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Editorial



The 58th volume of the Historical Reporter is devoted to general history. The main part of the issue consists of the Russian History section, which, as per tradition, comprises materials dedicated to various periods of our country's history. The materials cover the period from the 17th to the early 20th century.

The issue opens with an article by Ivan A. Bulychev, which examines the attribution and dating of an incomplete copy of a printed Horologion. The article is interesting, among other things, because it sheds light on the publishing policy of the Print Yard regarding editions used for teaching faith and letters. The article also clarifies the period when Simeon of Polotsk wrote his work Preface to the Horologion, which is valuable in itself, as it provides additional information about the creative output of a figure emblematic of his time in Russian culture. Nikolay N. Petrukhintsev's article examines the set of measures concerning Siberia carried out between 1695 and 1700, which was shaped with the active participation of Peter I. These measures became one of the Tsar's first interventions in the country's domestic policy. The article analyzes the role of the monarch and one of his associates, A.A. Winus, in shaping and implementing this policy, which marked the beginning of the formation of a new industrial region in the east of the country. The Petrine times are a traditional topic on the pages of our publication, and this material makes a significant contribution to the study of this fateful period of Russian history. The work by Alim M. Abidulin and Kirill E. Baldin touches upon a topic that can also be called traditional for our journal — the travels of Russian pilgrims to the East. This time, the focus of our authors is on the travel notes of Father Ioann Dobrotvorsky, a clergyman from Sergachsky Uyezd of the Nizhny Novgorod Governorate. The impressions of an ordinary church servant are very interesting from the perspective of how the memoirist and other Russian pilgrims constructed their national, religious, and cultural identity in a foreign environment. The article by Alexander P. Shevyrev and Stanislav S. Yudin concerns Russian military history, a most fascinating and inexhaustible subject. The authors examine the state and development of the Russian army and navy during the reign of Emperor Alexander III, noting both the positive and the negative aspects of this crucial stage in the evolution of the empire's armed forces. While acknowledging certain undeniable successes in reforming the military machine, the authors conclude that this period also laid the groundwork for the crisis phenomena that would lead the empire to military and political defeats in the early 20th century. Nikita S. Erokhov's article is devoted to the little-known topic of interfaith relations in the Northwestern Region following the decree on religious tolerance of April 17, 1905. The article examines instances of religious violence committed by Catholics against Orthodox Christians shortly after the decree



was issued. The author objectively analyzes the reasons for such behavior and its historical background. Concluding the section is an article by Danil V. Rybin, dedicated to the historiography of the activities of Russian conservative liberals (“legalists”) in the early 20th century, whose position was based on the ideas of such renowned scholars as K.D. Kavelin and B.N. Chicherin.

The General History section opens with an article dedicated to the Ottoman Empire. In the past, we have published several thematic issues on the history of this state and always welcome new contributions on this fascinating subject. This time, we publish an article by Enver Alper Demirci and Daria A. Demirci, in which the authors undertake a comparative analysis of three key administrative institutions — timar, devshirme, and millet. The article is interesting because the authors draw on the comparative sociology of empires and the theory of internal colonialism, thereby contributing to overcoming the Eurocentric framework of colonial studies. Next in the section is a work by a young author, Alexander I. Krylov, who reexamines the established historiographical reasons for the Allies’ victory in the Battle of the Alma River during the Crimean War. The author is still a university student, but his work struck us as so interesting and professional that we decided to publish it as an exception. It is possible that not all specialists on this topic will agree with his conclusions, but the editorial board felt it was right to encourage a budding historian at the very beginning of his professional path. The section continues with an article by Kamil G. Askhanov and Dilara Sh. Muftakhtudinova, devoted to issues related to the history of both the Ottoman and Russian Empires. In it, the authors attempt to determine whether the claims of Russian gendarmerie officials about the existence of a widespread organization called “Tarrakion Islamiya” (“Progress of Islam”), allegedly centered in Istanbul, had any real basis, and whether the ties between Tatar intellectuals and the Young Turks posed a real threat. An article by our regular contributor Dmitry E. Mishin concludes both his research on the Sasanid rule over Yemen in the 7th century, and the section itself.

In the Communications section, we have placed a piece by Levon V. Batiyev on local government reform in the Russian Empire, using the example of the modernization of municipal administration in Nakhichevan-on-Don in the mid-19th century, when Nakhichevan was drawn into the mainstream of transformations during the Era of Great Reforms.

The editorial board continues its work on future issues and thanks our new and regular authors for their contributions.

Alexey E. Titkov

Editor-in-Chief of The Historical Reporter



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Original paper



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On the Newly Discovered Horologion (Moscow, December 1689), Previously Known Only from Seventeenth-Century Documents

Abstract

This article is devoted to the attribution and dating of an incomplete copy of a printed *Horologion* (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, hereinafter *РГАДА*, Library of the Moscow Synodal Printing House collection, hereinafter *БМСТ*, subdivision, hereinafter *снк*, № 2342). Since traditional methods made it possible only to establish the Moscow origin of the book under study, documentary materials from the archival collection of the Department of Printed Books (*РГАДА*. Ф. 1182) were consulted in order to determine the exact date of its publication. Their examination made it possible to establish the period during which the edition in question was printed. The non-liturgical texts contained in the book — *Predislovie v Chasoslov* (“Preface to the Horologion”) and *Predanie o slozhenii perstov* (“Instruction on the Folding of Fingers”) — allowed 1684 to be identified as the lower chronological boundary for the search for the edition. The upper



boundary was set at 1700 because such characteristics of the examined copy as the number of quires, the typeface, and the number of lines in the type area differ from the corresponding features of the Horologia printed in the eighteenth century. As a result of the study, it was established that the book belongs to the December 1689 edition, previously known only from seventeenth-century documentary evidence. An analysis of the contents of these texts, together with the cultural and political context of the Muscovite Tsardom in the 1680s, sheds light both on the reasons for their inclusion in this Horologion and on the publishing policy of the Moscow Print Yard concerning editions used for teaching faith and literacy. The article also examines the peculiarities of the liturgical contents of the edition in comparison with other Horologia of the last third of the seventeenth century, as well as the free distribution of newly printed copies of the December 1689 edition. In addition, the article establishes the period during which Simeon of Polotsk wrote the work *Predislovie v Chasoslov* and clarifies details of the procedure by which the management of the Print Yard reported printing expenses to the Patriarch.


Keywords:

Moscow Print Yard; Early printed Cyrillic editions; History of the book; Horologion; Department of Printed Books

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he collection of early printed books from the Library of the Synodal Printing House preserves an incomplete copy of a *Horologion* lacking publication information (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК № 2342)¹. The copy is a quarto-format volume (8°). The edition was printed in a single color. The *Horologion* was printed in the Arsenius typeface (84 mm)², cast by the hierodeacon Arsenius in 1687³ and widely used in Moscow editions of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As is well known, this typeface derived from the Nikitin font (85 mm), which was widespread in Moscow book printing during the seventeenth century. Rubrics, lombards, and incipits were also set in the Arsenius typeface⁴. The type area contains 13 lines per page.

The book consists of two parts with separate foliations. The first part originally contained 13 leaves (folios) (2 quires without signature marks), while the second part contained 304 leaves (38 quires with alphabetic numerals as signature marks).

The first part lacks folio 1, which contained the imprint information, and folio 6, containing a fragment of the text from the *Preface to the Horologion*. In the second foliation, the 16th and 17th quires (folios 121–136, containing the conclusion of the Typika Sequence, the Rite of the Panagia, and the beginning of the Ninth Hour service) are bound after the 18th quire (folios 137–144).

The earliest recorded use of the only “large” headpiece ornament found in the *Horologion* dates to 1651–1652⁵, whereas all of the “small” ornaments belong to the 1680s⁶.

¹ For a more detailed description of the item see Appendix 1.

² Лукьянова Е.В. Московские кирилловские издания в собраниях РГАДА. Каталог 1626–1650. Вып. 2. С. 322.

³ Покровский А.А. Печатный Московский двор в первой половине XVII века. М., 1913. С. 42.

⁴ In surviving documents of the Printing Department from the late 1680s — early 1690s, editions in which this typeface was used were often described as printed in Nikitin’s “alphabet”.

⁵ Зернова А.С. Альбом орнаментики книг московской печати XVI–XVII веков. М., 1952. № 374; same author. Указатель к альбому орнаментики книг московской печати XVI–XVII веков. М., 1952. С. 39.

⁶ Some of them were not included by A.S. Zernova as used in printing of *Horologia*. Зернова А.С. Орнаментика книг московской печати кирилловского шрифта XVII–XVIII веков. 1677–1750 (Атлас). М., 1963. № 51, № 99;

The paper used for printing the *Horologion* bears the watermark “Jester’s Head with Seven Bells” (for example, on folio 7 of the first foliation and folio 7 of the second foliation), but the small size of these fragments, determined by the format of the edition, makes precise attribution of the watermark impossible.

The edges of the book block are decorated with a floral stamped design with traces of blue pigment. The leather covering of the binding boards is worn, and the lower clasp has been lost. Judging from surviving traces of paint, the upper board originally bore gold tooling. The binding is characteristic of editions from the last quarter of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. The width of the page margins makes it possible to state confidently that the copy retains its original binding. The fragment of the “Jester’s Head” watermark on the front pastedown does not permit its identification.

No ownership or donation inscriptions are preserved in the described *Horologion*.

On the front pastedown there is a label from the Library of the Moscow Synodal Printing House⁷ (Палата Д. / Шкаф 4 / Полка III / Место 14 / Каталог № 1368). Various labels with shelf numbers are also present on the spine and upper board. The information on this label corresponds to the data in the БМСТ card catalogue compiled at the end of the nineteenth century: “No. 1368, *Horologion*. Undescribed, second half of the 17th century, octavo, 13 and 304 f. Д. 4. III. 14”⁸. The old shelfmark, 1368, has been crossed out on the labels, and next to it a new number, 2342, has been added in ballpoint pen from the current inventory of the library collection “Library of the Moscow Synodal Printing House: Early Printed Books”, in which the book is identified as a *Chasovnik* printed in Moscow in 1654. However, the 1654 *Chasovnik*⁹ differs from the copy under examination in its typeface, number of quires, number of lines, and contents¹⁰.

same author. Орнаментака книг московской печати Кирилловского шрифта XVII–XVIII веков. 1677–1750 (Указатель). М., 1963. С. 32–33, 54.

⁷ Hereinfter БМСТ.

⁸ Card catalogue of БМСТ of the second half of the 19th — early 20th century under the letter «Ч».

⁹ Inventory of БМСТ/СПК. Кн. 1: № 1–4825 (manuscript). Л. 95.

¹⁰ Часовник. М., апрель 1654 г. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК № 2334); Cf.: Зернова А.С. Книги кирилловской печати, изданные в Москве в XVI–XVII веках: сводный каталог. М., 1958. № 254.




Copy of the Book of Hours, December 1689 edition.
RGADA. BMST/spk No. 2342. From open sources

Moreover, the first, introductory section of the *Horologion*, which lacks its imprint information, contains two texts that were printed in Moscow Horologia at the end of the seventeenth century: *Predislovie v Chasoslov* (“Preface to the Horologion”) (fols. 2a–7a), first attested in an edition published in February 1680¹¹, and *Predanie o slozhenii perstov* (“Instruction on the Folding of Fingers”) (fols. 8a–13b), which first appeared in printed books in September 1684¹². The text of the *Instruction* is an abridgement of *Iz’iavlenie kako vsiakomu pravoslavnomu khristianinu podobayet na izobrazhenie Khrista, i kiia persty slagati i krestnoe zname-nie na sebe izobrazhati* (“Explanation of How Every Orthodox

¹¹ Часослов. М., февраль 1680. Л. 2a–7a (foliation 1). <РГАДА. МГАМИД/спк № 813>. An article dedicated to this newly discovered edition is currently being composed.

¹² РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 100. Л. 81b; Белянкин Ю.С. Церковь и государство в полемике со старообрядцами во второй половине XVII в. (на примере деятельности Московского Печатного двора). Дисс. на соискание уч. ст. канд. ист. наук. М., 2013. С. 163–164 <manuscript>.



The first page of a copy of the Book of Hours (December 1689 edition), featuring the beginning of Simeon of Polotsk's "Preface to the Book of Hours".

From open sources

Christian Should Form the Fingers for the Sign of Christ and Make the Sign of the Cross upon Oneself”), first published in the Moscow instructional *Psalter* of March 1684¹³, and later included in the *Psalter with Offices* edition of September 1684¹⁴. Consequently, the *Horologion* under examination could not have been printed earlier than 1684. The upper boundary for dating the edition is 1700, since all *Horologia* printed at the Moscow typography during the first half of the eighteenth century contained fewer quires, were printed in a smaller typeface, and accordingly had a greater number of lines per type area¹⁵.

¹³ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп.1. Д. 100. Л. 80b–81a; Белянкин Ю.С. Церковь и государство в полемике со старообрядцами... С. 163.

¹⁴ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 100. Л. 81a; Белянкин Ю.С. Церковь и государство в полемике со старообрядцами... С. 163.

¹⁵ Гусева А.А. Свод русских книг кирилловской печати XVIII века типографий Москвы и Санкт-Петербурга и универсальная методика их идентификации. М., 2010. № 1780, 1782, 1783, 1786, 1788, 1799, 1802, 1805, 1812, 1814, 1816.

Since traditional methods of dating editions on the basis of typographic ornaments or paper watermarks do not provide a precise positive result in this case, the only possible way to establish the publication date of the *Horologion* under study is to consult the documentary materials of the Department of Printed Books (РГАДА. Ф. 1182)¹⁶.

According to the materials of the Department of Printed Books, twelve *Horologia* were printed at the Moscow Print Yard between 1684 and 1700 (Table 1), of which only two — the *Horologion with Kathismata* (No. 2)¹⁷ and the *Horologion* (No. 5) — have survived to the present day¹⁸.

Table 1. Main characteristics of the Horologia printed at the Moscow Print Yard from September 1684 to July 1700

№	Edition	Date of completion	Print run	Format	Type-face/ font	Number of quires	Source
1	<i>Horologion</i>	September 1684	4800	quarto	<i>Osipov</i>	32 ½	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 81. Л. 123a–126b
2	<i>Horologion with Kathismata</i>	20 March 1685	2400	quarto	<i>Nikitin</i> (font 85 mm)	39 ½	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 81. Л. 153a–160a
3	<i>Horologion</i>	20 September 1686	4800	quarto	<i>Osipov</i>	32 ½	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 81. Л. 230b–234b
4	<i>Horologion</i>	December 1687	4800	quarto	<i>Voskresensk</i>	24 ¼	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 81. Л. 291a–295b

¹⁶ For more on documentation of the Printing Book Office see: Дадыкин А.В. Документы приказа книгопечатного дела второй половины XVII в. как исторический источник // Поздеева И.В., Пушкин В.П., Дадыкин А.В. Московский печатный двор — факт и фактор русской культуры, 1652–1700 гг. Кн. 1. М., 2007. С. 39–59.

¹⁷ Зернова А.С. Книги кирилловской печати... № 392.

¹⁸ Ibid. № 418.

№	Edition	Date of completion	Print run	Format	Typeface/ font	Number of quires	Source
5	<i>Horologion</i>	January 1689	4800	quarto	<i>Voskresensk</i> (font 60 mm)	24 ¼	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. Л. 30a–35a
6	<i>Horologion without cinnabar</i> (without red ink)	December 1689	4800	quarto	<i>Nikitin</i>	40	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. Л. 70b–75a
7	<i>Horologion</i>	20 December 1691	7200	quarto	<i>Osipov</i>	25	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. Л. 114a–118b
8	<i>Horologion</i>	23 June 1694	4800	quarto	<i>Nikitin</i>	Not mentioned	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. Л. 184a–187b
9	<i>Horologion</i>	27 April 1696	7200	quarto	<i>Osipov</i>	Not mentioned	Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. Л. 237b–241a
10	<i>Horologion</i>	25 April 1697	2400	quarto	<i>Osipov</i>	Not mentioned	Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Д. 176. Л. 1a–4a
11	<i>Horologion</i>	April 1698	4800	quarto	<i>Nikitin</i>	Not mentioned	Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Д. 182. Л. 1a–5a
12	<i>Horologion</i>	6 July 1700	4800	quarto	<i>Osipov</i>	Not mentioned	Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Д. 194. Л. 1a–5a

It follows from Table 1 that the characteristics of the *Horologion* from the Moscow Synodal Printing House collection under examination — its format, typeface, number of quires, and absence of red printing — correspond to those of the *Horologion* whose printing began on 17 October 1689 and was completed in December of the same year (No. 6). All other Horologia differ in their combination of these parameters.

In the register book of newly issued books for 1689–1696, the term *Chasoslovets*¹⁹ is used in reference to this *Horologion*. During the

¹⁹ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. Л. 70b.

second half of the seventeenth century, this was the standard designation for quarto-format *Horologia* corresponding to the modern octavo format, although the more precise generic term *Chasoslov*²⁰ (“*Horologion*”) could also be used for such books. In the inventory book, however, the December 1689 edition was referred to as the “small *Chasoslovets*”²¹. The same designation appears in inventory books for *Horologia* printed in September 1682²², June 1694²³, and April 1698²⁴.

Another term used in the late seventeenth century in the records of the Department of Printed Books for quarto-format *Horologia* was “instructional *Horologion*” (*uchebnyi Chasoslov*). This designation appears in the expenditure book for September 1692 — August 1693 in the section recording books distributed free of charge: “on the 24th day of November ... presented ... to the Sovereign Lady, Tsarevna and Grand Princess Maria Alekseevna ... also an instructional, small *Horologion*, bound, without payment”²⁵. The most recently printed *Horologion* at that time was the December 1691 edition, which is evidently the one referred to in this entry. A.V. Voznesensky associated the appearance in the accounting records of the Department of Printed Books of the term “instructional” for quarto-format *Horologia* with the publication in March 1688 of the “large lectern *Horologion*,” printed in folio format²⁶. This circumstance probably also explains the more frequent use during the same period of the term “small” to characterize quarto-format *Horologia* in the records of the Department of Printed Books.

As Table 1 demonstrates, a notable feature of the *Horologion* under examination is its large print run, significantly exceeding the print runs of other liturgical books. Large print runs and repeated

²⁰ See: Андреев А.А., Мольков Г.А. Часовник—Часословец—Часослов: эволюция названия книги в XI—XVIII вв. // Славянская историческая лексикология и лексикография. 2023. Т. 6. С. 24–29.

²¹ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 90. Л. 59а.

²² Ibid. Д. 82. Л. 28b.

²³ Ibid. Д. 90. Л. 259а.

²⁴ Ibid. Д. 97. Л. 48а.

²⁵ Ibid. Д. 94. Л. 119b.

²⁶ Вознесенский А.В. К истории славянской печатной Псалтири. Московская традиция XVI—XVII веков. Простая Псалтырь. М., 2010. С. 61.

reprinting were also characteristic of other small-format *Horologia*, which was evidently connected with the specific functions of quarto-format editions.

The educational purpose of the book is also indicated by the inclusion of the *Preface to the Horologion*, which explicitly mentions the instructional process: “So that children, learning to read letters, may at the same time become accustomed to praying to the Lord God for all their needs and offering Him praise...”²⁷ It should be noted that this text was absent²⁸ from the “large lectern *Horologion*” (March 1688), which undoubtedly had a strictly liturgical purpose. The original text of the *Preface* survives in the manuscript miscellany of drafts by Simeon of Polotsk entitled *Collection of Congratulatory Speeches to the Tsar, the Patriarch, and Other Persons*, and he should evidently be regarded as its author²⁹. The inclusion of this text in the most widely circulated church book was clearly connected with the dispute of the late 1660s to early 1680s between the “Latinophile” and “Greeko-phile” factions concerning the paths and principles of organizing education in the Muscovite Tsardom: whether through the study of the Church Fathers or through the establishment of schools modeled on Jesuit colleges (*collegia*)³⁰. Although these groups differed in their understanding of the structure of the educational process, both agreed that learning contributed to a better knowledge of God. This positive attitude toward knowledge differed from the traditional Orthodox Russian ideal of “pleasing God in simplicity”, and found expression in the recognition of the importance of spreading literacy among the

²⁷ Часослов. М., декабрь 1689. Л. 5а (1 фолиация). <РГАДА. БМСТ/спк. № 2342>.

²⁸ Часослов. М., март 1688 (РГАДА. БМСТ/спк. № 988).

²⁹ ГИМ. Синодальное собр. № 229. Л. 255а–256а. Ср.: Татарский И. Сimeон Полоцкий. Его жизнь и деятельность. М., 1886. С. 249.

³⁰ See: Богданов А.П. К полемике конца 60-х — начала 80-х годов XVII в. об организации высшего учебного заведения в России // Исследования по источниковедению истории СССР XIII–XVIII вв.: сборник статей. М., 1986. С. 177–210; Сазонова Л.И. Восточнославянские академии XVI–XVIII вв. в контексте европейской академической традиции // Славяноведение. 1995. №3. С. 46–61; Панич Т.В. Писатели патриаршего круга в богословской полемике 80–90-х гг. XVII в. Новосибирск, 2007. Дисс. на соиск. уч. ст. докт. филол. наук. С. 42–48 (рукопись).

common people. The shared conviction that knowledge was necessary probably explains why this work by Simeon of Polotsk was printed at the Moscow Print Yard, unlike most of his other writings.

The *Preface* was written after June 1676, as indicated by the mention of Tsar Fyodor Alekseyevich at the beginning of the text: “By the command of the most pious, most peaceful, and most autocratic Great Sovereign, our Tsar and Grand Prince Fyodor Alekseyevich, autocrat of all Great, Little, and White Russia. And by the blessing of the great lord, His Holiness Kyr Joachim, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia”³¹.

The upper chronological boundary for the composition of the text is February 1680, when the work on the *Horologion* edition in which this *Preface* was first printed was completed. However, the printed text contains several differences from the original manuscript version (Table 2).

Table 2.

Preface to Horologion from Collection of Congratulatory Speeches to the Tsar, the Patriarch, and Other Persons (ГИМ. Синодальное собр. № 229)	Preface to Horologion from Horologion (Moscow, December 1689) ³²
“In vain games do they destroy the golden time of childhood, which cannot be returned at any price; but, as in the springtime of their life, they till the fields of their hearts with learning, and, joyfully receiving from their teachers the seed of the Word of God, they gladly accept it, so that they may gather the nourishing wheatheads of the soul at the time of harvest...” (fol. 255a)	“In vain games do they destroy the golden time of childhood, which cannot be returned at any price; but, as in the springtime of their life, they till the fields of their hearts with learning, and, joyfully receiving from their teachers the seeds of the Word of God, they gladly accept it, so that they may gather the nourishing wheatheads of the soul at the time of harvest...” (fol. 3b, first foliation)

³¹ ГИМ. Синодальное собр. № 229. Л. 255b.

³² Conjecture by author — I.B. The missing fragment printed on the absent folio 6 (1st foliation) in No. 2342 was compared with the Horologion of March 1685 (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2341). It should be noted that in all surviving Horologia of the 1680s the text of the Preface is identical, therefore such replacement is justified.

Preface to Horologion from Collection of Congratulatory Speeches to the Tsar, the Patriarch, and Other Persons (ГИМ. Синодальное собр. № 229)	Preface to Horologion from Horologion (Moscow, December 1689) ³²
“By the command of the most pious, most peaceful, and most autocratic Great Sovereign, our Tsar and Grand Prince Fyodor Alekseyevich, autocrat of all Great, Little, and White Russia. And by the blessing of the great lord, His Holiness Kyr Joachim, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia”. (fol. 255b)	<i>No corresponding text</i>
“For the common benefit of all Orthodox Christian youths, this book has been printed...” (fol. 255b)	“Therefore, for the common benefit of all Orthodox Christians, this book has been printed...” (fol. 4b, first foliation)
“So that children, while learning letters and reading together, may also become accustomed to pray to the Lord God in all their needs and to send up glory to Him for the good deeds continually done. And may this custom take its deep root in their hearts, so that it may remain in them until the end of life, with the sprouting of branches of piety”. (fol. 255b)	“So that children, while learning letters and reading together, may also become accustomed to pray to the Lord God in all their needs and to send up glory to Him for the good deeds continually done. And may this custom take its own deep root in their hearts, so that it may remain in them until the end of life, with the sprouting of branches of piety”. (fol. 5a, first foliation)

The *Predanie o slozhenii perstov* (“Instruction on the Folding of Fingers”; hereafter, the *Instruction*), which followed the *Preface* in the first section of the December *Horologion*, provided a justification for the use of the three-finger sign of the cross (*troeperstie*). This text was first published in the *Horologion* (Moscow, September 1684) by decree of Patriarch Joachim³³. It represents an abridged version of the *Iz’iavlenie o slozhenii perstov* (“Explanation on the Folding of Fingers”; hereafter, the *Explanation*), which, by order of Patriarch Patriarch Joachim of Moscow, was first included in the instructional *Psalter* (March 1684)³⁴ and subsequently in the *Psalter with Offices* (September 1684)³⁵.

³³ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 100. Л. 81a.

³⁴ Ibid. Л. 80b.

³⁵ Ibid. Л. 81a.

Table 3. Comparison of the texts
of the Explanation and the Instruction

Explanation on the Folding of Fingers from Psalter of August 1684 r. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 845)	Instruction on the Folding of Fingers from Horologion of December 1689 (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2342)
“A brief exposition of how every Orthodox Christian, according to the ancient tradition of the holy apostles and holy fathers, ought to form upon his own face the sign of the holy cross with the fingers of his hand, and which fingers to use, the arrangement of which we have here depicted by printed impression; and how one should make this sign upon oneself”. (fol. 11a)	“The ancient tradition of the holy apostles and holy fathers, concerning how every Orthodox Christian ought, when making the sign of the holy cross upon his face, to arrange the fingers of his hand, which fingers to use, and how to make that sign upon oneself”. (fol. 8a, first foliation)
“Every devout and Orthodox Christian ought, when making the sign of the cross, to arrange the fingers of his hand in this manner: first, he should bring together the first three fingers of his right hand, as an image of the Holy Trinity—the thumb and the two fingers next to it”. (fols. 11a–11b)	“First, therefore, it is fitting for an Orthodox Christian to bring together the first three fingers of his right hand, as an image of the Holy Trinity—the thumb and the other two fingers next to it”. (fols. 8a–8b, first foliation)
“With these we clearly proclaim the equality and unity of the Holy Trinity, both together and without confusion. Equality, because in the Holy Trinity there is neither first nor last, nor greater nor lesser; but the three hypostases are whole, co-eternal with one another, and equal. In the same way, in these three fingers, there is neither greater nor lesser, but all are in order, admitting nothing between them, and they have equality both among themselves and toward one another, as can be seen in them. And by such our confession of the Holy Trinity we condemn the accursed Armenians who think falsely about the inequality of the Holy Trinity, and therefore, when they make the sign of the cross upon their face, they join the first finger with the fourth and fifth, thereby showing through the inequality of those fingers the inequality of the equal divine persons; thus we reject them as wrong-thinking, and we do not agree with them as Orthodox Christians (православнии)”. (fols. 11b–12a)	“With these we proclaim the equality and unity of the Holy Trinity, together and without confusion. And by this we reject the false teaching of the accursed Armenians concerning the inequality of the Holy Trinity, and by this when make the sign of the cross upon their face, they join the first finger with the fourth and fifth, thereby showing through the inequality of those fingers the inequality of the equal divine persons; thus we reject them as wrong-thinking, and we do not agree with them as, as Orthodox Christians(православныя)”. (fols. 8b–9a, first foliation)

Explanation on the Folding of Fingers from Psalter of August 1684 r. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 845)	Instruction on the Folding of Fingers from Horologion of December 1689 (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2342)
But we flee far away from such destructive vain wisdom of theirs. And by joining the first fingers together, not as some who divide them by place with the little fingers, but extending the great finger past the two middle ones and joining them together, as the Armenians do. Yet, fleeing their evil doctrine and the malicious division of Arius’ destructive pit, we do not confess a unity of essence in the Holy Trinity. But by preaching the distinction of the persons without confusion, we reject the heretical reasoning of Sabellius. (fols 12a-12b)	But we flee far away from such destructive vain wisdom of theirs. Fleeing from Arius’ destructive pit, we do not confess a unity of essence in the Holy Trinity. But by preaching the distinction of the persons without confusion, we reject the heretical reasoning of Sabellius. (fols 9a-9b, first foliation)
No corresponding text	And sixth, in the year 7192, in the Psalter folio book, in the preface or exposition concerning how every Orthodox Christian ought to make the sign of the cross, and which fingers are to be arranged, and how one is to make the sign of the cross upon oneself (leaf 12b, foliation 1).
The passage between: <i>“Now then, let a brief interrogative and exhortatory word be extended by us to those who think contrary to the Holy Church, concerning the use of their sign of the cross—whether they rightly hold to it or not”</i> (fol. 14b) and <i>“Cease now, O opponents of the Holy Church, from listening henceforth to your unrighteous false teachers, or rather deceivers, who think contrary to the Holy Church, and from partly practicing piety; for that is not piety, when one partly holds with the Eastern Church and partly does not. For this is deemed by those of understanding to be more impiety than piety”</i> (fol. 21b) is found only in the <i>Explanation</i>.	No corresponding text

Explanation on the Folding of Fingers from Psalter of August 1684 r. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 845)	Instruction on the Folding of Fingers from Horologion of December 1689 (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2342)
And turning away from this soul-destroying deception, let us turn to the holy, synodic, and apostolic Church; and, by joining together the first three fingers of the right hand, let us praise the Holy Trinity and the dispensation of the Incarnation, according to the true dogmas handed down to us from those who have pleased God, and let us all together in agreement glorify Him. So that, by Her grace, after a long and peaceful life here, we may be deemed worthy to behold Her directly, together with all the heavenly powers and saints, and in endless ages to glorify and magnify Her with joyful voices. May it be granted to all of us to attain this, amen (fol. 21b).	And submitting to the true teaching of the holy, synodic, and apostolic Church, let them likewise, together with us who are orthodox, glorify the joining together of the first three fingers of the right hand, the Holy Trinity, and the dispensation of the Incarnation, according to the true dogmas handed down to us from those who have pleased God. So that, by Her grace, we may be deemed worthy to attain both temporal and eternal blessings, amen (fols. 13a–13b, foliation 1).

The *Iz"iavlenie* ("Explanation") should be dated to the period between the publication of the *Slovo blagodarstvennoe o izbavlenii ot otstupnikov* ("Thanksgiving Sermon on Deliverance from the Apostates") — the latest book mentioned in the text — in October 1683³⁶, and 19 January 1684, the date of Patriarch Joachim of Moscow's decree ordering the inclusion of the *Explanation* in the instructional *Psalter*. Accordingly, the abridgement of the *Explanation* that resulted in the *Instruction* was produced, as noted above, no earlier than March 1684, since the *Instruction* mentions the March edition of the instructional *Psalter*. The text of the *Instruction*, printed in the *Horologia* of September 1684 and March 1685, was later used by Adrian, Metropolitan of Kazan from 1686 to 1690, in a printed pastoral instruction issued under his name, the sole surviving copy of which is preserved in a late seventeenth-century miscellany³⁷. It should be noted that E.V. Belyakova identifies the future Patriarch of Moscow as the author of this work³⁸.

³⁶ Зернова А.С. Книги кирилловской печати... № 384. Ср.: РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 81. Л. 75а–77а.
³⁷ ГИМ. Синодальное собр. № 904. Л. 278а–287б.
³⁸ Белякова Е.В. Адриан // Православная энциклопедия. Т. I. М., 2000. С. 312–313.

A.V. Voznesensky regarded the appearance in the first half of the 1680s of the anti-Old Believer texts *Explanation/Instruction* in the most widely circulated church books as a consequence of “the Streltsy uprising of 1682, the ideological justification of which was provided by the epistle of Nikita Pustosviat, who devoted considerable attention to the issue of the sign of the cross...”³⁹ At the same time, it should be emphasized that among the highest circles of authority the idea of combating the spread of Old Believer teachings through publications of the Print Yard had been articulated even before the summer of 1682. Thus, Article 14 of the Church Council of 1681–1682 contains a proposal by Tsar Fyodor Alekseyevich to the assembled fathers of the Council, stating that “common people, not knowing the true writings, accept falsehood as truth and thereby fall into sin; moreover, from this there grows opposition to the Holy Church: and therefore His Holiness Joachim, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, should order this to be monitored and verified through the Print Yard”⁴⁰. Thus, the emergence of mass-produced anti-Old Believer texts was connected both with the general intensification of anti-schismatic policy in the 1680s and with the recognition of the need to eradicate popular ignorance, since supporters of the Orthodox Church regarded the lack of education among the population as the principal reason for the popularity of the schismatics.

A significant feature of the principal liturgical section of the *Horologion* under study is the absence of the complete texts of the seventeenth kathisma in the weekday Midnight Office, the ninth kathisma in the Saturday Midnight Office, and the canon to the Holy Trinity in the Sunday Midnight Office (despite the presence of the corresponding incipits), as well as the omission of the canon to the Guardian Angel. The same structural features are found in the surviving *Horologia* of February 1680 and January 1682⁴¹, as well as in the *Horologion* of December 1683⁴² (32 quires, Osipov typeface). Judging from the identical number of quires and use of

³⁹ Вознесенский А.В. К истории славянской печатной Псалтири... С. 164.

⁴⁰ Акты исторические, собранные и изданные Археографическою комиссиею. Т. 5. 1676–1700. СПб., 1842. №75. С. 117.

⁴¹ Часослов. М., январь 1682 г. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2338).

⁴² Часослов. М., декабрь 1683 г. (ГИМ. Синодальное печатное собр. № 204).

the same typeface, the now-lost *Horologia* printed in September 1684 and September 1686⁴³ evidently had the same contents as the December 1683 edition. The surviving *Horologion* of January 1689⁴⁴ (24¼ quires, Voskresensky typeface) also contained similar contents. Since the records of the Department of Printed Books indicate the same principal characteristics — number of quires and typeface — for the now-lost *Horologion* of December 1687, it may be assumed that the same reductions in the liturgical section were present there as well. It should be noted that these compositional features had appeared earlier in small-format *Horologia*, for example in the editions of November 1668⁴⁵ and April 1675⁴⁶.

The reasons why many *Horologia* in the late seventeenth century were printed with incomplete forms of the Midnight Office and without the canon to the Guardian Angel remain unclear. One possible explanation is that Moscow printers wished to preserve the original purpose of the *Horologion* as a book containing the unchanging services of the daily cycle. This intention may have motivated both the exclusion of those parts of the Midnight Office that varied according to the day on which the service was celebrated and the omission of the canon to the Guardian Angel, which was read before Communion. At the same time, it should be noted that the practice of printing *Horologia* without these texts was not entirely consistent. Thus, surviving copies of the *Horologia* printed in September 1682⁴⁷ and March 1685 contain the complete text of all three versions of the Midnight Office, as well as the canon to the Guardian Angel.

The documents of the Department of Printed Books also shed light on other aspects of the publication of the *Horologion* under examination. The expenses associated with its publication amounted

⁴³ Although the *Horologion* editions of September 1684 and 1686 had 32½ quires, in this case this difference is not significant, since it can be explained by the inclusion of the Instruction.

⁴⁴ Часослов. М., январь 1689. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2343).

⁴⁵ Часослов. М., ноябрь 1668 г. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2335).

⁴⁶ Часослов. М., апрель 1675 г. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2337).

⁴⁷ Часослов. М., сентябрь 1682 г. (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК. № 2339).

to 712 rubles, 21 altyns, and 4 dengas⁴⁸. The largest expenditure was the purchase of paper for printing. Four hundred reams were bought at the price of 26 altyns and 4 dengas per ream, amounting in total to 320 rubles (Д. 91. л. 71a).

