej, who ruled from 1958 to 1967.

⁴² That is, from the territory of North Yemen—the Yemen Arab Republic.

⁴³ Ahmad Salim Obayd (born 1942) is a South Yemeni military and state figure who, at the time in question, served as commander of the People’s Guard in

tia⁴⁴, a friend. “Pravda” — this is truth (he says in Arabic). “Like the Red Guard” — the people’s militia. No pay. Only symbols.

Three tasks:

1. Control over the officer corps of the old army⁴⁵.
2. Control over arrivals from the North.
3. Search for hidden weapons.

He studied in Romania at the Lenin School, at the Faculty of E[conomics].

To this day there is weak contact with the army. In practice, the militia is led by the Front. They help peasants, build roads. There is no mutual understanding between the militia and the “police”. The police are stronger.

25 January 1968.

1. H[ead] of the Lib[eration] Front — (pseudonym Faris Ahmed) ®Sultan Ahmed Umar⁴⁶— h[ead] of the organizational department. Was in Cairo and Beirut, worked in the Ministry of Education in Yemen.

2. Abdallah Sharar — member of the ideological commission, works in the newspapers *14 October* and *Suwar*⁴⁷.

3. Said al-Ibbi — head of security in the Front.

Meeting at the Front’s premises in Crater⁴⁸. Sultan speaks in a low voice. Security. He wanted to go out to stop the noise. Sultan said: p[erhaps] it is better that they are making noise...

1. Creation of an organization — as if there are contradictions within the Front.

Lahej Governorate. He later held the posts of Deputy Minister of Defense and Minister of Information. Since 1994 he has lived in political exile in Egypt.

⁴⁴ This refers to the People’s Guard (al-Haras al-Sha bi).

⁴⁵ This refers to the officer corps of the former army of the Federation of South Arabia, trained by the British and later, for the most part, incorporated into the armed forces of the People’s Republic of South Yemen.

⁴⁶ Sultan Ahmad Umar (Faris) (d. 1993) was a Yemeni revolutionary, activist of the Arab Nationalist Movement, one of the leaders of the left wing of the National Front, one of the founders of the Yemeni Socialist Party, and a member of its Central Committee. He was a supporter of the unification of the two Yemeni states.

⁴⁷ *14 October (14 Uktubir)* is a daily government newspaper published in Aden since 1967, named after the date of the revolution in South Yemen. *Al-Thawra* (“Revolution”) is the government newspaper of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), published since the anti-monarchical revolution of 1962.

⁴⁸ Crater is a historic district of Aden, located inside the crater of an ancient extinct volcano. In 1967 it became the scene of fighting between British troops and units of the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen.

2. Sixty thousand of the adm[inistrative] apparatus were inherited [from the Federation of South Arabia]. He is hostile towards them.

3. Provinces.

4. Army. There is a danger. Naval officers are Somalis, pro-British. The army is 15,000 strong.

Really cultivated land – 150,000 feddans. Another 150,000 are cultivated very primitively. One million feddans can be cultivated. Out of 39 million → 16 million go to the army, the rest goes to the state apparatus.

Tribes. They were incited against one another. Saudi Arabia attempted to attack three times. We understand that the capture of Sana'a would be an attack against us. And this creates enormous difficulties for us.

We are convinced that we must have direct ties with the socialist camp, especially with the Sov[iet] Union. Nationalist China betrayed us; a consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany will be opened – do not let this mislead you. We will remain with you regardless; we will create a Marxist–Leninist party.

We believe that the communists of Abdallah Badheeb and we are moving in the same direction. There is no closeness between us at present, but we are going along the same path.

1. Asnag's party⁴⁹ – the middle and petty bourgeoisie, perhaps even more the bureaucracy.

2. The group in the army supporting Asnag killed workers and the fedayeen⁵⁰.

There are different views regarding their friends. They do not want either to allow them [to act] independently or to include them [in the National Front]. He said that this is how the majority of the leadership thinks. The reasons: extremists, fault-finders, intellectuals, did not fight. He says that a M[arxist]–L[eninist] group exists within the Front as well. He let slip, in effect, that against including the friends of Q. Sh.⁵¹ is the Minister of the Economy, Faisal al-Shaabi (a cousin) also.

The alternative is to let them create a separate party, but in the North. In any case, our country is one.

⁴⁹ That is, FLOS Y—the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen.

⁵⁰ Fedayeen (fida i, fida iyin), from the Arabic “those who sacrifice themselves,” is a general term for members of insurgent detachments of national liberation movements in various Arab countries.

⁵¹ Qahtan al-Shaabi.

NB! Salaries. The British introduced extremely high pay for the army. Soldiers — 30 pounds. Officers — over 100. Com[mand] — 200.

Civil servants. Previously a minister received (under the British) 350 pounds. Permanent secretaries — 250. Highly paid bureaucracy. Now ministers receive little, but everything is provided by the state — house, car, electricity. They buy Gr[reek] vases and ask the merchant to send the bill to the government.

In the army under the British, the Aulaqi⁵² dominated — a tribe that, with British help, entered the army. Tied to the British. The NLF used sentiments against the Aulaqi, who were all the senior officers and altogether made up 20% of the army. Nepotism, promoting their own people.

Connections during the clash with FLOSY. H[alf] of the security service — one out of three who was dismissed — was tied to the British and to FLOSY in the most decisive way.

Now the NLF [leads] through its people in the army. One of them is Muhammad Salih (?) Sab a — head of military counterintelligence.

27 January 1968

Minister of Defense⁵³. Attitude toward the situation in the North.

The main problem, which became acute after the military coup five years ago: there was no money and no program of action. This led to the fact that, having carried out the revolution, the leadership did not meet the demands placed upon it. The revolution did not have a serious social base. Unfortunately, again after five years the question is on the agenda — will there be a republic.

Under these conditions, the development of the revolution in Yemen proceeded along the correct path. But of course the initiative is now not in the hands of the republicans. The meeting in Beirut showed this.

After victory here, the attacks [of the monarchists] in the North intensified. This is against us; we understand this. We always believed that

⁵² That is, people originating from the large Aulaki Arab tribe in southern Yemen, whose leaders during the colonial period were ruling sultans in two sultanates—Upper Aulaki and Lower Aulaki—as well as ruling sheikhs in a small state known as the Upper Aulaki Sheikhdome. These political entities were part of the Aden Protectorate and the Federation of South Arabia under British protection until 1967.

⁵³ The minister's name is not specified in the text, but it most likely refers to Ali Salim al-Beidh (born 1939), a South Yemeni political and state figure who served as Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of South Yemen in 1967–1969 and as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party from February 1986 to May 1990.

our front line of defense runs through the North. If it is breached, they will be here. My personal opinion is that the creation of front line defense forces in the North inspires great hopes. Even if we lose Sana'a and Taiz, these forces will still be found in the future.

This is the position of everyone — the government, the masses, etc. — to help the North. Despite our modest capabilities, we will exert every effort to help and to take direct part.

2. The situation on the peninsula in general is determined by the struggle of two camps. If the soc[ialist] camp made incorrect tactical moves, it handed trump cards to the enemy.

Given the difficult conditions, we cannot take up defensive positions. We must continue the revolution. We have no means for defense. Internally — a strong pol[itical] organization. Externally — the support of friendly countries. From the moral point of view there are great forces. Especially after 20 June⁵⁴ this was confirmed — the people support the revolution.

We ask that the USSR help us for the development of the world revolution.

Military and civilian delegations.

Do they fully control the situation in the army? The army question — army circles — has not been resolved in many Third World countries. At the head of the army are capable young members of the Front, cells. He did not expect immediate danger.

27 January 1968

President Qahtan al-Shaabi. The palace of the former High Commissioner.

We receive you not simply as journalists who will tell public opinion about this meeting. I receive you as friends, as representatives of a socialist country with which we want to develop relations in all aspects. With our revolution we want to make a modest contribution to the struggle of peoples against imperialism and reactionism. We hope and believe that relations between us will develop at the most varied levels. We are conducting the struggle together with you against a common enemy. We hope that Sov[iet] public opinion will be imbued with a deep understanding of our hopes and needs.

⁵⁴ On 20 June 1967 an anti-British uprising began within the armed forces of the Federation of South Yemen, leading to an intensification of the national liberation struggle under the leadership of the National Liberation Front. The actions of the rebels forced Great Britain to withdraw its troops from Yemen by the end of November 1967.

There is no doubt about the exchange of telegrams. I must highly appreciate the initiative of the Sov[iet] Union, which was expressed in send[ing] us greetings. It was well received throughout the country, by all our people. A decision has been made to exchange embassies, and we hope that embassies will be opened in the near future. We, as a young country pursuing a progressive liberation policy both domestically and abroad, are guided in our activities, both during the liberation struggle and now, by the Charter of the NLF adopted earlier.

We are filled with determination to implement the goals set out in the Charter. At the forthcoming congress we intend to consider a concrete program of actions aimed at developing a progressive, socialist society.

Our main task is the creation of an independent national economy. After 129 years of Br[itish] imp[erialist] rule, Britain left us a very heavy legacy, especially in the economic sphere. Hence it is natural that primary attention must be given to the most backward areas and regions, particularly the countryside. In this program we must give foremost and primary attention to solving the land problem. We will proclaim agrarian reform as one of the cornerstones of our policy. We are currently drafting legislation.