In the surviving expenditure books of the second half of the 1680s, the first recorded purchase of blank paper at this price occurs in August 1687. The expenditure book for September 1686 — August 1687 contains the following entry: “By order of hegumen Sergius and clerk Ivan Arbenev, one hundred and six reams of imported paper were purchased from the Kadashi merchant Fyodor Kharitonov ... at the price of twenty-six altyns and four dengas per ream...” (Д. 86. л. 104a–104b). On 28 September 1687, paper (28 reams) at the same price was acquired from another Kadashi merchant, Kondraty Lukyanov (Д. 88. л. 98a), and in February 1688 from the Kargopol merchant Semen Kirilov (90 reams) (*ibid.*, л. 102a). The largest purchase took place on 1 January 1689, when 1,910 reams of blank paper were bought from the Kadashi merchants “Feoktist Kostyantinov and associates” at the price of 26 altyns and 4 dengas per ream, for a total sum of 1,528 rubles (Д. 89. л. 112a). It is highly probable that the December 1689 *Horologion* was printed on paper from this consignment⁴⁹.

The printing of the December 1689 *Horologion* took place in the Spassky and Nikolsky chambers of the Print Yard on eight presses⁵⁰. Work on the edition began one day earlier than the date recorded in the register book of newly issued books (17 October 1689), as evidenced by records of material distribution: “On the 16th day of October 198 [1689], typesetter Petr Efimov received from clerk Petr Artemyev in the Spassky chamber for the books of the small *Horologia* without red ink four formes per press for eight quires, eighty reams...” (Д. 90. л. 59a). The final issuance of materials for this edition occurred on 30 November (*ibid.*, л. 61b).

⁴⁸ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 1. Д. 91. л. 74a. Further references to files of this inventory will be given in the text.

⁴⁹ The expenditure book for September 1689 — August 1690 has not survived.

⁵⁰ For more on the buildings with printing presses of the Moscow Printing Yard in the 17th century, see: Румянцов В.Е. Древние здания Московского печатного двора. М., 1869. С. 11–17.

The printing of the December 1689 *Horologion* almost exactly coincided with work on a *Psalter* printed without red ink, issued in the same month. Interestingly, the breakdown of monetary expenditures for the *Psalter* did not include incidental expenses — primarily heating costs for the chambers of the Print Yard — which were instead included in the expense estimate compiled for the December *Horologion* (Δ, 91. Λ. 73a).

The receipts for the materials issued for the printing of the December 1689 *Horologion* preserve the names of the typesetters who worked on the book: in the Spassky chamber worked Petr Efimov, Khariton Evfimyev, and Vasily Markov, while in the Nikolsky chamber worked Semen Mordvinov, Fedot Minin, and Merkul Lebedev (Δ, 90. Λ. 59a–61b). The total amount of the “sovereign’s compensation” paid to the employees of the Print Yard⁵¹ for the edition amounted to 283 rubles, 28 altyns, and 4 dengas (Δ, 91. Λ. 73b)⁵².

After the completion of printing, the administration of the Moscow Print Yard determined the number of copies to be distributed free of charge. The number of such copies was usually divided into two unequal parts: the smaller portion was given to the tsar and the patriarch, while the larger portion was distributed to employees of the Department of Printed Books in recognition of their work on the edition. In the case of the December *Horologion* of 1689, the number of presentation copies was limited to three bound and specially decorated books prepared for the Moscow Patriarch Patriarch Joachim of Moscow, of which one was “a book with gilt edges, two books with floral decoration” (D. 91, fol. 74a). The practice of presenting copies solely to the patriarch became typical in

⁵¹ The sum of the “allocation” for printing in the Moscow printing house (“tsar’s salary”) was determined by a sworn officer or chief clerk who maintained financial reporting of the Department of Printing Books. The total funds included portions of annual payments to workers involved in book production (see: Пушков В.П. Книжное дело на Московском Печатном дворе по отчетам целовальников за первую половину 1660-х гг. // Поздеева И.В., Пушков В.П., Дадыкин А.В. Московский печатный двор — факт и фактор русской культуры. 1652–1700 гг. Кн. 1. М., 2007. С. 181).

⁵² It should be noted that this sum also included financial support for teachers and students of the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy, which was partially funded through the Department of Printing Books.

the 1680s–1690s, when such books were practically no longer offered to the tsars. Only among the editions of March 1681 (D. 75, fol. 176a), December 1683 (D. 81, fol. 85a), and April 1696 (D. 91, fol. 237b) were there copies presented to the monarch.

Another feature of the free distribution of copies of the December 1689 *Horologion* was the absence among its recipients of the Order of the Great Palace, which was connected with a decree issued by Patriarch Joachim of Moscow on 27 November 1689. This decree clarified the procedure for the free distribution of copies of the newly issued *Psalter with Offices*. In the Patriarch's directive, it was stated that "those newly issued books in quires which are not presented to the great sovereigns shall not be issued free of charge from the Order of Printed Books to the Order of the Great Palace"⁵³. It should be noted that the last *Horologion* edition whose copies were distributed both to the tsar and to the Order of the Great Palace was the December 1683 *Horologion* (D. 81, fol. 85a), which indicates that such a distribution regime had existed several years before Patriarch Joachim's decree. As in the case of presentation copies to the tsar, the situation changed in the following decade, when among the *Horologia* printed in the 1690s only the July 1700 edition did not allocate 50 copies to this state institution⁵⁴.

In addition to payment for their work, copies of the December 1689 *Horologion* were distributed to the following employees of the Department of Printed Books: the supervisors — hegumen Sergius⁵⁵ and clerk Andrei Mikhailov⁵⁶ — each receiving "four bound books with floral decoration" (Д. 91. Л. 74b). Three proofreaders were

⁵³ Поздеева И.В., Пушков В.П., Дадыкин А.В. Московский печатный двор — факт и фактор русской культуры. 1652–1700 гг. Кн. 2. М., 2011. С. 557.

⁵⁴ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Д. 194. Л. 1а–5а.

⁵⁵ The former hegumen of the Putivl Molchensky monastery Sergius worked for many years at the Moscow Printing Yard as a corrector. He held a leading position in the printing house from 23 August 1687 to August 1694, and also from September 1695 to August 1697. See: Дадыкин А.В. Сотрудники Московского печатного двора второй половины XVII века. Именной список // Труды Научной библиотеки МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова. М., 2017. Вып. 2. С. 62.

⁵⁶ Andrey Mikhailov was a clerk at the Moscow Printing Yard from 7 November 1688 to 1689, from September 1690 to August 1694, and from September 1695 to 18 January 1700 (ibid. p. 59).

granted “four bound books each” (ibid.); “three clerks, two readers, and one scribe received four books in quires each” (ibid.). In the Correcting Chamber, “two books were kept: a clean copy and an annotated copy, bound, for translation” (ibid., A. 75a). The colouring of the book-block edges and the floral blind-stamping, as well as traces of gilding on the binding boards of the БМСТ copy under study, indicate that it belonged to the group of ten copies issued with floral-decorated bindings. However, the incorrect sequence of quires excludes the possibility that this copy belonged to Patriarch Joachim, to whom two copies of this type of binding were presented.

After determining the number of copies distributed free of charge, the sale price of an unbound copy (“in quires”) was established. The price was determined on the basis of expenditure data submitted by the Print Yard administration to the patriarch. A “Book Extract” in tabular form⁵⁷ was presented to him for review. After the report, the clerk of the Department of Printed Books entered in the Book Extract a note indicating the fixed sale price. In most cases, for small-format Horologia of the 1680s–1690s, the markup amounted to one third of the production cost. The December 1689 edition was no exception: with a production cost of 5 altyns (15 kopecks), its selling price was set at “two grivnas per book” (20 kopecks) (ibid. A. 75b). The data on printing costs together with the fixed selling price were recorded in the copy books of the Register of Newly Issued Books.

In the 1680s, a Book Extract was submitted to the Patriarch after the completion of a publication in two versions: a short and an extended one. The short version contained only the total sum spent on the edition. This version was read aloud to the Patriarch,

⁵⁷ A Book Extract is the self-designation of the final accounting document containing a breakdown of printing expenses. It was compiled on the basis of the expenditure and inventory books (see: Дадыкин А.В. Документы приказа книгопечатного дела... С. 53.) This self-designation, for example, appears in the final summary document compiled upon completion of the printing of the April 1688 edition of the *Apostle* (РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Д. 85. Л. 1а). Another self-designation for this document was *Smetnoy spisok* (‘Estimate List’), as noted by A.V. Dadykin (Дадыкин А.В. Документы приказа книгопечатного дела... С. 53). The *knizhnaya vypiska* (‘book statement/extract’), which contained information on the expenses for printing the December 1689 *Horologion*, has not survived.

as indicated by the explicit heading “for report” on the short copy (see: *Book records concerning the publication of instructional Psalters* <M., March 1684> and <M., August 1684>, *the large lectern Horologion* <M., 24 March 1688> and the *Apostle* <M., 18 April 1688>)⁵⁸. It should be noted that in the short versions of the Book Extracts concerning the instructional Psalters of March and August 1684, price notes were recorded, unlike in the comparable documents for the large lectern *Horologion* and the *Apostol*⁵⁹. *The extended version contained detailed information on production costs and was typically the one in which the clerk entered the note specifying the selling price.*

The profit from the sale of the December 1689 Horologion in the Print Yard bookshop amounted to 237 rubles, 18 altyns, and 2 den-gas (Δ. 91. Λ. 75b). This sum is comparable to the revenue from ten days of trade in the *Horologia* printed in December 1683 and September 1684, which amounted to 234 rubles, 10 altyns (*ibid.*, Λ. 86b) and 236 rubles, 10 altyns (*ibid.*, Λ. 126b), respectively. Given the identical pricing of all three books, it may be assumed that the profit from the December 1689 edition likewise corresponds to the same time span. Another conclusion that can be drawn from comparing the revenues of these editions is that small-format *Horologia* printed without red ink were in equally high demand among buyers of Print Yard publications as books printed in two colours.

Thus, the *Horologion* (РГАДА. БМСТ/СПК № 2342) was issued in December 1689. At present, it is the only known surviving copy of an edition otherwise attested solely in the documents of the Department of Printed Books. The discovery of a previously unrecorded edition with precisely established publication data provides new possibilities for dating defective copies of *Horologia* and broadens our understanding of the repertoire of the Print Yard. This, in turn, sheds light not only on the history of book printing in Moscow but also on aspects of the development of seventeenth-century Russian culture. It is noteworthy that only materials from this archival fund made it possible to establish the time of publication of this *Horologion*.

⁵⁸ See, respectively: РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Δ. 237. Λ. 6a; Δ. 55. Λ. 7a–8a; Δ. 275. Λ. 8a; Δ. 85. Λ. 9a.

⁵⁹ РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Оп. 3. Δ. 237. Λ. 6a; Δ. 55. Λ. 7a–8a

Appendix 1⁶⁰

Horologion. — Moscow: Print Yard, October 17 — December 12, 1689 (7198)

Signatures: [*]⁶⁺¹—[*]⁴⁺², 1⁸—38⁸. — 8⁰. — 1—13, 1—304.—
Lines: 13.

Typeface (Arsenius): 10 lines = 84 mm.

Type area: 105 x 69 mm.

Printing: Single-color (black ink).

Running titles: Without decorative embellishments.

Page numbers (catchwords/folio numbers): Placed in the upper right corner of each leaf.

Copy condition: Incomplete — leaves 1 and 6 of the first foliation are missing. Due to a binding error, the order of quires is mixed up: quires XVI and XVII (leaves 121–136) are bound after quire XVIII (leaves 137–144). On leaf 12b, there is the only inscription found in the book. Traces of blue pigment application remain on the edges of the book block, with small "flowers" stamped/embossed into it. The binding shows traces of gilding. The structural integrity of the book block is compromised, and the leather on the covers is noticeably worn. The lower clasp is missing.

Decorative ornamentation:

— Engravings: leaf 8a (1st foliation) — (Hand with the sign of the cross/hand making the sign of the cross).

— Headpieces (ornamental vignettes):

— leaf 2a (1st foliation), 244b, 279b, 299a (2nd foliation) — <Зернова (Zernova) 1963, No. 28>

— leaf 8a (1st foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 91>

— leaf 1a, 31b, 35a (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 106>

— leaf 4a (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 65>

⁶⁰ Since to date the December 1689 edition of the *Horologion* is known only from the copy held at БМСТ/СПК № 2342, its description necessarily serves simultaneously as the description of the edition itself. Possible corrections to the leaf formula of this *Horologion* can only be made after the discovery of other copies of the December edition. The description of the copy has been carried out under the influence of the principles for processing early printed books proposed by A.A. Guseva.

— leaf 27a, 109b, 168a, 253b (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 104>

— leaf 83a (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 99, not previously listed as used in the *Horologia*>

— leaf 97a, 134a (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 105>

— leaf 127b (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 104a>

— leaf 169b, 225b, 275a (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1963, No. 51, with trimmed/cropped edges, not previously listed as used in the *Horologia*>

— leaf 146b (2nd foliation) — <Зернова 1952, No. 374>

— Lombards (ornamental initials):

Leaf 8a (1st foliation) — (Π), 4a (ΙΙ) (2nd foliation), 6a (Π), 8b (Β), 14b (Β), 15a (Γ), 18b (Β), 19b (C), 21b (Π), 35b (Υ)??, 36b (Γ), 40b (Γ), 41b (Γ), 44a (Β), 46a (Γ), 48b (Β), 51a (Γ), 57b (X), 59b (Β), 60b (X), 71b (Γ), 73b (Γ), 75b (M), 80b (ΙΙ), 83a (ΙΙ), 85a (Υ), 87a (K), 89b (Π), 95a (ΙΙ), 96b (Β), 97a (Β), 97b (Β), 100b (Ж), 106b (Β), 109b (Β), 112b (X), 117a (Β), 125a (Β), 131b (Β), 134a (K), 136a (Β), 137b (Π), 142b (ΙΙ), 144a (Β), 147a (Β), 152a (Γ), 154a (Γ), 170a (Β), 171a (Γ), 172b (Δ), 173b (K), 176a (H), 179b (Ж), 186b (Β), 193a (Γ), 194b (Π), 197a (Γ), 200a (Γ), 204b (Β), 205a (Β), 205b (Γ), 215a (H), 218a (ΙΙ), 220a (Β), 222b (H), 225b (ΙΙ), 227b (Π), 230a (Β), 230b (Γ), 235a (Β), 238a (ΙΙ), 239a (H), 242a (ΙΙ), 288b (Β)

Contents

Leaf 1a (1st foliation) — Title page / imprint leaf (containing publication data); (*missing*)

Leaf 2a–7a — Preface to the *Horologion*;

Leaf 8a–13b — The ancient tradition of the h(ol)y ap(o)s(t)les and holy fathers: how every Orthodox Christian ought to arrange the fingers of his hand upon his face for the sign of the h(ol)y cr(oss), and which fingers to join together, and how to depict it upon oneself;

Leaf 1a–34b (2nd foliation) — Midnight Office;

Leaf 35a–82b — Matins and the First Hour;

Leaf 83a–96b — The beginning of the Hours. The Third Hour;

Leaf 97a–109a — The Sixth Hour;

Leaf 109b–127a — The Typica;

Leaf 127b–133b — The Rite of the Panagia;

Leaf 134a–146a — The Ninth Hour;

Leaf 146b–167b — Vespers;

Leaf 168a–169a — [Prayers upon entering the refectory] "When entering the refectory, we say...";

Leaf 169b–225a — Great Compline;

Leaf 225b–244a — Little Compline;

Leaf 244b–253a — S(u)nday Dismissal Troparia of the Eight Tones, with Theotokia (hymns to the Mother of God);

Leaf 253b–274b — Dismissal Theotokia sung throughout the entire year, at Vespers, at "God is the Lord," at Matins, and again at the end of Matins;

Leaf 275a–279a — Daily Dismissal Troparia for the entire week;

Leaf 279b–298b — The Order of the General Prayer;

Leaf 299a–304a — S(u)nday Troparia sung after the "Blameless" on Sundays throughout the entire year.

Appendix 2⁶¹

Entry from October 16, 1689, from the Inventory Book for 1689–1696

On October 16, in the year 198, the typesetter Petr Efimov received from the clerk Petr Artemyev, in the Spasskaya Chamber, for the printing of small *Horologia* without cinnabar (red ink), for four runs per press, for eight quires, eighty reams. For the packing/blanketing: two quires; and for the [inking] padding: eight quires; sixteen [sheep]skins for the press blankets; 260 nails; and for the press counterweights, two pieces of cloth per press — 200 arshins. Large candles: ninety-six; and smaller ones: eighty; oil: five pounds; wheat flour: a quarter, five altyns; for the cloth [used] on each press: four straps. Additionally, for lye: three baskets of ash, one bucket of drying oil, two bundles of large candles; and to the (Print) Office: two rolls of [fine calfskin] for the seventh press⁶².

РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Д. 90. Л. 59a

⁶¹ This publication has been prepared in accordance with the recommendations of *Правила издания исторических источников* (Moscow, 2020) for preparing documents from the 17th century for print.

⁶² Written in a different hand.

**Entry on the commencement of printing of the *Horologion*
without cinnabar, dated October 17, 1689, from the *Registry*
Book of Newly Published Books for 1689–1696**

In the current year 198, on October 17, by the decree of the Great Sovereigns, Tsars and Grand Princes Ioann Alekseyevich and Peter Alekseyevich, Autocrats of all Great, Little, and White Russia, and with the blessing of the Great Lord, the Most Holy Patriarch Kyr Joachim of Moscow and all Russia and all the northern lands, at the Book Print Yard, work commenced on printing the *Horologia* in quarto, using the Nikitin typeface, in the Spasskaya and Nikolskaya Chambers, on eight presses, at a run of 4,800 books. These *Horologia* without cinnabar came out of the press in the current year 198, on December⁶³. Each book contains 40 quires.

РГАДА. Ф. 1182. Д. 91. Л. 70b

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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⁶³ Date not indicated.

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The "New Siberian Course" of Peter I and A.A. Winius (1695–1700)

Abstract

This article examines the complex of measures regarding Siberia that were implemented between 1695 and 1700. This policy was shaped with the active participation of Peter I and became one of the first instances of the Tsar's intervention in Russia's domestic politics. The author analyzes the role of Peter I and A.A. Winius in the formulation and implementation of this policy, highlighting its driving motives and key stages. The main factors that prompted the Russian government to address Siberia's problems were the decline in Siberian revenues and the demand for metal for coinage, which once again raised the issue of industrial exploitation of Nerchinsk silver. The main reason for the shortfall in Siberian revenues was the crisis in the fur trade in Siberia, which gradually worsened towards the end of the 17th century. However, A.A. Winius believed that it was primarily caused by the arbitrary behavior and theft by Siberian voivodes, which led to a change in the principles of appointing them in Siberia

and to a kind of an "anti-voivode" policy associated with tightening customs policies and control over the voivodes' activities. However, this policy did not lead to an increase in Siberian revenues in the first two years of its implementation, which was clearly demonstrated by the problems with providing the Grand Embassy with a "fur treasury" in 1697–1698. This became one of the incentives for A.A. Winius to more deeply study the problems of Siberia, which led to the publication of the *Assessment Book of Siberia* and to cartographic work with the active participation of Semyon Remezov. The low effectiveness of this policy ultimately changed A.A. Winius's approach, who decided to compensate for the decline in Siberian revenues by developing Ural metallurgy, no longer limited to the extraction of Nerchinsk silver but to the construction of ironworks. An undeniably positive aspect of this policy was the establishment of metallurgical production in the Urals and Siberia, which laid the foundation for the development of a new industrial region in the east of the country.

Keywords:

Siberian policy; Metallurgy of the Urals and Siberia; Fur trade; Grand Embassy; Siberian trade, Siberian voivodes; A.A. Winius; S.U. Remezov

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Unfortunately, the complex of state measures taken in Siberia at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries is still perceived primarily as a series of isolated, disparate actions, with little connection to the Tsar himself.

In our recent work, we attempted to overcome these established stereotypes¹, but due to the peculiarities of its structure, individual links of the “New Siberian Course” described there were scattered across different chapters, which makes it difficult to perceive it as a whole.

This article aims to summarize this material, adding new details, and present a comprehensive picture of the “New Siberian Course” that took shape in 1695–1698 and became one of the first serious manifestations of the Tsar's active intervention in the country's domestic political development, beginning in the first months of his independent reign. Much of this picture is open to debate and will undoubtedly stimulate a more detailed study of the Siberian policy at the turn of the century, allowing for a more accurate assessment.

* * *

The main reason for the transition to the new course was the problem of profitability from the management of Siberia, which gradually increased in the 1670s–1680s and reached a peak in the mid-1690s.

Probably, by the beginning of the 1690s, a crisis in fur production in Siberia had already begun to clearly emerge, caused by almost a century of predatory sable hunting (the “exhaustion” and “extinction of large-scale fur trades” by the end of the 17th century, as E.V. Vershinin noted²), as well as a more complex set of fac-

¹ Петрухинцев Н.Н. «Начало славных дел»: первые преобразования Петра I в контексте внешней и внутренней политики России (1682 — рубеж XVII–XVIII вв.). Очерки по истории ранних реформ Петра I. М.: РОССПЭН. 2022.

² Вершинин Е.В. Русская колонизация Северо-Западной Сибири в конце XVI — XVII вв. Екатеринбург. Демидовский институт. 2018. С. 324–325; 289.

tors associated with the characteristics of the fur trade during this period of time³. Despite the fact that the state has been constantly increasing its share in sable hunting⁴, limiting private industry and private trade and reducing the private merchant segment, in the 1680s, the sables harvested decreased from 39.3% to 28.6% compared to the 1660s. During the same period, the average annual number of pelts entering the treasury decreased by half (from 60.2 thousand to 30.2 thousand). The annual state income from the sable trade (at Siberian prices) had already fallen from 104.7 to 71 thousand rubles in the 1680s compared to the middle of the century, and the decline continued in the 1690s (in 1699, the state and private hunters combined harvested only 58 thousand rubles' worth of sables)⁵. According to P.N. Pavlov, "by the end of the 17th century... sable harvest, compared to the middle of the century, had decreased 4 times in price and 5–6 times in quantity"⁶.

Moreover, the quality of the sable arriving at the Siberian Prikaz (= State Department of Siberian Affairs. — *Editor*) began to deteriorate sharply, and a trend toward overpricing state-issued sables emerged, the sables being increasingly used for payments at these inflated prices. This price gouging began as early as the receipt and appraisal of pelts by Siberian authorities, who found increasingly less high-quality fur and sought to inflate prices, if only to avoid a shortfall in revenue.

The crisis in Siberian revenues was probably one of the most important reasons for the failure and gradual decline in the 1667–1670s of the military reforms of the late 1650s–1660s in Siberia aimed at creating regiments of the "new order", which worsened with the return to silver currency, as well as the general crisis in the financing of military structures in Siberia, which had already become apparent in the early 1670s and, naturally, only deteriorated in the

³ Павлов П.Н. Пушной промысел в Сибири в XVII в. [Учеб. пособие]. Красноярск. [б. и.] 1972. С. 304.

⁴ Naturally, the main part of it consisted of collections from the yasak-paying population.

⁵ Ibid. С. 106. Табл. 12.

⁶ Ibid. С. 302.



Collection of yasak (fur tribute).

Drawing from the «Remezov Chronicle», 17th — early 18th century.

From open sources

1670s—early 1690s.⁷ According to A.A. Winius (a.k.a. Vinius. — *Editor*), the shortage of Siberian revenues for the salaries of local service people in the 1690s led to the government being forced to send at least 130 thousand rubles over 10–12 years to pay their salaries from sources other than the Siberian Prikaz⁸. Thus, the clearly visible deficit in the Siberian budget became one of the main reasons for the transition to a new course, aimed primarily at identifying its causes and overcoming them.

Another impetus for the change could have been problems related to monetary circulation: with the beginning of Peter's reign in 1694, the minting of silver coins increased sharply. Between

⁷ Никитин Н.И. Государственное обеспечение гарнизонов Тобольского разряда в XVII веке. // Общественно-политическое развитие феодальной России. М., 1985. С. 58–62; Дмитриев А.В. Войска «нового строя» в Сибири... С. 133–147; 152–185.

⁸ Милюков С.Г. Неизвестное послание А.А. Вiniusа к Петру Первому // Документ. Архив. История. Современность. Сборник научных трудов. Вып. 10 / Уральский госуниверситет им. А.М. Горького. Екатеринбург: Изд-во Уральского университета, 2010. С. 252.

1694 and 1697, compared to the same period of 1690 and 1693, their output doubled (by 1.99 times) with the average annual minting volume increasing from 218,218 to 434,250 rubles⁹, and this, of course, stimulated the search for sources of silver, and the intensive military campaigns that were beginning — the search for ores of other metals.

The combination of these two factors led to the “Siberian problem” coming to the attention of Peter I already at the earliest stages of his reforms, probably prompted by the foreign part of Peter’s “company”, which was most influential in 1695–1697.

* * *

The beginning of the "New Siberian Course" became apparent on the eve of Peter's first Azov campaign, and the immediate impetus for it was likely the Tsar's contacts with Ides Evert Ysbrant. Ysbrant returned to Moscow from his embassy to China on February 2, 1695¹⁰, and, probably, in February–March 1695, had conversations with Peter and reported to him on the results of the embassy, along with his thoughts on the state of Siberia. Under the influence of these conversations, a false conclusion was drawn that the main problem of the Siberian financial deficit was not the objectively existing crisis in the fur trade, but the abuses of Siberian voivodes — which undoubtedly occurred and also contributed to it. A.A. Winius later directly testified to this: “The foreigner Ysbrant, who was sent by Your Grace to the Khin kingdom, faithfully reported to Your Majesty, both orally and in writing, and having traveled through Siberia twice, having seen countless disturbances there, reported to Your Majesty”, prophetically adding that “those embittered ones, having risen up in arms, would kill and depart to a distant land, or, having fallen into despair, would perish”¹¹.

⁹ Calculated from: Юхт А.И. Русские деньги от Петра Великого до Александра I. М., Финансы и статистика. 1994. С. 11.

¹⁰ Гордон П. Дневник. 1690–1695. М.: Наука. 2009. С. 252.

¹¹ Милюков С.Г. Неизвестное послание А.А. Виниуса ... С. 252.



A.A. Vinius. Self-portrait.
From open sources

Ysbrant also raised the issue of Nerchinsk silver. This problem had been outlined as early as 1677 by B.P. Sheremetev's father, P.V. Sheremetev (who had been the Tobolsk voivode during his tenure) and remained relevant throughout the 1680s, being one of the objects of close attention of I.B. Repnin in the Siberian Prikaz. It also became one of the objectives of F.A. Golovin's mission to Siberia in 1686–1688, who was closely involved in this issue during the conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk¹². In 1688–1689, a decision was made to build a silver smelter in Nerchinsk. This failed due to the technical impossibility of ensuring the plant's profitability given the labor shortage and the financial shortage of the Siberian Prikaz, whose revenues were already insufficient to cover the salaries of Siberian service personnel. Consequently, the mining and processing of Nerchinsk ores effectively ceased in 1692¹³.

¹² Курлаев Е.А., Манькова Е.А. Освоение рудных месторождений Урала и Сибири в XVII веке (у истоков российской промышленной политики). М.: Древлехранилище, 2005. С. 254; Изгачев В.Г. Строительство первого Аргунского сереброплавильного-завода в XVII в. // Ученые записки Забайкальского государственного гуманитарно-педагогического университета им. Н.Г. Чернышевского. 2009. № 3. С. 11–13.

¹³ Курлаев Е.А. Манькова Е.А. Освоение... С. 266–271, 273–284.

However, by this time, F.A. Golovin had probably already become convinced of the less than encouraging prospects for developing the Nerchinsk mines, and the issue was most likely revived by Ysbrant himself — in his own words, “I brought a sample of ore to Muscovy, and I have no doubt that His Majesty will soon order the resumption of mining”¹⁴.

All this undoubtedly stimulated the Tsar’s desire for changes in Siberian policy.

But the Siberian Prikaz, intermittently, since 1679¹⁵, was headed by I.B. Repnin. He was familiar with the local problems firsthand: in 1670–1673, he was the voivode of Tobolsk¹⁶, ruling actually all of Western Siberia, but by 1695 the almost 78-year-old boyar was increasingly losing his ability to act; according to contemporaries, by the end of 1696, “Prince Ivan Borisovich was still in the Siberian Prikaz, but they say that he has become decrepit, they carry him around in a chair”¹⁷. It became clear that the New Course regarding Siberia required new people for its implementation.

It’s hardly a coincidence that its beginning was linked to a new stage in the rise of A.A. Winus. Winus was assigned to the Siberian Prikaz as I.B. Repnin’s assistant shortly after the Tsar’s conversations with Ysbrant — most likely, his transfer occurred simultaneously with or immediately after his promotion to Duma clerk (*dyak*) on March 24, 1695¹⁸, which Winus himself later directly testified to: “when ... the boyar and truly faithful zealot Prince Ivan Borisovich Repnin, due to his old age and illness, came to the extreme exhaustion, and the state of Siberia, the government there of *the evil, venal*

¹⁴ Ibid. С. 285.

¹⁵ Лисейцев Д.В., Рогожин Н.М., Эскин Ю.М. Приказы Московского государства XVI–XVII вв. Словарь-справочник. М.; СПб: Центр гуманитарных инициатив, 2015. С. 173.

¹⁶ Дмитриев А.В. Войска «нового строя» в Сибири во второй половине XVII века. Новосибирск, 2008. С. 116–122.

¹⁷ Письмо енисейского сына боярского красоярскому воеводе С.И. Дурново от 8 июля 1697 г. // Зольникова Н.Д. «Что своему брату учинишь, такожде и сам приимешь»: грамотки и челобитные красоярскому воеводе С.И. Дурново. 1696–1698 гг. // Исторический архив. 1993. № 5. С. 194.

¹⁸ Marshall T. Poe. The Russian Elite ... Vol. 1. P. 333.

voivodes reached a desperate and destructive state", the sovereign "deigned to send me to the Siberian chancery to that aforementioned boyar for assistance and *correction* in many fallen matters as a *Duma clerk* by His high word"¹⁹.

This marked another step in strengthening the position of the foreign part of Peter the Great's "company" and significantly elevated Winius's own status in Russian society; Winius immediately began displaying it publicly. V.E. Bulatov notes that Winius abandoned the European version of his old Friesland family coat of arms and developed a new version, more in keeping with Russian realities: instead of the round helmet with a crest in the form of five ears of grain that crowned the previous coat of arms, a noble crown appeared, and the cloven Spanish shield in the right field acquired half of a double-headed eagle (the symbol of the Russian state), and in the left — a hand with a sword (a symbol of honor and loyalty to the Tsar). V.E. Bulatov dates the appearance of this coat of arms to 1694, but the combination of the Latin letters "D.D." ("Duma Dyak") and "A.W." ("Andrei Winius") testifies that the coat of arms most likely appeared in 1695²⁰.


It was Winius, who probably fully shared the assessments of Ysbrant, the latter possibly only conveying to the Tsar Winius's position on the disastrousness of the omnipotence of "bribe-taking voivodes" for Siberia, who was entrusted with the implementation of the new course.

As a result, four days before the Tsar's departure for the First Azov Campaign, a new policy towards Siberia was launched.

On April 24, 1695, Peter received a report on Nerchinsk silver along with ore samples, a matter which he had ordered shortly before to be transferred from the Streletsky to the Siberian Prikaz with Winius appointed to it, and already on April 27, the first 10 pounds of ore were sent abroad for research with the foreigner Vladimir Fangever, and on August 25, 1695, encouraging test results arrived

¹⁹ Миллюков С.Г. Опр. cit. С. 251.

²⁰ Булатов В.Э. Формирование геральдических изображений сибирских городов (по материалам Окладной книги Сибири 1697 г.) // Гербоведение. Том IV. М.: Старая Басманная, 2015. С. 32–33.



Map of the lands of the town of Nerchinsk.
 «Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri» (Drafting Book of Siberia) by S.U. Remezov. Folio 94

from Amsterdam with a conclusion on the prospects of building a silver smelting works²¹. Winius was likely familiar with the problem of Nerchinsk silver firsthand; the first phase of construction of the Nerchinsk silver smelting works in 1689–1692 was associated with the active participation of Vologda-born "ore prospector" Ya. G. Galkin, who "for many years, in company with Andrei Winius and alone, explored and smelted various ores in the Perm and Ural mines"²².

On April 24, 1695, the first decree appeared, which outlined new trends in the governance of Siberia — on the extension of the term of voivodeships in Siberian cities ("henceforth in Siberian towns, except for Tobolsk, voivodes will serve, against previous years, 4, 5,

²¹ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1511.

²² Изгачев В.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 12–13.

6 years and more, depending on the person”, and if the voivode collects revenues “zealously and in full”, in “Siberian towns *there will not be frequent changes for the voivodes* for the fact that from such frequent changes... the treasury began to experience *great shortfalls* and in all incomes depletion...”)²³ [from here on, the cursive and internal numbering are ours. — N.P.].

The decree of April 24, 1695, which drastically changed the traditional practice of appointing voivodes (with a standard term of two years), could not have been issued without the direct sanction of the Tsar, who, in fact, initiated it. Most passages in this decree likely reflected the opinion of the Tsar (consulted and directed by Winius) about the excessive abuses of the Siberian voivodes; the voivodes:

a) "transport large quantities of wine and many goods to Siberia, and, moreover, distill wine in Siberia and make great profit from that wine", reducing the state revenue from wine sales with their taverns;

b) "take large bribes" from collectors of the yasak treasury, "and, having selected the best sables for themselves, give the worst ones to the sovereign's treasury"; c) with their selfish and violent policies have alienated the yasak-paying population, part of which went “to the Mungals” and now raids and robs the Tsar’s servicemen and yasak-paying people²⁴.

The decree of April 24, 1695 outlined a course of action to combat abuses within the Siberian voivodeship administration, which unfolded in the coming years, likely with the active participation (and most likely even leadership) of A.A. Winius, who was initially formally concealed behind the figure of the Prikaz head, I.B. Repnin. Such a course inevitably led to clashes with influential individuals and families, and the newly appointed Duma clerk would hardly have dared to undertake this without the support of the Tsar, with whom he was at the height of favor at the time.

This course soon received additional justification in the events that unfolded almost immediately: on May 16, 1695, the

²³ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1511.

²⁴ Ibid. C. 203.



The Mansi bring tribute to Yermak.
From open sources

“Krasnoyarsk Riot” (*Shatost*) began, resulting in the expulsion of the local voivode and the transfer of Krasnoyarsk for three years under the control of elected representatives of local service people, who consistently rejected and expelled the voivodes sent to replace A.I. Bashkovsky, even though those voivodes were supported by the Tobolsk voivode, stolnik A.F. Naryshkin, while fulfilling their primary duties to the state²⁵.

As a result, in the development of the April decree, even before Peter I returned from the campaign, another decree appeared on September 21, 1695, tightening customs controls on the borders of Siberia concerning the passage of people with goods from Siberia

²⁵ Оглоблин Н.Н. Красноярский бунт 1695–1698 гг. (к истории народных движений XVII века) // Журнал Министерства народного просвещения. (ЖМНП). 1901. Ч. CCCXXXV (№ 5), май. Отд. 2. С. 26–70; Зольникова Н.Д. «Что своему брату учинишь...». С. 192.

only through Verkhoturys, closing the roads through Kazan and Kungur under the threat of confiscation of goods²⁶.

* * *

But the main set of decrees developing the new course appeared in the autumn of 1695 — spring of 1696 during Peter I's stay in Moscow between the First and Second Azov campaigns.

The main provisions of the decree of April 24, 1695 were expanded and specified: by the decree of November 27, 1695, the Irbit Fair became the main center of trade, where stricter control over the tax collection was introduced; on December 18, 1695, an edict was issued stating that "in sending yasak treasuries to Moscow, the amount of fur compared to previous years *have been diminished by much*", and the overvaluation of furs, both in Siberia and later in Moscow, leads to the fact that "that is why service people of every rank, who are given the sovereign's salary, ... report that they lose money from selling those sables and *they can't earn half the money*". Following this, a decree was issued on the eve of Christmas on December 24, 1695, on strict control over the voivodes at the Verkhoturys customs office and the confiscation of excess belongings from the voivodes and their "acquaintances", who were threatened with the death penalty for transporting the voivodes' belongings²⁷. Two days later, on December 26, 1695, a decree was issued on the protection of the yasak population from the tyranny of local administrators and the abolition of torture and execution of Siberian yasak-paying foreigners²⁸.

A series of specific decrees detailing the "New Course" in relation to the Siberian voivodeship administration was continued in January–February 1696²⁹: One of these decrees required merchants trading in Siberia to provide information on the duties

²⁶ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1518.

²⁷ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1520, 1522, 1523.

²⁸ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1527.

²⁹ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1529, 1531, 1532, 1533, 1534, 1535, 1541, 1542.

they paid in Nerchinsk, Yakutsk, and Irkutsk to the voivodes I.P., M.M., and I.M. Gagarin, to report on whether the voivodes sent their relatives and acquaintances with their goods in caravans to China, and whether the merchants smuggled in the voivodes' goods³⁰.

The "anti-voivode course" in Siberia bore its first fruits, reviving local hopes for justice: it was probably during these months that Peter received a delegation of representatives of the yasak population, who threatened a general uprising in the event of continued violence by the voivodes. This delegation, in March 1696, launched a mass investigation by D.L. Polyansky into the abuses of the Siberian voivodes: "Heeding prayers of theirs, Your Majesty, were so condescending that soon after this, for the purpose of investigation... You deigned to send the Duma clerk Danila Polyansky with full authority to Siberia"³¹. The ongoing unrest in Krasnoyarsk could have provided additional incentive for the investigation.

* * *

But the first year of strict customs control over Siberian trade and voivodes hardly improved the situation with the yasak treasury, which probably forced A.A. Winius to turn to a more serious and in-depth study of the problems of Siberia.

The first consequence of this was the decree of January 10, 1696 on the beginning of mapping Siberia³². The work began on collecting cartographic materials at the Siberian Prikaz, which naturally took time. This may have also given impetus to

³⁰ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1535.

³¹ Милюков С.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 255–256. However, Winius, writing a decade later, clearly made a chronological error, dating the petition to years 207–208 (September 1698–August 1700), corresponding to the period of D.L. Polyansky's investigation, but most likely not to the filing of the petition itself.

³² ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1532.

cartographic work in the field, and Semyon Remezov could have begun work on compiling the *Chorographic Book of Siberia*, intended for presentation to the sovereign and forming a picture of the Siberian river network as the backbone for subsequent cartographic work. According to L.A. Goldenberg, the first version of the book was ready by September 1, 1697 (the decree on mapping Siberia was received in Tobolsk on April 17, 1696, and Remezov had been on a campaign to Miass since April 10 and returned only at the end of September 1696). However, it is doubtful that the meticulous Remezov mistakenly put "7205" (1696) instead of "7206"³³ on the carefully prepared presentation copy, and it is possible that the contents of the book could have been formed before 1697.

It was probably then that the collection of materials for the compilation of the consolidated *Assessment Book of Siberia* began, which was supposed to provide an idea of the dynamics and structure of Siberian incomes, the work on which was clearly progressing at least as early as the summer of 1696.

At the same time, the collection of chronicle materials on the history of Russia and Siberia was also underway. It is possible that A.A. Winius had some connection with the compilation of the *Slavo-Russian Chronicle*, based on the *Book of Royal Degrees* and dating back to 1698. In any case, A.V. Sirenov drew attention to its close connection with the chronicle-based introduction to the *Assessment Book of Siberia of 1697*, which in fact directly borrowed the *Chronicle* materials³⁴. In Siberia, apparently at the same time, Remezov began his work on the *History of Siberia*, the main text of which L.A. Goldenberg, following A.I. Andreev, considers possible to date to 1697³⁵, which went on in parallel with the compilation of the *Chorographic Book*.

³³ Гольденберг Л.А. Изограф земли Сибирской. Жизнь и труды Семёна Ремезова. Магадан: Кн. изд-во, 1990. С. 110–111, 178–179.

³⁴ Сиренов А.В. Степенная книга и русская историческая мысль XVI–XVIII вв. М.; СПб.: Альянс-Архео, 2010. С. 337–339.

³⁵ Гольденберг Л.А. *Op. cit.* С. 219–220.

* * *

Another important link in the history of the “New Course” at the turn of 1696–1697, after Peter’s return from the Second Azov Campaign, was the preparation for the dispatch of the Grand Embassy.

The Siberian Prikaz did not have the originally planned amount of sable pelts worth 70 thousand rubles for the Embassy, and they issued only 40 thousand rubles worth, adding other furs and expensive fabrics against the rest of the amount³⁶. This is not at all surprising, since the average annual sable harvest had already fallen in value to 71 thousand rubles by the 1680s, and the Embassy needed not ordinary sables, but the high-quality “representative” ones.

But this made obvious the very modest successes of the “Siberian Course” and thus required explanations.

It is possible that the result was the acceleration of work on the *Assessment Book of Siberia of 1697*, preserved in the collections of the State Historical Museum³⁷, which was fundamentally different from the 1214 surviving individual assessment (tax) books of Siberian cities known to N.N. Ogloblin in its generalized data for the whole of Siberia³⁸, and, from the point of view of A.I. Andreev, who discovered it, it became “a real reference book, very useful for the current work of the Prikaz”³⁹.

Its publisher (V.E. Bulatov) noted that in the title, which stated that the book was “built” *during the service of the boyar Prince Ivan Borisovich Reprnin in the Siberian Prikaz, and during the time of the Duma clerk Andrei Andreevich Winius... in the current year 7205, and from the Nativity of our Lord God and Savior Jesus Christ in the year 1697*”, the role of A.A. Winius in its compilation was especially

³⁶ Ф. Лефорт. Сборник документов и материалов. М. Древлехранилище. 2006. С. 382.

³⁷ Окладная книга Сибири 1697 г. / Сост. В.Э. Булатов. М.: Государственный исторический музей. 2015. 294 с.; впервые описана — Наврот М.И. Окладная книга Сибири 1697 г. // Проблемы источниковедения Вып. V. М.: Изд-во АН СССР. 1956. С. 184–209.

³⁸ Наврот М.И. Окладная книга... С. 185; Булатов В.Э. Формирование геральдических изображений... С. 22.

³⁹ Андреев А.И. Очерки по источниковедению Сибири XVII в. Л., 1939. С. 72.



Title page of the Tax Assessment Book.
Tax Assessment Book of Siberia, 1697 / Compiled by V.E. Bulatov.
 Moscow: State Historical Museum

emphasized by highlighting the name (written "with *vich* at the end"), and it was Winius who had initiated its writing⁴⁰.

However, its small size (198 pages); a preliminary excursion into the history of Russian exploration of Siberia, using information from the *New Chronicle*; an unusual design; drawings and textual explanations of the new customs seals of Siberian cities (in the drawings of which V.E. Bulatov sees possible heraldic experiments of Winius himself, which formed the basis for almost a third of the future coats of arms of Siberian cities⁴¹), and the time of its

⁴⁰ Булатов В.Э. Формирование геральдических изображений... С. 21.

⁴¹ Ibid. С. 23–29. The appearance of these seals may have resulted from the tightening of customs control over Siberian trade carried out by Winius. For this purpose, on December 9, 1696, he secured the restoration of a special seal of the Siberian Prikaz; only documents and travel passes bearing this seal were valid for Siberian cities, without which no one was allowed into

compilation (before June 5, 1697, the death of I.B. Repnin) suggest that the copy may have been prepared as a gift for the Tsar himself, who was actively intervening in the Siberian problems. However, it was most likely not presented to the Tsar (possibly because its compilation was not completed before the departure of the Grand Embassy).

The book primarily provided information on recent affairs and the necessary additional argumentation to justify Peter I's "New Siberian Course". M.I. Navrot also noted that the "overall shortfall in yasak in all Siberian cities..." indicated in it was very large: out of 1,021 soroks of sables, only 475 were actually paid taxes on⁴², i.e. 46.9%. The deficit in funds for the salaries of service people in Siberia was determined at 50,420 rubles out of 62,541 rubles, i.e. 80.6%, partially covered (approximately 20 thousand rubles) by money sent from the Moscow revenues of the Siberian Prikaz⁴³ [ibid. P. 198–199], but still remaining at around 48.6%.

Therefore, immediately after the departure of the Grand Embassy on March 22, 1697, a state monopoly on the trade in sable and silver fox furs was effectively introduced, motivated by the fact that "the great sovereign's sable yasak treasury (used by many voivodes for their self-interest) *began to grow small compared to the previous years*, and the voivodes with their merchants and their (trusted) people sent many sables to Moscow and the Chinese state and other places for exchange and sale, and thereby enriched themselves beyond measure". In connection with this, by August 1, 1697, all merchants were ordered to sell their pelts, and then to resell only those purchased from the Siberian Prikaz with seals from it⁴⁴. The fight against inflated prices for state-owned sables also began; for the first time since the beginning of the century, they were assessed

Siberia. He also removed the Siberian Prikaz from the jurisdiction of the Seal Prikaz and abolished payment of sealing fees to the latter (ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1559). This special regime remained in force until the decree of December 5, 1699. (ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1727).

⁴² Наврот М.И. Окладная книга... С. 202, 199.

⁴³ Ibid. С. 198–199.

⁴⁴ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1578.

in Moscow *below* the Siberian price. If in 1690–1696 the Moscow price for sable fluctuated between 111 and 155% of the Siberian price (on average, exceeding the Siberian price by 28.6%), then in 1697 the Moscow price was 94%, and in 1698 — only 101% of the Siberian price⁴⁵.

It is hardly a coincidence that at the beginning of the new year (September 1, 1697) a change of some of the Siberian voivodes followed: in place of the Tobolsk voivodes, the relatives of the Tsar's stolniks Andrei Fedorovich Naryshkin and his son Andrei, who patronized the Krasnoyarsk voivodes rejected by the city⁴⁶, the Tsar sent Prince Mikhail Yakovlevich Cherkassky with his son Peter, and the Verkhotur voivode seat was to be given to stolnik Kozma Petrovich Kotov⁴⁷. M.Ya. Cherkassky successfully ruled in Tobolsk for another 10 years (from 1697 to 1710)⁴⁸, following the letter of the law of April 24, 1695, which had extended the terms of the Siberian voivodeship.

However, the picture of the enormous deficit revealed by the *Assessment Book* hardly inspired in A.A. Winius any particular hope for a sharp increase in the Siberian Prikaz's revenues, even if the "anti-voivodeship course" were strictly enforced. It's possible that the search for new sources of income drew his attention to the second aspect of the "New Siberian Course", which had been intensified before the departure of the Grand Embassy.

* * *

Financial problems and the need for artillery for the Azov fleet, which was just beginning to be built, stimulated the search for silver and copper ores at the turn of 1696–1697.

On December 12, 1696, a decree was issued to send the Greek Alexander Levandiadi with 10 people to Tomsk, Siberia, to search

⁴⁵ Calculated from: Павлов П.Н. Пушной промысел... С. 235, табл. 11.

⁴⁶ Зольникова Н.Д. *Op. cit.* С. 192.

⁴⁷ ПСЗРИ, 1830. Т. III. № 1594, 1595.

⁴⁸ Marshall T. Poe. *The Russian Elite ...* Vol. 1. P. 462.

for silver ore and expand the mines⁴⁹, and in the spring of 1697, the voivode appointed to Nerchinsk, S.F. Nikolev, was given orders to resume the extraction of Nerchinsk ore and to populate the region with people from the surrounding forts with the prospect of a possible construction of a silver smelter⁵⁰. No later than the beginning of March 1697, Lieutenant Colonel L.A. Neidhart, who had participated in the ore prospecting during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, was sent to Kazan with the task of searching for copper ores in the Volga region (“and to establish a large copper smelting factory, and extract copper ore and smelt copper with great zeal”)⁵¹. Nor did the Grand Embassy abandon hopes for the extraction of Nerchinsk silver. Nicolaes Witsen was actively involved in determining the quality of Nerchinsk ore. On September 1, 1696, he analyzed the samples of the ore sent to him in Amsterdam and found it promising (“it is believed that the mines are approximately equal in importance to the mines of Saxony”), and, apparently, upon the arrival of the Embassy, shared his assessments with F.A. Golovin, who told him “that he had been to the silver mines in Dauria and had seen old mines that had been active for many hundreds of years”⁵².

Winius, who was clearly involved in this, however, from the spring of 1697 placed his main bet on the more promising iron metallurgy in Siberia, which was facilitated by the deposits of magnetic ore discovered by that time, and “that magnetic ore ... is so rich that from 100 pounds of ore comes 30 or 40 pounds of the best iron”, moreover, “from that place to all Russian and Siberian cities all guns and iron can be sent by water”⁵³. Peter I's letter of April 20, received by him on May 3, 1697, actually sanctioned construction of metallurgical plants in Siberia, and with the reply letter of May 7, 1697, there began a long epic with persistent requests from Winius for the

⁴⁹ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1561.

⁵⁰ Курлаев Е.А., Манькова Е.А. Освоение... С. 285–286

⁵¹ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1579. С. 301, 292.

⁵² Витсен Николаас. Северная и Восточная Тартария, включающая области, расположенные в северной и восточной частях Европы и Азии. Т. I. Амстердам: Pegasus. 2010. С. 107–108.

⁵³ ПБПВ. Т. 1. С. 623.

Tsar to find craftsmen for new iron factories in the Grand Embassy, with which he maintained constant attention to his person and justified the slow progress of work in preparation for the construction of the factories⁵⁴.

On June 5, 1697, the head of the Siberian Prikaz, Prince I.B. Repnin, died. According to Winius, he parted with "great signs of heartfelt paternal love for me, as if with his closest relative"⁵⁵. Thus Winius "emerged from the shadow" of Repnin and became the formal head of the Siberian Prikaz, but was left without the protection of an influential boyar, which aroused his concerns — the Duma clerk may have asked the Tsar to dismiss him from leading the Prikaz, but it was denied⁵⁶. Realizing that drastic measures could pit Winius against serious opponents, the Tsar on December 31, 1697, entrusted him to the care of F. Yu. Romodanovsky: "Winius wrote that he should be under your protection; please do as I ask, according to his request"⁵⁷.

Immediately after the death of I.B. Repnin, Winius's policy of developing Ural metallurgy took shape: on June 10, 1697, a comprehensive decree was issued on preparations for the construction of an ironworks/foundry in Siberia⁵⁸. It was primarily aimed at satisfying internal Siberian needs: a) "so that cannons and grenades and all kinds of guns for the defense of the Siberian kingdom would be cast at those foundries"; b) "also to make and cast iron of all kinds (puddled, sheeted, roofing, pig iron) for sale in various cities toward the Kama salt mines"), but also provided for the possibility of sending products to Moscow. The decree envisaged a strategy of active ore prospecting by the local population ("and if through their labors and searches some good, profitable, and durable ores are found, then for that they will be granted a Crown fee"). Therefore, the construction of the foundry had to be preceded by careful preparation with a description of the area, routes with the cost of transportation, ore


⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Зольникова Н.Д. *Op. cit.* С. 195.

⁵⁶ Миллюков С.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 253.

⁵⁷ ПБПВ. Т. I. № 215. С. 228.

⁵⁸ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1588.



Map of the Nerchinsk silver works.

«Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri» (Drafting Book of Siberia) by S.U. Remezov. Folio 165

resources, and a search for craftsmen, "and until good craftsmen and factory owners are sent, *don't build dams and don't establish iron-works, and don't cause any burden to the district people*"⁵⁹.

The new course toward ore exploration and the development of metallurgy could have become an additional incentive for completing the program of mapping Siberia: by decree of September 20, 1697, Winius summoned Semyon Remezov to Moscow to compile a consolidated map of Siberia; however, he was able to arrive only almost a year later⁶⁰.

One of the reasons for his delay was other aspects of the course related to problems on the Siberian borders — the growing threat of raids by Kazakh nomads, which Remezov helped repel in 1696. Winius, apparently, was already planning the construction of

⁵⁹ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1588. С. 326.

⁶⁰ Гольденберг Л.А. *Op. cit.* С. 120.

a stone Tobolsk Kremlin in the spring of 1697 (a charter to this effect was received by A.F. Naryshkin as early as July 1697)⁶¹. A.Yu. Konev quite rightly points out that the stereotype that has developed in historiography about its “ceremonial and representative” functions, given the high cost of construction (44 thousand rubles) in the context of the Siberian budget deficit, is untenable, and the Tobolsk Kremlin was, first and foremost, a fortress, quite sufficient to repel nomads and less susceptible to fire hazard, which previously caused its constant reconstruction with unnecessary expenditure of funds⁶². It is surprising that Winius, who had a good idea of the state of Siberian revenues, decided to do this, but the point about the construction of a stone Tobolsk Kremlin was included in the order to the new Tobolsk voivode M. Ya. Cherkassky (paragraph 12). He pointed to the need for a gradual (“so that it was done *not suddenly* and there would not be a great burden for people; one needs to *little by little* to that stone enterprise the necessary supplies... collect and prepare”) and the cheapest option for its construction: “to make that building inexpensive; and to order the ... Tobolsk nobles to be in charge of that building and of all the supplies and stores”⁶³. One of such people was Remezov, who, under M.Ya. Cherkassky, was forced until May 9, 1698 to work on the plan and draw up the cheapest estimate, reducing the Kremlin to a minimum size with a modest height and thickness of the walls and towers; it still cost 44,225 rubles, which caused a new reminder from the Siberian Prikaz on September 8, 1698 about the need to save money⁶⁴. It is characteristic that at the same time, Winius was actively involved in the economic development of the Siberian Prikaz in Moscow: he built stone chambers for it, which may have saved the “fur treasury” in the fire of the “207th” (1698–1699).⁶⁵


⁶¹ Конев А.Ю. Тобольский кремль: дискуссионные вопросы «каменного городского строения» в Сибири. // Исторический вестник. 2024. Т. XLIX. С. 45.

⁶² Ibid. С. 55–57.

⁶³ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1594. С. 343–344.

⁶⁴ Гольденберг Л.А. Оp. cit. С. 118.

⁶⁵ Юркин И.Н. Андрей Андреевич Вinius. 1641–1716. М.: Наука, 2007. С. 231.



Tobolsk.

«Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri» (*Drafting Book of Siberia*) by S.U. Remezov. Folio 21

It's possible that another consequence of the growing danger on the borders (possibly somehow connected to the rebuilding of the Tobolsk fortress in stone) was the decree to create the Tobolsk Dragoon Regiment in Siberia. According to A.V. Dmitriev, the decree to form the Regiment was issued as early as December 22, 1697⁶⁶, and was probably transmitted to Siberia only on February 20, 1698. The Regiment not only restored the Siberian dragoons, who had been effectively abolished and merged with the Belomestnye Cossacks in 1689–1690, but for the first time was transformed into a real combat unit — a semi-regular regiment with a single command and structure, which had never been achieved at its formal creation in 1667–1668, but was now financed by a new additional tax of 30–50 kopecks on the local peasant and tradesman

⁶⁶ Дмитриев А.В. Войска «нового строя» в Сибири... С. 191.

population of Siberia.⁶⁷ It is possible that the mission of the exiled Christopher Lowenfelt, sent by A.F. Naryshkin to inspect the forts and settlements of the Tobolsk and Verkhoturys districts with the aim of developing measures for their strengthening, was also connected with this program of strengthening border defenses. The results of this mission were obtained in July–October 1697.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, while awaiting a possible order to send a new batch of sables to the Grand Embassy, Winius, on December 3, 1697, continued the fight against inflated prices when accepting them into the treasury, obliging the merchant who gouged the prices of sables during the appraisal, to buy back the pelts that had not been sold by the treasury in the last three years due to inflated prices (estimated at a total of 10 thousand rubles), which, “lying from year to year, fade” or cause complaints from service people who received their salaries in sable and were then forced to sell them at low prices⁶⁹. As a result, that year the Moscow price of sable pelts was lower than the Siberian price for the first time. On December 5, 1697, Winius sent the nobleman Ivan Kachanov to Tobolsk to take a census of households and survey the land⁷⁰. It was precisely during these days, on December 6, that Peter received a letter from Winius dated November 4, 1697, with news of the results of the New Course: a caravan had left China with 40,000 bolts of damask fabric and, possibly, “pure gold” carried by merchants; “the new voivodes are very meek”, and the abuses of the previous ones were becoming increasingly exposed, which was facilitated by the investigation of Danila Polyansky, “only his investigation has not yet reached Moscow”⁷¹.

Winius' letter, which inspired hopes for an increase in Siberian revenues, could have become an additional incentive for the order of December 10, 1697 “to send to the Great Embassy sables ... of good Siberian value... worth 10,000 rubles”⁷².

⁶⁷ Ibid. C. 185–187; 191–193.

⁶⁸ Гольденберг Л.А. *Op. cit.* C. 293.

⁶⁹ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1604.

⁷⁰ Ibid. № 1605.

⁷¹ ПБПВ. Т. I. С. 656.

⁷² ПДС. Т. VIII. Ст. 1137.

But even the dispatch of this relatively modest consignment caused serious difficulties.

Not all the sables received by the treasury were suitable for embassy expenses. As early as the 1680s, the average annual sable harvest by the state had fallen to 30,200 heads (71,000 rubles)⁷³; the average Siberian price for a sable pelt received by the treasury in the 1680s was 2.3 rubles. In a number of Western Siberian districts, the average Moscow price for a sable pelt in 1685 fluctuated between 69 and 79 kopecks, and only the Eastern Siberian sables could be valued between 3.2 and 3.9 rubles⁷⁴, and were suitable for ambassadorial gifts to individuals in pairs of sables, the price of which at the Grand Embassy usually started at 6.5–7 rubles per pair. Only the "best" and "good" sables, costing at least 2–3 rubles⁷⁵, were suitable for ambassadorial gifts (even when the sable was gifted in batches), and the Siberian Prikaz received very few of those. Moreover, in the 1690s, the quantity and quality of sables had clearly declined compared to 1680. At the same time, according to our calculations, during the Grand Embassy's stay in Europe, a total of 4,307 pelts were spent (mostly gifted) for a total of 31,749.5 rubles, meaning the average price of a sable was just under 7.4 rubles⁷⁶. It is not surprising that before the Embassy's departure, the Prikaz managed to scrape together only 40,000 rubles' worth of quality sables, and even assembling a second, four times smaller batch presented great difficulties, and therefore the sables were brought to Vienna by Vladimir Borzy just before the Embassy's return to Russia, only one day before the audience with the Tsar, on July 17, 1697.⁷⁷

⁷³ ПАВЛОВ П.Н. Пушной промысел... С. 106, табл. 2; 105.

⁷⁴ Ibid. С. 144, табл. 6.

⁷⁵ Ibid. С. 143.

⁷⁶ Calculated from: Ф. Лефорт. Сборник материалов... С. 381–392. Calculations by the sorok (a bundle/batch of forty sable pelts) are somewhat approximate. Our data on value also differ slightly from the final total in the expenditure book (which records 31,578 rubles' worth of sable pelts), but exceed it by only 171.5 rubles, i.e., 0.5%, which is a fully acceptable margin of error.

⁷⁷ Ф. Лефорт. Сборник ... С. 382; ПДС. Т. VIII. Ст. 1394.

All this (along with the continuing decline in income from the fur trade) increasingly inclined Winius to hope for compensation at the expense of Siberian metallurgy, and the search for craftsmen for Siberian factories continued to be a recurring theme in his correspondence with Peter, judging by the Tsar's response letters to him (January 21, February 16, March 1 and 29, 1698)⁷⁸.

* * *

The next round of activation of the "Siberian Course" turned out to be connected with the return of Peter I from the Grand Embassy.

On the eve of this, on August 11, 1698, Semyon Remezov arrived in Moscow with proposals for the construction of the Tobolsk Kremlin and with an estimate of its costs (possibly also with his supplemented *Chorographic Book*, the contents of which already included "a drawing of a stone city building")⁷⁹, and also, likely, with the task of completing the cartographic description of Siberia. He probably made a personal report to Winius on the plan of construction and the problems related to it before September 8, 1698, and Winius almost immediately switched him to work on compiling a consolidated *Drawing of all Siberian Cities and Lands*. The Duma clerk clearly needed visual "presentation" material for his report to Peter on the nearly four years of implementation of the "Siberian Course", which could distract the sovereign from a detailed assessment of its still very modest results.

Remezov and his son Semyon made copies of the cartographic materials collected in the Siberian Prikaz in the shortest possible time, and by September 18, 1698, having compared them with his own, he had apparently prepared a rough draft of the *Drawing...*, carefully made in colors in October 1698 in two versions (on white Chinese paper and polished calico) and submitted them to the

⁷⁸ ИБГПВ. Т. I. № 228, 230, 233.

⁷⁹ Гольденберг Л.А. *Ор. cit.* С. 119, 122, 118.

Siberian Prikaz by November 8⁸⁰. One of the two copies (on calico) was intended personally for the Tsar "at the Oak Chamber" and was probably later presented to him by Winius.

Peter I continued to show interest in the "Siberian Course". Before the Streltsy riot investigation began, on September 11, 1698, he heard reports on the Siberian foundries and ordered the construction of an ironworks that could, among other things, utilize the ore from Magnitnaya Mountain (a drawing of which Winius had sent to the Tsar during the Grand Embassy). Due to the lack of foreign specialists, Peter I ordered the recruitment of craftsmen from the Tula and Kashira smelting factories, sending them to Siberia as early as the winter of 1698/99. However, despite the fact that craftsmen arrived at the (Moscow) Siberian Prikaz in January 1699, not a single one was sent to Siberia during that year⁸¹.

Perhaps, before leaving for Voronezh on October 23, the Tsar, previously busy with other matters and the Streltsy investigation, again spoke with Winius about Siberian affairs and sanctioned the series of new decrees that followed soon after, continuing the "anti-voivode course".

On November 7, 1698, a decree was issued establishing state-owned distilleries in Siberia, producing wine from local grain, and banning private distilling there (one of the incentives was the grain shortage in Russia, which led to the extreme high cost of wine supplies to Siberia). On November 22, 1698, a supplementary decree was issued on the principles of wine trade from taverns in Siberia, which directly accused Siberian voivodes of tavern-keeping, thus diminishing state revenues from alcohol sales; it prohibited the intoxication of both Russians and yasak-paying foreigners ("so that *no one should drink by force*, and from immoderate drinking *should not drunk themselves to death* and did not destroy their souls forever"). For a person who died in a tavern, the tavern-keepers were promised a severe beating with a whip and a fine of 20 rubles to the family of

⁸⁰ Ibid. С. 120-122.

⁸¹ Курлаев Е.А. Строительство заводов на Урале в 1699–1700 гг.: планы и реальность. // Известия Уральского государственного университета. Серия 2. Гуманитарные науки. Том 55. № 15. 2008. С. 220.

the deceased; it was also forbidden to accept the weapons of service people as payment for wine⁸². On February 14, 1699, a decree established the prices for the sale of wine from taverns in Siberia: 1 ruble 20 kopecks per 12.3 liters of regular wine and 2 rubles 40 kopecks for 24.6 liters⁸³, which was almost twice as high as Moscow prices, which had been raised due to the grain shortage.

On November 12, 1698, a decree was issued changing the principle of levying duties in Siberia by collecting them only from goods sold and abolishing the tithe on the purchase of Siberian goods, which had not previously brought in much income, because "it is notable that many sables were stolen"⁸⁴. In fact, this decree carried out a customs reform in Siberia, abolishing the regulations of 1693–1694, which, according to E.V. Vershinin, who described it in more detail, "alleviated the tax burden in Siberia and contributed to the further development of economic ties between it and the European part of Russia"⁸⁵. On December 20, 1698, a decree was issued on branding Siberian goods to prevent them from being smuggled as Chinese goods and to make it more difficult to avoid paying duties.⁸⁶

Winus thus tried to combat the decline in Siberian incomes on the basis of the decree of April 24, 1695, yet achieving success was hard as in 1699 the total sable harvest probably reached its minimum value (58 thousand rubles). The crisis in the fur trade was also felt in the significant drop in the average annual yasak collection — in most regions of Siberia in 1695-1700, compared to the middle of the century, they fell from 3-5 to 1-1.1 sables per person.⁸⁷ Nor did Winus succeeded in what had steadfastly main-

⁸² ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1652, 1656.

⁸³ Ibid. № 1677.

⁸⁴ Ibid. № 1654.

⁸⁵ Вершинин Е.В. *Op. cit.* С. 289.

⁸⁶ ПСЗРИ. Т. III. № 1659.

⁸⁷ Бродников А.А. Сбор ясака: зависимость процесса объясачивания от постарно-политической ситуации в регионе (по материалам Восточной Сибири XVII в.) // *Евразия: культурное наследие древних цивилизаций*. Выпуск 1. Культурный космос Евразии. Сб. ст. Новосибирск. 1999. Табл. с. 120, 122.

tained Peter I's interest in him during the Great Embassy period — he had not yet begun practical steps to build Siberian metallurgical plants (although the problem of hiring foreign craftsmen for them, which Peter had not yet resolved, could serve as some justification for this).

All this, probably by the end of 1699, began to cause the first signs of dissatisfaction in the Tsar with A.A. Winius — he proved to be an ineffective "crisis manager". Of course, this wasn't his fault; the objective downturn in the fur trade, which he never recognized, couldn't be compensated for by the struggle against voivodeship tyranny and corruption in 1695–1699, the course and objective results of which still await research.


Having been appointed head of construction work in Tobolsk, Remezov began in January 1699 to collect lime for the construction of the Kremlin, and on January 30, 1699, to implement another order from Winius, supported by the "industriousness and diligence" of the Duma clerk, given to him on November 18, 1698 (against the backdrop of a new wave of "anti-voivode" decrees) — to compile a second Siberian atlas, the *Drawing of all Siberian Cities and Lands*⁸⁸, the idea of which could have been suggested by the *Chorographic Book*, which Winius had probably become familiar with during Remezov's visit (and Remezov, in turn, saw the *Assessment Book of Siberia* of 1697⁸⁹). In April 1699, 100 cannons and 20,000 cannonballs from L.K. Naryshkin's Tula and Kashira factories were sent to Tobolsk and the settlements "to guard against the arrival of enemy people", and another 2,100 poods of iron were sent for the construction of the city⁹⁰. This testified not only to the construction of the Kremlin primarily as a fortress, but also to the fact that the course towards establishing Siberian factories had not yet yielded the expected results.

Therefore, Winius himself, not seeing any significant return from the "anti-voivode course", was forced to focus on Siberian metallurgy.

⁸⁸ Гольденберг А.А. *Op. cit.* С. 128, 190, 125–126.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* С. 289.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* С. 126–128.



Kamensky Plant. 1703.

«Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri» (*Drafting Book of Siberia*) by S.U. Remezov. Folio 155

On April 23, 1699, the Tsar signed a more specific decree on the construction of an ironworks in the Verkhotursky uyezd on the Tagil and Neiva rivers, but, according to E.A. Kurlaev, real practical work in preparation for the construction of the Nevjansk plant began only on September 1, 1699, and the peasants of the surrounding settlements began to extract Magnitogorsk ore.⁹¹

At this time, mining experts sent from Saxony finally arrived in Moscow: on September 26, 1699, the mining master Johann Enderlein presented the Tsar with a list of the nine "mining men" who had arrived with him. They had been brought by the Saxon general Karlovich⁹² and, apparently, according to the idea of Augustus II, they were supposed to become another gesture of "goodwill" and an additional argument in the negotiations in favor of persuading Peter I to enter the Swedish War, but they probably turned out to be another impetus to speed up work at the Siberian factories.

⁹¹ Курлаев Е.А. Строительство заводов... С. 223–224.

⁹² Устрялов Н.Г. История царствования Петра Великого. Т. III. Прил. VII. С. 511, 524.

At the very end of 1699, preparations began for the construction of the Kamensky plant in the Tobolsky uyezd, where a small foundry belonging to the Dalmatovsky Dormition Monastery had already been operating for 15 years. However, construction of the foundry (which was to produce artillery and even rifles) did not begin until the summer of 1700, and the first metal from the newly built smelting furnace was not obtained until the end of 1700⁹³.

It was only after Peter's new decree of January 19, 1700, that the first 22 specialists were dispatched from Moscow to Verkhotur-rye on February 1, 1700. With their arrival, an initial attempt was made to build not the Nevyansk, but the Tagil foundry on the site of today's Nizhny Tagil. However, this pioneer of Ural metallurgy, which was under construction until the end of 1700, was soon shut down (most likely due to the inability to smelt magnetic iron ore and a labor shortage), although the magnetic ore mined there was used for some time at the Nevyansk plant as a supplement to regular ore⁹⁴. Winius, however, as early as March 6, 1700, hastened to report to the Tsar that iron had been brought from Siberia, which the craftsmen considered better than Swedish iron and suitable for cannons⁹⁵. A little later, on May 9, 1700, after a year of preparation and the organization of mass brick production on site, Remezov began the construction of the Tobolsk Kremlin, continuing work on the *Drawing...*, completed by January 1, 1701⁹⁶. In July 1700, the Greek A. Levandiani arrived at the Nerchinsk (Argunsk) silver smelting plant, and soon carried out the first ore smelting, and the production of silver and lead began to resume in Nerchinsk⁹⁷, which was firmly established only in 1704.

As a result, Peter I's "New Siberian Course" led to the first visible practical results and the establishment of the foundations of Ural

⁹³ Курлаев Е.А. Строительство заводов... С. 223–226.

⁹⁴ Ibid. С. 222–223.

⁹⁵ Устрялов Н.Г. История царствования Петра Великого. Т. III. С. 534.

⁹⁶ Гольденберг Л.А. Op. cit. С. 128, 190, 125–126. Most likely, it was through Winius's mediation that materials from the *Drawing...* (and other materials by Remezov) became available to Ysbrant and Witsen, who used them by 1705 [Ibid. С. 257, 260, 264–265].

⁹⁷ Изгачев В.Г. Op. cit. С. 15.




Casting of cannons at a Ural plant, 1701–1703.

«Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri» (*Drafting Book of Siberia*) by S.U. Remezov. Folio 156

and Siberian metallurgy only by 1700–1701, which became another significant result of Peter I's early reformist period.

The Ural factories promised to the Tsar by Winius only began operating for the most part towards the end of 1701, and the lack of experience and poor production at the Kamensk plant meant that the first batches of cannons produced by it, brought to Moscow, had a very significant percentage of defects.

Winius's "slowness" could have caused the Tsar's displeasure, and in 1700 a noticeable cooling of his relations with Peter I began: already in 1700, his lively correspondence with the Tsar had diminished; in March 1701, the postal service was taken away from him; Winius turned out to be not as effective in management as the Tsar expected, when in 1701-1703, the control of three Prikazs (the Siberian, the Apothecary, and the Artillery) was temporarily concentrated in his hands, as well as work on Peter's first Legislative Commission. As a result, in the summer and



Drawing of a mortar and a cannon.

«*Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri*» (*Drafting Book of Siberia*) by S.U. Remezov. Folio 125

autumn of 1703, Winius fell into disgrace, which almost ended in exile to Siberia, suffered significant material losses and lost control of all three Prikazs.⁹⁸ Semyon Remezov was involved in the production of cannons at the Kamensk plant and the preparation of its designs from the autumn of 1703.

* * *

The outbreak of the Great Northern War and the subsequent fall of Winius significantly weakened Peter I's attention to the problems of Siberia, leading to the end of the "New Course", which had not produced quick and effective results.

At the same time, it became a notable phenomenon in the domestic policy of Russia in the initial period of Peter the Great's reforms (1695–1699): according to our calculations, the share of legislation

⁹⁸ Юркин И.Н. *Op. cit.* С. 271, 279, 283–315.

documents concerning Siberia accounted for 21.6% of all acts during these years, and taking into account the multi-page orders to the Siberian voivodes — almost a quarter, 23.9% of all acts⁹⁹. Even with the obvious overestimation of the Course's relative importance due to its incompleteness and numerous gaps in the *Code of Laws of the Russian Empire*, it is clear that it occupied far from the last place in it.

An objective assessment of this policy is not yet possible: the effectiveness of the "anti-voivode course" can only be determined through a detailed study of its practical results. However, it likely did have an impact on curbing the arbitrary actions of the voivodes at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, regulating Siberian trade, tightening customs controls, strengthening the defenses of Siberia's southern borders, accumulating knowledge about the region, and implementing a more lenient policy toward the yasak-paying population. More definitively, we can speak of the positive consequences of the second direction of this policy: it laid the real foundation for Ural metallurgy, and without the establishment of the first foundries at the turn of the century, its development could have been delayed indefinitely (and perhaps the "Demidov Empire" of the first half of the 18th century, which grew out of the Nevyansk plant, already built by the treasury, and the explored ore resources, would not have come into being).