The first step is the expropriation of land from sultans and sheikhs and its transfer to the state. We are resolutely determined to eliminate semi-f[eudal] relations in the countryside. The next step after expropriation is the transfer of land own[ership]. A maximum size of landholding will be established by law. We intend to take up virgin lands. We intend to transfer the expropriated land into the hands of those who cultivate it. The subsequent stages: part will be distributed among landless peasants. On the other part we intend to create agricultural cooperatives. We will try to conduct an experiment with the creation of st[ate] farms. Naturally, at the first stage the state will take control over the entire conduct of the experiment.

We will proclaim the slogan “land to those who cultivate it” and are determined to put it into practice.

The main condition for the development of agriculture is water — a fairly difficult problem, since we have poor sources. There are no rivers, or almost none. Agriculture is mainly rain-fed; we use precipitation and flows after snowmelt in the mountains. Wells are also envisaged — both artesian and ordinary. A small number of artesian wells already shows that there are underground waters, and in large quantities.

For better use of floodwaters it is necessary to build dams and weirs. Perhaps the most radical solution to the problem is drilling a large number of artesian wells.

Most of the suitable land is still uncultivated. Of course, we need specialists and external assistance. Naturally, the state must take care of the marketing of agricultural products so that profits do not go beyond the borders of the state (NB!), but remain with the peasants and the state.

In developing agriculture, we will, naturally, rely on the achievements of technology. It is necessary to mechanize, to carry out the necessary research to select the best, most productive crops. Of course, we will devote great attention to increasing fish production (fish is already the second export i[tem] after cotton).

We must create ind[ustry] — of course not heavy industry, but industry that would find sources of raw materials for itself. The question is being studied about building a textile factory, a plant (or ...?) for processing fish for export, a soap-making factory, and a tobacco factory (there is local raw material).

Naturally, this is only the first stage. Further on — the creation of medium-scale industry. In the future we intend to become an industrial power.

As a result of prolonged colonial domination, our country is very backward, but it is not poor.

We want, with the help of specialists, to carry out extensive geological exploration. We hope that there is oil. In five governorates—Hadhramaut and four other governorates. Two for[eign] companies have already searched, but did not find any—we do not trust them very much and think that exploration was stopped for political reasons.

We want to grant concessions to for[eign] companies, including those from friendly countries, but not on unequal terms, as was the case in the past.

The USSR is engaged in oil exploration in various countries. If we find oil, this will help us solve our problems.

As stated in our Charter, the main role in the development of the socialist economy will be played by the state sector. You may have noticed that there is no great order in the countryside. In the future the state wants to direct both foreign and dom[estic] trade. We want to create our own nat[ional] bank, which will be state-owned.

It is necessary to put financial policy in order. We attach great importance to protectionism. We must pay enormous attention to the social development of the countryside.

The British did not even dig wells for drinking water. I was recently in northern Hadhramaut. I was told that there are not even wells for drinking water. This is reality. British imperialism exploited our country in every way—as a base, a port, a market for goods—but did nothing essential for the country itself.

In effect, when leaving, the British left our country bankrupt and did everything so that we would fail.

An en[ormous] adm[inistrative] apparatus, artificial inflation of salaries, the distribution of handouts without any justification.

Naturally, to solve our problems we need the most varied forms of your assistance.

As a main principle, this assistance must in no way infringe upon our freedom and sovereignty. Therefore I must say frankly that above all we expect assistance from our friends in the soc[ialist] camp, from the Sov[iet] Union.

We are accustomed in the Arab countries to the fact that Soviet leaders correctly understand our problems.

In the present difficult conditions our people highly value any assistance, and we will never forget it.

Our situation is quite clear. It is understood first by enemies, and only later by friends.

Independence was not granted; it was won in a hard struggle that cost many sacrifices. Therefore, we intend to defend it. The goal of the struggle is not to simply stop at the seizure of power. That is only a means.

The main goal is the complete liberation of the country from for[eign] influence and its development in the interests of the people.

We know what imperialism and colonialism are; as a people and as a revolutionary authority we closely follow their intentions. To the extent of our strength and capabilities, we will take part in the common struggle against colonialism and reaction, for the elimination of the exploitation of man by man. That is what the revolution was carried out for. We do not consider our independence complete as long as external influence and the exploitation of man by man persist in the Arab world. We are part of the Arab world; we particularly perceive this now, when the imp[erialists] — Israel — aim not only to occupy our lands but to overthrow progressive regimes.

The aim of concentrating the offensive pushes aggression toward stopping the development of the rev[olutionary] social process before it reaches its goals.

We consider the complete lib[eration] of the Arab world and its unification on socialist foundations to be our main duty.

Not only us, but other Arab peoples as well, highly value the position taken by the USSR against imp[erialism], Zionism, and reaction.

Here in our country we believe that the forces of counterrevolution will not sit idly by — world imperialism and Arab reaction.

We fully realize what dangers threaten us. With all the forces at our disposal we will defend ourselves and will not allow external counter-revolutionary forces to divert us from our path. Our friends, and above all the USSR, will not leave us alone in our struggle against our enemies.

The events unfolding in the North, in my opinion, are not due to internal disagreements, but to the intervention of external reactionary forces, in order not to let this most important strategic resource slip out of their hands.

You yourselves could see that inhumane attempts are being made to return the people to the darkness in which they lived for centuries.

The main goal of the imp[erialists] in the North, perhaps, is not so much the YAR⁵⁵, but, as is now becoming clear, the PRSY⁵⁶, where the development of events poses the greatest threat to their interests.

We feel our responsibility and in no case absolve ourselves of it for the development of events in the North.

We will take direct part in repelling the attacks of the counterrevolution in the North.

Already after the proclamation of independence, near Habarut⁵⁷ (the east[ern] border), there was a concentration of troops⁵⁸ with the participation of British officers. Of course, not the Sultan of Muscat, but Great Britain itself. In other border areas as well there have been attempts to penetrate our territory for hostile purposes.

The Khuriya Muriya Islands⁵⁹ are part of our territory and are still under British rule. They want to transfer them to Muscat. We will never renounce them.

⁵⁵ Yemen Arab Republic.

⁵⁶ People's Republic of South Yemen.

⁵⁷ Habarut is a city in western Oman, near the border with Yemen.

⁵⁸ This refers to the armed forces of the Sultanate of Oman.

⁵⁹ The Khuriya Muriya Islands are a group of islands in the Arabian Sea. In 1937 they were annexed by Great Britain to its colony of Aden. In November 1967 the islands were transferred by the British to the control of Oman, which itself was under British protection. After the proclamation of the People's Republic of South Yemen in 1967, the South Yemeni authorities declared claims to the islands.

Of course, we will declare that we do not want to interfere, but as events show, our intentions are not met with reciprocity. It is necessary that everyone understand that despite the fact that we have no aviation, no navy, and only a small army, our people are ready for the fiercest struggle.

We will fight against any attempts to divert us from the progressive path of development.

Britain, which for many years ruthlessly exploited us, must at least partially compensate for this. We will insist on this.

Of course, it is an injustice when, after such long exploitation, we are literally abandoned to our fate. At the negotiations in Geneva we were disappointed by Britain's position. But I believe that Britain must show a sober approach. We hope that the forthcoming economic negotiations with Britain will be more successful and that Britain will be more accommodating.

The British in Geneva stated that they had not so much derived benefits as incurred expenses. We said that we are ready to total all expenditures over 129 years and deduct from the profits only those of the [last] 50 years.

In Yemen⁶⁰.

Objective conditions are conducive.

1. Cl[ass] relations are underdeveloped; hostility and venality of the tribes.

2. There was no genuine revolution—there was merely a coup. There were only leaders who did not rely on the masses and did nothing to assist them.

In the leadership there were, and still are (there are indeed such people here), dishonest individuals.

The leadership is incompetent and is not going to deal with concrete matters. It is absolutely uninformed. It does not know the situation or what is really happening.

There is no program of practical actions whatsoever.

As a result of exchanging four messages (to the last of which I received no reply), the People's Republic of South Yemen demands a concrete discussion of who has what and who needs what. Otherwise it may turn out that our fighters arrive and there is nothing to eat, or no ammunition, and shots are fired into their backs. The leadership in the North does not even know how many weapons it has on hand.

⁶⁰ This probably refers to North Yemen, i.e., the Yemen Arab Republic.

The situation in the North is catastrophic. And the climate is very favorable for successful intervention by external counter[revolutionary] forces.

A people's militia is now being created. But it must be done faster, and above all honest people must be appointed — at least 60 per cent must be honest. We will, of course, help. Two delegations were here about which nothing was reported. There are other delegations as well, including from Eritrea. But the delegations are absolutely incompetent.

They only say: help us — but what exactly they want, they do not know.

I sent my last message to al-Eryani⁶¹ 14 days ago — no reply.

Regarding the possibility of assistance, I said: we have no weapons and no ammunition. But we will not stay on the sidelines anyway.

Despite the fact that the population resisted the creation of an army, they did not create a militia⁶² either. I frankly wrote about everything to Nasser.

S[audi] A[rabia] is assembling units on our borders. There are training camps where forces for an invasion of the South are being prepared. I emphasized the importance of Harib⁶³ as a key position and gave orders to the troops to suppress any incursions.

We are sending people there.

Seventy-five thousand Egyptians could do nothing with these tribes⁶⁴, for whom war is life — especially with such support.



Minister of Defense.



⁶¹ Abdul Rahman al-Eryani (1910–1998) was a Yemeni political and state figure, the second President of the Yemen Arab Republic (from 5 November 1967 to 13 June 1974).



⁶² That is, the people's militia.