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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Memoirs of the Orthodox Priest Ioann Dobrotvorsky on the Pilgrimage to the Christian Holy Sites of the East

Abstract

The article analyzes the travel notes of the priest Ioann Dobrotvorsky from Sergachsky Uyezd of the Nizhny Novgorod Governorate. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, he undertook a pilgrimage to the Eastern Mediterranean. In two essays published in the *Nizhny Novgorod Church and Public Herald*, he described his impressions of visiting the Ottoman capital Constantinople and the Oak of Mamre located in the Holy Land. His memoirs critically examine the foreign environment characterized by a different religion and culture. In this regard, the travel notes reveal the nonverbal categories of the “other” and the “alien”. The author was especially disturbed by Christian holy sites being in the hands of non-Christians, as well as by memorial places associated with the repression of the Orthodox minority in the Ottoman Empire



by the Turks. At the same time, the article pays considerable attention to the process of constructing the national, religious, and cultural identity of the memoirist and other Russian pilgrims in a foreign setting. Individual and collective identity was shaped through communication among fellow pilgrims and through their shared residence in hostels established by Russian Orthodox institutions in Constantinople and Palestine. In the territory of the Ottoman Empire, Russian pilgrims also had the opportunity to attend services and pray in churches of the Constantinople and Jerusalem Patriarchates, where the arrangement of churches and the peculiarities of worship differed from practices familiar to Russians, yet still remained Orthodox. On the everyday level, identification was expressed through the ability to communicate in one's native language and to consume familiar foods.


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he first travel notes of Russian pilgrims appeared as early as the High Middle Ages, in the 11th century. For centuries, memoirs describing pilgrims' stays in the Christian East appeared rather infrequently, since journeys by Russians to the biblical region were rare, difficult, and extremely dangerous. In the 18th and the first half of the 19th century, the number of such personal sources increased noticeably, and they began to attract the attention of a broader reading public. In the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, memoirs of Orthodox pilgrims practically developed into a distinct literary genre. The authors of these texts included representatives of the nobility, state service people, intelligentsia, and business circles. Nevertheless, the majority of such works were written by members of the clergy, both academically educated scholars and ordinary parish priests. A significant portion of these memoirs remained scattered throughout the pages of local diocesan journals and has not yet been introduced into scholarly circulation. In this regard, the forgotten memoirs of Archpriest Father Ioann Dobrotvorsky from Sergachsky Uyezd of the Nizhny Novgorod Diocese are of considerable interest. Ivan Fedorovich Dobrotvorsky served as Archpriest (Protopresbyter) of the Trinity Church in the village of Kekino, Sergachsky Uyezd, Nizhny Novgorod Governorate. He was born in 1841 in the village of Suryatino, Lukoyanovsky Uyezd, Nizhny Novgorod Governorate. In 1865 he graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Theological Seminary with first-rank honors and was appointed priest in the village of Kekino. He received a number of ecclesiastical awards, including the nabadrennik, skufia, kamilavka, and a pectoral cross of the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class. In 1904 he was elevated to the rank of archpriest. From 1881 to 1904 he served as Dean, and in 1907 he retired from active service.

Judging from indirect evidence, he undertook a pilgrimage to the Holy Land several years before the publication of his travel notes. His memoirs concerning his stay in the capital of the Ottoman Empire were published in the *Nizhny Novgorod Church and Public Herald* in 1913 (Nos. 11, 12, 19, 33, 35, 38) under the title *Constantinople*. In 1915, the same journal published his notes about visiting the



The Oak of Mamre. 19th-century lithograph.
From open sources

Oak of Mamre in Palestine. Later that same year, the essay *To the Oak of Mamre* appeared as a separate brochure without publication data.

The overwhelming majority of pilgrimage memoirs written by clergy were devoted to detailed descriptions of holy places and the authors' religious experiences while visiting the Eastern Mediterranean — Constantinople, Mount Athos, and the Holy Land. They also discussed meetings with Greek clergy of the Patriarchates of the East, peculiarities of Greek liturgical practices within the canonical territories of these sister churches, and similar topics. Such personal sources only rarely contain episodes connected with the everyday details of pilgrimage — housing and food during the journey, ethnographic descriptions of local life, customs and morals, climate, natural beauty, and so forth. This self-censorship stemmed from the widespread understanding of the boundaries of the pilgrimage genre. In the authors' view, texts devoted to such elevated themes should not concern themselves with worldly details.

However, the author of the memoirs under consideration understood the limits of the genre differently. The Nizhny Novgorod priest apparently believed that, for practical benefit, to make the text more engaging, and to attract new pilgrims to the Near East, it was

worthwhile to dwell not only on impressions of holy places, but also on encounters with compatriots abroad, contacts with local inhabitants, weather, flora and fauna, the financial expenses awaiting Russian pilgrims abroad, and many other matters. In this regard, attention should be paid to the notable subtitle of Father Ioann's memoirs: *From the Notes* (in another publication — *From the Recollections*) *of a Sergach Pilgrim-Tourist* (boldface ours. — *Authors*). Naturally, this was not a slip of the tongue. The author in no way perceived himself as a secular tourist in the Holy Land. He truly was a pilgrim and nothing more. Nevertheless, the wording appears significant, since among other things the author paid close attention to objects that would mainly interest tourists.

It should be noted that the turn of the 19th–20th centuries was the period when mass tourism emerged in the West and also began to develop in Russia, though on a much smaller scale. The author of the memoirs had probably heard the foreign word “tourist”, which was becoming fashionable at the time, and decided to insert it into the title of his travel notes.

The broad range of impressions contained in Ioann Dobrotvorský's text allows researchers to examine such topics — rather unusual for clerical memoirs — as the social condition of the Russian pilgrim in a foreign environment and the formation of his religious, national, linguistic, and everyday identity. Despite their relatively small volume, the travel notes of the Nizhny Novgorod priest provide rich and valuable material for the study of such issues.

Naturally, the primary goal of Russian Orthodox pilgrims traveling to the Holy Land was the visitation of places that may conventionally be called sacred landmarks. Some scholars are also inclined to describe them as chronotopes. Etymologically, this term denotes events that occurred in a precisely defined place (*topos* in Ancient Greek) and at a specific time (*chronos* in Ancient Greek). Let us consider those that the author of the memoirs was able to visit.

The most famous point of attraction for Russian Orthodox pilgrims in Constantinople was the Cathedral of Hagia Sophia, known in Greek as Aya Sophia. It was built under Emperor Justinian in the 6th century, but after the Turkish conquest of Byzantium it was



Hagia Sophia, Constantinople.
Photo by the Abdullah Brothers, second half of the 19th century.
From open sources

converted into a mosque. This domed structure, one of the largest places of worship in the world, made an indelible impression on all visitors. Fr. Ioann Dobrotvorsky recalled these unforgettable moments with admiration: “With trembling hearts we entered inside and were literally overwhelmed by its unimaginable vastness. The interior is lofty, wide, and long, and one cannot help but wonder how the roof of this astonishing edifice is supported, since not a single pillar can be seen obstructing the space as in our great churches”.¹

During their brief stay in Constantinople, the pilgrims also visited another of the oldest churches of early Christianity — the Church of St. Irene. It had been dedicated to the deified concept of peace. As if in mockery of this idea, the Turks used the building as an arsenal. Russian pilgrims were also shown the column erected in the 4th century by order of Emperor Constantine the Great, who made Christianity the dominant religion of Byzantium.

¹ Добротворский И., прот. Константинополь (Из воспоминаний сергачского паломника-туриста) // Нижегородский церковно-общественный вестник (НЦОВ). 1913. № 19. С. 491.



Church of Saint Irene, Constantinople.
Photo from the late 19th or early 20th century.
From open sources

The author noted with deep regret that “it has the completely unimpressive appearance of a quadrangular brick pillar left uncovered. It is said that in its time it was clad in bronze plates, which the conquerors (i.e., the Turks. — *Authors*) mistook for gold and stripped away”.² The architectural monuments listed above served as living testimonies to the first centuries of Christianity.

In Constantinople, the author also saw places associated with the brutal reprisals carried out by the Ottomans against the former masters of Tsargrad (= Constantinople. — *Editor*) — the Greeks. These places inspired in Russian pilgrims not merely sorrow, but horror and indignation. During one excursion through the Turkish capital, their *kavass* (a guard and guide in the East) pointed out iron hooks driven into ancient trees standing on one of the city’s vacant lots. He explained to the Russians that defeated Greeks had been hanged there. This referred to the mass executions carried out by the conquerors against the local population after the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in

² Ibid. № 33. C. 862.

1453. “Despite the heat”, wrote the author, “a shudder involuntarily ran through our bodies at the vivid image of the horrors that had taken place here, horrors not erased even by the passing centuries...”³

No less emotionally did the pilgrims react to a site connected with tragic events from the comparatively recent 19th century. In 1821, an uprising began in Greece as the local population fought for independence from the Ottoman Empire. In response, the Turks carried out a massacre among the Greek community of their capital. Its culmination was the execution of Patriarch Gregory V of Constantinople. Their guide pointed out to the pilgrims the wire from which the Patriarch’s body had hung. However, the author mistakenly dates these tragic events to 1864.⁴

The sacred places visited by the author in the Holy Land date back to much more ancient times. The central object in Fr. Ioann Dobrotvorsky’s essay *To the Oak of Mamre* is this sacred tree, whose age, according to biblical tradition, reached several thousand years. The events associated with it in antiquity are recorded in the Book of Genesis, the first of the Old Testament. Abraham’s tent was pitched beneath the oak, and there the Lord appeared to him in the form of three men. Abraham received them with great honor and offered them a lavish meal. Afterwards, they foretold that he and his wife Sarah would have a child, despite their advanced age and their loss of hope for offspring (Genesis 18:1–14). In memory of these biblical events, near the oak “sanctified by the visible manifestation of the Most Holy Trinity”, the Nizhny Novgorod archpriest read “an akathist to the Triune Godhead”.⁵

According to the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, Archimandrite Leonid (Kavelin), in the late 1850s, the crown of the patriarchal oak was still extremely dense: “...its branches spread out in a vast impenetrable canopy with a circumference of 120 paces...”⁶

³ Добротворский И. Константинополь // НЦЮВ. 1913. № 19. С. 490.

⁴ Ibid. № 33. С. 863.

⁵ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. Из записок сергачского паломника-туриста [Нижний Новгород, 1915]. С. 2.

⁶ Архимандрит Леонид (Кавелин). Старый Иерусалим и его окрестности. Из записок инока-паломника. М., 2008. С. 368.

According to the Russian traveler A.V. Eliseev, “however various tourists attempted to determine the age of the Oak of Mamre by counting its rings... in the end they lost count”. Eliseev’s travel notes included a drawing of the oak by the famous Russian artist A.D. Kivshenko. It shows that by the early 1880s two of the oak’s three main trunks had already dried up, and only the third still bore leaves⁷.

After spending the night near the tree, Fr. Ioann traveled to the city of Hebron, which the memoirist authoritatively described as “one of the most ancient cities in the world”. There they were interested in the cave where the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were buried. The pilgrims did not fail to admire this structure, which represented an important Old Testament sacred site⁸.

At the end of their journey to the oak, as the Nizhny Novgorod pilgrims approached Jerusalem, they noticed a large stone on whose surface there remained a hollow resembling the imprint of a man lying on his side. According to tradition, this mark had been left on the stone by the Old Testament prophet Elijah⁹.

During the journey to the Oak of Mamre, the pilgrims also encountered another sacred Gospel site — the so-called Fountain of the Magi. It was there that the Magi once again beheld the miraculous star, which had temporarily disappeared from sight while they were in Jerusalem (Matthew 2:9–10). This star in the heavens testified to the birth of the Savior¹⁰.

During their travels through Constantinople and Palestine, Russian pilgrims immersed themselves in a foreign environment — one that was alien in religion, language, and culture. Throughout the journey this made a strong impression on them, especially on those who had never before traveled outside Russia.

In this connection, pilgrimage texts frequently contain the non-verbal category of the “other”, with which the author constantly

⁷ Елисеев А.В. По белу свету. Очерки и картины из путешествий по трем частям Старого света. В 4 т. СПб., 1915. Т. 1. С. 284–285.

⁸ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 5.

⁹ Ibid. С. 10.

¹⁰ Ibid.

encountered abroad. This “otherness” did not necessarily provoke rejection, but it attracted attention and aroused genuine curiosity. The “other” fascinated Russian memoirists because they had seen nothing similar in their homeland. This was characteristic of the ethnographic details of the local population’s everyday life — patterns of behavior, clothing, food, dwellings, as well as features of the climate, flora, and fauna. For clerical authors, the “other” was especially embodied in the peculiarities of worship and church arrangement, to which these memoirists devoted particular attention.

The first sounds that attracted the attention of the author and his companions, even before they disembarked in Constantinople, were church bells. That day was one of the great feast days of the Orthodox calendar — the Feast of the Ascension — and the author described his emotional reaction to hearing bells hundreds of versts away from his homeland: “...it was comforting to hear them in the infidel capital, and the heart stirred joyfully”. Yet from the very first strikes, the sensitive ear of the priest immediately recognized that this was a “different” ringing; the bell was apparently small, and its sounds sharp and even “disorderly”. The difference also lay in the fact that “this peal sounded lonely, orphaned, and somehow joyless, and its sounds, as though forcibly stifled, soon ceased”.¹¹

In time the author understood why this ringing seemed unusual to Russian pilgrims. Attending services in the Greek Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker in Constantinople, located near the pilgrims’ hostel where he stayed, he clearly saw the reason. In Russia, bell-ringers swung the clapper so that it struck the bell, whereas in Eastern Orthodox churches (of the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Jerusalem) the bell itself was swung so that it struck the freely hanging clapper¹².

Walking around the aforementioned church, the author also observed with regret that it scarcely differed from the surrounding residential buildings, since it possessed neither dome, nor cross, nor bell tower, as was also the case with other Orthodox churches in the

¹¹ Добротворский И. Константинополь // ИЦЮВ. 1913. № 11. С. 285.

¹² Ibid. № 35. С. 919.



Constantinople, Sultan Ahmed Mosque.
Photo from the late 19th or early 20th century.
From open sources

Near East. To the memoirist, the Greek church resembled a Lutheran prayer house more than a traditional Orthodox church¹³.

Twice in his essay on Constantinople, the author also draws attention to another distinctive feature of Eastern Christian churches in Greece and the Ottoman Empire. As is well known, Orthodox parishioners in Russia pray standing, whereas Greek churches contained stalls (*stasidia*, special seats). This feature too was perceived by the author as something “other”, evoking not rejection but rather curiosity. He specifies that they were intended for honored worshippers. This applied not only to churches in Constantinople, but also to those on Mount Athos and in Palestine. Describing a service at the metochion of the Athonite Monastery of St. Panteleimon in Tsargrad, Fr. Dobrotvorsky wrote: “Along the western wall and by the choirs stood the stalls (*stasidia*) — a kind of tall armchairs (higher than

¹³ Ibid.

a man's height), decorated with carved tops, with solid side panels, armrests, and a folding board behind for seating".¹⁴

Moreover, the foreign environment offered pilgrims its own diet and distinctive cuisine. The Russians encountered this shortly after arriving at the pilgrims' metochion in Tsargrad. For breakfast they were served fish prepared in various ways — fried, cold, and canned — as well as fruit and, instead of the customary kvass, a decanter of red wine. Dinner that same day consisted of rice soup, buckwheat porridge with olive oil, plums, and the same red wine. This menu demonstrates that the food of the Tsargrad monks was also "different", since in Russia the majority of the population did not see fruit on their table daily, while olive oil was consumed only by wealthy people¹⁵.

The evening of the first day spent on foreign soil reminded the pilgrims that Constantinople, though a Muslim city, was nevertheless a noisy imperial capital with its own distinctive leisure culture that had absorbed much from the West. After the thoroughly exhausted Russians had lain down on soft beds and even managed to fall asleep, they were awakened by the pounding of drums, the sounds of brass music, and a singer who was "screeching all night", because the pilgrims' shelter stood next to a "*café-shaitan*" (italics in the original memoirs, a wordplay on *café-chantant*). Father Ioann almost certainly distorted the word intentionally in order to make readers understand that, in his view, this entertainment establishment was a creation of the devil¹⁶. Unlike the stasidia in churches or the olive oil served at dinner — which aroused interest but not rejection — such amusements represented a form of "otherness" that the Nizhny Novgorod priest was clearly unwilling to accept.

The flora and fauna of the Eastern Mediterranean were also unlike anything Russians were accustomed to at home. Here they likely saw donkeys for the first time in their lives, animals on which they themselves had to ride, as well as camels, whose unusual appearance frightened them. Another animal in Palestine they managed only to

¹⁴ Ibid. № 12. C. 315.

¹⁵ Ibid. C. 315–317.

¹⁶ Ibid. C. 317.

hear, not to see: one night, Fr. Ioann Dobrotvorsky and his traveling companion suddenly heard mournful cries in the distance. Alarmed, they listened carefully, but the kavass accompanying them explained that it was a jackal howling¹⁷.

The flora was no less exotic than the fauna. The pilgrims may have seen cacti in Russia, but only small ones, growing on windowsills or in greenhouses. In Palestine, near the Fountain of the Magi, they encountered a hedge of cacti — a tall and thorny barrier that protected private property more effectively than any fence¹⁸. Another pilgrim, the priest N.G. Gusev from the Vyatka Governorate, came across a walnut tree, whose fruits he had previously seen only in shops and never growing on branches¹⁹.

The principal object of the pilgrims' interest in the essay about the Oak of Mamre also looked unusual. Its bark differed so greatly in appearance from that of Russian trees that one might sooner have mistaken it for an elm. Yet the most important distinction of the evergreen Palestinian oaks lay in their leaves, which, first, lacked the wavy indentations characteristic of Russian oak leaves and, second, measured no more than half a *vershok* in length. The leaves were not so much green as grayish-green, resembling olive leaves. Palestinian oaks perfectly embodied the notion of the "other". Only the presence of acorns revealed that the tree was in fact an oak. The thickness of its trunk was impressive — three or four arm spans around²⁰.

Unlike the "other", which was perceived with curiosity and without rejection, the "alien" appeared quite differently. It seemed threatening, provoking complete rejection and even fear. In this regard, it is first necessary to consider such a phenomenon as rumors circulating among pilgrims. Most often they belonged to the category that sociologists call "false scare rumors". Such were the widespread *stories that one might* suffer shipwreck and drown during the sea voyage to the Holy Land, or that the population of Palestine was extremely

¹⁷ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 1–2.

¹⁸ Ibid. С. 10.

¹⁹ Гусев Н.Г. Путешествие в Святую Землю // Вятские епархиальные ведомости. 1900. № 7. С. 293.

²⁰ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 2–3.

hostile toward foreigners, and so forth. When Russian pilgrims were traveling to the Palestinian city of Hebron, the kavass accompanying them, Nikolai, warned them to exercise extreme caution there. He explained that the inhabitants of Hebron were “a people exceedingly rude and uncontrollably violent... and even a trivial cause might lead to tragic consequences”.²¹ Numerous rumors about the cruelty of the Turks, their hostility, and the danger of losing one’s life also circulated in Constantinople.

Naturally, such rumors gave rise to closely related fears passed down from one generation of pilgrims to another. In Constantinople, Fr. Ioann decided to stroll along Pera, the main street of the Turkish capital, where the embassies and consulates of nearly all European states were located. Despite the fact that the street was always crowded, he was afraid to go there wearing his gold pectoral cross, wondering “whether the Turks might tear off my head together with it”.²²

In Palestine, very specific rumors and fears surrounded a site known as Solomon’s Pools, which the travelers encountered on the road between the Oak of Mamre and Jerusalem. These were enormous half-dried reservoirs that have survived to the present day and whose construction tradition associates with King Solomon, ruler of the Kingdom of Israel in the 10th century BCE. Although the weather was extremely hot, the kavass strongly advised the pilgrims not to bathe there, since, according to him, fatal accidents had occurred repeatedly. The memoirist cites various rumors concerning the causes of such deaths: “Whether the algae entangle them or some creatures drag them away — no one knows”.²³ Here the reader again encounters a typical example of how a false scare rumor transformed into a persistent anxiety associated with an alien environment.

A clear marker of hostile “alienness” appears already on the first page of the memoirs describing the visit to the Turkish capital. As the Russian steamship sailed through the Bosphorus, before Constantinople itself even came into view, the author noticed embrasures

²¹ Ibid. C. 6.

²² Добротворский И. Константинополь // НЦЮВ. 1913. № 38. С. 1001.

²³ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 9.

scattered along the banks of the strait, “from which, grimly concealed, protruded the mouths of steel monsters guarding the Bosphorus”. At one point the author counted seven such batteries on both sides of the Strait. “An enemy ship would fare badly if it penetrated here”, Fr. Ioann concluded in his reflections on these hostile fortifications²⁴. Such thoughts were entirely natural, since Turkey had for centuries been a historical adversary of Russia. The memory of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 was still vivid among contemporaries, while on the horizon already loomed the prospect of the First World War, in which Russia would once more confront the Turkish army.

The museum of the Janissaries, which the pilgrims visited with a monk-guide, reminded them of Russo-Turkish conflicts from both the distant (the 18th century) and the more recent past (the four wars with Turkey in the 19th century). The museum displayed wax figures of these former Turkish guardsmen (the Janissary corps had been dissolved in 1826) dressed in costume and fully armed. “The appearance of the figures is savage”, remarks the memoirist, immediately and nonverbally assigning them to the category of the “alien”.²⁵ The Janissary museum, promoted by the Turks, also displeased another Russian pilgrim, the priest A. Trapitsyn, who called its exhibits “repulsive effigies” and clearly preferred the museum of Egyptian and Greek antiquities, where remarkable examples of sculpture from the ancient world were displayed²⁶.

As noted above, the interior of Hagia Sophia made an enormous impression on the Russian pilgrims. Yet this impression was overshadowed by the fact that its interior decoration had been desecrated by the infidels. Christian frescoes were hidden behind enormous wooden shields adorned with intricate patterns of gilded Arabic script. The six-winged seraphim depicted high upon the walls remained, but their faces had been covered with black paint. Dmitry Skalon, who traveled to Constantinople in 1872, observed that “above the high place one can discern the image of the Mother of God seated upon

²⁴ Добротворский И. Константинополь // НЦЖОБ. 1913. № 11. С. 284.

²⁵ Ibid. № 19. С. 493.

²⁶ Трапицын А. Из впечатлений паломника во Святую Землю // Вятские епархиальные ведомости. 1878. № 5. С. 145.



Church of the Life-Giving Trinity, Kakino village.
Photo from 1960. Gagino Local History Museum

a purple throne, with the infant Jesus standing beside her”. Finally, a bloody handprint of the conqueror of Tsargrad, Sultan Mehmed II, had been preserved on one of the walls, where he supposedly leaned his blood-covered hand after the capture of the city in 1453²⁷.

The Russian pilgrims were deeply distressed by the sight of desecrated Orthodox churches transformed into mosques. The spectacle of violated Christian shrines weighed heavily upon them. “Deep within the soul”, writes the author, “there arose a cry: how long, O Lord, will this abomination of desolation continue?”²⁸

Extremely unpleasant memories for most Russian pilgrims were associated with such an “alien” custom as the constant begging for, and even demanding of, what in the East is called by the capacious term *bakshish*. Borrowed from Persian, the word denotes something intermediate between a bribe, a gift, and alms.

²⁷ Добротворский И. Константинополь // НЦЮВ. 1913. № 19. С. 491–492; Скалон Д.А. Путешествие по Востоку и Святой Земле в свите великого князя Николая Николаевича в 1872 году. М., 2007. С. 37.

²⁸ Добротворский И. Константинополь // НЦЮВ. 1913. № 19. С. 491.

Fr. Ioann Dobrotvorsky first encountered the nearly omnipotent bakshish, which opened every door and accompanied the pilgrims daily and almost hourly, even before disembarking in Constantinople. A small ca que (boat) approached the vessel in which monks were ferrying the pilgrims ashore. In it sat an Effendi in a uniform with bright buttons indicating his official status. Slowly and with a sense of his own importance, he stretched out his hands toward the priest's luggage.

“What does this mean?” — I asked the monk.

‘Well, this means: give me two twenty-kopeck coins!’ — he replied.

I did. The monk slipped them into the hand of the Effendi, and the caique drifted away. It turned out that he was a customs official responsible for preventing smuggling, and had we not paid him off, he would have unceremoniously rummaged through our suitcases. Later the monk explained: in order to save state funds, customs officials receive no salary and live solely on bakshish”.²⁹

Their acquaintance with this unpleasant Eastern custom continued in Palestine. Leaving the city of Hebron, the travelers encountered on the road a mullah and some ragged fellow whom they had met in the city, although neither of them had rendered the pilgrims any real services. Nevertheless, both insistently demanded bakshish. The mullah received a twenty-kopeck coin, though he was dissatisfied with so small a sum. The ragged beggar received nothing and became very offended. Seizing a stone, he intended to throw it at the Russian pilgrims, but the kavass accompanying the travelers drew a revolver, waved it threateningly, and drove away the aggressive beggar³⁰.

The categories of the “other” and the “alien” were not permanently fixed or self-contained. In human consciousness, circumstances may transform one into the other and back again. Fr. Ioann's memoirs illustrate this through his personal impressions during his stay in Constantinople.

One day at the pilgrims' hostel he heard mournful singing in the street and saw a funeral procession. Its participants carried banners,

²⁹ Ibid. № 11. С. 285–286.

³⁰ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 7.

while at the head of the procession walked Greek Orthodox priests in liturgical vestments. From a nearby Orthodox church came the slow tolling of bells. The spectacle greatly astonished the author, who until then had been convinced that in the Ottoman Empire, as for many centuries before, any “open manifestation of the Christian faith” was forbidden. Seeking clarification, he turned to the monks of the metochion of the Monastery of St. Panteleimon, where he was staying.

It turned out that his information concerning the extremely difficult condition of Orthodoxy in Turkey was somewhat outdated. The monks explained that after “the last war between the Russians and the Turks” (that is, the war of 1877–1878), Orthodox funeral processions had begun from time to time to appear openly in the streets of the Turkish capital without any official permission. At first the Turks regarded them suspiciously, but later grew accustomed to them: “...now this has come to be regarded as an accepted custom, against which no one protests or offers resistance”. The same applied to church bells, the public display of banners, and other liturgical attributes³¹. Thus there occurred a transformation of the “alien” — that which had been hostile toward Christianity — into the “other”; gradually, religious tolerance toward Orthodoxy began to form among the non-Christian population. This episode also demonstrated that expectations did not always coincide with reality, and that reality sometimes proved significantly better than anticipated. Confirmation of this may be found in yet another episode from the travel notes.

The attitude of the Turks with whom the author interacted in Constantinople was particularly revealing. Local residents helped him find his way in the enormous unfamiliar city, which at first seemed hostile. On one occasion, Father Ioann accidentally found himself at an underground tram station. In the semi-darkness he walked off in a random direction and heard someone shouting: “burda, burda” (*burda* meaning “here, this way” in Turkish). He could not understand what was being shouted or to whom. Then someone shouted again, this time in Russian: “Here, here!” The priest saw a man from the ticket office waving to him. Father Ioann bought a ticket and soon

³¹ Добротворский И. Константинополь // НЦЮВ. 1913. № 38. С. 1003.

was riding the tram³². This episode shows that some Turks, who regularly interacted with Russian travelers, knew and used basic Russian words.

The memoirs also contain another rather colorful episode demonstrating not merely an exchange of individual words, but a kind of “interethnic dialogue”. On the deck of a steamship traveling through Constantinople to Palestine, a Russian female pilgrim was telling a sorrowful story about her son, who had fallen into some kind of trouble. Her Turkish interlocutor listened attentively without interrupting her. During a pause in the conversation, the Ottoman began telling the woman his own story, which, judging by his facial expression, was equally sad. Fr. Dobrotvorsky writes: “Taking turns, they finally concluded their conversation, and the Turk, rising to his feet, touched the fingers of his right hand to his forehead and heart, thereby showing that he had unburdened his soul in conversation with a good person and sincerely thanked his companion”. The memoirs then include a brief dialogue between the author and the pilgrim woman:

“Did you understand what the Turk was telling you?”

‘How could I understand? He was mumbling in the infidel tongue’.

‘Well then, did he understand you?’

‘How could he not? I spoke to him in Russian — what could be simpler, dear man?’³³

The woman was absolutely convinced that the “Russian” language ought to be understood everywhere. At the same time, the author expressed confidence that, even if they had not understood the details, they nevertheless grasped the general meaning of each other’s sorrowful stories and came to sympathize with one another. The Turk and the Russian woman were certainly different, yet they were not “alien” to one another.

We may assume that Fr. Dobrotvorsky had heard about such a famous feature of the Turkish capital as the dogs of Constantinople even before his journey, since most Russian travelers passing

³² Ibid. C. 1002.

³³ Ibid. № 35. C. 919.

through the city mentioned them, usually in negative terms. Indeed, at the beginning of his account the author also speaks of these numerous stray dogs in distinctly negative language, calling them “mangy”. However, as the memoirist later discovered, the dogs proved to be quite useful animals, for they “performed the role of scavengers perfectly, cleansing the city of all kinds of refuse and waste left unattended by people, which without these unpaid laborers might have infected the air”. Fr. Ioann also observed that dogs enjoyed a certain degree of respect in the Turkish capital. In Russia, he writes, a dog lying in the road would almost certainly be kicked, whereas in Turkey people carefully walked around them. Moreover, local residents fed them: “Compassionate citizens sometimes arrange special meals for these dogs in memory of the soul of some wealthy deceased effendi”.³⁴ In these reflections, the pilgrim reveals sympathy not only for the stray dogs, but also for the local inhabitants, who treated this living landmark of their city not merely with tolerance but with genuine care.

The unusualness — and in some cases the alienness and even hostility — of the surrounding foreign environment led pilgrims to require spiritual, psychological, and organizational support. Religious, national, and cultural-linguistic identity became important instruments of such support. The need for identification is one of the existential needs of the human being. A sense of identity is especially important for a person who finds himself in a foreign environment. Consciously or unconsciously, he begins to seek out people similar to himself for communication and mutual support, or else other forms of stability within that environment.

Alongside the “other” and the “alien”, Russian pilgrims constantly encountered fellow countrymen and co-religionists in distant lands, and there were quite a few of them. The Russian state, Orthodox institutions, and public organizations were well aware of the needs of pilgrims; they created support structures that enabled pilgrims to find themselves within a familiar and kindred environment during their journeys abroad and not to feel abandoned.

³⁴ Ibid. № 12. C. 316.

Indeed, the question of where to lay one's head in a completely foreign city arose already on the deck of the Russian ship anchored in the Golden Horn Bay in Constantinople: "The usual bustle began, and along with it arose the alarming question: where were we now to go in this enormous, utterly unfamiliar, and moreover infidel city?.." Entirely natural fears instantly emerged under such circumstances. However, the confusion of the pilgrims, who did not know where they would stay, did not last long. The author continues: "...thankfully, the hospitable brethren of various Athonite monasteries came to our aid, having appeared on our steamship precisely for this purpose".³⁵ Some pilgrims traveling from Odessa to Constantinople already knew in advance where they would lodge during the ship's two- or three-day stop in the Turkish capital. While still in Odessa, they had stayed at one of the metochia of the Athonite monasteries. These were the monasteries of St. Panteleimon, St. Andrew, and St. Elijah, which, among the several dozen monasteries on Mount Athos, were Russian in composition (the remaining Athonite monasteries were predominantly Greek). Metochia of the same three monasteries also operated in Constantinople. Their representatives were well acquainted with the schedules of steamships arriving from Russia; they met Russian pilgrims in their boats, helped them avoid customs difficulties, and escorted them to the gates of their metochia. The author stayed at the guesthouse of the Russian Monastery of St. Panteleimon.

The metochion's four-story stone building was rather spacious. "We were warmly received here", the author recounts, "and were assigned a spacious and clean room, whose southern windows overlooked the Golden Horn..." Since the day of their arrival coincided with the Feast of the Ascension of the Lord, the Russian pilgrims immediately proceeded to the metochion church in order to thank the Lord for the successful completion of the first stage of their sea journey. There were many worshippers there, among them not only fellow Russians, but also "brothers" — Orthodox coreligionists from the Balkan countries: Serbs, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins³⁶.

³⁵ Ibid. № 11. C. 285.

³⁶ Ibid. № 12. C. 314–315.



Constantinople, Golden Horn.
19th-century photograph. From open sources

Identity is constructed in human consciousness not only in the national and confessional spheres, but also at the everyday level. This applied to the food offered to the pilgrims at the St. Panteleimon metochion. On the one hand, they were delighted by dishes and kitchen utensils familiar to Russians; on the other hand, they curiously encountered and tasted things they had rarely seen or only heard about. After the thanksgiving service celebrating their safe arrival at the metochion church, the pilgrims were offered a light refreshment, for which they were served “a samovar and white bread”.³⁷ The samovar was perceived as an unmistakable marker of Russian identity.

That same day, the Russian monks of the St. Panteleimon metochion delighted the pilgrims at dinner with a symbolic national dish: buckwheat porridge. True, it was seasoned not with flaxseed or hemp oil, but with olive oil, which many knew only by hearsay³⁸.

³⁷ Ibid. C. 315.

³⁸ Ibid. C. 317.

Thus, the pilgrims' diet combined foods familiar and culturally "their own" with exotic, that is, "other", elements.

The Russian travelers lived at the St. Panteleimon metochion in Tsargrad for several days. The author described the nature of their interaction with the metochion clergy, who belonged to the Orthodox priesthood, in the following way: "Under the influence of the brethren's affectionate and hospitable treatment, we felt here as if at home, in Mother Russia herself".³⁹

The pilgrims were deeply reluctant to leave their hospitable hosts, who carefully escorted them together with their luggage to the gangway of the steamship. Fr. Ioann described his feelings at parting as follows: "They proved to be for us truly like our own fathers. Save them, O Christ, and have mercy upon them! At our final farewell tears welled up in our eyes, and we were sorry to part from these genuinely Christian and kind people".⁴⁰

Particularly noteworthy was the entirely noncommercial attitude of the Russian Athonite monks toward pilgrims. They demanded nothing for their services (lodging, meals, excursions around the city, and so forth), contenting themselves with whatever they were given. The author notes that he paid two rubles per day, and the servants of the guesthouse were more than satisfied with this amount. At the same time, Fr. Ioann mentions that some pilgrims, whether from poverty or stinginess, paid nothing at all and nevertheless did not hear a single word of reproach. The monks recounted that they sometimes had to provide lodging and food on the return journey to pilgrims who had completely exhausted their means in the Holy Land, and even lend them money for the road without any written receipts. Some debts were never repaid, while others, on the contrary, were returned with interest, so that the brethren ultimately suffered no losses. When some of Fr. Ioann's companions, shortly before boarding the steamship in Constantinople, attempted to offer the monks sums of money as a token of gratitude, the monks regarded this as a temptation and categorically refused⁴¹.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid. № 38. C. 1003.

⁴¹ Ibid. № 12. C. 316; № 38. C. 1003.

The religious identity of the Russian pilgrims was strongly felt during their visits to the church at the St. Panteleimon metochion, where the entire liturgical practice fully corresponded to the canons of their native Orthodox Church. Once, after Matins in the metochion church, the author went to a neighboring Greek church in order to hear a Hellenic service. He describes the surprise awaiting him there: “Suddenly, to my astonishment, I heard singing in a minor tone with a non-Russian accent chanting ‘Lord, have mercy’. I entered and learned that the service was being conducted there by Montenegrins, who rented a side chapel from the Greeks”. The specifically Montenegrin liturgical features of Orthodoxy aroused Fr. Ioann’s curiosity. He saw in the church, as among the Greeks, stalls, and discovered that there were no Royal Gates, although an iconostasis, as in Russian churches, was present. He was pleased that “...the priest was vested entirely in our manner, and the whole service was conducted according to our service book as well... The chant was mournful, resembling the Greek style, though without the nasal intonation in the voice”. The Montenegrins invited Fr. Ioann to participate in the service, to which he agreed and read several texts in Church Slavonic. After the conclusion of the service, a Montenegrin priest approached the Nizhny Novgorod cleric and greeted him: “Drago mi poznatisya z Vami” (“I am glad to make your acquaintance”). No translation of this phrase was necessary⁴². It should also be added that the guide who accompanied the pilgrims on their excursions around Constantinople was a Montenegrin named David, with whom the Russian pilgrims were very pleased⁴³.

Let us cite another example of identity, this time linguistic, which the author encountered quite unexpectedly on one of the streets of Constantinople. A man who appeared to be a Turk, dressed in a green robe and white turban, addressed Fr. Ioann: “Zdravstvuy, bachka” (“Greetings, Father”). The priest asked him in pleasant surprise: “How is it that you speak Russian?” “I am, after all, a Kazan Tatar!” the man replied with an accent. The memoirist summed up

⁴² Ibid. № 35. C. 919–920.

⁴³ Ibid. № 19. C. 490.

this encounter with the words: “So, we are countrymen, therefore, friends”.⁴⁴

Thanks to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, hostels for Russian pilgrims were also established in Jerusalem and other locations in the Holy Land. In the opening lines of the essay about the journey to the Oak of Mamre, the author states that the pilgrims departed from the “Russian Buildings”.⁴⁵ This complex, situated on the outskirts of Jerusalem, included the Trinity Cathedral, spacious metochia for pilgrims, buildings of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, the Russian consulate, and a hospital. They were constructed in 1860–1872 by the Palestine Committee — the predecessor of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society — and later transferred to that organization. A considerable number of sites for other Russian religious and socio-cultural support centers in Palestine were acquired by Archimandrite Antonin, who headed the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem from 1865 to 1894. He is mentioned in Fr. Ioann’s memoirs because he founded a hostel for Russian pilgrims near the Oak of Mamre. It is no coincidence that in the memoirs under discussion it is referred to as the “Antonin Metochion”. There the author received an exceptionally warm welcome. Fr. Ioann particularly noted that the rooms in the pilgrim inn were comfortable and that, in accordance with Russian custom, tea was served to the travelers⁴⁶.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a church dedicated to the Holy Patriarchs was being built near the oak. Luxurious vestments for its sacristy were donated by Grand Duchess Elizabeth Feodorovna, Chairwoman of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. The church was fully completed in 1914, but owing to the outbreak of the First World War, it was consecrated only in 1925⁴⁷.

It was extremely important that Russian pilgrims traveled through the Holy Land not entirely at their own risk. The Palestine Society

⁴⁴ Ibid. № 33. С. 862.

⁴⁵ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid. С. 2, 5.

⁴⁷ Россия в Святой Земле. Документы и материалы. В 3 т. М., 2017. Т. 2. С. 809, 884.

hired guides and guards (kavasses) for them. Archpriest I. Dobrotvorsky was accompanied by a young Montenegrin named Nikolai; other guides of Russian pilgrims were likewise natives of this South Slavic country⁴⁸.

Despite rumors and fears concerning the hostility of the surrounding environment, the author observed that reality often differed from expectations, and that attitudes toward Russian pilgrims in the Near East were noticeably better than toward travelers from Western Europe. This is illustrated by a dialogue recorded by I. Dobrotvorsky between the Russian pilgrim A.N. Errakhten and a local resident: “He might ask, for example... pointing almost point blank at you with his finger: ‘Moskov?’ If you jokingly answer him: ‘No, Ingles!’ (Englishman), he will pout and turn away. But if, to console him, you say again: ‘No, no, Moskov,’ he brightens and begins to treat you warmly”.⁴⁹ As they say, this quotation requires no further commentary.

In conclusion, it should be stated that travel to the East left deep and unforgettable impressions on Russian Orthodox pilgrims. These impressions may be divided into positive and negative ones. Let us begin with the positive.

The most important of these were the profound religious experiences associated with visiting and praying at the principal Christian shrines in Tsargrad and the Holy Land. Moreover, for many Orthodox pilgrims, collective religious experiences among crowds of their compatriots were often deeper than individual ones. Communication with fellow believers in a foreign environment — one that was alien in religion, culture, and language — also made a powerful impression on the pilgrims. It was precisely through this interaction that both the confessional and national identity of the pilgrims were formed. The majority of the local population — Turks and Arabs — treated the Orthodox religion with tolerance and the Russians themselves with goodwill. According to the observations of the pilgrims, including the memoirist, attitudes toward them were noticeably more

⁴⁸ Добротворский И. К дубу Мамврийскому. С. 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid. С. 8.

favorable than toward Western tourist-pilgrims, which naturally inspired feelings of patriotism.

On the other hand, there were many negative impressions as well. Above all, the sight of great Christian shrines that had passed into the hands of non-believers and had been desecrated by them deeply saddened and even outraged the pilgrims. In addition, many manifestations of the surrounding foreign religious and cultural environment, as well as customs and manners very different from those to which they were accustomed at home, caused them discomfort. Constant anxieties arose about making some wrong move whose consequences might prove unpredictably disastrous. It was impossible not to notice that part of the Muslim population demonstrated, if not open hostility, then at least dislike toward Russian pilgrims, above all as adherents of another faith. Finally, the Russian travelers were surprised and irritated by the incessant begging of many local inhabitants, who believed that Russians were obliged to engage in charity and to pay bakshish not only for real services but even for imaginary ones.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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Military and Naval Reforms under Alexander III

Abstract

The article examines the condition and development of the Russian army and navy during the reign of Emperor Alexander III of Russia (1881–1894) as an important stage in the evolution of the armed forces of the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century. The military and naval policy of the period 1881–1894 was based, on the one hand, on the continuation and further development of the reforms of the previous stage and, on the other hand, on the revision of certain measures and adaptation to changing domestic and foreign political conditions. Based on an analysis of the system of military administration, technical rearmament, material support, and personnel policy, the authors identify a contradiction between modernization trends in the army and navy and the generally conservative course pursued by the supreme authority. Despite certain

successes related to the expansion of naval construction and the increase in the size and combat readiness of the army, by 1894 negative processes had already become noticeable, later intensifying under Nicholas II of Russia. By the mid-1890s, strategic defense issues began to conflict with the general political line of the last Romanovs, which was oriented toward preserving social stability. These contradictions manifested themselves in the sphere of material support (armaments, fortress construction, railway network development, and shipbuilding) and especially vividly in resolving the “officer question” — the problems of the social composition, career prestige, and professional training of the officer corps. The authors conclude that it was precisely during the reign of Alexander III that the preconditions were laid for the crisis phenomena that would later define the state of the Russian army and navy and lead to military and political defeats in the early twentieth century.

Keywords:

Alexander III; Russian Empire; Army, Navy; Military reforms; Modernization; Officer corps.

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Stagnation?

In 1881, assessments of the condition of the Russian army and navy were shaped by the ambiguous outcomes of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) and the growing threat posed by the German Empire. By the time of Alexander III's death in 1894, however, the prestige of the armed forces was once again relatively high. The troops possessed many of the latest technical means, and the Black Sea Fleet had been restored. Yet only ten years later, a severe blow would follow in the form of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), and thereafter army units and naval crews would become involved in the Revolution of 1905–1907. These turbulent events led later observers to view the preceding peaceful decades as a period of stagnation — a slow withering of the military and naval power of the Russian Empire.

Among historians there is a consensus¹ about stagnation trends in the military and naval spheres, but their dynamics remain poorly studied. Can we really regard the history of the Russian army and navy after 1881 as a uniform movement toward the defeats in Manchuria and the Tsushima Strait? Or was there a sharp turning point after which negative trends intensified? Does the change of reign in 1894 represent such a boundary?

Another important and insufficiently studied question concerns the nature of this decline. Some historians, following A.A. Kersnovsky², tend to trace the roots of negative trends back to the military reforms of Milyutin, either to their incomplete character or even to the “bureaucratization” of the army they allegedly produced. Others place greater emphasis on individuals, including Alexander III, Nicholas II, their entourages, and prominent military leaders. In this interpretation, what matters is that after 1881 there began “counter-reforms” imposed from above, in an atmosphere dominated by mediocrity and incompetence³. Hence, the question of rup-

¹ Меннинг Б.У. Пуля и штык. Армия Российской империи. 1861–1914. М., 2016. С. 129.

² Керсновский А.А. История русской армии. Т. 3. М., 1994. С. 14.

³ Бескровный Л.Г. Русская армия и флот в XIX веке. Военно-экономический потенциал России. М., 1973. С. 100; Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие



Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin.
From open sources

ture or continuity in the army and navy in relation to the reign of Alexander II appears especially important.

In naval historiography, there is little doubt about the fruitfulness of the reforms carried out by the General-Admiral, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich of Russia, during the first decade of his leadership of the naval ministry⁴. However, researchers note that from the mid-1860s the Grand Duke withdrew from direct management of the naval administration and handed control to his compliant deputy Nikolai Krabbe. After this, naval policy became overly arbitrary and insufficiently thought out. Excessive

и русская армия на рубеже XIX–XX столетий. 1881–1903. М., 1973. С. 3; Биографии наиболее видных деятелей: Кочуков С.А. П.С. Ванновский — военный министр России (1881–1898 гг.). Дисс. на соискание уч. ст. канд. ист. наук. Саратов, 2003; Айрапетов О.Р. Генерал-адъютант Николай Николаевич Обручев (1830–1904). Портрет на фоне эпохи. М., 2017; Юдин С.С. Солдат империи. Генерал М.И. Драгомиров. Стратег. Учитель. Полководец. М., 2022.

⁴ Воронин В.Е. Государственная деятельность великого князя Константина Николаевича до начала 60-х гг. XIX в.: Дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. М., 1996; Шевырев А.П. Русский флот после Крымской войны: Либеральная бюрократия и морские реформы. М., 1990.



Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich.
From open sources

simplification of the administrative structure of the Ministry of the Navy following the 1867 reorganization, and an enthusiasm for building round ironclad ships — the so-called “popovkas” — resulted in the low combat effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet⁵.

In both military and naval historiography, scholars pay considerable attention to the objective conditions under which the armed forces of the Russian Empire developed. The transition to mass, multi-million-man armies, the complex strategic situation on the western borders as well as in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific regions, rapid development of technology, major socio-economic transformations, and shortages of budgetary funds — all of this undoubtedly complicated the tasks faced by those responsible for managing the army and navy. However, the balance between objective and subjective factors remains a matter of debate.

⁵ Кондратенко Р.В. Морская политика России 80-х годов XIX века. СПб., 2006. С. 11–18, 315.



Alexander III.
From open sources

A number of questions arise concerning the possible paths of reform that the army leadership failed to pursue. Drawing on the example of the German army and the opinions of some authoritative contemporaries, a number of historians⁶ have expressed regret that the Russian Empire never established the General Staff as an independent planning body. Such a step appears logical given the scale of the strategic challenges that emerged, but its political consequences are difficult to predict⁷. It is quite understandable that conservative monarchs such as Alexander III preferred to keep the army under the control of obedient bureaucrats like Pyotr Vannovsky.

Regarding naval reform under Alexander III, historians are generally unanimous. It had already become clear during the

⁶ Steinberg J.W. All the Tsar's Men: Russia's General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898–1914. Washington D.C., 2010. P. 6; Меньинг Б.У. *Op. cit.* C. 143–145; Айрапетов О.П. *Op. cit.* C. 294.

⁷ Rich D.A. The Tsar's Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia. Cambridge MA, London, 1998. P. 6.

Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 that the naval administration had reached an impasse in the previous reign, when it turned out that the Black Sea Fleet essentially did not exist, despite the fact that six years had passed since the lifting of the restrictive clauses of the Treaty of Paris before the war began. Therefore, the main achievements of this period—the revival of the Black Sea Fleet and the construction of seaworthy battleships in the Baltic — can hardly be disputed⁸. Historians are equally unanimous in assessing the negative consequences of the introduction of the naval “service qualification requirement” in the fleet⁹. However, naval history is still largely reduced to the study of naval campaigns and battles, as well as the history of individual ships and their voyages. If we turn to broader questions of naval history during the reign of Alexander III, the most developed topic is naval policy, which is the subject of a major monograph by R.V. Kondratenko, as well as dissertations by V.A. Boltrukevich and A.D. Fedechkin¹⁰. These studies trace the connection between changes in naval strategy and the foreign policy challenges faced by Russia during the reign of the “Tsar-Peacemaker”. However, questions related to reforms of naval administration, naval education, economic aspects of shipbuilding, and other economic activities of the Naval Ministry and port institutions remain insufficiently explored.

⁸ Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.* С. 316; Золотарев В.А., Козлов И.А. Три столетия российского флота, XIX — начало XX века. М.; СПб., 2004. С 478–481; Грибовский В.Ю. Флот в эпоху Александра III: Корабли открытого моря // Морской сборник. 1995. № 9. С. 83–88.

⁹ Никитин В.О. Закон и реальность. «Положение о морском цензе для офицеров флота 1885 года» // Россия XXI. 2011. № 6. С. 58–75; same author. Морской ценз в Российском флоте // Военно-исторический журнал. 2016. № 1. С. 10–15; Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.* С. 315.

¹⁰ Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.*; Болтрукевич В.А. Развитие Императорского Российского флота во второй половине XIX века в восприятии военно-морских кругов: Дисс. на соискание уч. ст. канд. ист. наук. М., 2014; Федечкин А.Д. Создание и совершенствование конструкции броненосных крейсеров Российского флота во второй половине XIX века (1869–1901): Проблемы и решения: Дисс. на соискание уч. ст. канд. ист. наук. СПб., 2019.

Ministry of War and Ministry of the Navy: People and Administration

In 1881, Emperor Alexander III ascended the throne. For the Russian army and navy, the change of reign primarily raised the question of whether the course initiated by the military reforms of the 1850s–1870s would continue. The international situation largely remained the same, shaped by the outcomes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. In an early 1881 memorandum, Dmitry Milyutin expressed a bleak forecast: “Everything happening in Europe indicates that we are experiencing only an armistice, and perhaps a very short one”¹¹. Despite Alexander III’s later reputation as the “Tsar-Peacemaker”, the army and navy still had to prepare for war.

The death of Alexander II and the subsequent Manifesto of April 29, 1881, declaring the inviolability of autocracy, made it impossible for Dmitry Milyutin to remain in office as Minister of War. On May 22 (June 3), 1881, General Pyotr Vannovsky became head of the Ministry of War. On January 1 (13), 1882, he was formally confirmed as Minister of War. His Chief of the General Staff was General Nikolay Obruchev, a close associate of Milyutin. Vannovsky and Obruchev formed a duo that led the military administration until 1898. The conservative Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff — who nevertheless had a reputation as a “liberal” — embodied the contradictory nature of military policy, which combined continuity with the era of the Great Reforms and the emerging conservative, protective tendencies.

As soon as Dmitry Milyutin’s resignation became apparent, opposition to the military reforms intensified. After the death of Prince Aleksei Baryatinsky in 1879, its informal leader became Prince Ivan Vorontsov-Dashkov, who was close to the new emperor¹². Rostislav Fadeev, as before, played the role of ideological

¹¹ Quoted from: Величко К.И. Русские крепости в связи с операциями полевых армий в Мировую войну. Л., 1926. С. 20–21.

¹² Исмаил-Заде Д.И. Граф И.И. Воронцов-Дашков. Наместник Кавказский. М., 2005. С. 221.



Petr Semenovich Vannovsky.
From open sources

inspirer and driving force¹³. Together, they aimed to carry out large-scale changes in the central military administration, modeled on the system that had existed after 1812: a strong and independent Chief of the General Staff, representing line command, and a weak Minister of War responsible only for administrative and economic matters. An additional argument in favor of such a “counter-reform” was its superficial similarity to the organization of the German army, which after 1871 set the tone in military affairs across Europe. However, the main goal of Vorontsov-Dashkov and Fadeev was to eliminate what they saw as the harmful influence of “military bureaucracy”. Nevertheless, the Special Commission established on their initiative to consider the questions on the organization of military administration (posed by the monarch), and chaired by Count Pyotr Kotzebue, did not approve a radical dismantling of Milyutin’s system. Most likely, the opposition of Vannovsky and Obruchev, fears of high costs, and the

¹³ Кузнецов О.В. Р.А. Фадеев: генерал и публицист. Волгоград, 1998. С. 137.



Nikolai Nikolaevich Obruchev.
From open sources

absence of a coherent plan for a new system played a decisive role in the failure of this military “counter-reform”¹⁴.

In July 1881, in a letter to Milyutin, Obruchev expressed confidence in the stability of the existing system: “The palace will continue to stand, and everyone will know what to call it”¹⁵. And so it turned out: the structure of command in the Russian army remained unchanged. Leadership was exercised by Vannovsky and Obruchev, while the influential “heroes” of 1877 such as Iosif Gurko and Mikhail Dragomirov retained significant influence, as did the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich of Russia, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich the Elder, and Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich of Russia.

In the naval administration, personnel changes were more dramatic. In addition to the fact that the General-Admiral, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich of Russia, was the most active supporter of

¹⁴ Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 102; Юдин С.С. Генерал М.И. Драгомиров и проекты реформирования военной администрации в 1881 г. // Российская история. 2016. № 6. С. 55.

¹⁵ ОР РГБ. Ф. 169. К. 71. Д. 61. Л. 5 об.

continuing Alexander II's reformist course, he was also personally disliked by Alexander III. Therefore, in May 1881 the General-Admiral was forced to leave St. Petersburg for his Crimean estate of Oreanda, after which the Emperor issued an ultimatum demanding that Konstantin Nikolaevich submit a request for resignation from all his posts. After some dispute, Konstantin Nikolaevich complied. The Grand Duke had hoped to remain formally in office until August, when he would reach 50 years of service as General-Admiral, but on July 13, 1881, Alexander III dismissed Konstantin Nikolaevich and appointed Grand Duke Aleksei Alexandrovich of Russia as Head of Fleet.

The task of the new head was to sharply redirect the naval administration away from the path it had followed under its previous leader. Apparently aware of Aleksei Alexandrovich's weak character, in January 1882 the Emperor appointed Ivan Shestakov as his assistant and Minister of the Russian Navy — a harsh, irritable man who had also been embittered by the previous reign, though not by Konstantin Nikolaevich himself but by the Minister of the Navy Nikolai Krabbe. Suspecting that “radical changes were being planned in naval affairs and that this was why Shestakov had been chosen”, the disgraced Grand Duke nevertheless “could not believe that Shestakov could become a traitor either to me or to his own past”¹⁶. Yet even in June 1881, before the personnel changes began, during his first audience with Alexander III, Shestakov ambiguously stated that “one should not destroy, but it is absolutely necessary to liquidate everything so that Aleksei [Alexandrovich] enters office without shackles and difficulties”¹⁷.

After becoming Minister, Shestakov pursued a policy aimed at correcting the errors of the previous leadership. However, formally, the main tasks that Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich had set for the naval administration at the beginning of his leadership of the fleet remained unchanged under his successor as well. These tasks

¹⁶ Великий князь Константин Николаевич — А.В. Головнину. 23 января/4 февраля 1882 г. // ГА РФ. Ф. 722. Оп. 1. Д. 1119. Л. 36–36 об.

¹⁷ Шестаков И.А. Полвека обыкновенной жизни. Т. 1. Воспоминания (1838–1881 гг.). СПб., 2013. С. 842.



General-Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich.
From open sources

were reiterated in Grand Duke Aleksei Alexandrovich's report on the period of Alexander III's reign, and they consisted of: 1) "as great a development as possible of the cruising of warships in distant seas and oceans, in order to create true sailors and to maintain Russia's international prestige; 2) independence of our fatherland from foreign shipyards and factories in the construction of warships; 3) the reduction and simplification of the shore-based administration to the greatest possible extent, with the understanding that it is not the fleet that exists for the administration, but the administration for the fleet"¹⁸.

Ivan Shestakov led the Naval Ministry until his death in 1888, after which Nikolai Chikhachyov was Acting Minister until 1896.

Unlike the Ministry of War, the Naval Ministry undertook a noticeable restructuring of its administrative system. By the time Shestakov took office, naval administration operated under the 1867 Statute,

¹⁸ Обзор деятельности Морского ведомства за царствование императора Александра III. 1881–1894. СПб., 1901. С. 6.



Pavel Evstafievich Kotzebue.
From open sources

according to which all economic activity was concentrated in port administrations, while the central administration had neither economic management bodies nor strategic planning organs. Indeed, the shore administration had been reduced and simplified “to the greatest possible extent”.

Almost immediately after taking office, in April 1882, Shestakov initiated a commission to revise the existing legal framework governing the organization of naval administration. However, the commission completed its work only in 1884, and on June 3, 1885, Alexander III approved the new Statute on the Administration of the Naval Department¹⁹. Under this Statute, four new bodies were created within the Naval Ministry: Main Naval Staff, Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply, Naval Scientific Committee, Naval Construction Committee, and Main Naval Judicial Administration. The affairs of the Inspectorate Department were transferred to the Main Naval Staff; the Hydrographic Department was elevated to the status of a Main Directorate; and the office of the

¹⁹ ПСЗРИ. Собрание 3-е. 1885. 3 июня. № 3025.



Ivan Alekseevich Shestakov. Artist Alexander Pershakov.
From open sources

Surgeon-General was renamed the Directorate of the Chief Medical Inspector of the Fleet.

The Main Naval Staff (MNS) was tasked with everything “relating to the maintenance of discipline in the fleet and its combat readiness”²⁰. It was divided into two departments: one dealing with personnel records, and the other with a wide range of functions: it “was responsible for training personnel, supervising the economic activity of units, collecting information on foreign military and commercial fleets and trade routes, developing plans for the deployment of Russian ships and monitoring their implementation, maintaining ship registers, and conducting ‘administrative work on their preparation for military operations’”. In the view of Roman Kondratenko, given the “relative weakness of Russian forces” and the resulting continuity in naval strategy, there was no pressing need for the Naval Ministry to transform the strategic component of the Main Naval Staff into a separate general staff of the navy²¹.

²⁰ Ibid. Ст. 29.

²¹ Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.* С. 137–138.

Strategy: Fortresses and Railways

The military reforms of the 1850s–1870s provided the Russian army with a solid command structure headed by the Ministry of War and a reliable system of conscription. The introduction of universal military service in 1874 made it possible to keep under arms in peacetime 844,000 men (1881), 940,000 (1894), and even more than 1 million (1904). At the same time, a substantial reserve accumulated (growing from 1 to 2.24 million between 1881 and 1890), which allowed for the formation of a truly mass army in wartime. The 1903 mobilization plan set the total wartime strength of the armed forces at 3 million men²². The Russian army was no longer a professional force with long terms of service. Alexander Roediger summarized this trend as follows: “The army has now become a school through which as large a part of the male population as possible is passed, a cadre of those enormous forces (the armed nation) that are deployed in time of war”²³.

However, the armies of other great powers were no less numerous and were rationally organized²⁴. In the event of a major European war, it was impossible to rely on a decisive numerical advantage. Accordingly, qualitative factors came to the forefront: speed of mobilization and concentration, quality of command decisions, the condition of the troops and their armament, etc. It was up to Vannovsky and Obruchev to focus their efforts on improving precisely these indicators. Two circumstances posed serious obstacles on this path.

First, the Russian army was once again in a situation of strict austerity. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 led to a significant

²² Очерк деятельности Военного министерства за истекшее десятилетие благополучного царствования государя императора Александра Александровича: 1881–1890. СПб., 1892. С. 2; Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 123; Бескровный Л.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 42–43; Меннинг Б.У. *Op. cit.* С. 160.

²³ Редигер А. Комплектование и устройство вооруженной силы. СПб., 1900. С. 176.

²⁴ Strength of the armies of the major European powers in peacetime (wartime) in 1892: Germany — 521,000 (2.37 million), Austria-Hungary — 317,000 (1.16 million), France — 552,000 (2.6 million), Italy — 249,000 (1.16 million), Great Britain — 382,000 (900,000) men. (Бескровный Л.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 43).



Nikolai Matveyevich Chikhachev. 1895–1900.
From open sources

budget deficit, and the financial consequences of the Balkan conflict were only overcome by the end of the 1880s. The expenditures of the Ministry of War fell from 253.6 million rubles in 1881 to 204.9 million rubles in 1882. A substantial increase occurred only at the turn of the 1880s–1890s: 213.4 (1888), 227.7 (1889), 243 (1890), 254.7 (1891) million rubles. At the end of the reign of Alexander III, military expenditures reached 284.4 million rubles (1894)²⁵. In the 1880s, the situation left no choice: necessary expenses had to be spread over several years, and some costly projects had to be postponed.

Second, in the event of a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, an extremely unfavorable situation developed on the western borders of the Russian Empire. The two neighboring powers significantly outpaced Alexander III's Russia in the speed of mobilization and concentration. According to late 19th-century forecasts, Germany would complete the concentration and deployment of its armies on the Russian front by day 12, Austria-Hungary by day 15,

²⁵ Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 81.

whereas the deployment of all Russian forces took about 32 days²⁶. The configuration of the borders allowed the forces of the Triple Alliance to envelop Russian troops in the “Polish salient” (a territory of the Russian Empire protruding deeply westward). The Russian command would have faced a choice: either evacuate the Kingdom of Poland or accept battle under unfavorable conditions with a high probability of being cut off.

To compensate for this strategic vulnerability, it was necessary to implement a whole range of measures, including the construction of border fortresses, redeployment of troops from the interior to the frontiers, construction of additional railway lines, and a general increase in mobilization readiness. But the shortage of funds limited the possibilities of Vannovsky and Obruchev.

The military leadership had to intensify the construction of modern fortresses in order to prevent a rapid defeat of troops in the “Polish salient”. By 1881, only a few outdated fortresses existed on the western frontier: Dinaburg, Novogeorgievsk, the Warsaw Citadel, Ivangorod, Brest-Litovsk, Kiev, and Bendery, and in the second line — Bobruisk.

At the beginning of 1881, the then Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin acknowledged that the existing state of fortifications on the western frontier was unsatisfactory. Initial plans were drawn up to modernize the fortifications of Novogeorgievsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod, as well as to build the fortresses of Osovet, Dubno, and Kovno. Total expenses were to amount to 32 million rubles²⁷. By the early 1890s, this plan had been largely implemented. Warsaw was turned into one of the largest fortresses in the world, with 14 forts and an outer line of about 47 versts. However, other projects can hardly be considered successful. The Dubno fort-outpost was poorly located, poorly constructed, and became the subject of a corruption scandal²⁸. In 1886–1887, successful tests of large-caliber high-ex-

²⁶ Зайончковский А.М. Подготовка России к мировой войне. М., 1926. С. 41.

²⁷ Величко К.И. *Op. cit.* С. 18–20.

²⁸ Service Historique de la Défense (SHD GR) 7 N 1472. Nomination du général Zabotkine à la tête de la Direction du Génie (10 novembre 1890); SHD GR 7 N 1472. Au sujet du fort de Doubno (1 juin 1891); Очерк деятельности Военного министерства... С. 181.

plosive shells once again rendered the western frontier fortifications obsolete. The major leap forward in siege warfare required equally powerful defensive efforts, but this meant new expenses, the usefulness of which was questionable. In the 1890s, the Ministry of War would gradually wind down the fortification program.

An alternative to large-scale fortress construction was the development of the railway network. Measures in this direction could dramatically increase the speed of mobilization and concentration, making it possible to offset the advantage of Germany and Austria-Hungary. As early as 1873, eleven railway lines essential for the defense of the western frontier had been planned. However, by 1888, construction had begun on only three of them. In the same year, the General Staff was denied its firm request for the construction of 959 versts of new track and the conversion of 602 versts into double-track lines. In 1881–1888, the construction of 2,655 versts of hard surface roads was planned, but only 40 versts (1.5%)²⁹ were completed. In the 1880s, Russia increased its railway length by 33%, Germany by 25%, and Austria-Hungary by 44%³⁰. By 1900, the Russian Empire surpassed Austria-Hungary in provision with locomotives, wagons (railway cars), and personnel, but lagged behind Germany in the same indicators³¹.

Another means of accelerating mobilization was the deployment of troops closer to the western frontier and increasing their combat readiness. The number of troops in the Warsaw, Kiev, and Vilna military districts in peacetime increased from 227,000 (1883) to 610,000 (1893). The latter figure amounted to about 45% of the entire peacetime army. But this change in deployment also meant new

²⁹ Fuller W. *Strategy and Power in Russia. 1600–1914*. New York; Toronto, 1992. P. 339.

³⁰ In the 1880s–1890s, the length of railroads increased in Russia from 22.9 to 30.6 thousand km; in Germany from 33.3 to 41.8 thousand km; in Austria-Hungary from 18.4 to 26.5 thousand km (Соловьева А.М. *Железнодорожный транспорт России во второй половине XIX в.* М., 1975. С. 231; *Энциклопедический словарь: в 86 т.* / Ф.А. Брокгауз, И.А. Ефрон. Т. XIа. СПб., 1894. С. 783).

³¹ Соловьева А.М. *Op. cit.* С. 303.

expenses for barracks, depots, etc.³² Poor provision of barracks had long been a chronic weakness of the Russian army, affecting above all the quality of training in units scattered over large distances. In 1883, barracks construction began using an economic method (built by the troops themselves). The proportion of units housed in barracks grew slowly: from 57.1% (1885) to 61.5% (1894)³³.

The start of construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1891 led to a slowdown in railway building related to the defense of the western frontier. As in the case of the fortresses, significant expenditures did not lead to a radical improvement in the strategic situation in a hypothetical conflict with the Central Powers.

Strategy: The Black Sea Fleet and Armored Seagoing Battleships

The naval ministry's strategy in the early 1880s was shaped by new foreign-policy conditions that had emerged by that time. The “embryonic state”³⁴ of the Black Sea Fleet meant that Russia was unable to fully reap the benefits of its land victories in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. The formation of the German Empire created a new situation in the Baltic Sea. While in the 1860s the task of building a fleet superior to the combined forces of all Baltic states was feasible, the rapidly developing navy of the German Empire was becoming a serious adversary. Another task of the Baltic Fleet in the 1860s–1870s had been to resist the already superior British and French navies through a combination of coastal-defense ironclads and ships intended for commerce raiding. However, “the combination of coastal defense and oceanic cruiser warfare, which had

³² Fuller W. Op. cit. P. 342.

³³ Русское военное обозрение. Положение о постройке казарм распоряжением войскового начальства хозяйственным способом // Военный сборник. 1887. № 5. С. 27; Всеподданнейший отчет Военного министерства за 1894 год. СПб., 1896. С. 7.

³⁴ Петров М.А. Подготовка России к мировой войне на море. М.; Л.: Госвоениздат, 1926. С. 24.

seemed appropriate in a confrontation with England or France, did not promise success against a unified Germany or Turkey”³⁵. Finally, the strengthening naval power of China and Japan required a corresponding reinforcement of Russia’s Far Eastern fleet in the event of political tensions there.

In August 1881, a conference was held with the participation of War Minister Pyotr Vannovsky, Foreign Minister Nikolay de Girs, and the Minister of the Russian Navy, Ivan Shestakov, under the chairmanship of Grand Duke Aleksey Alexandrovich Romanov. It was decided that the Naval Ministry’s primary task would be the construction of a combat-ready Black Sea Fleet capable of ensuring “absolute dominance in the Black Sea waters” and, in the event of intervention by other powers in a war with Turkey, capable of “seizing the Bosphorus straits, entrenching itself on both shores, and, having firmly positioned itself at the entrance to the Black Sea, of protecting its coasts and waters from any encroachment”. Without abandoning the idea of a defensive fleet in the Baltic, the conference recognized that “the defense of the Baltic Sea coasts must be active, not allowing blockade and ready to exploit any favorable opportunity for going on the offensive”. Finally, to address the Far Eastern problem, it was assumed that “in the case of separate clashes with China or Japan [...] it would be necessary to dispatch a squadron from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets to the waters of the Pacific Ocean”. It was also considered necessary to maintain a sufficient number of cruisers in the Pacific capable, in the event of conflict with European powers, of seriously threatening their commerce³⁶. Cruisers, notes researcher V.A. Boltrukevich, “were still regarded by ruling circles as the only effective means of damaging the interests of potential adversaries of the Russian state”³⁷ outside the Baltic and Black Seas.

In 1882, Alexander III approved a 20-year shipbuilding program that envisaged the expansion of the Baltic Fleet by 16 battleships

³⁵ Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.* С. 14–15.

³⁶ Quoted from: Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.* С. 76.

³⁷ Болтрукевич В.А. Эволюция типа русского корабля крейсерского класса на протяжении второй половины XIX в. в восприятии военно-морских кругов // Вестник Университета Дмитрия Пожарского. 2018. № 2 (10). С. 21.



Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov. Artist I.E. Repin.
From open sources

and 11 cruisers, and the Black Sea Fleet by 8 battleships, as well as the construction of 41 smaller vessels for all fleets³⁸. This program was subsequently revised several times. Its implementation was facilitated by a rapid increase in the naval budget in the 1880s compared to the budget of the Ministry of War. It rose from 30.7 million rubles in 1882 to 40.9 million rubles in 1888³⁹ — an increase of 33%, whereas the military budget grew by only 4% over the same period. However, by the end of Ivan Shestakov's tenure in 1888, the actual results were modest: in the Baltic only one battleship and four cruisers (two frigates and two corvettes) had been completed or launched, and in the Black Sea three battleships and six gunboats. While in the Black Sea Russian battleships surpassed the Turkish fleet in both quantity and quality, in the Baltic the superiority of Germany's armored forces continued to grow⁴⁰.

³⁸ Огородников С.Ф. Исторический обзор развития и деятельности Морского министерства за сто лет его существования (1802–1902 гг.). СПб., 1902. С. 217–218.

³⁹ Ibid. С. 243–244.

⁴⁰ Моисеев С.П. Список кораблей русского парового и броненосного флота (с 1861 по 1917 г.). М.: Воениздат, 1948. С. 52–53, 66–67, 278–279, 320–323.

From the mid-1880s, torpedo boats were included in ship-building programs. The ideas of the French “*Jeune École*” (“Young School”) were popular in Russia, as they aligned with the same strategic logic promoted by French Minister of Marine Théophile Aube, appointed in 1886. Just as France could not compete with Britain’s vast battleship fleet, Russia was unable to match the pace of German battleship construction. Therefore, it was hoped that developing a large “small fleet” would compensate for the shortage of capital ships. In Russia, this idea was also supported by the successful use of naval mines during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878⁴¹. From 1886 onward, the Ministry of the Navy began mass orders abroad and domestic construction of torpedo boats, and by the end of Alexander III’s reign the fleet had been augmented by 49 such vessels⁴². However, as historians note, “despite all the expectations raised by their initial successful use, by the end of the 19th century torpedo boats had not fully justified the hopes placed upon them. Alongside the improvement of this new class of ships, countermeasures were also being developed—both active and passive”⁴³.

People: Non-Commissioned Officers, Officers, and Cavalry

As already noted, the combat qualities of soldiers and officers were understood as a key factor in conditions of mass-army warfare. However, improving these qualities became increasingly difficult. First, short service terms were introduced in order to build up a reserve. The term of service was raised from 4 to 5 years in 1881, but then reduced again to 4 years in 1888⁴⁴. Second, the proportion of literate recruits remained consistently low, about 22%. Third, in conditions of prolonged peace in Europe and the end of military operations in Central Asia, training relied entirely on peacetime methods:

⁴¹ Болтрукевич В.А. *Op. cit.* С. 112–113.

⁴² Обзор деятельности Морского ведомства за царствование императора Александра III... С. 87.

⁴³ Болтрукевич В.А. *Op. cit.* С. 122. See: Кондратенко Р.В. *Op. cit.* С. 297–298.

⁴⁴ Очерк деятельности Военного министерства... С. 4.

general exercises, field maneuvers, and large-scale drills. The latter took place in 1886–1892 near Białystok, Elisavetgrad, in Volhynia, and near the Ivangorod Fortress. Especially notable were the Volhynia maneuvers of 1890, which lasted 9 days and involved 120,000 men⁴⁵.

A clear weak point of the Russian army in the 1880s remained the non-commissioned officer corps. It was planned to have 33,000 extended-service NCOs, but in reality their number fluctuated around 5,000. In 1888, a stipend was introduced, which increased the number of extended-service NCOs from 4,988 in 1888 to 7,800 in 1891⁴⁶. However, financial incentives had limited effect, since long-term military service could not compete for manpower with agriculture or urban employment⁴⁷. It was proposed to ease access for NCOs to officer rank, but Pyotr Vannovsky strongly opposed this measure⁴⁸. By the late 1890s, the army had about 13,000 extended-service NCOs, but this was still insufficient. Historian Pyotr Zayonchkovsky concluded that staffing the army with NCOs remained “the most difficult and essentially unresolved task”⁴⁹.