⁶³ Harib is a district of Marib Governorate in North Yemen.



⁶⁴ This refers to the participation of an Egyptian military contingent on the side of the republicans during the civil war in North Yemen.



















26

Уважаю, как и
 всегда уважаю.
 Мне хотелось, но
 еще не успел.
 Это мое дело.
 Оно принадлежит
 мне и моему делу.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.

27

Уважаю, как и
 всегда уважаю.
 Мне хотелось, но
 еще не успел.
 Это мое дело.
 Оно принадлежит
 мне и моему делу.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.







28


Уважаю, как и
 всегда уважаю.
 Мне хотелось, но
 еще не успел.
 Это мое дело.
 Оно принадлежит
 мне и моему делу.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.

29

Уважаю, как и
 всегда уважаю.
 Мне хотелось, но
 еще не успел.
 Это мое дело.
 Оно принадлежит
 мне и моему делу.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.
 Оно мое дело.










Psychologie in der Natur
 u. in der Geschichte
 der menschlichen Seele
 Die Seele ist unsterblich
 u. wird nach dem Tode
 in eine andere Welt
 übergeführt.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.

Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.



Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.

Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Handlungen.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Leidenschaften.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Tugenden.
 Die Seele ist die Ursache
 aller Laster.





Original paper



Lebanon, Syria, 1973

12 Oct 1973 – 14 Oct 1973 – Lebanon.

14 Oct 1973 – 20 Oct 1973 – Syria¹.

20 Oct 1973 – 24 Oct 1973 – Lebanon.

Nadim, Karim: 12 Oct 1973.

1. Never before have there been such pro-Soviet sentiments; it recalls the year 1956². “If they could, they would (...) at S(?)–6 and S(?)–7” – that is how they affectionately refer to (...). A complete collapse of all talk about: a) the source of weapons; b) alleged collusion of the superpowers during the period of détente.

2. The Iraqis, in their (Ba’athist)³ struggle with the Syrians, are watching to ensure that the more decisive word was theirs. Therefore, they are now insisting that under no circumstances and in no situation should military operations be halted.

3. The logic of events is leading to contradictions between the Egyptians and the Syrians. The Egyptians began, with the understanding of their obligation (?)

¹ These notes were made during the October War of 1973, the last major Arab–Israeli war, which took place from 6 October to 25 October 1973. During the hostilities, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and liberated part of the Sinai Peninsula, which had been occupied by Israel since 1967, while Syrian forces simultaneously launched an offensive against the Golan Heights, which Israel had also seized from Syria in 1967 during the Six-Day War. Egyptian and Syrian forces were armed mainly with Soviet weapons, and a significant portion of the command staff of both countries had been trained by Soviet instructors.

² This refers to the events of the Suez Crisis of 1956, during which Egypt was subjected to a tripartite military aggression by Great Britain, France, and Israel. A stern warning from the USSR about its readiness to intervene directly in the conflict on Egypt’s side disrupted the aggressors’ plans and forced them to withdraw. This led to a sharp rise in pro-Soviet sentiment in Arab countries, especially in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

³ At that time, two factions of the same Ba’ath Party (the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party) were in power in Syria and Iraq. Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athists competed and conflicted with one another, but in 1973 they temporarily united during the military confrontation with Israel. An Iraqi military contingent was sent to Syria and, together with Syrian forces, took part in the offensive on the Golan Heights in October 1973.

on the east bank of the S[uez] C[anal], to use it as leverage for negotiation⁴. The Syrians want to liberate the Golan Heights. The Egyptians are not in a great hurry to pull the Syrians out of their difficult situation.

4. The Palestinians are thinking about a state on the West Bank and in Gaza⁵. They want (possibly) to bring down Hussein now⁶. Previously they feared an Israeli strike; now less so. Internally, G. Habash⁷ is losing [influence] — he is passive. Hawatmeh⁸ is gaining strength. His rapprochement with Arafat⁹.

12 Oct 1973. Newspaper “An-Nahar”¹⁰. Abdel Karim Abu Nasr¹¹.

1. Confirms that our stock has risen extraordinarily — this is “your victory” (which is true, since it is a pro-Amer(ican) newspaper).

2. NB! “The Americans have realized that without you they will not now be able to do anything to resolve the conflict”. He sees a sign of this in Kissinger’s¹²

⁴ This likely refers to the fact that the Egyptian leadership (President Anwar Sadat and his inner circle), having launched an offensive operation against Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula on 6 October 1973, did not intend to develop the offensive after the successful crossing of the Suez Canal. Instead, they planned only to seize a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Canal and to use this position in subsequent negotiations with Israel mediated by the United States.

⁵ That is, the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip, which were occupied by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967.

⁶ This likely refers to King *Hussein bin Talal* of Jordan, on whose orders Jordanian forces in 1970, during the events known as “Black September”, carried out a large-scale military operation against the bases and units of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan, with the aim of destroying them and expelling them from the kingdom.

⁷ *George Habash* (nom de guerre al-Hakim; 1926–2008) was a prominent Palestinian political figure and leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a left-wing militant political organization.

⁸ This refers to *Nayef Hawatmeh* (born 1935), a prominent Palestinian political figure and leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), a left-wing Palestinian military-political organization that is part of the PLO.

⁹ *Yasser Arafat* (1929–2004) was an outstanding Palestinian political and statesman figure, leader of the Fatah movement, chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO (since 1969), and President of the State of Palestine (from 1989 to 2004).

¹⁰ An-Nahar is one of Lebanon’s leading newspapers.

¹¹ *Abd al-Karim Abu al-Nasr* (died 2022) was a well-known Lebanese journalist.

¹² *Henry Kissinger* (1923–2023) was an American statesman and diplomat who served as U.S. Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977 and as National Security Advisor to the U.S. President from 1969 to 1975.

latest statement, in which he emphasized that “the USSR is acting within the bounds of responsibility”.

3. The Egyptians and the Syrians have found, by agreement (?), that the military action must transition into the political. They will continue to control the situation in terms of how events develop. But certain differences are already present.

4. NB! The new round of military operations has struck directly and progressively at the future prestige and positions of the PLO¹³. It is bound to be the most active and most effective factor. Moreover, the Egyptians and the Syrians have shown that only they, and only by the force of regular armies, can achieve anything.

12 Oct 1973. “L’Orient-Le Jour”¹⁴. Marwan Hamadeh¹⁵.

1. The danger of the moment may come not from your friends, who now understand the necessity of coordination with you, but from S[audi] A([abia], Libya, and others, who will be putting pressure.

2. This is “your victory above all” — he repeated what Abu Nasr said. Apparently this point of view is fairly widespread.

Muhammad Odeh, 13 Oct 1973.

3. Their propaganda toward the Arab countries now resembles the onslaught of 1967. “They have become more Arab, and we have become more Jewish”.

1. (It) completely changes the situation in Egypt. He emphasized that he knows everything, since he arrived in Lebanon only on 19 September. Sadat¹⁶ used all anti-Nasserist alternatives and failed. Events have shown who was right. This is a victory for the conservative trend. A new era is awaiting Egypt. Of course, there will be no copying or repetition of Nasserism — there will be a post-Nasser period; but it will differ from Nasserism by even greater radicalism.

Bourgeois elements have lost everywhere. In the army there were two groups: Sadek¹⁷ wanted to make the army a pol[itical] instrument, march on Cairo, establish his power, and reach an agreement with the Americans. But there was another group as well. They were pushed aside even after Sadek’s removal.

¹³ The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Movement) is a collective term for all Palestinian organizations that participated in armed struggle against Israel from the 1960s through the first half of the 1980s with the aim of creating a Palestinian state.

¹⁴ L’Orient-Le Jour is a French-language Lebanese newspaper.

¹⁵ *Marwan Hamadeh* (born 1939) is a Lebanese journalist and politician who, at the time in question, worked for L’Orient-Le Jour and An-Nahar.

¹⁶ *Anwar Sadat* (1918–1981) was an Egyptian statesman and military figure, President of Egypt from 1970 to 1981.

¹⁷ *Muhammad Ahmad Sadek* (1917–1991) was an Egyptian military and political figure who served as Egypt’s Defense Minister in 1971–1972. In October 1972, following a conflict with President Anwar Sadat, he was dismissed from office.

S(...), for example, was sent as military attaché to Istanbul. These (...) and the officers believed that Egypt was capable of fighting! Now they are on top. I do not think that Sadat rules everything without restraint, that he now has unchecked power in his hands. Internally, he will look over his shoulder more and more. He believes that a group headed by Ali Sabri¹⁸ will be released from prison. He believes that, due to objective reasons, Sadat's maneuvering with the Americans has become more difficult:

a) Without us it will now be harder than before.

b) S(audi) A(rabia) has exposed itself.

The situation in relation to the Soviet Union is changing completely. Piles of lies have melted away. No one will be able to revive them anymore.

2. It should be more advantageous for Israel than for the Arabs now to accept Resolution 242¹⁹. Only in this way can they guarantee their security.

3. Libya — Qaddafi²⁰ has lost enormously, immeasurably. The future of Egypt's progressive forces is separating itself from Qaddafi, who objectively, in recent times, under conditions of Egypt's rapprochement with S[audi] A[rabia], played a progressive role. Financial ties m(ay) remain, but it will be easier to separate.

"Jeune Afrique"²¹. Barrada Hamid, 13 Oct 1973.

He has just arrived from Libya, where he met with Qaddafi. Qaddafi is in a depressed state, because he feels that events are passing him by. His statement that he is ready to support not only with money and oil, but with everything at all, is an attempt to regain lost positions. This is the best time to work with him.

¹⁸ *Ali Sabri* (1920–1991) was an Egyptian political and military figure of the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, an advocate of socialist orientation and closer ties with the USSR. He headed Egypt's General Intelligence Service in 1956–1957, served as Prime Minister of Egypt (officially, of the United Arab Republic) in 1962–1965, and as Vice President of Egypt in 1965–1968 and 1970–1971. After Nasser's death, Ali Sabri and his supporters criticized President Anwar Sadat; in May 1971 they were removed from all posts, arrested, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

¹⁹ This refers to UN Security Council Resolution No. 242, adopted on 22 November 1967 following the Six-Day War. The resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied during the conflict (i.e., East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights). Resolution 242 remains one of the principal international documents defining the principles of Middle East peace settlement.

²⁰ *Muammar Gaddafi* (1942–2011) was a prominent Libyan revolutionary, statesman, and political theorist, leader of the 1969 Libyan Revolution, and at the time Chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (de facto head of state).

²¹ *Jeune Afrique* is a French-language pan-African weekly magazine founded in Tunisia in 1960 and later published in Paris. Hamid Barrada is a well-known Moroccan journalist and political commentator.

“Al-Jumhur al-Jadid”. Farid Abu Shahla²².

1. The Saudis, due to circumstances, will now have to act more decisively (the logic of events) than before, if the United States openly begins supplying Israel with weapons.

“Al-Muharrir”, Editor-in-Chief Shafiq al-Hout²³. 13 Oct 1973.

1. At a certain stage the Palestinians could agree to the creation of a state under conditions of Israel’s existence. How else would we liberate part of our homeland? At this stage we could create a state as a base for further struggle.

Egypt and Syria began military actions after reaching an agreement with Faisal²⁴. He believes that the agreement included the oil question, but the king is not in a hurry – perhaps he is waiting for events to develop. The Egyptians are nervous. He thinks that today’s (Saturday’s) article by Hatem (?) is an indication of this – it states directly that something must be done about oil. If the king doesn’t take action, he will not be able to (...) two months’ oil reserves.

Ahmad Shukeiri²⁵, 13 Oct 1973.

Met him at [“]Al-Muharrir[”]. As I learned from Z. Mohsen²⁶, he urgently arrived from Cairo in order to “turn (?) the Palestinians toward oil”. A. Shukeiri said to me: “Obviously, now is precisely the moment – not the time, but the moment – to use such a weapon as oil”. I think, added A. Shukeiri, that circumstances will force the king to begin acting in 2–3 days.

Nayef Hawatmeh, 13 Oct 1973.

A member of the leadership of the PFLP, Saleh Raafat²⁷ (released from prison) was sent to Amman four days ago, where he met with King Hussein. Two issues: the beginning of the war and permission to return. Hussein: “The Americans told

²² Al-Jumhur al-Jadid is one of Lebanon’s leading socio-political magazines. Farid Abu Shahla is a prominent Lebanese journalist and editor-in-chief of Al-Jumhur al-Jadid, a position he inherited from his father, Michel Abu Shahla.

²³ Al-Muharrir is a Lebanese daily newspaper expressing the views of Arab nationalists. Shafiq al-Hout (1932–2009) was a Palestinian political figure, writer, and publicist, one of the founders of the PLO and its representative in Lebanon.

²⁴ *Faisal ibn Abdulaziz Al Saud* (1906–1975) was the third King of Saudi Arabia, reigning from 1964 to 1975.

²⁵ *Ahmad Shukeiri* (1908–1980) was a Palestinian political figure and the first Chairman of the PLO (1964–1967), who resigned after the Six-Day War of 1967.

²⁶ This may refer to *Zuheir Mohsen* (1936–1979), a Palestinian political figure and leader of the militant Palestinian organization al-Sa’iqa (“Lightning”), which was closely linked to the Syrian party and military-political leadership.

²⁷ Until 1974, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was known as the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Saleh Ra’afat (born 1945) is a prominent Palestinian political figure, a member of the PLO Executive Committee and of the leadership of the PDFLP.

me that in a few days the Arab and Egyptian groupings will be destroyed. Under these conditions I will not [act]. I will begin only in the event of the liberation of the Golan Heights and consolidation on the eastern bank of the canal. Without my beginning military actions, there can be no talk of permission for the Palestinians to return". (He met with Z. Mohsen and agreed on a meeting at 18:00.)

Z. Mohsen, 13 Oct 1973.

With a submachine gun, a pile of debris of a ["Phantom"] and a ["MiG"].

He is dissatisfied with the Egyptians. They are acting slowly, without taking into account what is happening on the Arab front. With regard to Hussein — Sadat and H. Assad²⁸ told him nothing. The matter was discussed only in a tentative way. Therefore, there was no firm coordination; they feared leaks.

13 Oct 1973.

Second meeting with N. Hawatmeh — basement, doors barricaded. A political settlement after the fighting. At present, the response is under way with the aim of liberating the occupied territories, possibly creating a state — he and Abu Ammar²⁹ are in favor. It will play (?) a relative role in connection with the events; therefore it is very important to have a constructive program.

14 Oct 1973. Met with D[eputy] Prime Minister Khaddam³⁰. Basement of the MFA — tired, somewhat depressed.

1. The best prospects are with us.

2. Jordan has weakened itself. Sending a brigade was a move. It did not even take up positions.

3. Attitudes toward Egypt changed after the start of the offensive in Sinai that began on the morning of the 14th.

4. Libya has given (t[urned] to us) + all oil and food for the army and 20 million dollars.

15 Oct 1973. Meeting with Khaled Fahoum³¹.

1. A ceasefire and political settlement are needed.

2. The Palestinians are divided into two parts. He himself is for the "Hussein Plan". Syria is too. Assad told him many times that after liberation of the territo-

²⁸ *Hafez al-Assad* (1930–2000) was a Syrian statesman, politician, and military figure, President of Syria from 1971 to 2000.

²⁹ One of Yasser Arafat's pseudonyms.

³⁰ *Abdul Halim Khaddam* (1932–2020) was a Syrian statesman and politician, Vice President of Syria from 1984 to 2005, and a member of President Hafez al-Assad's inner circle. From 1970 to 1984, he served as Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic and also held the post of Deputy Prime Minister.

³¹ *Khaled al-Fahoum* (1923–2006) was a Palestinian political figure, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, and Chairman of the Palestinian National Council.

ries, autonomy within Jordan should be eliminated. In his assessment, the majority of the Palestinian people think so. Arafat and Riyadh (?) are for a separate state.

15 Oct 1973. Meeting with Hussein Uweidat.

Came out of the Council of Ministers bunker, tired, drinking vitamin “C” in large doses.

1. The plan — to take K.

2. With Iraq — a new alignment of forces. The Right here are afraid — hence the exaggeration of assistance from reactionary regimes and forces and the downplaying of Iraqi assistance.

The problem of the presence of Iraqi troops — the position of Iraq — political settlement.

16 Oct 1973. Khaled Bakdash³².

He listens, asks; he needs it himself. Himself.

a) Anti-extremism is necessary.

b) They did not even use this period for a joint statement. Two groups issued/will issue statements (?) The Turki (?) group issued its own.

23 Oct 1973. Meeting with Arafat.

In Sidon. The driver is checked. A group of fighters. One has a very familiar face, gray eyes, speaks English well. Everyone treats him with respect. “Arab countries always sell us out”. At that time a broadcast of “Radio Peace” off the coast of Cyprus. A pilot (...) who flew to Cairo during the “Six-Day War”. The broadcast is against militaristic elements on both sides.

“I never believe the Zionists. It is they who are trying to demobilize the Arabs”. Arafat arrived. As always, a warm meeting (Kolotusha V.M.³³ was with me).

1. Only for (the creation of) a state. No one and nothing will force us again to go under the authority of those Bedouins tied to American and British imperialism (West Bank, Gaza, Ha(?)). The issue of a corridor³⁴.

2. They can participate in negotiations. It would be good if we were the ones inviting them. But justification for the invitation is needed: either UN resolutions, or at least wording from the joint statement of L. I. Brezhnev and Nixon.

3. Coordination of positions.

³² This likely refers to *Khaled Bagdash* (1912–1995), a Syrian political figure and leader of the Syrian Communist Party from 1937 to 1995.

³³ *Vasily Ivanovich Kolotusha* (1941–2020) was a Soviet and Russian diplomat, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Lebanon (1986–1990) and to Morocco (1992–1999). At the time in question, he was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Lebanon.

³⁴ This likely refers to the issue of the possible creation of a land corridor between the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip.

4. He will never allow anti-Sovietism.

5. He referred me to our previous conversation (November 1972), when I asked him to retrospectively speak about mistakes or missteps. Then Arafat acknowledged insufficient flexibility during the “Rogers Plan”³⁵. As a result — during Black September³⁶ the Palestinians had no Egyptian support (literally “rear” — *Editor*).

“We will not repeat the mistakes”.

Assessment of the situation — “military incompetence of the Egyptians and Syrians”.

23 Oct 1973. Meeting with Habash³⁷ in Beirut.

Again he speaks about “the masses”. I interrupt. Revolutionary romanticism and revolutionary realism. Me: “I greatly respect, revere, and consider Che Guevara a hero, but he did not make a revolution in Bolivia”. He defines his position:

a) against the resolution;

b) against anti-Sovietism;

c) on political settlement there is still no decision. They are interested either in handing the West Bank over to the bourgeoisie (this after I proposed a bet that the Palestinians would participate and he would remain on the sidelines), or in taking into account the PLO, or in disrupting it.