Similar problems existed in the officer corps. As a result of reductions in the peacetime army, the number of officers fell from 34,917 in 1880 to 30,655 in 1885, and then rose again to 36,568 in 1895⁵⁰. At the same time, the era of mass armies required both an expansion of the officer corps and an improvement in its professional quality. The military administration struggled to meet these demands. In 1882, cadet corps were restored. The aim of this “counter-reform” was to give children a military-oriented education, strengthen the caste character of the officer corps, and reinforce its noble, loyalist ethos. Special measures were taken to facilitate the admission of children of nobles

⁴⁵ Ibid. C. 83–88.

⁴⁶ Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 122.

⁴⁷ Шишло К. К унтер-офицерскому вопросу // Военный сборник. 1884. № 10. С. 235.

⁴⁸ Редигер А.Ф. История моей жизни. Воспоминания военного министра. Т. 1. М., 1999. С. 161.

⁴⁹ Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 120.

⁵⁰ Бескровный Л.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 97.

and officers to these institutions⁵¹. After the cadet corps, a young man entered a military school, where he received specialized training before being commissioned as an officer. Alongside this path, there was a less prestigious but faster route to officer rank through junker schools. By 1889, the number of graduates from military and junker schools had become nearly equal⁵². Efforts were also made to raise the educational level of junkers, and Anton Denikin (a former junker) believed that significant progress had been achieved in this regard⁵³.

Interestingly, during the reign of Alexander III — a period usually associated with conservative tendencies — radical reforms were carried out in the cavalry, a branch of the armed forces known for its caste-like structure and attachment to tradition⁵⁴. These reforms were driven by several factors, including high costs, poor performance during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, and the evident vulnerability of cavalry to modern firepower. On the initiative of Colonel Nikolai Sukhotin, in 1882 hussar and uhlan regiments were transformed into dragoon regiments. The resulting savings allowed the number of squadrons to increase from 224 to 328. In the same year, the Officers' Cavalry School was established. Training increasingly emphasized dismounted action, reconnaissance, and raids behind enemy lines. The abandonment of the traditional role of cavalry as a shock arm of battlefield warfare, the abolition of familiar uniforms and regimental names, and especially the redeployment of cavalry units to border regions with poor living conditions led to an outflow of wealthy officers and dissatisfaction among those who remained. In 1890, the French military attaché noted the poor training of Russian cavalry, especially the Guards, and the beginning of a reaction against the reforms⁵⁵. The death in 1891 of the

⁵¹ Очерк деятельности Военного министерства... С. 206–207.

⁵² Бескровный Л.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 98–99.

⁵³ Деникин А.И. *Старая армия. Офицеры.* М., 2005. С. 233.

⁵⁴ Керсновский А.А. *Op. cit.* Т. 3. С. 18–21; Айрапетов О.Р. *Op. cit.* С. 294; Шапиро Б.Л. Русификация и модернизация конницы в царствование Александра III // *Гуманитарные ведомости ТГПУ им. Л.Н. Толстого.* 2019. № 4 (32) Т. 2. С. 70–86.

⁵⁵ SHD. GR 7 N 1472. *Au sujet des Manoeuvres de Krasnoe-Selo et de Narva* (9 septembre 1890).



Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich the Elder. Artist *N. Schilder*.
From open sources


Inspector-General of Cavalry, Grand Duke Nikolas Nikolaevich the Elder, intensified debates about the future of this branch of service. Planned raids deep into East Prussia and Galicia intended to disrupt German and Austro-Hungarian mobilization and concentration appeared increasingly unrealistic⁵⁶. The era of “raid doctrine” was coming to an end.

Sailors: “real seamen” vs. “careerists”

In the jubilee report of the Ministry of the Navy for 1855–1880, it was stated that the number of naval officers as of 1 May 1879 was 2,962, while the fleet’s requirement was 3,021⁵⁷. In the report for the reign of Alexander III, however, it was stated that in 1880 there were

⁵⁶ Ibid. Au sujet de l’emploi de la Cavalerie au début des opérations (8 janvier 1892).

⁵⁷ Обзор деятельности морского управления в России в первое двадцатипятилетие благополучного царствования Государя Императора Александра Николаевича. 1855–1880. Ч. 1. СПб., 1880. С. 12–13.



Evfimiy Vasilyevich Putyatin.
From open sources

3,209 officers on active service — exceeding the fleet's requirement by 182⁵⁸. The need to eliminate surplus officers, especially those who had long remained in shore-based positions, led to the introduction in 1885 of the “naval service qualification requirement”.

The idea of regulating the size and career progression of the naval officer corps by requiring mandatory sea service throughout one's career was first proposed by a commission chaired by Admiral Yevfimiyy Putyatin in 1871⁵⁹. Vice Admiral Grigory Butakov and, in the late 1870s, Rear Admiral Nikolai Chikhachyov also submitted memoranda on introducing such a system. According to researcher V.O. Nikitin, these projects and commissions “testify to the search for ways to change the system of officer service”⁶⁰ already in the preceding era.

With the appointment of Ivan Shestakov as Minister of the Russian Navy, the issue of the naval qualification was immediately

⁵⁸ Обзор деятельности Морского ведомства за царствование императора Александра III... С. 11–12.

⁵⁹ Никитин В.О. Морской ценз в Российском флоте... С. 10.

⁶⁰ Ibid.



Grigory Ivanovich Butakov.

From open sources

placed on the agenda of upcoming reforms, and on 25 February 1885 the *Regulations on the Naval Qualification for Fleet Officers* were approved by imperial decree⁶¹. The law established a required number of months at sea for promotion to the next rank, as well as a maximum age limit for each rank. Upon reaching that age, an officer was to be retired from the fleet.

The introduction of the naval qualification requirement soon provoked criticism among naval officers, and it was eventually regarded as “one of the most important causes of the defeat at Tsushima”⁶². The intention itself — to maintain the combat readiness of every naval officer through regular sea service — was sound, but in practice it turned into a bureaucratic calculation of days spent on various ships, in different operational statuses, and under different complexity coefficients. Historian V.O. Nikitin vividly summarized the reform’s outcome: “The law on naval qualification was intended to produce as many ‘real’ seamen as possible in the fleet, but instead

⁶¹ ПСЗРИ. Собрание 3-е. 1885. 25 февраля. № 2769.

⁶² НИКИТИН В.О. Закон и реальность... С. 60.

it contributed to a significant increase in ‘careerists’ among officers, which inevitably affected the combat readiness of the fleet”⁶³.

Another reform was the abolition of the separate corps of naval navigators and naval artillery officers. Before the advent of steamships — and even before steam fully replaced sail — the duties of a watch officer in controlling a ship were complex enough that it was considered impossible to combine command duties with those of an artilleryman or navigator. These responsibilities were assigned to officers of specialized corps. These officers occupied a marginal position within naval service: they held army-style ranks and were recruited not only from the nobility but also from the non-noble estates. On 12 June 1885, rules were approved abolishing the corps of naval navigators and naval artillery officers. According to these rules, recruitment into the navigation and artillery departments of the Naval Technical School was discontinued, and navigation and artillery posts in the fleet were gradually filled by officers of the Navy⁶⁴.

A year later, the corps of ship engineers and marine mechanical engineers were reorganized⁶⁵. Army-style ranks in these corps were abolished and replaced by five grades in each corps, ranging from junior assistant shipbuilder to inspector of shipbuilding, and from junior mechanical engineer to inspector of the mechanical branch. Correspondence between these grades and naval ranks was established for pension calculations and for transfers to civilian service. Both corps continued to be recruited from the shipbuilding and mechanical departments of the Naval Technical School. Thus, changes in the technological nature of the fleet led to the merging of navigation and artillery specialties with line service and to an even greater separation of engineering branches.

In 1891, a counter-reform in naval education followed, similar to earlier changes in the army: the Naval School was renamed the Naval Cadet Corps, and in 1894, as in the army, admission was restricted to hereditary nobles and children of naval officers.

⁶³ Ibid. C. 72.

⁶⁴ ПСЗРИ. Собрание 3-е. 1885. 12 июня. № 3056.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 1886. 15 мая. № 3701.

Toward the 20th Century

A certain summary of the first stage of development of the Russian army during the reign of Alexander III can be considered the new *Regulations on Field Command of Troops in Wartime* adopted in 1890⁶⁶. This new system of command had several distinctive features. First, it (for the first time) provided for the formation of several armies within a single theater of operations, all subordinate to a single commander-in-chief. Second, army staffs were formed on the basis of military district staffs, which accelerated their creation and simplified coordination. Third, the 1890 *Regulations* corrected a major shortcoming of the 1868 *Regulations* (amended in 1876), which had seriously affected the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878: the poorly defined system of logistical supply. Historian Pyotr Zayonchkovsky regarded this document as a step forward, even though it had to be revised in 1903 due to the increase in the number of armies on the western frontier to seven, while there were only four border military districts⁶⁷.

Some measures of the 1880s continued the line laid down by the military reforms of Dmitry Milyutin, sometimes even in a radical form (as in the cavalry reforms). Others are more appropriately described as “counter-reforms” (such as the restoration of cadet corps). Overall, however, the measures of the military administration sought to adjust earlier policies in response to new circumstances: a threatening strategic situation, financial constraints, the transition to mass armies, and lessons learned from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878.

In 1890–1894, significant changes occurred in the general conditions in which the army and navy of the Russian Empire developed. The worsening relations with Germany and the resulting Franco-Russian alliance coincided with economic growth. Public opinion became more active, including the rise of anti-militarist sentiment. Finally, a new wave of military technological development

⁶⁶ ПСЗРИ. Собрание 3-е. 1890. 26 февраля. № 6609.

⁶⁷ Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 108.

beginning in the mid-1880s forced the military leadership to respond to emerging challenges.

In the navy, changes at the turn of the 1880s–1890s were also linked to a change in leadership of the Ministry of the Navy. After the death of Ivan Shestakov in 1888, the ministry was headed by Nikolai Chikhachyov. The new minister opposed the dispersion of active fleet forces for operations in foreign seas and the Pacific and consistently defended the priority of the Baltic naval theater⁶⁸. In 1890, construction began on an ice-free port at Libau (Liepāja), which eight years later received its first ships. From 1891, the naval budget began to grow significantly, rising from 40.7 million rubles in 1890 to 51.2 million rubles in 1894 under Alexander III. Naval expenditures would later grow even faster, reaching 98.3 million rubles in 1902⁶⁹.

In total, during the reign of Alexander III, the Baltic Fleet commissioned four battleships and had seven more under construction, seven first-rank cruisers (two under construction), five mine cruisers, 33 torpedo boats (one under construction), one torpedo boat tender, and seven gunboats (one under construction). In the Black Sea Fleet, four battleships entered service (with three more under construction), along with one cruiser, two mine cruisers (one under construction), 15 torpedo boats, and six gunboats. Two additional torpedo boats were built in St. Petersburg and assembled in Vladivostok⁷⁰. One can agree with historian V.Yu. Gribovsky that “by the mid-1890s the Russian fleet occupied a solid place in the world in combat power, third only to the navies of Britain and France”⁷¹, although in the Baltic Sea the superiority of the German fleet was evident.

In the army, intensified work on planning, improving mobilization procedures, and theoretically mastering new methods of warfare strengthened the position of the General Staff, whose

⁶⁸ Грибовский В.Ю. *Op. cit.* С. 87.

⁶⁹ Огородников С.Ф. *Op. cit.* С. 243–244, 259.

⁷⁰ Моисеев С.П. *Op. cit.* С. 52–55, 66–71, 74–77, 94–107, 180–181, 204–205, 208–211, 278–281, 284–289, 298–305, 320–323, 370–373.

⁷¹ Грибовский В.Ю. *Op. cit.* С. 87.

personnel grew from 661 in 1882 to 1,232 in 1904⁷². It included figures with international reputations such as Obruchev, Dragomirov, Leer, Puzyrevsky, and Kuropatkin. However, organizationally the General Staff remained one of the departments of the Ministry of War, alongside artillery, engineering, medical, and other administrations. In 1894, Nikolai Obruchev pointed out the abnormality of this situation and proposed a reform to transform the General Staff, expanding its personnel and authority, including the right of independent reporting to the Emperor. However, Pyotr Vannovsky refused to consider a reform that might have removed the strategic planning body from his control⁷³.

By 1881, the Russian army was still equipped with the Berdan rifle, although full rearmament was completed only by 1884. By that time, the future direction of small arms development was already clear: reduction of caliber and the adoption of magazine-fed rifles. Major European powers first adopted magazine rifles and then reduced-caliber designs. The Russian Empire could not afford to re-equip itself twice. In practice, the military leadership took a calculated risk, keeping the army for several years with outdated weapons in order to later adopt a system combining both advantages. Thus, in 1891 the Mosin–Nagant rifle was adopted. The transition to the new model required additional expenditures of 70 million rubles, and rearmament proceeded in two phases, completed in 1897 and 1903⁷⁴.

By the end of 1881, the transition to steel artillery pieces in field artillery had largely been completed, after which rearmament extended to reserve (1884–1885), mountain (1885–1886), and relief (replacement) artillery (1887–1890). In 1889–1894, five mortar regiments were formed, equipped with 6-inch Engelhardt mortars capable of high-angle fire. An important organizational reform was the transfer of corps artillery from the authority of district artillery chiefs directly to corps commanders. This significantly reduced its organizational autonomy and strengthened its integration with infantry.

⁷² Ibid. C. 177–178.

⁷³ Кочуков С.А. *Op. cit.* C. 72–73.

⁷⁴ Бескровный Л.Г. *Op. cit.* C. 312–319; Зайончковский П.А. *Самодержавие...* C. 156–157; Кочуков С.А. *Op. cit.* C. 181; Меннинг Б.У. *Op. cit.* C. 153–154.

The size of the artillery increased by 40% between 1881 and 1899, but its overall level of equipment remained insufficient. For example, in 1893, per infantry battalion there were 4.2 guns in France, 3 in Germany, 2.85 in Austria, and 2.5 in Russia⁷⁵.

In the Russian army, experiments were conducted with balloons, machine guns, telephones, and other military technologies. However, innovations rarely met with sufficient trust or willingness to allocate funds. For example, after the 1891–1892 trials, 250 machine guns were ordered, but only for fortress units, not for field troops⁷⁶. Overall, the Russian army, slowly and with delay, nevertheless managed to keep up with the high pace of the arms race of the late 19th century. Beyond obvious financial constraints, this was also due to the fact that the military leadership still viewed a hypothetical major European war as a short, maneuver-based conflict, in which technical equipment would play only a secondary role.

Probably the most acute problem of the Russian army in the 1890s was not slow mobilization or technical backwardness, but rather internal social issues within the armed forces and the growing gap between the army and society. John Bushnell described the world of the Russian officer at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries as a closed circle in which women, alcoholism, and gambling led to theft; theft was covered up in the name of corporate honor; corporatism reinforced the isolation of the officer corps; and this isolation, in turn, encouraged alcoholism⁷⁷. Of course, not all officers were swept up in this pattern. Researchers note the uneven and heterogeneous composition of the Russian officer corps in this period⁷⁸. However, escaping the narrow confines of a bleak garrison life into a broader career path was indeed difficult.

⁷⁵ Бескровный А.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 356; Зайончковский П.А. *Самодержавие...* С. 159–162; Меннинг Б.У. *Op. cit.* С. 155–156.

⁷⁶ Бескровный А.Г. *Op. cit.* С. 321.

⁷⁷ Bushnell J. The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881–1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency // *American Historical Review*. Vol. 86. No. 4 (October 1981). P. 753–780.

⁷⁸ Зайончковский П.А. Русский офицерский корпус на рубеже столетий (1881–1903) // *Военно-исторический журнал*. 1971. № 8. С. 41; Меннинг Б.У. *Op. cit.* С. 152.

Due to the privileges of the Guards and the rarity of transfers between units, promotion rates varied significantly between different branches of service⁷⁹. But the overall picture was unpromising for those without the right connections. The officer corps was aging. Nearly one-third of company commanders were over 46 years old⁸⁰. Their advancement was blocked by a small number of lieutenant colonel positions and a large number of elderly generals. Pyotr Vannovsky strictly followed the will of Alexander III: promotions were based on seniority, and elderly officers were not forced into retirement⁸¹. As a result, ambitious officers left the service, while more inert or even incompetent leaders took their place. This system of selection did not enhance the prestige of officers among enlisted men or society. In addition, the social cohesion of the officer corps weakened: by 1895, hereditary nobles made up about 50% of officers⁸².

The restoration of cadet corps further contributed to the insularity of the officer corps. In 1894, a new step in this direction was taken when, contrary to criminal law and international trends, dueling was legalized in the army. Through this measure, the military authorities hoped to strengthen corporate esprit de corps among officers; in practice, however, it only increased the number of duels and deepened the alienation between the military and society⁸³.

By 1894, negative trends were already visible in the development of the Russian army and navy, trends that would intensify under the reign of Nicholas II. In a situation where war was becoming a “scientific and administrative problem”⁸⁴, organizational and technical factors came to the forefront. The Russian Empire was traditionally weak in these areas and did too little to correct this. It was able to supply

⁷⁹ Защук И. Ваканционное производство 1893 года в армейской пехоте // Разведчик. 1893. № 160. С. 869–870.

⁸⁰ Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 189.

⁸¹ Кочуков С.А. *Op. cit.* С. 46.

⁸² Зайончковский П.А. Самодержавие... С. 204–205.

⁸³ Robinson P. Courts of Honour in the Late Imperial Russian Army // The Slavonic and East European Review. Vol. 84. No. 4. 2006. P. 711–713.

⁸⁴ Интеллектуальная и моральная реформа во Франции // Ренан Э. Собрание сочинений Эрнеста Ренана. В 12 т. Т. IV. Киев, 1902. С. 130.

itself with material resources (weapons, fortifications, railways), albeit with some delay compared to leading powers. However, the situation became alarming where military issues intersected with political and socio-economic ones. The need for serious changes in the officer corps was obvious, but these were blocked by the supreme power. Measures aimed at preserving the military caste system (restoration of cadet corps, legalization of dueling) can hardly be considered successful.

By the mid-1890s, it had become clear that strategic defense issues were increasingly in conflict with the conservative course of the late Romanovs.

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“The Tsar Converts to Catholicism”: Confessional Hierarchies, Perceptions of the Decree on Religious Tolerance, and Religious Violence in the Northwestern Region after April 17, 1905

Abstract

This article examines cases of religious violence (the looting of churches and cemeteries, attacks on parishioners of the Orthodox Church) committed by Catholics in the Northwestern Region of the Russian Empire against Orthodox Christians living there shortly after the issuance of the decree on religious tolerance. Drawing on administrative records and journalistic materials that document cases of church and cemetery desecration (and, in some instances, their motivations), the author concludes that these acts of looting carried symbolic significance and were intended to “cleanse” the sacred space of churches and cemeteries from the attributes of a “dirty faith” or “dog-faith”. They were motivated by a perception


widespread in Catholic circles that Orthodoxy constituted an “unclean faith”. The article demonstrates that the surge of religious violence by Catholics following the Decree of April 17, 1905, resulted from a specific combination within the worldview of Catholics in the provinces of the Northwestern Region: namely, particular conceptions of supreme authority together with the aforementioned perception of Orthodoxy as an “unclean faith”. It is further noted that Catholics viewed the looting of Orthodox churches not only as an affirmation of their own faith, but also as a means of fulfilling social demands and improving the institutional position of the Catholic Church. In conclusion, the article argues that attacks on churches and cemeteries, as well as the coercion of some Orthodox believers into converting to Catholicism, may be interpreted as a “redirection” by Catholics of the bureaucratic justifications that had accompanied their own mass conversion into the “Tsar’s faith” in the 1860s. Such a “redirection” was intended to signify what Catholics themselves perceived as the emergence of a new confessional hierarchy in the Northwestern Region after April 17, 1905.

Keywords:

Non-Orthodox confessions of the Russian Empire; Northwestern Region of the Russian Empire; Decree on Religious Tolerance of April 17, 1905.

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On November 1, 1905, according to reports from the Police Department in the Vilna Governorate, an unusual robbery took place at the Orthodox Church of Saint John. According to the police report, the church's "holy icons, the royal and side gates, the chandelier, the holy altar table, the offertory table, banners, and other church utensils were removed, and all of this was scattered around the church; near the fence and beyond the church fence were found the holy altar table, the offertory table, and lecterns; the holy icons lay directly on the ground, scattered along the entire fence; the royal gates remained intact, while the side gates were broken; two banners had been dismantled and placed beyond the fence; the chandelier and the depiction of the Last Supper, formerly attached above the royal gates, had also been thrown over the fence; two priestly vestments were hung on fir trees; pages of the Gospel were hung upon the removed offertory table; and the binding of the Holy Gospel and a bent Holy Cross were found two versts away from the church in a state forest tract, lying on an overturned post. In the church there remained only an old relief crucifix of the Roman Catholic church" (which had remained there ever since the church had been converted from a Uniate Catholic into an Orthodox church)¹. According to rumors reported to the informant, this had been done with the aim of converting it back into a Catholic church².

This desecration was very unlike the more "ordinary" cases of church robbery — in the report on the destruction of the Church of Saint John, nothing was said about the concealment of valuable church utensils in the neighboring villages or the theft of money from the church, which were characteristic features of ordinary robbery³.

¹ ГА РФ. Ф. 102 А-3. оп. 103, А. 16. Ч. 33. Л. 20.

² Ibid. А. 18.

³ A "typical" robbery is described as follows: on 26 September 1906, in the settlement of Kositskaya in the Vylevskaya Volost, a prayer house of Old Believers (!) was robbed of church books worth 200 rubles, as well as candles, three altar vestments from lecterns, and a burial shroud (altogether worth 105 rubles). These items were later found in the settlement, in the bathhouse of a local resident, where the thieves were also discovered. During their arrest, the thieves were beaten by local residents and subsequently died from their

As will be shown below, in the case of the Church of Saint John, several key problems connected with the peculiar confessional situation in the Northwestern Region of the Russian Empire intersected at once. On the one hand, it revealed the long-term consequences of the mass bureaucratic conversions of Catholics to Orthodoxy and the transfer of Catholic churches into the jurisdiction of Orthodox dioceses that had taken place in the 1860s; on the other hand, it reflected the peculiarities of how local Catholics perceived the decree on religious tolerance. This article will attempt to examine why the publication of this decree was interpreted by Catholics as a signal to begin attacks on local Orthodox believers and their sacred objects.

The Institutional Position of Catholicism in the Northwestern Region in the Second Half of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries

Modern scholars of religion in the Russian Empire describe its system of confessional administration as a “confessional state”⁴. As the originator of this concept, Robert Crews, notes, the imperial bureaucracy granted particular faiths the status of “tolerated” confessions, while in return expecting their representatives to remain loyal to the imperial regime⁵.

Catholicism was one such “tolerated” confession, whose administrative structure largely replicated the synodal system created at the beginning of the eighteenth century⁶. The system governing the

injuries. It is noteworthy that in this case we observe cooperation between local residents and the authorities, which resulted in extrajudicial punishment of the thieves. In cases involving ritualized plundering of Orthodox churches and cemeteries, there is no evidence of such lynch justice.

⁴ Crews R. Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia // *The American Historical Review*. 2003. P. 50–83.

⁵ *Ibid.* P. 53–55.

⁶ On the synodal system, see: Freeze G. Institutionalizing Piety: The Church and Popular Religion in Russia, 1750–1850 // *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank and David Ransel. Bloomington., 1999. P. 212. On similarities between the Orthodox Holy Synod and the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical collegium, see: Werth P. *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia*. Oxford, 2014. P. 52.



Governor-General M.N. Muravyov-Vilensky.

From open sources

Catholic Church was finally formalized in 1832, when the Department for the Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Confessions, which administered all non-Orthodox religions in the empire, became part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs⁷.

This institution reflected, on the one hand, the state's desire to strengthen control over the lives of its subjects, including by winning over the clergy to its side; on the other hand, it indirectly acknowledged the necessity of clergy participation in local administration.

In response, the clergy itself effectively “signed on” to the understanding that it would not become involved in politics and would not claim equal status with the Orthodox Church (which retained the exclusive right to conduct missionary work among adherents of other confessions). Article 54 of the “Catholic” section of the Statute on Foreign Confessions stated that “members of the Roman Catholic clergy are strictly forbidden, in their sermons delivered in churches, to touch upon political subjects, even in general terms, or to publish writings concerning political matters”⁸.

⁷ Высшие и центральные государственные учреждения России. 1801–1917: Центральные государственные учреждения. Т. 2. СПб., 2001. С. 36–38.

⁸ Свод законов Российской империи. Т.XI. Ч. 1. Уставы духовных дел иностранных исповеданий. СПб., 1857. С. 14.

From the authorities' point of view, this “agreement” between Catholics and the government was broken during the uprisings of 1830–1831 and (especially) 1863–1864⁹. Soon afterward, additional restrictions began to be imposed on the everyday life of the Catholic faith in the Northwestern Region, intended to strip it of its “political” content. Thus, during the governorship of M. N. Muravyov, bans were introduced on ceremonial receptions for clergy, on pastoral letters, and on leaving one's parish without permission from the regional administration; restrictions were also imposed on the construction of Catholic churches and chapels¹⁰.

Thus, beginning in the 1860s, a gradual conflation of the political and the confessional took root: the prohibitions imposed on the confessional attributes of the Catholic Church acquired political significance. At the same time, campaigns were carried out to convert Catholics to the “Tsar's faith”, Orthodoxy. The key motivation behind these conversions was supposed to be not religious experience or a conscious change of faith, but rather the affirmation of civic self-identification and the demonstration of political loyalty to the throne¹¹. Along with the conversion of Catholics to Orthodoxy, churches too “departed”, becoming symbolic embodiments of Orthodox dominance in the region.

Supporters of these “bureaucratic” conversions perceived such actions as affirmations of the “Russian” presence in the region¹². However, this article will examine how Orthodoxy and Catholicism were perceived within the Catholic community itself, which developed its own notions of a hierarchy of confessions and of the place of Orthodoxy within it.

⁹ Werth P. The Tsar's... P. 153. On the Polish uprising of 1863, see: Воронин В.Е. Польское восстание 1863 года: опыт «Примирительной политики» русского правительства. М., 2008. On earlier Catholic church–state relations, see: Долбилов М.Д. Русский край, чужая вера: Этноконфессиональная политика в Литве и Белоруссии при Александре II. М., 2010. С. 41–109.

¹⁰ РГИА. Ф. 821. Оп. 150. Д. 5. Л. 19.

¹¹ Долбилов М.Д. Русский край... С. 379–381.

¹² Ibid. С. 452.



Archbishop Alexander of Lithuania.
From open sources

“The Dog-Faith”: The Image of Orthodoxy in the Catholic Milieu

As the scholars of the Catholic Church in the Modern era have shown, the history of Catholic communities in nineteenth-century Europe was bound up with an intertwining of secularization and religious revival¹³. During this period, the Catholic Church succeeded, on the one hand, in creating a transnational community of believers, and on the other, in definitively shaping and transforming the values of its community and identifying the “enemy” as that which denied these values¹⁴.

At the same time, a distinguishing feature of the “Catholic Revival” was its heightened attention to the religiosity of the “lower orders”: church canon and pastoral authority were combined with the encouragement of religious ideas and tastes close to the social

¹³ Clark C. The New Catholicism and the European culture wars. // Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. P. 11.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 35–36.

lower classes¹⁵. On the western borderlands of the Russian Empire, however, Catholics were perceived as a politically disloyal and dangerous group; a large number of administrative restrictions were imposed upon them for the purpose of protecting the “dominant faith”¹⁶, which inevitably affected perceptions of the Orthodox living alongside Catholics — friendly relations between Orthodox and Catholics in the region were punishable by local clergy¹⁷.

Therefore, on the western borderlands of the Russian Empire, within the framework of the “renewal” of Catholicism, the problem of separating one’s own community from the neighboring “enemy”¹⁸ became especially acute. This demarcation of “us” and “them” in relation to the Orthodox was carried out by Catholics on several levels simultaneously — confessional, social, and political¹⁹. Let us begin with the confessional dimension.

One of the most common tropes in the anti-Orthodox discourse of Catholicism was the depiction of Orthodoxy as a filthy, “dog-faith”. According to a detailed letter by the Lithuanian Archbishop Alexander describing the actions of Roman Catholic priests, “the priests obstruct the issuing of certificates for marriage with Orthodox Christians, demanding large sums of money for this and expressing wild

¹⁵ Долбиллов М.Д. Конфессиональная идентичность и аргументы памяти — католический ответ на русификацию // Православие: конфессия, институты, религиозность (XVII–XX вв.): Сборник научных работ. СПб., 2009. С. 76.

¹⁶ See: Долбиллов М.Д. Русский край, чужая вера... С. 297–367.

¹⁷ Werth P. *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia*. Oxford, 2014. P. 201.

¹⁸ The need for such confessional separation was also due to the fact that not all believers in everyday life adhered strictly to a single confession. As early as the early 20th century, a report by the Head of the Chancellery of the Governor-General of the Northwestern Region noted that in some villages parishioners kept both Orthodox and Catholic icons, and that Orthodox and Catholics attended each other’s churches. ОР НБ МГУ. Ф.39. Оп. 1. Д. 122. Л. 3. This situation was perceived by the Catholic clergy as abnormal.

¹⁹ A methodological note should be made before proceeding to the analysis of Catholic rhetoric in the Northwestern Region. Unlike bureaucratic and Orthodox perceptions of Catholicism, which are available to us directly, in the case of Catholic perceptions of Orthodoxy we usually receive this information through an intermediary often biased against Catholics, which may distort or even fabricate direct speech. Therefore, it is important to rely not only on rhetoric but also on documented actions of Catholic clergy preserved in administrative records.

judgments such as: ‘the Orthodox faith is a canine, dog-faith’; ‘every Orthodox person smells of a dog and it is repulsive to live with him in marriage’; ‘it is better for a Catholic to live in debauchery than to marry Orthodox Christians’; ‘from marriages between Orthodox and Catholics devils (little fiends) are born in an unbroken succession of generations, and they are condemned to eternal life in hell’²⁰.

A similar description was applied to Orthodox churches: “it is better to be in a tavern, cattle shed, or a house of debauchery than to enter an Orthodox church”²¹. A Catholic who had defiled himself by visiting an Orthodox church was expected to cleanse himself by throwing carrion, dogs, cats, and manure into the church, or by personally insulting the priest²². Such topoi describing Orthodox priests would also appear in journalism in 1905 — *Novoe Vremya* would cite the following statements: “an Orthodox priest stinks like a dog”, “...Orthodox Christians are anointed with dogs’ tails” and “it is better to go to a synagogue than to a church”²³.

An inquisitive reader may notice that all of the examples we have listed above concerning such perceptions of Orthodoxy come “second-hand”, and that there are good reasons to doubt their reliability. Therefore, let us turn to an example from 1902, when notions of “unclean” Orthodoxy were embodied in Catholic practice itself. This concerns the case in which the Vilna bishop Stefan Zwierowicz issued a circular letter prohibiting Catholics from attending parish schools.

This letter (the text of which has been preserved in the collections of the Police Department of the State Archive of the Russian Federation) stated that parish schools were hostile to the Catholic faith and that Catholics were regarded there as enemies of the state²⁴.

Zwierowicz declared that, since parish schools exerted an unquestionably harmful influence upon Catholic youth, priests had to ensure

²⁰ РГИА. Ф. 1282. Оп. 2. Д. 2061. Л.11.

²¹ Ibid. Л.11 об.

²² Ibid.

²³ Новое время. 20.05.1905. С. 3.

²⁴ ГА РФ. Ф. 102. Д.-3. Оп. 100. Д. 48. Ч. 5. Л. 2–2 об. On the political connotations of confessional division between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, see below.

that Catholics did not attend them — and if they did attend, absolutism should be denied both to the children and to their parents²⁵.

Apparently, at least some Catholic priests enforced this requirement. Thus, one priest, after the Decree had already been issued, learned that his parishioner Anton Marcinkiewicz was attending school and pulled his ear in church. Another priest by the name of Wojciechowski said that schools taught debauchery and also declared that he would deny Christian burial to those who attended them²⁶.

Thus, the Catholic notions described above regarding the need to protect the “purity” of their own faith from “filthy” Orthodoxy, although they may have been embellished in reports and journalistic articles, evidently had real foundations. And in 1905 we observe a large number of symbolic “purifications” of sacred spaces (churches, cemeteries, and so forth) from elements of the filthy, “dog-faith”, similar to the desecration of the Church of Saint John described at the beginning of the article.

For example, in Bielsk district (uyezd) of the Grodno Governorate, a Catholic church had once been abolished because of its “harmful influence” upon the Orthodox population. In 1881 all its property was transferred to the Orthodox Church, but reconstruction work only began in July 1905 — and this provoked dissatisfaction among Catholics, who attempted to obstruct the work and did not want the former Catholic church to change its confessional character²⁷.

Another case involved Catholics no longer “defending” a church that had once belonged to them, but rather “attacking” an Orthodox one. In September 1905, according to the Minsk governor, two priests arrived in a village in the Slutsk district and held a mass, after which they converted 150 people to Catholicism and declared that all lands there would be returned to Catholics. The authorities summoned two military companies, which prevented the transformation of a formerly abolished Catholic church into an active Catholic place of worship²⁸.

²⁵ Ibid. А. 3 о6.

²⁶ Ibid. А. 29.

²⁷ РГИА. Ф. 821. Оп. 11. Д. 80. А. 31–31 о6.

²⁸ Ibid. Оп. 3. Д. 822. А. 1–1 о6.

At times Catholics sought to prevent the construction of Orthodox churches — in May 1905 the priest Malinowsky and the vicar Karl Soluba arrived with a crowd of Catholic peasants at the site of a new Orthodox chapel, demanding that the construction stop²⁹.

In some cases, shortly after Catholics seized a church that had been converted into an Orthodox place of worship, Catholic services began to be held there again. Thus, on May 13, 1905, the inhabitants of the settlement of Żołnierkiewicze converted to Catholicism and soon seized the keys to the cemetery church, which, despite the priest's demands, they did not return, "and after seizing the keys they conducted unauthorized services in the church"³⁰. Only after intervention by the state authorities in August 1905 were the keys returned to the church priest³¹.

Not only churches suffered desecration — for example, in May 1905 a parish school in the village of Studzianka was vandalized: "the shutters were torn from the windows, the doors ripped off, the glass smashed, the desks broken, the stove destroyed, portraits of His Imperial Majesty and Archbishop Hieronymus torn to pieces, and the icon removed and placed in the back corner near the threshold"³².

Cemeteries too were subjected to attacks and desecration. In September 1905 in Kovno Governorate, an Orthodox cemetery was destroyed by unknown persons; twenty-four grave crosses were destroyed and the fence broken down³³. Significantly, during this desecration four-pointed crosses, resembling Catholic ones, were left untouched, while all eight-pointed crosses (clearly marked as Orthodox) were broken³⁴.

In some cases, the attacks did not stop at the crosses themselves — in the settlement of Kodno, former "obstinate ones" smashed monuments and crosses in the cemetery, attempted to dig up some graves, and tried to throw out the bones of Orthodox dead³⁵.

²⁹ Ibid. Оп. 3. Д. 817. Л. 3.

³⁰ РГИА. Ф. 797. Оп. 75. Отд. III, ст. 3. Д. 324. Л. 1.

³¹ Ibid. Л. 3.

³² Католическая агитация // Новое время 31.05.1905. С. 4.

³³ ГА РФ. Ф. 102. Д-3. Оп. 104. Д. 1. Ч. 59. Б. Л. 28.

³⁴ Ibid. Л. 36.

³⁵ Католическая агитация // Новое время. 31.05.1905. С.4.