He promised that the leadership would consider my arguments and proposals. He said: “You together — you, the USSR — have a broader outlook”.

23 Oct 1973. Met again with Hawatmeh.

An even better impression. Papers pressed down by a pistol. Cultured faces all around.

a) The leaders of Egypt and Syria are already lying about us. On the eve, Sadat invited Abu Ayad³⁸ and said: “The Soviet Union imposed the ceasefire”. The Syrians. A delegation (?) — Assad is preparing to present criticism.

³⁵ The “Rogers Plan” refers to the framework proposed by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers in 1969–1971 to end hostilities in the Arab–Israeli conflict following the Six-Day War of 1967. The plan envisaged the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula occupied in 1967 and mutual commitments by Israel and Egypt to maintain a ceasefire and peaceful relations. The plan was effectively rejected by Israel.

³⁶ This refers to the events of “Black September” in Jordan in 1970.

³⁷ That is, with George Habash, leader of the PFLP.

³⁸ More precisely, *Abu Iyad*. His real name was Salah Khalaf (1933–1991), known as Abu Iyad, a Palestinian political and military figure, one of the founders of Fatah, and a close associate of Yasser Arafat.

1. Tlass³⁹ spoke before the National Council the day before, where he showed on a map what would happen — said (...) asked whether there was confidence that the issue (...) would be supported. They agreed with (?) on timing.

2. (...) — if we do not finish it, our children will. Any regime that — even if reactionary — does this will be better than us (the liberation of the occupied territories).

Complex 1. 12(th?), 13(th?) (...) a message — the same by all chiefs (?) (buzaat — ?) to exert pressure on (the) 1(st). He himself agrees to also (...) the message. They began on the morning of the 14th.

Complex 2 — “crisis”. He called, saying he was ready (...) weapons, issues (...) — better himself — to you (...).

Somewhat depressed — we will go out into the streets ourselves.

11. (...) Iraqi (...).

Complex 3. When a brigade⁴⁰ arrived near Daraa⁴¹ — the commander said: I have no orders. Assad: let them clear out. The king received a representative and assured that they were fully subordinate to Syrian command. Arafat told me: in the [Jordanian] brigade 3 people were killed, yet they speak of losses and heroic actions — Assad is completely silent about the Palestinians. Budeiri (general)⁴²: Arafat did not even call us in Syria.

12. How Israeli propaganda is changing.

The first days — total bravado (M. Odeh: This (...) us into the Six-Day War). Then: a knot/junction at Damascus — 20 km.

Tlass then (...) on the 14th said 40 km — and this after so many declared offensives.

On the 14th a radio broadcast for internal use: radio program “with a microphone across the country”: “We have become more restrained. This is reflected both in communiqués and in reports from the field. A psychological restructuring is taking place. We were programmed for a lightning war and a quick victory. This is not like what happened before. When we ourselves began and assessed the enemy. We underestimated the fact that they could operate complex types

³⁹ *Mustafa Tlass* (1932–2017) was a Syrian statesman and military figure who served as Minister of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic from 22 March 1972 to 12 May 2004.

⁴⁰ This likely refers to Jordan’s 40th Armored Brigade. In 1973, after the outbreak of the October War, the brigade was sent to the Syrian front and played an important role in the fighting.

⁴¹ This likely refers to the city of Daraa in southern Syria.

⁴² This may refer to General *Musbeh al-Budeiri*, who commanded a Syrian-controlled brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army.

of weapons”. Press conference by Meir⁴³ — completely unlike what it was before (on the 14th). Then on the 14th: we, (she) said, have fulfilled [our tasks]. Here on the northern front:

1. We pushed them off the Golan Heights (and crushed them, and smashed them, even threw them back. — E.).

2. We weakened the enemy, his military power, and

3. advanced in the direction of Damascus.

The main goal of the war is to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy’s military force. This is easier to declare than, say, the seizure of territory — if it does not work out, then in the second case no one will be misled.

Israel, for the first time during the war, announced the numbers of killed and wounded; the figures are small, in my view. Obviously, this was done in order to relieve internal pressure — understated figures. At the same time Dayan⁴⁴ said that there are 440 Arab prisoners and that there will be exchanged — also to calm things down. Neither G.⁴⁵, nor Dayan in fact said anything about American assistance.

Attacks against the S[oviet] Union from G. Meir.

On the 16th, a session of the Knesset.

Opening it, the speaker speaks of a “treacherous aggressor who invaded the territory of our country”. G. Meir: “This war was imposed on us”, we did not want it (one could imagine that [they] cut off smth(?) from the history of Palest[in]e(?), but the matter concerns only events beginning on 6 October 1973). Again and again, it was the Arabs who acted first (Abba Eban⁴⁶, leaving on the 13th for a rally in New York, said that in general this affair was needed by the Arabs — after all, negotiations were supposed to take place in November). An interesting move — about borders.

Obviously, in order to deflect criticism of previous policy, Meir demagogically declared: “Can you imagine what it would have been like if we had had to repel the blow under the conditions of the old June 1967 borders”.

Arafat, 23 Oct 1973.

There must be either a UN resolution or the B[rezhnev]–Nixon wording. A pretext is needed.

Iraq is a special case.

⁴³ *Golda Meir* (born Golda Mabovitch; 1898–1978) was an Israeli political and stateswoman, the fourth Prime Minister of Israel (1969–1974).

⁴⁴ *Moshe Dayan* (1915–1981) was an Israeli military and political figure who served as Israel’s Minister of Defense from 1967 to 1974.

⁴⁵ This likely refers to *Golda Meir*.

⁴⁶ *Abba Eban* (1915–2002) was an Israeli statesman and political figure who served as Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1966 to 1974.

Egypt, N[orth] Africa, S[audi] Arabia must make efforts.

He promised not to take rash steps or make rash stat[ements]. He struck out two-thirds of the draft in order to put the PLO in a dif[ficult] pos[ition] – the beginning of its movement in 1965 – and then included the rights of the Pales[stinian] people.

We will not accept a variant when we return to Hussein⁴⁷. Even if for this reason we all become [in his eyes] terrorists. No one will force us to return under the authority of Bedouins connected with (...).

For a state. The very least we can accept is the West Bank, Gaza, and Galilee. And even that would require conducting a poll within the PLO. If, however, [...] all the wavering ones receive support – the people want to obtain something.

We have no decision on the question of participation in negotiations. Our formula is – either they invite us or they will wait– for what? Or so as to invite us again. They are taking us into account.

Agreed positions before [a meeting] with us.

A big mistake.

There is no d[oubt] that they will try to place responsibility. This comes from the top leadership of Egypt and Syria.

A firm position against.

But the popular masses – HIMSELF will decide – we will not change (...). How quickly withdrawals will take place. In Egypt and Syria the regimes are under threat of collapse.

Junior officers.

From the very beginning of the military actions there was a plot aimed at strangling the PLO.

The Jordanian brigade lost three men – “such courage”! We understand what price [...] and the establishment of peace entails. We are expecting trouble in Lebanon.

1. Do you intend to participate in negotiations?

2. Your mood – what exactly will you support: a) Palestinian state; b) autonomy in Jordan; c) ?

3. Who will participate?

4. Who will support you within the PLO?



5. Which Arab countries do you intend to rely on?



6. What forms of communication and armament?



How do you intend to oppose anti-Soviet tendencies?



Have you informed Cairo of (...) and what was Sadat’s reaction?


⁴⁷ This refers to King *Hussein bin Talal* of Jordan.


















Сборник вещей

1. Не забыть, что не забыть...
 2. ...
 3. ...
 4. ...
 5. ...
 6. ...
 7. ...

Сборник вещей, которые
 надо иметь с собой в поездку.
 1. ...
 2. ...
 3. ...
 4. ...
 5. ...
 6. ...
 7. ...

1. ...
 2. ...
 3. ...
 4. ...
 5. ...
 6. ...
 7. ...

1. ...
 2. ...
 3. ...
 4. ...
 5. ...
 6. ...
 7. ...
-
1. ...
 2. ...



Original paper



Lebanon, Syria, 1976

Damascus (*underlined by the author*).

6 April 1976.

H. Fahoum¹.

1. The situation in Lebanon. Arafat and Abu Ayad² arrived and reached an agreement with Assad³. On Friday (in two weeks) to convene parliament. The next day – Frangieh's⁴ abdication. Everything seemed to be working. Frangieh agreed.

But suddenly Aziz Ahdab⁵ [spoke out]. Fatah is behind him – I am sure. The h[ead] of the security service, Abu Hasan⁶ (Hammali(?), was in Moscow in 1972), personally escorted him to the radio station. Later Z. Mohsen (Sa'iq)⁷ circulated among the cadres of his organization a statement accusing Fatah of conspiring with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Fatah found out. A fight broke out.

¹ *Khaled al-Fahoum* was Chairman of the Palestinian National Council.

² More precisely, *Abu Iyad*.

³ That is, with the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, *Hafez al-Assad*.

⁴ *Suleiman Frangieh* (1910–1992) was a Lebanese statesman who served as President of Lebanon from 1970 to 1976. He was the head of the influential Maronite Frangieh political family.

⁵ On 11 March 1976, against the backdrop of the escalating Lebanese Civil War, Brigadier General Aziz al-Ahdab of the Lebanese Army attempted an unsuccessful coup d'état. In a radio address, he demanded the resignation of President Suleiman Frangieh and the government, calling for early presidential elections. However, his appeal was not supported by the Lebanese Army command, and the coup failed.

⁶ *Abu Hasan* most likely refers to *Ali Hassan Salameh* (1941–1979), known by the nom de guerre Abu Hassan, a prominent figure in Fatah and the PLO and considered one of the leaders of the “Black September” organization. He was assassinated in Beirut in 1979 in an operation carried out by Israeli intelligence services.

⁷ *Zubair Mohsen* (1936–1979) was a Palestinian political figure and leader of the militant Palestinian organization al-Sa'iq (“Lightning”), which was created in 1966 with the support of the ruling Ba'ath Party in Syria.

There is other evidence as well that Fatah favors the continuation of bloodshed in Lebanon.

“Yarmouk”⁸ is subordinate to Arafat. The Egyptian brigade that arrived in Lebanon (subordinate to Egypt). They take the main part in the fighting on Jumblatt’s⁹ side, not his militia. Meanwhile, the fire does not cease.

2. Why Arafat? Syria — its prestige has fallen. It does not want to bind itself. There is no unity in Fatah — not everything is under control. It does not want to associate itself with a “capitulationist narrative”.

3. What is everyone seeking in Lebanon? All Arab countries are against the former situation (before the events in Lebanon) for various reasons. [For] the USA the main thing is [to work] toward a split between Syria and the PRM¹⁰, and within the PRM itself. The questions of Am[erican] journalists are identical: why the PLO leadership is not re-elected, why the PLO Nat[ional] Council is not convened. Another direction — a moderated¹¹ leadership on the West Bank¹². The PLO is weakly connected to the events taking place there. The Sov[iet] Union needs to tell the op[posing] forces to stop escalating the situation in Lebanon. Then + the Palestinians [could come out] against Sadat, having freed themselves.

4. He acknowledged that Syria, in coordination with the USA, introduced troops into Lebanon. He also referred to the Fr[ench] ambassador

⁸ The Yarmouk Brigade was a combat unit within the Palestine Liberation Army, established in 1970 with Syrian involvement. During the Lebanese Civil War, it was effectively subordinate to Syrian command.

⁹ *Kamal Jumblatt* (1917–1977) was a Lebanese politician and thinker, founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and leader of Lebanon’s Druze community. He held leftist views and, in the early period of the Lebanese Civil War, aligned with other left-wing forces in Lebanon and with the PLO against the militias of the right-wing nationalist Kataeb Party and its allies, who in 1976 formed the Lebanese Front coalition.

¹⁰ PRM (Palestinian Resistance Movement) is a collective term for Palestinian organizations — both within and outside the PLO — that participated in armed struggle against Israel with the aim of realizing the Palestinians’ right to national self-determination and the creation of a Palestinian state in Pales.

¹¹ “moderate”.

¹² That is, in the West Bank of the Jordan River, which was occupied by Israel in 1967.

Fernand Rouyon (?) (former h[ead] of the Middle East Department of the French Foreign Ministry).

5. Egypt. A 20-year-old officer arrived. An argument with Ga(...) at the base. Heikal¹³ — a conversation with Sadat at the beginning of the year. “No, I am not claiming your place, Mr. President”. [President of Egypt] can only be an officer.

Beirut.

4 April 1976.

Naif Hawatmeh, Abed Rabbo, Abu-Leila¹⁴.

After 22 January a radical shift in the balance of forces. On 16 October 1975 there was a meeting between H. Assad and the Amer[i-can] ambassador in Damascus, where for the first time the USA [declared] support for [Syria’s actions in Lebanon] (this was said by H. Assad to the Pales-tinian leaders). They asked for the time being not to introduce reg[ular] units. After 22 January — a ceasefire, the final collapse and decomposition of the Lebanese army.

The influence of events on the army turned out to be somewhat de-layed. The greater part of the army is on the side of the progressive forces. The progressive forces¹⁵ > and this led to the fact that they strength-ened their demands compared to the Syrian mission. They were right. But parallel to this, Egypt, S[audi] A[rabia], and the right wing of the Pales-tinians [are striving] to pit the left forces against Syria.

11 March — a coup for this purpose.

The left managed to block such a development of events (together with Jumblatt).

At this moment two forces manifested themselves: the progressive forc-es, to go beyond the limits of changes in the Syrian mission, and Syria, in coordination with the Americans, to freeze [the conflict].

¹³ *Mubammad Hassanein Heikal* (1923–2016) was a leading Egyptian journalist, best known as editor-in-chief of *Al-Ahram* (1957–1974). He was regarded as a close as-sociate and friend of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1974, during the presiden-cy of Anwar Sadat, whose policies he opposed, he left his position at *Al-Ahram*.

¹⁴ *Yasser Abd Rabbo* (born 1944) is a senior Palestinian political figure and a mem-ber of the PLO Executive Committee. At the time in question, he was a member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the second most influential figure in the organization after Nayef Hawatmeh. Abu Layla refers to Qais Abd al-Karim (party pseudonym Abu Layla), a Palestinian political figure and Deputy Secretary-General of the DFLP.

¹⁵ “Progressive forces” refers to the bloc of “National-Patriotic Forces” (NPF) led by Kamal Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, acting in alliance with the PLO against the Kataeb Party and its allies.

The progressive forces are [conducting] operations in mountainous Lebanon. Syria's reaction — political and military, (...) (the ports of Tripoli, Sidon, (...)). Syria agreed with the Americans on intervention to return to what existed before 22 January, but the internal balance of forces has already changed! The Americans — Ford¹⁶, Ki (...) ¹⁷ and others — constantly emphasized the agreement with Syria on a “constructive role and limits”.

Brown¹⁸ proposed that Jumblatt act as a mediator between the left and the Syrians, stressing that the general line between the USA and the Syrians was agreed.

1. One cannot take the balance of forces in the country outside the framework of the Middle East crisis, the situation in the Arab world and in the world in general.

2. Where is the main enemy?

3. Who are the allies?

4. What do the Americans want?

5. The PRM — with all its forces — supports the progressive parties?

Two days ago there was a meeting of Khaddam¹⁹ with members of the Political Bureau of the DFLP²⁰ — the Syrian troops will not go further. Assad as well. How events develop further — this will determine how the Syrian troops will be used.

At present: the essence of the struggle between the progressive forces headed by Jumblatt and the Syrians is who will establish military control. Because whoever establishes it will lead the settlement and ensure the restoration of state institutions, including the army.

The Syrians want the election of such a [Lebanese] president who would immediately turn to Damascus with a proposal to provide troops to ensure the construction of new state institutions.

Brown: Jumblatt rejected the American proposal for cooperation. Then the USA began to feed Jumblatt the idea of using Syrian-Arab troops, since Syria had compromised itself.

¹⁶ *Gerald Ford* was President of the United States from 1974 to 1977.

¹⁷ This may refer to *Henry Kissinger* (1923–2023), U.S. Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.

¹⁸ *Lewis Dean Brown* (1920–2001) was an American diplomat who in 1976 served as President Gerald Ford's special envoy for the settlement of the Lebanese crisis.

¹⁹ *Abdul Halim Khaddam* (1932–2020) was a Syrian statesman and politician who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic from 1970 to 1984.

²⁰ The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) changed its name in 1974 to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

Jumblatt insists on using mixed Lebanese [forces] and the PRM.

Positions:

Egypt, S[audi] A[rabia], Iraq — striving to weaken Syria's influence in Lebanon. Ready to support American proposals if Arab troops are also sent to Lebanon. Sadat declared readiness.

In the initial contacts Brown let Jumblatt understand that the USA was ready to support > [more] than the Syrian mission. They wanted all sides to get bogged down and then to play!

In recent days Jumblatt has begun to understand that the Americans are using him. This manifested itself in conversations with him over the last two days. Until recently J[umblatt] believed that the actions of the Syrians, coordinated with the Americans, were supported by the USSR. Now he has begun to move away [from this point of view].

After the meeting with Soldatov²¹, Jumblatt is in a state that disposes him to accept the advice of the USSR. An increasing interest in the USSR's position, in its ability to normalize his relations with Syria.

The French have become convinced that the American game leaves no room for a French game. Gorse²² proposed to Jumblatt a round table in Paris for all Lebanese forces. He said he would discuss this with Damascus and the right-wing Christian leadership.

But we do not think that [this plan] will be accepted by the right-wing Christian parties, which, feeling their relative weakness, cling to the Syrians, the Americans, etc.

Proceeding from this, we consider it necessary to have an effective Soviet presence from positions of support for the Lebanese progressive forces. Abd Rabbo.

The Syrians believe that if they manage to establish control over Lebanon and the PLO, they will use this as a trump card.

They have been behaving in Lebanon this way for six months as if there is no internal struggle here.

1. Externally Syria is involved, and 2) the conclusion — everything is bad for Syria — it is in an American mousetrap.

Hence the compromise.

²¹ *Aleksander Alekseevich Soldatov* (1915–1999) was a Soviet statesman and diplomat who served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to Lebanon from 1974 to 1986.

²² *Georges Gorse* (1915–2002) was a French politician and diplomat; in 1976 he served as a special envoy to Lebanon for the settlement of the Lebanese crisis.

The Syrians tasked Hussein²³ in the USA to convince the Americans to allow Syria to introduce troops.

How to save Syria? How to prevent a direct clash between Syria and the progressive forces and the PRM?