Catholic Archbishop of Mogilev Szembek.
From open sources

Local authorities (as well as newspapers writing about these events) explained such ritual attacks as the result of agitation and incitement by Catholic priests³⁶. However, acts of desecration were not always “coordinated” with the Catholic clergy — indeed, in some cases we can state with confidence that Catholic parishioners acted on their own initiative. In May 1905, during his visit to the Minsk Governorate, the Catholic bishop Szembek learned of a conflict between local Catholics and an Orthodox priest over the confessional

³⁶ See, for example: “Lithuanian peasants during the feast attacked Old Believers; in the crowd there were cries of ‘down with the Russians, the police and the guards, we do not need a tsar, we must have Lithuania’”. According to rumors, the hostility of Lithuanians is being encouraged by the Catholic priest Pyotr Voytekun (Petras Voitekūnas), who in his sermons incites Lithuanians to attack Russians” (ГА РФ. Ф. 102. Д-3. Оп. 104. Д. 1. Ч. 59. Б. Л. 10). At the same time, it seems important to emphasize that in some cases attacks by Catholics on Orthodox Christians could be provoked by religiously exalted parishioners and priests (although, as the case of Metropolitan Szembek described below shows, the opposite situations also occurred). However, at the same time, the position of A.Yu. Bendin, who claims that attacks on churches and cemeteries were only the result of a “propaganda campaign”, seems unfounded (Бендин А.Ю. Проблемы веротерпимости в Северо-западном крае Российской империи. Минск, 2010. С. 322). Even if attacks by Catholics on Orthodox Christians were the result of planned propaganda by the Catholic clergy, it is necessary to understand why this propaganda so easily found resonance in the hearts of their parishioners.

ownership of a cemetery, and that the local Orthodox priest, seeking to prevent desecration, had locked it. Szembek, not wishing to escalate the conflict, refrained from visiting the cemetery, but local peasants nevertheless climbed over the cemetery fence and “purified” it of Orthodox objects³⁷.

All of the above-described cases are united by a remarkable selectivity regarding precisely which objects were broken or removed from churches or cemeteries. Almost always these objects were confessionally marked as Orthodox: the eight-pointed cross (while four-pointed crosses in the cemetery remained untouched), banners, priestly vestments, icons. Moreover, shortly after the seizure of churches that had once belonged to Catholics and later become Orthodox, the Catholic parishioners who seized them often immediately began conducting services there. In some cases Catholics resisted the consecration of objects by Orthodox priests — for example, in the village of Ostrovok in the Grodno Governorate in June 1905, a priest consecrated a local well, after which a tertiary nun approached him and declared: “we do not need Russian devils consecrating the water in the well; I consecrated it myself”³⁸.

The reverse side of these “purifications” of former Catholic churches and efforts to prevent the penetration of Orthodox elements into Catholic parishes was the symbolic “contamination” of Orthodox churches. For example, in the settlement of Horodlo during the Easter service, Orthodox believers were openly attacked by “the obstinate Catholics” and during the religious procession: lanterns and church windows were smashed, and after the Orthodox entered the church, it was desecrated with filth³⁹. Alongside such “contamination”, Catholics often sought to fence off Catholic sacred spaces from Orthodox believers. In the Gelvonai (Giełwany) parish of the Vilna Governorate, Catholics set aside a small corner for Orthodox believers, surrounded it with a ditch, and cut an opening in the wall so that the “unclean” Orthodox would not carry their dead through the main entrance⁴⁰.

³⁷ РГИА. Ф. 821. Оп. 125. Д. 3012. Л. 90–92.

³⁸ ГА РФ. Ф. 102. Д-3. Оп. 103. Д. 1. Ч. 18. Л. Б. Л. 21.

³⁹ «Католическая агитация» // Новое время. 31.05.1905. С. 4.

⁴⁰ «Католическая агитация» // Новое время. 11.06.1905. С. 3.

Thus, one may observe that the confessional demarcation between Orthodoxy and Catholicism presupposed a hierarchy in which “pure” Catholicism dominated over “filthy” Orthodoxy. On the one hand, such a symbolic division that attributes dirt and impurity to the “Other” is among the most widespread ways of structuring surrounding reality across many different cultures⁴¹. But equally important is the opposition created through these metaphors: that of “pure” Catholicism versus “filthy” Orthodoxy.

It would seem that this division was a response to the hyperbolized opposition of “splendor—drabness” within the empire’s social hierarchy, employed during the campaigns to discredit Catholicism in the 1860s, in which the brilliance of the “upper strata” of society in the Northwestern Region (meaning the Polish landowner and the educated priest) was ultimately portrayed as superficiality and an alien “overlay”⁴².

If this interpretation is correct, then the depiction of Orthodoxy as a “filthy” faith represented a symbolic redefinition of the hierarchies between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, in which the established symbols of social and confessional hierarchy — once redefined by the authorities — were being redefined once again, this time “in favor” of Catholicism as the “pure” confession belonging to the social elite. This is why in journalism one encounters statements attributed to priests claiming that Orthodox clergy would one day become their servants⁴³, that the Orthodox faith was a servile faith, and that Orthodox priests lived in poverty⁴⁴.

Finally, this division also carried political connotations. Earlier we cited the text of Bishop Zwierowicz’s circular letter, which stated that Catholics were regarded as enemies of the state. The confessional confrontation between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, politicized by

⁴¹ See: Дуглас М. Чистота и опасность: анализ представлений об осквернении и табу. М., 2000. С. 24–28.

⁴² Долбиллов М.Д. Полонофобия и политика русификации в Северо-Западном крае империи в 1860-е гг. // Образ врага. М., 2005. С. 142–143.

⁴³ Новое время. 20.05.1905. С. 3.

⁴⁴ «Из западнорусских епархий» // Литовские епархиальные ведомости. № 28–29. С. 257.

the imperial authorities themselves in the 1860s⁴⁵, was now likewise being interpreted politically by Catholics.

In this respect, it is useful to return to the letter of Archbishop Alexander, in which he also reported (as early as 1882!) that among Catholics there circulated a rumor that after his coronation in Moscow the reigning emperor would convert to Catholicism and travel to Rome to bow before the Pope⁴⁶.

Such a rumor rearranged and inverted the existing political hierarchy: Catholicism, from being a merely “tolerated” confession, was transformed into the dominant faith, whose power even the Emperor himself would obey! This small detail from Archbishop Alexander’s letter becomes extremely important for further analysis of Catholic actions and their interpretation of the Decree of April 17, 1905, because it partially explains the sharp upsurge of religious violence by Catholics following its publication.

“The Tsar-Catholic”: Rumors of Religious Change in the Catholic Milieu after the Promulgation of the Decree on Religious Toleration

The previously mentioned letter of Archbishop Alexander, which referred to the rumor circulating among Catholics about the Emperor’s imminent conversion to Catholicism, is not the only evidence suggesting that such an idea genuinely existed in Catholic circles. Here is another similar example.

In 1903, P. N. Sergievsky, an official in the administration of the Northwestern Region, noted that Catholics of the Peskovsky parish in the Grodno Governorate were persuading Orthodox believers that “God willing, there will soon be a union [of churches], John of Kronstadt is converting to Catholicism and will become the Pope of Rome” (their belief in such an outcome being reinforced by the recent laying of the foundation stone for a new Catholic church in their parish)⁴⁷. Sergievsky

⁴⁵ Werth P. The Tsar’s... P. 153.

⁴⁶ РГИА. Ф. 1282. Оп. 2. Д. 2061. Л. 12 об.—13.

⁴⁷ ОР НБ МГУ. Ф.39. Оп. 1. Д. 122. Л. 56—57. Sergievsky describes these Catholic views as the result of the “influence” of a local priest, who was presented as

also mentioned other rumors which at first glance appear absurd: that a “Tsar’s manifesto has been issued recognizing Catholicism everywhere in Russia as the only true faith, but the priest is hiding it”⁴⁸, and that “Joachim, Bishop of Grodno, had been arrested by the government authorities for speaking about the superiority of Orthodoxy”⁴⁹.

Such rumors, described by the authorities as superstitions, evidently formed an integral part of the worldview existing within the Catholic milieu. As scholars of peasant culture note, such rumors frequently arose from cognitive conflicts: clashes between peasant notions of how things ought to be and the intentions of the authorities or political reality⁵⁰.

In our case, such a clash appears logical: Catholic notions of the primacy of Catholicism (as “the only true faith”) conflicted with the lower — and, given the many restrictions on manifestations of Catholic religiosity in the region, indeed discriminatory — institutional status of the Catholic Church relative to Orthodoxy. Evidently, this contradiction was “resolved” in the consciousness of Catholic peasants through the belief that for their present “sufferings for the faith”⁵¹ (and incidents of Catholic discreditation were apparently perceived precisely in this way — in one report to the Governor-General, it was stated directly that “the punishment of guilty Roman Catholic clergy for persistence in anti-government activity, appearing in the eyes of the flock as martyrdom for the faith, only inflamed fanaticism and subjected the people even more strongly to the influence of the priests”; after the exile of Father Hryniewicki,

the direct author of such “monstrous rumors”. Although it seems to us that the emergence of such rumors was more likely connected to the peasant milieu, it is still quite possible to imagine a situation in which the local priest at least did not prevent their spread — since in Catholicism of the second half of the 19th century it was considered important to listen to and respect popular forms of religiosity. See also: Долбилов М.Д. Русский край... С. 227–240 et passim.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Л. 59.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Л. 57.

⁵⁰ Аксенов В.Б. Слухи, образы, эмоции: массовые настроения россиян в годы войны и революции (1914–1918). М., 2022. С. 237.

⁵¹ As M.D. Dolbilov notes, “in Russian Catholicism, the psychology of popular Catholicism prepared its adherents for suffering for the faith”. See: Русский край... С. 235.

peasants began making pilgrimages to Vilna in his memory)⁵², Catholics would in the future be rewarded by the transformation of Catholicism into the sole true faith throughout the empire⁵³.

In such a perception, the Decree of April 17 appeared as confirmation of the rumors circulating in Catholic circles regarding the future fate of Orthodoxy and Catholicism⁵⁴ — and merged with the generally eschatological sensibility characteristic of peasant consciousness⁵⁵.

Already in May 1905 we observe the activation of these ideas, which often became a powerful argument in favor of Orthodox conversion to Catholicism.

Thus, O.I. Annenkova, a local defender of Orthodoxy, who corresponded with Konstantin Pobedonostsev, reported that “the granted mercy, it would seem, should have united the people, but bitter reality shows the opposite. Catholics, adhering to the Jesuit maxim of the end justifying the means, restrain themselves in nothing, extend their fictitious rights beyond all measure, assert that the sovereign himself has converted to Catholicism, as has Father John of Kronstadt; in short, everyone will become Catholic, and the sooner this happens the better, because the churches will be sealed shut”⁵⁶.

⁵² ОР НБ МГУ. Ф.39. Оп. 1. Д. 101. Л. 60 об.

⁵³ The “future retribution”, as will be shown below using the example of a rumor circulating in the peasant milieu that only Catholics would receive land, had in the consciousness of Catholics not only narrowly confessional but also broader social consequences — once again revealing the already described situation of contamination of confessional, social, and political elements “packaged” into confessional identity.

⁵⁴ If we consider this decree as part of a symbolic space, it could be interpreted differently from what the authorities initially intended — since the “translation” of symbols can be completely unexpected, and they may be assigned entirely unforeseen meanings” (Колоницкий Б.И. Символы власти и борьба за власть. СПб., 2001. С. 12).

⁵⁵ Аксенов В.Б. *Op. cit.* С. 241.

⁵⁶ РГИА. Ф. 1405. Оп. 2. Д. 88. Л. 43 об. — 44. The recurring mention of John of Kronstadt as an important figure for Catholics converting to Catholicism suggests that his veneration was not limited to Orthodox Christians. His image as a protector of “little people” again shows the link between confessional and social characteristics. On petitions to Father John from Catholics and even Jews requesting intercession, see: Киценко Н.Б. Святой нашего времени: отец Иоанн Кронштадтский и русский народ. М., 2006. С. 61, 75.

Annenkova’s testimony is reinforced by reports from the Police Department — in June 1905 it was reported that a peasant from Vilna Governorate told a police constable while he was repairing an Orthodox chapel in Krontsy: “Why are you repairing this church? This church will be ours, and the Orthodox faith is accursed; I read in a book that this faith is accursed”⁵⁷.

Reports of rumors about the Emperor’s imminent conversion to Catholicism also appear in journalism of the period. In July 1905 it was said that there were rumors “that the Tsar had converted to Catholicism, that Catholicism was now the dominant religion, that Orthodox churches would be turned into Catholic churches, and that land allotments would be given to Catholics; even the Decree itself is interpreted tendentiously — it is said that since conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism is not punished, then conversion from Catholicism to Orthodoxy is punished”⁵⁸.

In the August issue of the *Lithuanian Diocesan Gazette* (*Litovskie eparkhialnye vedomosti*) it was reported that in one Catholic church “a priest loudly declared that conversion from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism was now permitted by the government, which had allowed the bishop’s journey through Vitebsk Governorate precisely for this purpose”⁵⁹.

In an earlier article from late June 1905, we also encounter indications that the Decree would have immediate practical consequences — according to the article, the Decree was interpreted “as though the Sovereign had commanded everyone to convert to Catholicism, Orthodox churches would be transformed into Catholic churches, and their property transferred to the priests”⁶⁰.

The transfer of property (and above all land) to Catholic parishes likewise appears in reports of rumors circulating among Catholics. One peasant told a priest that “there are rumors that the peasants of

⁵⁷ ГА РФ. Ф. 102 Д-3. Оп. 103. Д. 1. Ч. 33. Л. Б. Л. 7.

⁵⁸ «Католическая агитация» // Новое время. 11.07.1905. С. 3.

⁵⁹ «Подвиги польских ксендзов» // Литовские епархиальные ведомости. № 35. 31.08.1903.

⁶⁰ «Борьба католичества с православием в Литве» // Новое время. 20.06.1905. С. 3.

one village were told they would lose their land allotments if they refused to convert to Catholicism, and that the church would be turned into a Catholic church”⁶¹.

The connection between land ownership and Catholic confession demonstrates that the conflation of the social, confessional, and political — which we discussed earlier as characteristic of the Northwestern Region — became newly reactivated soon after the issuance of the April 17 Decree.

A vivid example of this conflation is the surviving pamphlet *The Destruction of Catholic Churches by the Muscovites*, which appeared in 1905⁶². It recounts how the Catholic church in Śledzianów was closed and how, in 1892, it miraculously reopened. Soon after its reopening, police arrived intending to close the church once more, but the people refused to leave; they lay inside and around the church, and in the end soldiers beat those lying there. The text reported that many were whipped with nagaikas merely because they wished to witness the miracle that had occurred⁶³.

In the pamphlet, the “Muscovites” had settled on church lands and informed (sic!) on Polish Catholics to their Orthodox priests. It was stated that “whoever wishes to preserve the faith of his fathers must also preserve the native language”, and that “whoever defends the holy faith from desecration must in the end also defend the language of his fathers”⁶⁴. This, it was argued, was why “the Muscovite authorities forbade teaching in Polish in schools, so that we might forget the language of our fathers and forget that we are Poles”⁶⁵.

⁶¹ «Католическая агитация» // Новое время. 11.07.1905. С. 3.

⁶² I was unable to find the place of publication or publisher of this pamphlet; however, it is evident that it was produced by a supporter of the Polish national project and in this sense was clearly a tool of Polish nationalism. At the same time, the imagery used in the pamphlet, apparently intended for peasant readers, is rich in religious symbolism, and in the combination of political, ethnic, and confessional elements we see the intertwining of these spheres in Catholic consciousness.

⁶³ РГИА. Ф. 821. Оп. 3. Д. 822. Л. 12–13.

⁶⁴ Ibid. Л. 15.

⁶⁵ Ibid. Л. 15–17.

Political authority was represented as a force of hell and compared to the Roman emperors: “The Muscovites are messengers of hell who destroy God’s temples”; they are instruments of Satan “with which hell wages war against Christ”; they are “the enemy and destruction of all truth, more terrible than Nero”⁶⁶.

Further, according to the text of the pamphlet, the local Orthodox inhabitants were accused of having settled on church lands and of “informing (again, precisely in this sense!) on Polish Catholics to their priests”. Thus, we see that the contents of the April 17 Decree, as they penetrated the Catholic milieu, were interpreted as the fulfillment of expectations of the imminent triumph of the Catholic Church, when the ruling monarch himself would adopt this faith and Catholicism would become the dominant confession. At the same time, belonging to the Catholic Church — in a context where confessional affiliation carried political and social connotations — also implied an elevation in the status of Catholics: land allotments and the church property of the Orthodox were expected to be transferred to them.

Yet the political dimension of this redefinition of the hierarchies of Orthodoxy and Catholicism did not at all mean that Catholics were disloyal to the throne — on the contrary, shortly after the decree’s publication thanksgiving services were held in more than forty Catholic churches in the Vilna Governorate⁶⁷.

The Catholic population, apparently, interpreted the decree issued on April 17 as a return to “normality”, as the restoration in the administrative-political sphere of the “true” hierarchy of confessions. It is entirely possible that some Catholics understood their efforts to seize previously closed Catholic churches and “purify” them of Orthodox elements as the fulfillment of the “Tsar’s will”.

The clearest example of this was the case in March 1906 when a portrait of Nicholas II was hung in one of the formerly closed Catholic churches where services had begun again⁶⁸.

⁶⁶ Ibid. A. 20.

⁶⁷ РГИА. Ф. 821. Оп. 125. Д. 3012. Л. 80.

⁶⁸ Бендин А.Ю. Проблемы веротерпимости в Северо-западном крае Российской империи. Минск, 2010. С. 336.

Conclusion

A.P. Storozhenko, one of the most active proponents of Russification in the Northwestern Region during the 1860s, hoped that the campaigns he carried out would ultimately increase the religious indifference of the local population, “cooling” the faith of local inhabitants to such a degree that it would cease to be an important factor in local politics. For the secularized bureaucrat, “ardent” faith seemed like a vanishing relic of past eras and was interpreted as a collection of artificially sustained superstitions — at best curious, at worst politically dangerous.

Meanwhile, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries proved to be a time of growing religiosity not only in Russia but across Europe as a whole: increasing literacy and the wider availability of spiritual literature raised the level of spiritual and religious independence, while the orientation of religious literature toward the individual made religious experience more personal.

In early twentieth-century Russia, a vast number of new religious movements emerged, while the older ones increasingly focused attention on the spiritual and inner dimensions of faith and on personal religious experience.

Apparently, the Catholics of the Northwestern Region were likewise not untouched by this process of intensifying religiosity. The Catholic community, becoming internally cohesive, developed its own ideas of correct and incorrect belief and constructed its own symbolic hierarchy, alternative to the one existing in the institutional sphere. Within this hierarchy, the notion of “filthy” Orthodoxy was curiously combined with the belief that the ruling monarch would soon adopt Catholicism and make it the official confession of the empire.

The events following the decree of April 17, 1905, in a certain sense constituted a “revenge” of the Catholics’ fervent faith, whose adherents attacked the confessional hierarchy that had by then become institutionalized in the region. The key role in this attack belonged to the “purification” of closed or converted Catholic churches and cemeteries back into their “normal” state.

It would seem that the violent attempts in 1905 to seize churches, destroy Orthodox graves in cemeteries, and carry out ritualized destruction of property can be seen as a kind of boomerang-like return by Catholics against the local administration and the Orthodox Church of the administrative practice that had existed in the 1860s (and partially recurred in the 1890s) of forcibly “rebaptizing” Catholics into the “Tsar’s faith”. In a situation where rumors actively circulated in Catholic circles about the Emperor’s conversion to Catholicism, the “Tsar’s faith” itself came to mean Catholicism — and in that case its symbolic primacy within the Catholic milieu (reinforced by the opposition between “pure” Catholicism and “filthy” Orthodoxy) manifested itself in attempts to “purify” sacred spaces of elements confessionally marked as Orthodox and thereby to establish the dominance of the “correct” faith.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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Original paper



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Contemporary Russian Historiography of Conservative Liberalism and Legalism in the Early Twentieth Century

Abstract

The article examines the historiography of the activities of conservative liberals (primarily legalists) in the early twentieth century on the basis of scholarly works and political practice. An extensive group of scholars has emerged that has thoroughly analyzed most trends within liberalism and identified the principal characteristics of Russian reformist (liberationist) movements. The aim of the study is, on the basis of extensive historical, philosophical, legal, and political-science literature, to identify the body of ideas that developed within the liberal jurisprudence of the Russian Empire and to determine the main viewpoints of contemporary scholars regarding the nature of conservative liberalism.



Materials and Methods

A significant portion of the works of the leading legalists has been published, which facilitates the researcher's task. The use of numerous sources (countless articles and monographs by legalists), together with modern studies, makes it possible to compare different perspectives on the essence of the movement and to arrive at general conclusions. The application of the problem-chronological and the comparative methods enables a comprehensive scholarly analysis.

Results

The term "legalists" refers to an association of liberal dignitaries of the Russian Empire, primarily drawn from the judicial corps, as well as legal scholars. The ideology of the legalists may be defined as conservative liberalism, while their intellectual inspirations were the well-known scholars K.D. Kavelin and B.N. Chicherin. A stable group of jurists emerged that was deeply interested in the development of legality and the rule of law in Russia ("people of legal order"). In the early twentieth century, legalism experienced a decline and gradually "dissolved" within new right-wing liberal currents. Historians and philosophers have carefully analyzed various aspects of the worldview of the right-wing liberal intelligentsia.

Conclusions

It must be acknowledged that despite the considerable achievements made in clarifying the essence and nature of centrist ideologies in the late Russian Empire, contemporary scholars have generally failed to connect them with the legal background of the principal ideological scholars. The legal foundations of the conservative-liberal ideology of legalism have received little attention, nor was there much effort to investigate them. Studying scholarly views on the nature of right-wing liberalism makes it possible to form a new direction of research that may, in the future, reveal the legal nature of the movement and identify the legalist component within the broader liberal current.

Keywords:

Conservative liberalism, Liberal conservatism, Legalism, Progressive Party, Party of Peaceful Renovation, A.F. Koni

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Introduction

As the historiographer A.N. Egorov rightly wrote, at the end of the twentieth century historians in Russia had done away with ideological supervision, and researchers had been granted access to the country's archival repositories in order to work with new documents. At the same time, the best achievements of the Soviet school of liberal studies were preserved. Russian liberalism was “freed” from its association with the bourgeoisie. The Soviet theory of the liberals’ “fear of authority” was discarded, and liberals began to be evaluated, if not positively, then at least neutrally¹.

In this work we will attempt to determine the content of the socio-political phenomenon of “conservative liberalism” in the scholarly literature from the 1990s through the 2020s. During this period, hundreds of scholars appeared in Russian academia who enthusiastically began to investigate the previously understudied topics from the history of Russian public life under the empire. Having examined many works, we sought to identify different tendencies within conservative liberalism and, above all, to determine to what extent researchers succeeded in identifying the juridical current of liberal legalism

¹ *Егоров А.Н.* Российские либералы начала XX в. и власть: историографические дискуссии. Череповец: Череповецкий государственный университет, 2007. С. 194–197.

within right-wing liberalism. Faced with an enormous body of historical scholarship, we were compelled to exclude from the scope of our study many interesting works only indirectly related to the subject under consideration: other forms of liberalism, Octobrist and Kadet segments within conservatism and liberalism, and many other adjacent studies.

In the present study we will mention only some works connected with the historiography of liberalism. Not one of the hundreds of historical surveys — even the specialized studies — has managed to encompass more than a fraction of the works on liberalism because of their sheer number. Alongside the excellent works of A.N. Egorov, V.G. Kicheev defended a dissertation on the historiography of the landowner and bourgeois parties. In his works, the definition of parties implied the preservation of the old Soviet approach to evaluating the empire's party system. Overall, the scholar adhered to Lenin's classification of parties. For example, Kicheev correctly observed that the classification of the Octobrists within one or another political camp remains the subject of endless historiographical debate (the author himself continued to classify them as liberals)².

A distinctive feature of the synthesis of knowledge in contemporary scholarship is the shift toward the historiography of particular liberal activities and the biographies of prominent figures. Thus, in the work of S.V. Pronkin, governmental constitutionalism during the years of the First Russian Revolution was examined in detail. According to his findings, legalists (P.A. Kharitonov and others)³ played a major role in drafting the fundamental law. A.N. Egorov has studied the national question among the liberals⁴. N.B. Khailova published an

² Кичеев В.Г. Методология классификации политических партий и историография парламентской деятельности в России начала XX века. Улан-Удэ: Изд-во Восточно-Сибирской государственной академии культуры и искусств, 2009. 111 с.

³ Пронкин С.В. Правительственный конституционализм в России XVIII — начала XX в. в отечественной историографии: автореф. дисс ... докт. ист. наук. М., 2012. 50 с.

⁴ Егоров А.Н. Российские либералы начала XX в. и национальный вопрос: историографические оценки // Политико-правовые практики российского либерализма в начале XX в. Мат-лы Междунар. науч. конф. Т. 1. Ч. III. Орел, 2019. С. 210—220.

up-to-date historiography of centrist parties⁵. E.A. Naidenova devoted a study to D.N. Shipov⁶. N.B. Khailova examined the historiography of E.N. Trubetskoy⁷. Numerous historiographical essays are contained in the dissertations and monographs of contemporary authors.

In 1998, V.V. Shelokhaev, analyzing the state of scholarly knowledge about liberalism, formulated several historiographical tasks and quite logically anticipated that the accumulated knowledge would pass into a new qualitative stage⁸. It should be noted that during the 1990s and early 2000s, analytical surveys by Shevyrin continued to appear, containing up-to-date analyses of the historiography of liberalism⁹. Down to the present day, V.V. Shelokhaev and K.A. Solovyov continue to formulate contemporary tasks for the study of liberalism in Russia and largely determine the prospects for the development of historical scholarship in this field¹⁰.

Conferences devoted to liberalism or related themes also continue to be held: the Muromtsev Readings, Chicherin Readings, Koni Readings, as well as the large annual Tauride (Tavricheskie) Readings in Saint Petersburg, among others.

⁵ Пушкарева И.М., Хайлова Н.Б. Либеральный центризм в России начала XX в. (историографический аспект). Ч. 1 // Социальные и гуманитарные науки. Отечественная и зарубежная литература. Серия 5: История. 2023. № 2. С. 7–28.

⁶ Найденова Е.А. Современная историография общественно-политических взглядов и земской деятельности Д.Н. Шипова // Наука сегодня. Ключевые проблемы и перспективы развития. Сб. науч. ст. по итогам Междунар. науч.-практ. конф. Санкт-Петербург, 19–20 декабря 2015 года. СПб.: Редакционно-издательский центр «Культ-информ-пресс», 2015. С. 25–29.

⁷ Хайлова Н.Б. Политические взгляды и деятельность Е.Н. Трубецкого: историографический обзор // Прошлое и будущее либерализма в России — итоги и перспективы изучения. Муромцевские чтения вчера, сегодня, завтра. Мат-лы Междунар. науч. конф. Орел: Издательский дом «ОРЛИК», 2021. С. 198–211.

⁸ Шелохаев В.В. Русский либерализм как историографическая и историософская проблема // Вопросы истории. 1998. № 4. С. 26–40.

⁹ Шевырин В.М. Власть и общественные организации в России (1914–1917). Аналитический обзор. История России. Серия аналитических обзоров и сборников. 2003. № 1. С. 1–152; Шевырин В.М. Революции 1917 г.: переосмысление в зарубежной историографии // Россия и современный мир. 2007. № 1 (54). С. 53–77.

¹⁰ Шелохаев В.В., Соловьев К.А. Политические партии России в начале XX в. как историографическая проблема // Российская история. 2021. № 1. С. 139–150.

In our article we will attempt to determine the current state of scholarship on the conservative-liberal ideas of the empire and to establish whether scholars have succeeded in substantiating the existence of a distinct right-wing liberal juridical current within the broader liberation movement.

Main Part

In the 1990s, scholars moved toward a free discussion of the essence of the concept of “conservative liberalism”. Several directions emerged within contemporary Russian humanities in the analysis of this socio-political ideology and practice of the late empire. The first direction may conventionally be called “historical”. Within it, hundreds of researchers studied the concepts of “liberalism” and “conservatism”. Most of these scholars described the social phenomena of liberalism, explaining its numerous manifestations, without ascending to their abstract conceptual understanding. Nearly all historians (with rare exceptions) attempted carefully to avoid defining the phenomenon of “conservative liberalism” in the final decades of the empire’s existence. As a consequence, a gap emerged between understanding the essence of the processes taking place and the processes themselves. In many cases (for example, regarding the Octobrists), this led to a number of incorrect logical conclusions and errors despite outwardly accurate descriptions of events. Some historians formed their own viewpoints; others followed the Leninist scheme; still others (the majority), unfortunately, ignored terminology and employed it without analysis, following widespread interpretive models. Specifically, researchers as a rule conflated, identified, or confused the terms “conservative liberalism” and “liberal conservatism”.

The second direction may be called “philosophical”. Within it, most philosophers and sociologists carefully analyzed the works of liberal ideologues from Kavelin and Chicherin to Struve. The detailed analysis of the viewpoints of pre-revolutionary scholars led, in most cases, to scientifically grounded conclusions that often proved directly opposed to those of historians. It was precisely this group of

researchers that developed the categorical and conceptual apparatus of conservative liberalism. They formulated its characteristics, forms, and content, and also identified its key actors.

The third direction may conventionally be defined as “politological”. Within it, political scientists, as well as certain scholars from other fields (historians, philosophers, and others), approached the topic of conservative liberalism scholastically, describing it only superficially.

The fourth direction can be defined as “juridical”. Within it, scholars from various disciplines, primarily legal studies, approached the problem of conservative liberalism from the standpoint of legal science. In this direction, we more clearly see the authors’ effort to demonstrate the influence of the ideas of the rule of law and legal order on the formation of conservative-liberal ideology.

In our study we will focus only on the “historical” investigations — that is, works devoted to the emergence of conservative liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century and illuminating not so much the ideology of the movement as its political practices.

The Shelokhaev School

One of the themes that continued from the Soviet period was the study of the history of party movements in the Russian Empire. In the 1990s, the well-known historian V.V. Shelokhaev began researching the right-wing liberal party spectrum of the late empire¹¹. He highlighted the political activism of the Progressive Party during the First World War, which in some respects went further than the Kadets. Shelokhaev examined the tactics used by liberal parties in their struggle against the government¹².

¹¹ Шелохаев В.В. Прогрессисты — партия предпринимателей и интеллектуалов // Полис. 1993. №4. С. 159–164; Секиринский С.С., Шелохаев В.В. Либерализм в России. Очерки истории (середина XIX — начало XX века). М.: Памятники исторической мысли, 1995. 286 с.; Шелохаев В.В. Либеральная модель переустройства России. М.: РОССПЭН, 1996. 280 с. и пр.

¹² Егоров А.Н. Российские либералы начала XX в. и власть: историографические дискуссии. Череповец: Череповецкий государственный университет, 2007. С. 194–197. С. 197–199.


The accumulation of quantitative data eventually led to a transition into a new qualitative stage. During the 1990s–2020s, a series of collective and individual works appeared within the framework of the “Shelokhaev school”, summarizing the study of political parties and liberalism over previous decades while also setting new research agendas. For example, the collective monograph *Political Parties of Russia* (2000) was published, in which leading scholars analyzed, among other things, the work of right-wing liberal parties: V.V. Shelokhaev studied the Progressists, N.B. Khailova the Democratic Reformists, and V.M. Shevyrin the Party of Peaceful Renovation. This study presented a concise outline of the formation and crisis of right-wing liberal parties¹³. It is worth noting that Shelokhaev and representatives of his school classify the Octobrists as right-wing liberals. In one of his publications, the author argued that the Octobrists were a liberal-conservative party, a characterization with which one may agree. At the same time, he also pointed out that the Octobrists supported constitutional monarchy, hereditary authority under all circumstances, opposed parliamentarianism, and upheld a property-based electoral system. These elements of state organization significantly contradicted the principles of liberalism. Thus, the Octobrists were, first and foremost, still a conservative party¹⁴. In 1996, the first edition of the encyclopedia *Political Parties of Russia: From the End of the Nineteenth Century to the First Third of the Twentieth Century* was published¹⁵.

The scholarly school of V.V. Shelokhaev made an important leap forward by publishing extensive collections of documents relating to Russia’s political parties and organizations in the early twentieth century (beginning in 1994). Among other materials, documents

¹³ Политические партии России: история и современность. М.: РОССПЭН, 2000. 630 с.

¹⁴ Шелохаев В.В. Либеральная модель преобразования России начала XX века // Кто и куда стремится вести Россию?... Акторы макро-, мезо- и микроуровней современного трансформационного процесса. Материалы Восьмого международного симпозиума. М.: МВШСЭН, 2001. С. 32–40.

¹⁵ Политические партии России. Конец XIX — первая треть XX века. Энциклопедия / Отв. ред. В.В. Шелохаев. М.: РОССПЭН, 1996. 800 с.



Russian Liberalism. 2010.
From open sources

from centrist parties were published¹⁶. In 2006, the encyclopedia *State Duma* appeared, followed by a revised edition in 2008. This encyclopedia incorporated many excellent articles and biographical essays concerning the work of the imperial Duma¹⁷. An important intellectual advance in modern liberal studies was the encyclopedia *Russian Liberalism* (2010). The work was highly detailed and thoughtfully designed, though, as often happens in large collaborative projects involving many scholars, it was not exhaustive. Certain aspects of the encyclopedia raise questions. For example, it omitted important terms from the period under discussion, such as “liberation movement”, “rule of law”, and “conservative liberalism”, and failed to analyze the activities of the nonpartisan circle within the State Council. Many prominent liberals were also absent from the

¹⁶ Партии демократических реформ, мирного обновления, прогрессистов. Документы и материалы 1906–1916 гг. М.: РОССПЭН, 2002. 528 с.

¹⁷ Государственная дума Российской империи. Энциклопедия. В 2-х т. Т. 1. Государственная дума Российской империи (1906–1917 гг.). М.: РОССПЭН, 2006. 767 с.; Государственная дума Российской империи: 1906–1917. Энциклопедия. М.: РОССПЭН, 2008. 735 с.

authors' field of inquiry, including A.F. Koni, N.S. Tagantsev, and A.A. Saburov¹⁸.

In 1994, N.B. Khailova defended a dissertation on the Party of Democratic Reforms. This substantial work examined in detail the party's formation and political activity. The author analyzed the environment in which the party emerged, its composition, overall organization, parliamentary work, and programmatic content. At the same time, partly because she did not set such objectives for herself, the author did not focus on the dominance of lawyers within the party, failed to provide a precise definition of the party's ideology, did not situate it in relation to neighboring parties, and did not emphasize which social groups voted for it¹⁹.

The Shelokhaev school continues to produce numerous collections, reference works, and encyclopedias devoted to social thought in Russia. Among them are *Russia in 1905–1907*²⁰, *Russia in 1917*²¹, *Liberalism in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*²², and *Social Thought in Russia: From Ancient Times to the Mid-Twentieth Century*²³. Of particular interest is the reference guide devoted to the actors of the liberal movement in Russia²⁴. It finally began to include figures who had previously been ignored, including A.F. Koni and others. At present, it is the most comprehensive biographical reference work on liberal figures of imperial Russia in terms of the number of names included.

¹⁸ Российский либерализм середины XVIII — начала XX века. Энциклопедия. М.: РОССПЭН, 2010. С. 533–535.

¹⁹ Хайлова Н.Б. Партия демократических реформ: автореф. дисс ... канд. ист. наук. М., 1994. 30 с.

²⁰ Россия в 1905–1907 гг. Энциклопедия. М.: РОССПЭН, 2016. 1196 с.

²¹ Россия в 1917 году. Энциклопедия. М.: РОССПЭН, 2017. 1095 с.

²² Шелохаев В.В. Либерализм в России в начале XX века. М.: РОССПЭН, 2019. 503 с.

²³ Общественная мысль России: с древнейших времен до сер. XX в. В 4 т. Т. 3: Общественная мысль России второй четверти XIX — начала XX в. М.: РОССПЭН, 2020. 486 с.

²⁴ Деятели либерального движения в России: середина XVIII в. — 1917 г.: [биобиблиографический] справочник и электронная база данных. М.: Памятники исторической мысли, 2012. 772 с.