Saeb Salam²⁴ met with Dean Brown and said to him: you managed to kill two birds with one stone. Answer: he laughed for two minutes without stopping. The Syrians will not be able to exit without adopting compromise decisions. How to achieve this?

The DFLP did not follow in the footsteps of Jumblatt and Arafat. We show flexibility.

Arafat began to act together with Syria when S[audi] A[rabia] drew closer to Syria.

a) Sett[lement] in Lebanon in accord[ance] with minimal (...) demands – not the whole program, but only

b) agreement on a common candidate.

c) After achieving [a settlement] – restoration of the Lebanese [state] apparatus through agreement among internal forces.

The PRM and Syria could provide assistance, but not replace this apparatus with their presence.

Whatever Jumblatt says, he can give consent to this plan. But the Syrians do not want to accept it.

It is possible that in the PRM there are circles that are interested in Syria falling into American nets, in order to justify themselves in the future when they act in the same direction.

Abu-Leila.

For Syria not to go down Sadat's path is the main condition for preserving the independence of the PRM.

Hawatmeh.

We sharply opposed Arafat's attempts to use Egypt and S[audi] A[rabia] against Syria. We also openly opposed Jumblatt, who in his struggle against Syria is trying to use the same thing.

²³ This refers to the visit of King Hussein of Jordan to the United States, which took place from 29 March to 1 April 1976.

²⁴ *Saeb Salam* (1905–2000) was an influential Lebanese politician and one of the informal leaders of Lebanon's Sunni community. He served as Prime Minister of Lebanon in 1952, 1953, 1960–1961, and 1970–1973. During the civil war, he carried out mediation missions.

It is necessary to meet with Gemayel, Frangieh²⁵, etc.

14 April 1976.

Halim Dibbs.

Three main sections — within them one can concentrate everything that is being discussed.

1. The program on the basis of which the crisis should be resolved. Three variants (the Syrian compromise).

2. The president.

3. Security.

Four positions: a) accept the Syrian solution; b) an Arab–Syrian solution; c) an international solution; d) a Lebanese solution.

The Lebanese Communist Party²⁶ has no illusions that the fourth will win, but they put it forward in order to hinder the other solutions. Undoubtedly, it is impossible to resolve the security problem without cooperation with the Syrians.

The Soviet Union must play its role — more actively than ever before.

Jumblatt:

There are two forces that can force the Syrians to leave Lebanon. Jumblatt said (...) that it would be very useful if the USSR were to send its representative to Lebanon.

Fatah.

17 April 1976.

Helicopter.

Pierre Gemayel:

1. We do not want to be enemies of the USSR; we strive for friendship with you.

We believe that Lebanon should have friendly relations with both the USA and the USSR.

2. We are not against the Palestinian guerrilla struggle. But we cannot give up part of our sovereignty to them.

We have signed agreements with Arafat many times, but not for a single day were they ever observed. Arafat is the closest to us and we could understand each other. But the PRM is not united.

There was a situation in which Lebanon had a Lebanese government and five Palestinian-Lebanese armies²⁷, and five other armies. Zones were

²⁵ This likely refers to the Kataeb Party leader Pierre Gemayel and Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh.

²⁶ The Lebanese Communist Party was founded in 1924. During the civil war, it acted as an ally of the PSP and the PLO.

²⁷ This likely refers to the militias of various political forces during the civil war.

created that were no longer subordinate either to the Lebanese or to the Palestinian authorities.

Such criminals as Carlos²⁸ and those who killed King Faisal²⁹ were with us.

3. What needs to be done. The building is on fire. First the fire must be extinguished, and only then can there be a settlement. The greatest service you can render to this unfortunate country is to help put out the fire. And then we will be open to any discussions.

4. How to finish. 1 there must be one authority, one government. Influence the Palestinians, tell them that nothing can be achieved by chaos and aggression. This is not needed by them or by us.

We have the Cairo Agreement³⁰; it must be implemented. At one time we were against the Cairo Agreement, which gave Israel a pretext to strike us. Now we agree — let Arafat respect this agreement.

5. We have fully accepted the Damascus Agreement³¹.

6. We are ready to dissolve our militia if there is a force capable of protecting us.

7. We first wanted the Arab League to take up our affairs. After the League refused, Syria extended its hand to us. At first we were afraid. After a four-hour conversation with Assad, I understood that he is an honest man. Everyone advised us, but the only force that intervened was Syria.

He praises Sadat, who does not meddle in Lebanon and is dealing with Egyptian affairs.

17.

Member of the P[olitical] B[ureau] of the Kataeb, K. Pakradouni³².

²⁸ This refers to Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, known as Carlos the Jackal (born 1949), a notorious left-wing international terrorist of Venezuelan origin. At the time described, he cooperated with the PFLP.

²⁹ This refers to King *Faisal II* of Iraq, who was killed in Baghdad in 1958 by revolutionary officers during the coup d'état.

³⁰ The Cairo Agreement was concluded in November 1969 between the PLO leadership and the command of the Lebanese Army, with mediation by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The agreement effectively placed Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon under the military-political control of the PLO and allowed PLO fighters to conduct armed struggle against Israel from Lebanese territory in exchange for the Palestinians' commitment not to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs.

³¹ This refers to the ceasefire agreement between the opposing sides in Lebanon, concluded in January 1976 with mediation by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

³² *Karim Pakradouni* (born 1944) is a Lebanese politician of Armenian origin. At the time described, he was a member of the senior leadership of the Kataeb Party and advocated overcoming Lebanon's political crisis through cooperation with Arab states.

1. Full contact with Syria.
2. Arafat wanted to org[anise] a meeting.
3. An agreement with Syria.

17 April 1976.

Jumblatt.

Arafat informed him that they had secretly adopted two principles: withdrawal³³ and the free choice of the [Lebanese] president. We have no trust whatsoever in the Syrians.

The people are dissatisfied with them.

P[erhaps] they are even giving weapons to the other side.

The problem will be discussed in the Arab League at the initiative of Iraq and S[audi] A[rabia], which are also very angered by the actions of the Syrians in Lebanon.

The Americans have changed their position. At first — to help Syria. Now Brown has taken an independent position. The USA exerted pressure on Syria, Sa'iq³⁴, and Frangieh. We managed to present our position to them in a good light. France has also taken a strong position against the Syrian attack (...).

Toubou.

Abu Ammar³⁵ is pleased.

USA Sarkis.

Syria³⁶

He is for R. Eddé³⁷.

If Syria were at least neutral, we could wage a people's liberation war in this country and within three months be in power.

The French representative proposed a "round table" in Paris — p[erhaps] a good idea!

³³ This may refer to the withdrawal from Lebanon of units of the Palestine Liberation Army that were effectively under Syrian control.

³⁴ That is, the Syrian-controlled Palestinian organization al-Sa'iq.

³⁵ *Abu Ammar* is the party pseudonym of *Yasser Arafat*.

³⁶ This scheme may be interpreted as support by both the United States and Syria for the candidacy of the moderate Maronite politician Elias Sarkis in the forthcoming presidential elections of the Lebanese Republic. Elias Sarkis (1924–1985) was elected President of Lebanon in September 1976 and served until 22 September 1982.

³⁷ *Raymond Eddé* (1913–2000) was an influential Lebanese Maronite politician and leader of the National Bloc Party. A committed Lebanese nationalist, he opposed both Palestinian and Syrian interference in Lebanon's affairs. During the civil war, he was the only major Lebanese politician who consistently maintained neutrality and preserved good relations with political figures from both opposing camps.

“The Soviet Union was absent. It would be important to send a Sov[iet] representative to Damascus. You must not abandon us”.

He denied that he had spoken with Brown about pol[itical] matters — he is lying.

We prefer Arab forces to Syrian ones.

P[erhaps] Mahmoud Riad³⁸ [will organize] a meeting between him and the Gemayels³⁹.

Sadat speaks ind[irect]ly.

Assad is against the LCP [and] Jumblatt and will work against them. Assad argued with Hawatmeh about the role of S[audi] A[rabia].

1. The Syrians are not ready to go beyond the Frangieh document. Therefore, discussion must be continued after the election of a new president.

2. They are not ready to reach agreement with Jumblatt et al. regarding the person of the new president.

Assad noted that the Kataeb supports [this], while Chamoun⁴⁰ does not yet. Since the Syrians are not ready, Syria will continue its line, and the progressive forces and the PRM let them go their own way. But Assad said that Edde will not pass.

Sarkis — the most likely president?

3. Syrian troops.

It is clear that the Syrians are not insisting on retaining or advancing the troops.

H. Assad is not pressing very hard. At the same time Hikmat Shihabi⁴¹ [believes] that they should remain.

The decision: they remain on the same line as now. On the other hand, the three-[party] committee is being revived. It will have everything at its disposal (after Syrian troops).

³⁸ *Mahmoud Riad* (1917–1992) was an Egyptian diplomat who served as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States from 1972 to 1979. In 1976, during the Lebanese Civil War, he undertook mediation efforts in support of deploying an Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

³⁹ That is, with the leaders of the Kataeb Party, Pierre Gemayel and his son Bashir Gemayel.

⁴⁰ *Camille Chamoun* (1900–1987) was a Lebanese politician and statesman who served as President of Lebanon from 1952 to 1958. During the Lebanese Civil War, he was one of the leading Maronite figures of the right-wing nationalist camp and founder and leader of the right-centrist National Liberal Party.

⁴¹ *Hikmat al-Shihabi* (1931–2013) was a Syrian general who served as Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces from 1974 to 1998.

The committee's mandate — until the [election] of a new president. It will also decide whether Syrian troops will be used (this ...).

4. Assad agreed to the creation of an ind[ependent] consortium for reviving the Lebanese economy. But he is against the arrival of U.S. experts or foreign troops (also an undeclared point). On the declared points — all are against a resumption of hostilities and are ready to use force against those who start them (perhaps this is a step forward in defusing relations between Assad and the Leb[anese] left).

5. Discussion of the point on American intervention. Shihabi and Naji Jamil⁴² — favor a general formulation. Hawatmeh and Abu Saleh very clearly [against]. Assad asked: do you want to draw Syria into a clash with the Americans? H[awatmeh]: we want the road into the Am[erican] trap to be closed before each of us. After Assad agreed, Arafat was against it.

A discussion between Hawatmeh and Abu Ammar: they argued for 45 min[utes].

This is also a certain step forward toward a unified platform.

6. Against Arab or intern[ational] troops. The Syrians welcomed this. Abu Ammar was against it (on the question of rejecting Arabization). This is connected with his contacts with Egypt, Iran, and S[audi] A[rabia] on Lebanese affairs. He immediately sent his representatives to various Arab countries to explain.

Assessment: DFLP.

1. A step forward in freezing the struggle between Syria, the PRM, and the nat[ional] forces.

2. A step forward in unifying the actions of Syria and the PRM.

3. A step forward in weakening Syrian–American contacts.

4. On the path toward military détente.

But it did not solve the problems.

After the election of the [Lebanese] president, the struggle will take on sharp forms.

The camp[aign] of attacks has been halted until the election of the new president.

⁴² *Naji Jamil* (1932–2014) was a Syrian military and political figure, a close associate of President Hafez al-Assad, and Commander of the Syrian Air Force from 1971 to 1976. In addition, from 1970 to 1978 he headed the National Security Bureau, coordinating the activities of Syrian intelligence services. At the time described, he was one of the key figures in Syria's military-security apparatus and a member of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party.

Why was it possible to achieve this? At the first stage the USA dangled promises before the Syrians.

In Assad's latest speech and in the gov[ernment] statement – not a word about the USA.

The Syrians need to be encouraged and the disagreements intensified. Assad quoted Kiss[inger], who said that the USA plays the main role – “now”, Assad added, “they are playing the full role”.

A situation has taken shape. It is necessary to speak with Assad in concrete, clear language.

The tactic is that now, before the elections, to draw the conclusion that a single candidate has been [agreed upon] Jumblatt is against it. The new president: to legalize the presence of the troops – advise this and act accordingly.

8 April 1976.

Br(...)⁴³.

1. We are ready to fight in the streets of Beirut for Damascus.

2. Against Jumblatt – even by arm[ed] force. Behind them – Sadat. We intercepted weapons. And if the PRM [supports Jumblatt]? [In that case] we will not consider them Palestinians.

3. The war in Lebanon is “dirty”. We gave weapons both to Jumblatt and to the LCP. Those who oriented us incorrectly will be tried in Damascus. To the clarifying question: whom – people from your leadership, or Ba’athists in Lebanon? – both.

4. With the USA – a fragile glass vessel – policy must be flexible, but strategically opposed. The main thing is trust in us. Brown has already been in Damascus.

5. And Israel? – let it be. And [if] it occupies [part of Lebanese territory] – let it. It is worse if there are anti-Syrian establishments throughout Lebanon.

6. With the SCP. They did not send Bagdash⁴⁴, because there are two communist parties.

1. The Syrians intervened when the PRM and the left could come under attack; a power vacuum, the army disintegrated. Pal[estinian] brigades were introduced – support for a sector of the Syrian army.

⁴³ Judging by the context, this may refer to a representative of Syrian state structures.

⁴⁴ *Khaled Bagdash* (1912–1995) was a Syrian politician of Kurdish origin and leader of the Syrian Communist Party from 1936 to 1995.

2. Frangieh⁴⁵ was summoned to Damascus. 17 points. A secret agreement on dismissing from the army all > [officers above the rank of] brigadier to preserve its unity and restructure it, and on amnesty for those who deserted from it.

3. The army leadership learned of this and decided to act > [faster] than Frangieh. Boustany⁴⁶ and others — known for pro-American sentiments.

4. In parallel, another process — Arafat feared the strengthening of army control. He contacted Cairo — asked to send a brigade of Pal[estinians] in order somehow to “balance” the situation⁴⁷. And with S[audi] [Arabia], and with Iraq. Here a convergence of approaches between Fatah and the PFLP began to occur.

5. At the same time Frangieh was sinking, which caused concern and made Damascus nervous. Another issue that caused nervousness was the fear that the situation would get out of control. Khatib⁴⁸ was strengthening — Fatah was behind him. They proposed in an ultimatum form that Khatib surrender either to Frangieh or to the Syrian command.

6. At this time Ahdab⁴⁹ appeared on the scene. He tried beforehand to contact the Syrians — they rejected him. Behind him — Fatah, S[audi] A[rabia], Egypt. Abu Hasan (Hammaki) — h[ead] of Fatah intelligence — brought him to the radio station.

7. The Syrian mission [in Lebanon] came under attack. The Syrians.





⁴⁵ That is, *Suleiman Frangieh*, President of Lebanon.

⁴⁶ This likely refers to *Emile Boustany* (1909–2002), a Lebanese general who served as Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces from 1965 to 1970. In 1973, amid suspicions of involvement in a corruption scandal, he fled to Syria, where he was granted political asylum.

⁴⁷ That is, Syrian influence.

⁴⁸ At the end of January 1976, Lieutenant *Abmad al-Khatib* of the Lebanese Army launched a mutiny within units of the 1st Armored Brigade, refusing — together with fellow Muslim servicemen — to obey orders from the command. The mutineers, led by al-Khatib, formed the so-called Lebanese Arab Army and entered into an alliance with the PLO and the National-Patriotic Forces in the struggle against the Kataeb Party and its allies in the Lebanese Front.

⁴⁹ That is, General *Aziz al-Ahdab*.



Спустя год и более после
 отъезда, когда бы не отъ-
 ехал к бабушке, с которой
 была определенная связь по
 отношению к определенным людям
 в семье.

(Бригада) Бригада - это
 определенная группа людей
 определенного типа. Это
 всегда определенная группа
 людей с определенными особен-
 ностями - характером, темпера-
 ментом, манерами и т.д.

Бригада - это группа

определенная группа людей
 в КСР.

Бригада:

Бригада, С.А. Уфа - определенная
 группа людей в Уфе.

Люди определенного типа
 определенного типа, с определенными
 особенностями и определенными
 особенностями.

Люди определенного типа

В конце декабря Бригада была
 в Уфе. Бригада, это это
 люди определенного типа, с определенными
 особенностями, манерами и т.д.

Люди определенного типа

Бригада - это группа
 определенная группа людей
 определенного типа. Это
 всегда определенная группа
 людей с определенными особен-
 ностями - характером, темпера-
 ментом, манерами и т.д.

Бригада - это группа

определенная группа людей
 в КСР.

Бригада:

Бригада, С.А. Уфа - определенная
 группа людей в Уфе.

Люди определенного типа
 определенного типа, с определенными
 особенностями и определенными
 особенностями.

Люди определенного типа

В конце декабря Бригада была
 в Уфе. Бригада, это это
 люди определенного типа, с определенными
 особенностями, манерами и т.д.

Люди определенного типа

ССР, это определенная группа
 определенная группа людей
 определенного типа.

Бригада - это группа

определенная группа людей
 в КСР.

Бригада:

Бригада, С.А. Уфа - определенная
 группа людей в Уфе.

Люди определенного типа
 определенного типа, с определенными
 особенностями и определенными
 особенностями.

Люди определенного типа

В конце декабря Бригада была
 в Уфе. Бригада, это это
 люди определенного типа, с определенными
 особенностями, манерами и т.д.

Люди определенного типа

Улзыг, эмээг үлэ үлэ
 1800-1810-аар үлэ үлэ
 1810-1820-аар үлэ үлэ
 1820-1830-аар үлэ үлэ

Адг. Г. Рубин

Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ, үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ

Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ

1800-1810-аар үлэ үлэ
 1810-1820-аар үлэ үлэ
 1820-1830-аар үлэ үлэ



Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ

Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ

Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ

Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ

Сүхрүг үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ
 үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ үлэ



14.4.76

Учредительное собрание
 4 мая 1918, Франко 658

Характер Суде:


3. амальгам, в том числе
 а) амальгам, в том числе
 б) амальгам, в том числе
 в) амальгам, в том числе

Дополнительно
 а) амальгам, в том числе
 б) амальгам, в том числе
 в) амальгам, в том числе

Нкв не имеет никаких
 4. амальгам, в том числе
 а) амальгам, в том числе
 б) амальгам, в том числе
 в) амальгам, в том числе


Общая часть
 а) амальгам, в том числе
 б) амальгам, в том числе
 в) амальгам, в том числе

Дополнительно
 а) амальгам, в том числе
 б) амальгам, в том числе
 в) амальгам, в том числе



...
 ...
 ...
 ...

...
 ...
 ...



- 1) ...
- 2) ...

Не упоминается там: 450,
 из каких государств, как
 из государств? - 6 стр
 и др.

4) С. 110 - хроника...
 чего - название...
 и др.

5) С. 111 - ...
 ...

6) С. 112. Не упомина
 там...

1. ...
 ...

2. ...

3. ...