Public Thought in Russia.
From open sources

Researchers associated with the school continued intensive work on detailed descriptions of party movements in Russia in the early twentieth century. Of interest is the monograph *Reforms in Russia* (vol. 3), published in 2016. Presenting a broad panorama of reforms during the final sixty years of the empire, the authors also assessed the degree of active participation by various political groups in Russia's modernization. Nevertheless, the participation of conservative-liberal groups in this modernization was again scarcely represented (with the exception of foreign policy)²⁵. A further development of the Shelokhaev school's activity was the publication of the monograph *Social Thought in Russia* (2020). The authors sought to reconstruct the deeper processes taking place within the intellectual environment at the beginning of the century. A positive scholarly step was A.A. Safonov's refusal to assign the Parties of Democratic Reform and Peaceful Renovation unequivocally to one or another sector of the liberal camp. Meanwhile, K.A. Sokolov quite correctly

²⁵ Реформы в России. С древнейших времен до конца XX в. В 4 т. Т. 3: Вторая половина XIX — начало XX в. М.: РОССПЭН, 2016. 765 с.

classified these organizations as “parties of the center”. Incidentally, these parties retained B.N. Chicherin’s property-based conception of limited popular representation.

The work also contains an important comparison between the positions of “conservatively minded liberals” (the Shipovists) and “radically minded liberals” (the Kadets). The former envisioned the preservation of the monarchy within a constitutional framework, while the latter regarded monarchy as a merely technical institution that could be replaced if necessary. This was the line dividing conservative liberals from radical liberals²⁶. Nevertheless, in the work under discussion, the Octobrists were still, by inertia, classified as a liberal party.

In 2022, a new fundamental work, *Political Parties of Russia* (vol. 2), devoted to party formation at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was published. A separate chapter was dedicated to Progressivism. It described the weakness of Progressivism but did not provide definitions or analyze its ideology. The Octobrists were classified as liberals. The contribution of legalist figures to the ideology of Russian liberalism was mentioned only briefly. Of all the liberal parties, approximately 80% of the text was devoted to the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets)²⁷.

Among many other works, K.A. Solovyov²⁸ reveals new aspects of governmental constitutionalism at the turn of the centuries and examines the nature of interaction between the authorities and society on the eve of and during the First Russian Revolution. The researcher successfully uncovers the principal elements of the empire’s political system. Among other things, he demonstrates the efforts of high-ranking jurists to establish the rule of law in the country.

²⁶ Общественная мысль России: с древнейших времен до середины XX в. В 4 т. Т. 3. Общественная мысль России второй четверти XIX — начала XX в. М.: РОССПЭН, 2020. С. 150–153, 182, 183, 206, 207, 211, 212, 215, 246–251, 261, 290–293, 376, 385.

²⁷ Политические партии России. Конец XIX — начало XX в. В 3 т. Т. 2: Либеральные партии. М.: РОССПЭН, 2022. С. 26, 52, 97–109, 124, 158–167, 191, 192, 246–249, 349–357, 388, 389.

²⁸ Соловьев К.А. Самодержавие и конституция: политическая повседневность в 1906–1917 годах. М.: Новое литературное обозрение, 2019. 344 с.

The historian N.D. Postnikov²⁹ conducts studies of political parties, including regional research. However, he provides no discussion of right-wing liberal parties.

An important step in contemporary scholarship was the appearance of Nina Khailova's dissertation research³⁰. Of course, in a certain sense, her work is secondary to that of V.N. Seletsky. The researcher attempted to penetrate deeply into the essence of the conservative-liberal movement, to understand its nature and substance, and to correlate it with other components of the liberation movement. Drawing on the terminology of the Trubetskoy brothers, she began to apply the term "centrism" more broadly, identifying it with conservative liberalism. This enabled her to include within centrism not only the Progressists, but also the members of the Party of Peaceful Renovation, the Democratic Reform Party, and other small parties.

Having outlined the process of the emergence of "centrism" in Russia and providing a strong analysis of the causes of the internal weakness and amorphous nature of right-wing liberal parties, the scholar demonstrated how the ideology of major figures within the movement influenced liberalism as a whole and examined in detail the work of the centrists in the State Dumas. Nina Khailova accurately portrayed their self-sacrificing way of life and precisely identified their ethical — and therefore politically flawed — approach to politics. She also compiled an almost complete brief overview of centrist public organizations and parties during the final twenty years of the empire. Khailova observed that during the interrevolutionary period there were signs of a split within the Progressive Party over the question of a future war — between pacifists (M.M. Kovalevsky) and national liberals (P.B. Struve). Another of her achievements was the final rehabilitation of the Peaceful Renovationists and the Progressists, whom regional historians had repeatedly "buried", often preferring not to discuss local branches of centrist parties at all. She also very

²⁹ Постников Н.Д. Территориальное размещение и численность политических партий России (1907 — февраль 1917). М.: Информационно-издательское управление МГОУ, 2013. 325 с.

³⁰ Хайлова Н.Б. Центризм в российском либерализме начала XX века. М.; СПб.: Центр гуманитарных инициатив, 2022. 638 с.

successfully depicted the activities of the centrists in 1917. We fully agree with the researcher that the centrist path of Russia's development at that time corresponded to the country's national needs. It should be noted that the scholar classified the right-wing liberals as the center of the liberal camp, rather than the center-right, as we do. Thus, she continued to regard the Octobrists as right-wing liberals and the Kadets as left-wing liberals.

In this way, Nina Khailova closed several historiographical gaps in our knowledge. She correctly noted that the centrist parties were the most constitutionalist in orientation. However, she did not explain the reason for this phenomenon and failed to recognize the legalist core behind it. She avoided the phrase "legal order", as well as the term "conservative liberalism". In general, she almost always evaluated the activities of the Progressists positively and did not regard their maneuvers surrounding the Progressive Bloc as an adventurist undertaking.

Parties and Organizations in the State Duma and State Council

The organization of right-wing liberal parties has attracted considerable scholarly interest.

For example, A.V. Gogolevsky³¹ argues that the Octobrists should more properly be assigned to the conservative camp. Among other things, the scholar examined in detail the projects for electoral laws and other constitutional acts drafted in 1905 and demonstrated the role played by jurists in their development.

The most important and still definitive study of Progressivism remains the work of V.N. Seletsky. He worked toward this final study from the 1960s onward. Drawing on extensive material, the scholar reconstructed the entire history of the party from its rise to its decline. Although he remained within a Marxist ideological framework, he nevertheless created a broad panorama of the activities of the

³¹ Гоголевский А.В. Русский либерализм в последнее десятилетие империи: очерки истории (1906–1912). СПб.: Изд-во СПбГУ, 2002. 227 с.

conservative-liberal party in Russia during the last ten years of the empire's existence³². In our view, however, the work lacks an analysis of the ideology of Progressivism itself. Starting from the party program, Seletsky analyzed the Progressists' plans for Russia's future without examining the moral and legal aspects of their ideas. Nor did he investigate the Progressists' concept of a "legal constitutional monarchical state", despite the fact that the sources he used contained such material.

Many studies were also devoted to the activity of liberal parties in the imperial State Duma. Particularly notable is the work of D.V. Aronov. Beginning with a biography of S.A. Muromtsev, the author soon moved on to the broader activities of liberals in the Duma. Unfortunately, in his dissertation, he excluded the right-wing liberal parliamentary groups, focusing instead on the Kadets (except in chapter five). As a result, the legislative activity of liberals in the Duma was only partially explored³³.

The work of V.A. Demin on liberals in the State Duma is distinguished by its meticulous analysis of the composition of the Duma deputies³⁴. For example, the author examined in detail the work of the commissions in all Dumas. In the First and Second Dumas, lawyers headed 70% of all commissions, while legalists headed half of them. The works of V.A. Kozbanenko on the activity of parliamentary factions in the First and Second State Dumas describe, among other things, the formation and activity of the Peaceful Renovationist faction³⁵. A subsequent study on the subject was carried out by S.B. Pavlov³⁶.

Researcher Yu.A. Shestakov undertook a thorough analysis of parliament's work (including that of the legalists) in carrying out

³² Селецкий В.Н. Прогрессизм как политическая партия и идейное направление в русском либерализме. М.: Мир книги, 1996. 363 с.

³³ Аронов Д.В. Законотворческая деятельность российских либералов в Государственной думе (1906–1917 гг.). М.: Юрист, 2005. 408 с.

³⁴ Демин В.А. Государственная дума России (1906–1917). М.: РОССПЭН, 1996. 216 с.

³⁵ Козбаненко В.А. Партийные фракции в I и II Государственных Думах России, 1906–1907. М.: РОССПЭН, 1996. 238 с.

³⁶ Павлов С.Б. Взаимоотношения власти и легальной оппозиции (либералов и крайне правых) 1900–1907 гг.: автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. М., 2000. 24 с.



K.A. Solovyev. Legislative and Executive Power in Russia.
From open sources

judicial reform³⁷ and reform of the local courts during the interrevolutionary³⁸ period. K.A. Solovyov devoted considerable attention to the activity of political parties in the State Duma. In particular, he closely examined the work of liberal groups in all convocations of the Duma and identified the main aspects of their interaction with the government³⁹.

A newer topic was the relationship between the police and the liberals. This subject formed the basis of the 2009 dissertation by L.V. Ulyanova. Having conducted a strong analysis, the researcher concluded that the liberals and the police “spoke the same language” — that is, the language of law. The police generally faced experienced jurists, against whom it was not easy to fight. The liberals fully utilized state structures (of which the conservative liberals themselves were a part)

³⁷ Шестаков Ю.А. Судебная реформа начала XX века и фракции III Государственной думы. Шахты: ГОУ ВПО ЮРГУЭС, 2010. 111 с.

³⁸ Шестаков Ю.А. Обсуждение законопроекта «О преобразовании местного суда» в III Государственной думе. Шахты: ФГБОУ ВПО ЮРГУЭС, 2012. 120 с.

³⁹ Соловьев К.А. Законодательная и исполнительная власть в России: механизмы взаимодействия (1906–1914). М.: РОССПЭН, 2011. 720 с.

in conflicts with the police⁴⁰. I.S. Rozental studied the activities of public clubs in the Russian Empire, including the legalist ones⁴¹.

In his study, S.V. Kulikov attempted to determine the internal composition of the imperial State Council. V.A. Demin specializes in the history of the State Council⁴². In his extensive research, the scholar meticulously identified the composition of party groupings in the upper chamber. Among other things, he analyzed the “stronghold” of conservative liberalism — the nonpartisan association circle — identified party leaders, and cited many vivid statements by legalists (A.F. Koni, M.M. Kovalevsky, and others) regarding the work of the State Council⁴³. Closely related in type and character are the works of E.A. Yurtaeva⁴⁴.

An important contribution is the work of A.P. Borodin on the activity of the imperial State Council between the two revolutions. In it, the author, among other things, examines the principal groups in the upper chamber and demonstrates the role of the legalists. Describing the “left-wing” academic group, Borodin shows how, through the inclusion of legalists, it was transformed into a “progressive” bloc. The author also highlights the influence of jurists in the upper chamber. For example, lawyers constituted half of the members of the liberal-conservative centrist group⁴⁵.

In the last decade, scholars have continued to study the work of the chambers of the Russian parliament. A careful quantitative analysis of the composition of the State Council’s academic group was carried

⁴⁰ Розенталь И.С. «И вот общественное мнение!». Клубы в истории российской общественности. Конец XVIII — начало XX вв. М.: Новый хронограф, 2007. 398 с.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Куликов С.В. Политическая дифференциация членов Государственного совета в годы Первой мировой войны (август 1915 — февраль 1917) // Из глубины времен. 1997. № 9. С. 3–22.

⁴³ Демин В.А. Верхняя палата Российской империи. 1906–1917. М.: РОССПЭН, 2006. 376 с.

⁴⁴ Юртаева Е.А. Государственный совет в России (1906–1917 гг.). М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 2001. 200 с.

⁴⁵ Борodin А.П. Государственный совет России 1906–1917 (Состав и роль в истории третьеиюньской монархии): автореф. дисс. ... д-ра ист. наук. М., 2000. 46 с.

out in the dissertation of S.B. Archegov⁴⁶. Although the group consisted primarily of Kadets, it was also supported by certain legalists (“secretly married to it”, in the expression of D. Grimm). The activity of legalists in the upper chamber was also reflected to some degree in the dissertation of Z.I. Alieva⁴⁷. One may also mention our own works on the subject⁴⁸.

In a strong monograph, A.P. Degtyarev analyzed the work of deputy groups in the State Duma between the two revolutions. Among other things, the scholar examined the activities of the Peaceful Renovationist and Progressive factions in the rearmament of the army. In our opinion, however, the degree of Progressive participation in advancing defense programs was greater than suggested in the study⁴⁹.

In the monograph by A.D. Mindlin, the issue of the passage of “Jewish” legislation through the lower chamber was examined in detail⁵⁰. Among other things, the work discusses the activities of the Progressists. An expanded account of the legalists’ 50-year struggle to preserve and expand the rights of the local courts is presented in the research of A.A. Sorokin⁵¹.

In 2021, an extensive monograph by A.F. Smirnov on the work of the State Duma was published (a reissue of the 2010 edition)⁵². Considerable attention was also devoted there to the Progressists and their

⁴⁶ *Арчезов С.Б.* Академическая группа Государственного совета (1906–1917 гг.): историко-правовое исследование: автореф. дисс. ... канд. юр. наук. СПб., 2016. 25 с.

⁴⁷ *Алиева З.И.* Административно-судебные подразделения в структуре Государственного совета Российской империи 1906–1917 гг. (историко-правовое исследование): автореф. дисс. ... канд. юр. наук. М., 2019. 30 с.

⁴⁸ *Рыбин Д.В.* Партийное строительство легалистских организаций и их участие в выборах в Государственную думу в 1906–1907 гг. // Вестник государственного и муниципального управления. 2024. Т. 13. № 1. С. 113–123; *Рыбин Д.В. А.Ф.* Кони — член Государственного совета Российской империи (1907–1917 гг.) // Вестник РГГУ. Серия: Политология. История. Международные отношения. 2023. № 1. С. 139–151.

⁴⁹ *Дегтярев А.П.* Военные проблемы в деятельности Государственной думы России. М.: ВУ, 2018. 284 с.

⁵⁰ *Миндлин А.Б.* Государственная дума Российской империи и еврейский вопрос. СПб.: Алетейя, 2014. 488 с.

⁵¹ *Сорокин А.А.* Реформа местного суда в Российской империи: власть и общество (конец XIX — начало XX в.). СПб.: Дмитрий Буланин, 2021. 255 с.

⁵² *Смирнов А.Ф.* Государственная Дума Российской империи, 1906–1917: историко-правовой очерк. Челябинск: Социум, 2010. 624 с.

parliamentary activity. The work of moderate liberals has likewise been examined by K.A. Solovyov and V.V. Shelokhaev. In their joint monograph, the activities of the Progressists are presented in a highly representative and detailed manner⁵³. More generally, K.A. Solovyov undertook an entire series of studies illuminating various aspects of the activity of parliamentary groups and parties in the State Duma and State Council⁵⁴. Among other things, he compiled numerous biographical entries on liberals published in encyclopedias and reference works. A.A. Ivanov analyzed how the Progressists interacted in parliament with right-wing parties during the years of the World War⁵⁵.

In 2017, F.A. Gaida defended a dissertation that once again, with additional detail, thoroughly examined the confrontation between the State Duma and the government in 1910–1917, including the participation of the Progressists. The author correctly observes that the growth in the popularity of the Progressists was driven by voter disappointment in the old parties. Nevertheless, the study does not contribute fundamentally new data to the history of Progressivism⁵⁶. Contemporary researcher S.V. Kholyaev also discusses the participation of the Progressists in opposition to the authorities⁵⁷.

The Press

The history of the liberal press also remains a subject of attention among modern specialists.

⁵³ Шелохаев В.В., Соловьев К.А. История деятельности первых Государственных дум дореволюционной России: сравнительный анализ традиций правотворчества. М.: Изд. Госдумы, 2013. 240 с.

⁵⁴ Соловьев К.А. Государственный Совет и законотворческий процесс в 1906–1914 гг. // Труды Историко-архивного института. М., 2014. С. 37–50.

⁵⁵ Иванов А.А. Правые в русском парламенте: от кризиса к краху (1914–1917). М.; СПб.: Альянс-Архео, 2013. 520 с.

⁵⁶ Гайда Ф.А. Власть и общественность в России: диалог о пути политического развития (1910–1917). М.: Университет Дмитрия Пожарского, 2016. 604 с.

⁵⁷ Холяев С.В. Государственная дума Российской империи против Николая II: путь к февралю (1915–1917 годы). Ярославль: Изд-во ЯГТУ, 2013. 155 с.



Parties of Democratic Reform. A Collection.
From open sources

A.V. Likhomanov⁵⁸ examined the process of revising press legislation during the years of the First Russian Revolution. In Siberia, a study by V.V. Vorobyov on the regional press was published⁵⁹.

T.I. Sidnenko has written on *Moskovsky Ezhenedelnik* (*The Moscow Weekly*)⁶⁰.

Several works by Yu.A. Zherdeva on Russian liberalism in 1917 have been published. The author succeeded in tracing the rapid changes taking place within the liberal camp in the spheres of organization, journalism, war, economics, and other areas. Unlike many other scholars, Zherdeva observed that the liberals failed to unite around the Kadets (some Progressists remained outside the Kadet Party until the

⁵⁸ Лихоманов А.В. А.Ф. Кони в Особом совещании по составлению нового устава о печати 1905 г. // Цензура в России: история и современность. Сб. науч. тр. Вып. 4. СПб., 2008. С. 125–141.

⁵⁹ Воробьев В.В. Либерально-буржуазная периодическая печать Сибири в общественно-политической жизни края в 1907–1914 гг.: автореф. дисс. ... д-ра ист. наук. Омск, 1996. 22 с.

⁶⁰ Сидненко Т.И. «Новый» либерализм в России в начале XX в.: к истории создания и выхода в свет «Московского еженедельника» // Общество и власть. Мат-лы Всерос. науч. конф. СПб.: Санкт-Петербургский гос. университет культуры и искусств, 2006. С. 161–166.

end of 1917), which weakened their position. Her new work marked a step forward in deepening our understanding of the empire's moderate press. Among other things, the researcher examined the transformations of liberal political organizations, debates over liberalism, the financial and legal status of the press, the principal themes covered in newspapers and journals, and so forth. Overall, according to the author, the liberals rapidly radicalized. This also applied to the legalists⁶¹.

At present, a series of works by A.P. Sopova has appeared and continues to appear concerning the legal status of the press and the implementation of freedom of the press in the empire at the beginning of the twentieth century⁶². The author devoted many pages to the drafting of the Press Statute and other related acts in 1905⁶³. This research culminated in a dissertation in 2021. The drafting of the Press Statute is also discussed in the work of A.Ya. Kodintsev⁶⁴.

The works of several other contemporary authors are also noteworthy. An article by E.I. Orlova was devoted to *Russkaya Molva* (*Russian Rumor*)⁶⁵. In the works of A.P. Sopova, the history of the empire's censorship institutions in the early twentieth century is examined⁶⁶.

⁶¹ Жердева Ю.А. Пресса как инструмент политических технологий русского либерализма в 1917 г. Самара: Изд-во Самарского государственного экономического университета, 2013. 322 с.

⁶² Сопова А.П. Концепция свободы печати в русской либеральной правовой мысли конца XIX — начала XX веков // Гражданское общество в России и за рубежом. 2016. № 2. С. 10–14; Сопова А.П. Правовое положение прессы в России в начале XX века // Государство и право. 2024. № 1. С. 188–196.

⁶³ Сопова А.П. Дискуссия о порядке учреждения периодических изданий в ходе разработки проекта устава о печати в 1905 г. // История государства и права. 2018. № 2. С. 76–80.

⁶⁴ Коди́нцев А.Я., Шты́кова Н.Н. Уголовно-правовые и административно-правовые меры регулирования правонарушений в сфере печати в трудах А.Ф. Кони // История государства и права. 2022. № 9. С. 10–16.

⁶⁵ Орлова Е.И. К истории либеральной печати: газета «Русская молва» (1912–1913) // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 10: Журналистика. 2021. № 6. С. 3–20.

⁶⁶ Сопова А.П. Функционирование цензурных учреждений в Российской империи в 1905–1914 гг. // История российской государственности. Доклады Межд. науч. конф., посвященной 100-летию со дня рождения профессора Н.П. Ерошкина. М.: РГГУ, 2021. С. 262–268.

The Debate over the Fate of Liberal Government in 1905–1907 and the Struggle Between Parliament and Government During the First World War

The history of the three rounds of negotiations over the formation of a responsible ministry during the First Russian Revolution received “new life” in modern scholarship. A.N. Egorov outlined in detail the various scholarly viewpoints on this issue. He identified three principal interpretations regarding the failure of the negotiations over a responsible ministry: the government was to blame, the liberals were to blame, or both sides were at fault⁶⁷. In the end, Egorov largely agreed with the conclusions of Soviet scholars that, at that moment, an agreement between the state and the liberals was impossible. The history of these failed negotiations, drawing on new sources, was described by I.A. Khristoforov⁶⁸. The quality of his work, however, is diminished by the fact that the author effectively “lost sight” of the right-wing liberals — the “peaceful renovationists”. We also cannot agree with his characterization of the Octobrists as a “conservative-liberal party”. In the work of S.V. Shelokhaev, a detailed list of participants in the first round of negotiations on forming a responsible ministry in 1905 was presented; half of them were legalists⁶⁹.

Discussion of the relationship between parliament and government during the First World War also continued⁷⁰. As previously mentioned, V.M. Shevyrin prepared a broad analytical overview of

⁶⁷ Егоров А.Н. Российские либералы начала XX в. и власть: историографические дискуссии. Череповец: Череповецкий государственный университет, 2007. С. 227–237.

⁶⁸ Первая революция в России: Взгляд через столетие. М.: Памятники исторической мысли, 2005. С. 393–461.

⁶⁹ Шелохаев С.В. Поиск либералами консенсуса с властными структурами на платформе манифеста 17 октября 1905 года // Либеральный консерватизм: История и современность. Мат-лы Всерос. науч.-практ. конф. (Ростов-на-Дону, 25–26 мая 2000 г.). / Отв. ред. А.И. Нарезный. М.: РОССПЭН, 2001. С. 251–263.

⁷⁰ Куликов С.В. Совет министров и прогрессивный блок во время падения монархии // Нестор. 2005. № 7. С. 280–299.

the state of scholarship on this topic as of 2003⁷¹. In addition to the works of V.N. Seletsky, the political practices of the Progressists during the war years were studied by V.V. Shelokhaev⁷². This well-known scholar, in particular, confirmed the assumption that members of the Progressive Bloc sought to avoid revolution by exerting pressure on the government and the tsar. In the end, however, the liberals failed to prevent revolution and instead “rocked the boat”⁷³.

In an original study by S.V. Kulikov⁷⁴, the problems of confrontation between the liberals and the state during the First World War were reconsidered. The author made an especially active use of the term “conservative liberals”, perhaps more extensively than anyone else at the time. He vigorously argued that Nicholas II himself was a conservative liberal. Through examples involving the activities of Stürmer and Shcheglovitov, it becomes clear that what the author meant by “conservative liberalism” corresponded, in our understanding, to “liberal conservatism”. The author constructed a picture of two broad camps: the parliamentarians (Kadets, Progressists, and left-wing Octobrists), while the more right-wing groups he labeled “dualists”, nevertheless also classifying them as liberals. As a result, he arrived at the conclusion: “Thus, governmental liberalism at the beginning of the twentieth century, dualistic in its essence, was more liberal than social liberalism”.

The culmination of discussions concerning the liberal “assault” on the authorities during the war years is the study by F.A. Gaida. The author repeats older narratives about the “absence of a Progressist Party”, basing this interpretation on the memoirs of four individuals⁷⁵.

⁷¹ Шевырин В.М. Власть и общественные организации в России (1914–1917). Аналитический обзор. История России. Серия аналитических обзоров и сборников. 2003. № 1. С. 1–152.

⁷² Егоров А.Н. Российские либералы начала XX в. и власть: историографические дискуссии. Череповец: Череповецкий государственный университет, 2007. С. 237–249.

⁷³ Шелохаев В.В. Прогрессисты — партия предпринимателей и интеллектуалов // Полис. Политические исследования. 1993. № 4. С. 159–164.

⁷⁴ Куликов С.В. Бюрократическая элита Российской империи накануне падения старого порядка (1914–1917). Рязань: НРИИД, 2004. 467 с.

⁷⁵ Гайда Ф.А. Либеральная оппозиция на путях к власти (1914 — весна 1917 г.). М.: РОССПЭН, 2003. С. 73, 77–79, 82, 86, 102, 103, 109–113, 120–125, 128, 130–134, 170–175, 183, 184, 187, 223–228, 234, 245, 247, 249, 312, 313, 374.

Yet throughout his work he repeatedly demonstrates the hyperactive political activity of the Progressists in 1915–1916, while citing Kadets who spoke dismissively about the “insignificance” of the Progressists. One of the strengths of the study is that it provides one of the first analyses of the relationships and coordination between liberal groups in the State Council and the State Duma on the eve of a new revolution. Discussing the December 1916 elections to the Moscow City Duma, the author speaks of a Kadet-Progressist victory. In reality, the Progressists alone were victorious. After withdrawing from the Progressive Bloc, the Progressists abruptly “disappear” from the political scene for four months (according to the author’s account). What, then, happened to the Progressists after November 1? The author does not address the role of the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc in the events of 1916, including the active involvement of the empire’s leading legalists.

Liberties

A new topic developed by researchers became the liberals’ struggle for the implementation of the fundamental freedoms of the subjects of the empire. In the 1990s, historians, freed from ideological constraints, began describing the history of the implementation of freedom of conscience in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century⁷⁶. At that time, the leading researcher on freedom of conscience was A.A. Dorskaya. In her studies, the scholar examined in detail the problem of implementing freedom of conscience in Russia in the early twentieth century. She not only analyzed the legal acts concerning freedom of conscience, but also thoroughly described the process of their adoption in all convocations of the State Duma and the State Council. Among other things, the researcher identified the degree of

⁷⁶ Дорская А.А. Свобода совести в России: судьба законопроектов начала XX века. Монография. СПб.: Изд-во РГПУ им. А.И. Герцена, 2001. 144 с.; Дорская А.А. Деятельность комиссии по вероисповедным вопросам Государственной думы III созыва (1907–1912) // Таврические чтения 2012. Актуальные проблемы парламентаризма: история и современность. Международная научная конференция. СПб., 2013. С. 153–162.

participation of liberal jurists in advancing issues of freedom of conscience within the State Council of the empire.

In the 21st century, interest in the topic intensified. The number of studies has been growing rapidly. A large body of works is devoted to the analysis of legal acts concerning freedom of conscience in the early twentieth century. Similar studies, for example, have been carried out by A.Yu. Bendin⁷⁷.

Established scholars and younger researchers have conducted their studies within several thematic directions. Many works are devoted to the political struggle for the introduction of the principle of freedom of conscience. For example, F.A. Seleznev described the endless process surrounding the passage of the long-suffering law on Old Believer communities⁷⁸. It is also worth mentioning A.S. Tumanova's work on the State Duma's activities in implementing projects concerning freedom of conscience⁷⁹. The adoption of laws in the sphere of civil liberties and their legal implementation were also examined in a study by a group of researchers headed by N.V. Shingareva⁸⁰.

Interestingly, in most of these works the authors did not mention the ideological preparation carried out by leading liberals in support of the transition toward freedom of conscience; they did not reveal the complexity of passing such bills through the State Council, did not demonstrate the intensity of public debate in the press on the issue of freedom of conscience, and did not analyze the work of the commissions dealing with these questions. In many works, especially legal studies, the same texts of legal acts concerning freedom of conscience are endlessly reproduced.

⁷⁷ Бендин А.Ю. Свобода совести или веротерпимость? Полемика в российской печати (начало XX в.) // Новый исторический вестник. 2010. № 2 (24). С. 5–14.

⁷⁸ Селезнев Ф.А. Судьба законопроекта о старообрядческих общинах (1905–1914) // Вестник Нижегородского университета им. Н.И. Лобачевского. История. 2008. № 1. С. 130–140.

⁷⁹ Туманова А.С., Киселев Р.В. Права человека в правовой мысли и законодательстве Российской империи второй половины XIX — начала XX века. М.: Изд. дом высшей школы экономики, 2011. 279 с.

⁸⁰ Михайлова Н.В., Журов А.Н., Колыхалов Д.В., Шингарева Н.В. Разработка и реализация законодательства о веротерпимости и свободе совести во второй половине XIX в. — феврале 1917 г.). Историко-правовое исследование. М.: Изд-во Московского гуманитарного университета, 2008. 156 с.

In many studies, the struggle for the implementation of freedom of the press is mentioned within the broader context of the liberation movement in Russia⁸¹. The topic of human rights in the context of liberal practice in the early twentieth century has been of interest to D.V. Aronov. In his dissertation and a number of other works, he attempted to conceptualize liberal ideas regarding the model for Russia's reorganization⁸². A distinctive feature of Aronov's works was that he described how the legalists — Kavelin, Chicherin, and Kovalevsky — developed the theory of human rights in Russia. Yet Aronov described the subjects' freedoms themselves through the prism of the Constitutional Democratic Party, effectively identifying it entirely with liberalism.

There are relatively few works devoted specifically to the liberals' contribution to the drafting of legislative acts on freedom of conscience. One such study is the work of I.K. Petrovich⁸³. Among the more recent works, one may highlight the study by M.I. Odintsov and A.S. Kochetova. In it, the authors comprehensively analyze the history of the struggle for and against freedom of conscience in Russia from the 1890s to the 1920s. Despite the somewhat essayistic nature of the work, the authors illuminate the principal problems connected with the topics they examine. Because they addressed such a broad issue, however, they were forced, for example, to omit the role of the legalists and several other political groups in the establishment of freedom of conscience in Russia. They incidentally failed to mention many authors who debated freedom of conscience and did not explain how bills concerning freedom of conscience passed through the State Council⁸⁴.

⁸¹ *Аронов Д.В. Законотворческая деятельность российских либералов в Государственной думе (1906–1917 гг.). М.: Юрист. С. 144, 145.*

⁸² *Аронов Д.В. Права человека в теории и политико-правовой практике российского либерализма в конце XIX — начале XX в. М.: Юрист, 2007. 383 с.*

⁸³ *Петрович И.К. Законотворческая деятельность депутатов от либеральных политических партий по религиозному вопросу в Государственной думе Российской империи (1906–1917 гг.) // Христианское чтение. 2021. № 4. С. 4.*

⁸⁴ *Одинцов М.И., Кочетова А.С. Свобода совести в истории России: идеи, законодательные проекты, практическое воплощение. Конец XIX — первая четверть XX в. М.: РОССПЭН, 2023. 559 с.*

Among other studies, our own work on this topic may also be noted⁸⁵.

Liberalism and the National Question

Several dissertation studies have also appeared examining the position of liberal parties on the national question⁸⁶. For example, G.N. Bavkunova's work provides a detailed examination of party programs regarding the national question. At the same time, the author excluded the plans and actions of all centrist parties, while, conversely, describing in detail the program of the Octobrists ("liberals").

An important contribution was D.P. Kondratenko's work on the relationship between the autocracy, the liberals, and national groups seeking self-determination. The author thoroughly described the activities of liberal parties aimed at softening national policy in the empire. Yet, for some reason, the liberal parties in his work were reduced entirely to the Kadets. The researcher scarcely touched upon the role of the right-wing liberals, although they possessed their own vision of the national question. The legalists played an important role in the State Council by resisting legislative projects that infringed upon the rights of national groups, but the scholar did not address this topic at all⁸⁷. Similar works on the national-state

⁸⁵ Рыбин Д.В. Старообрядческий вопрос в Государственном Совете Российской империи: идея свободы совести в трудах А.Ф. Кони // Проблемы социально-экономического развития Сибири. 2021. № 4 (46). С. 141–146.

⁸⁶ Бавкунова Г.Н. Отечественные либеральные партии начала XX века: национальный аспект: дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Брянск, 2003. 189 с.; Витухновская М.А. Бунтующая окраина или модель для подражания: Финляндия глазами российских консерваторов и либералов второй половины XIX — начала XX веков // Многоликая Финляндия. Образ Финляндии и финнов в России. В. Новгород, 2007. С. 89–143; Золотовский Ю.А. Государственное устройство России в программных документах политических партий в начале XX в.: дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Воронеж, 1998; Иванников О.В. Политическая борьба в России по национальному вопросу в первой четверти XX века: дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. М., 2005. 220 с.

⁸⁷ Кондратенко Д.П. Самодержавие, либералы и национальный вопрос в России в конце XIX — начале XX века. Киров: Изд-во Вятского гос. гуманит. ун-та, 2005. 238 с.



Political Parties of Russia. 1996.
From open sources

structure of the empire have been carried out by N.G. Karnishina⁸⁸. Our own studies on this issue may also be noted⁸⁹.

Of interest is Mindlin's collection of studies concerning attitudes toward Jews among the empire's highest officials and public figures at the turn of the century⁹⁰. His book broadens our understanding of the issue. Nevertheless, it is not without shortcomings. A number of figures who made significant contributions to Jewish emancipation

⁸⁸ Карнишина Н.Г. Национальный вопрос в теории российского либерализма конца XIX— начала XX в. // Сергей Андреевич Муромцев — председатель первой Государственной думы: политик, ученый, педагог. Сборник научных статей. Орел: ИД «Орлик», 2010. С. 128–138; Карнишина Н.Г., Карнишин В.Ю. Великое княжество Финляндское в составе Российской империи в начале XX в.: по материалам журнала «Финляндия» // *Vua in tempore. История. политология*. Т. 48. 2021. № 4. С. 849–858.

⁸⁹ Рыбин Д.В. Консервативно-либеральные юристы Российской империи и польская проблема в начале XX века // *Ученые записки Орловского государственного университета*. 2024. № 2 (103). С. 56–61; Рыбин Д.В. Финляндский вопрос в Российской империи в 1907–1917 годах (политико-правовая позиция легалистов) // *Вестник Удмуртского университета*. Серия: История и филология. 2025. Т. 35. № 1. С. 114–125.

⁹⁰ Миндлин А.Б. Государственные, политические и общественные деятели Российской империи в судьбах евреев, 1762–1917: Справочник персоналий. СПб.: Алетейя. Историческая книга, 2007. 391 с.

(or, conversely, hindered it) were omitted: A.F. Koni, D.N. Milyutin, G.A. Evreinov, E.F. Turau, and others.

Legal and Governmental Constitutionalism

A popular and relatively new topic at the turn of the century became the examination of constitutional projects developed by liberals⁹¹. Burdukova, which is important for our study, identified and analyzed Witte's approach as that of a conservative liberal. Of interest also is the careful analysis of the collection *From the Depths* (*Iz Glubiny*) (1918, a continuation of *Vekhi*). The collection represents a deconstruction of conservative liberalism written by conservative liberals themselves. The mistakes of the right-wing liberals were analyzed, and the impossibility of implementing their projects in Russia demonstrated. In the scholar's opinion, P.B. Struve became a direct successor to Chicherin.

Of particular interest is S.V. Kulikov's publication examining several constitutional projects developed by the legalists in 1905⁹². These projects formed part of the broader legalist ideology widespread among Russian jurists in the second half of the nineteenth century. In other works, Kulikov⁹³ reveals many new aspects of governmental constitutionalism at the turn of the century, as well as the nature of interaction between state and society on the eve of and during the First Russian Revolution. Within the school of V.V. Shelokhaev, researchers conducted detailed studies of many

⁹¹ Бурдукова И.И. Становление и развитие конституционных идей в России. СПб.: Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет культуры и искусств, 1999. С. 116–130, 143–157, 186–223.

⁹² Куликов С.В. Государственная Дума и Государственный Совет в проектах основных законов П.А. Харитонов, А.П. Саломона и графа А.Ф. Гейдена (ноябрь — декабрь 1905 г.) // Таврические чтения 2010. Международная научная конференция «Актуальные проблемы истории парламентаризма»: Сб. науч. ст. СПб.: Межпарламентская ассамблея государств-участников СНГ, Центр истории парламентаризма. 2011. С. 29–99.

⁹³ Куликов С.В. Бюрократическая элита Российской империи накануне падения старого порядка (1914–1917). Рязань: НРИИД, 2004. 467 с.

constitutional acts from both the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods⁹⁴.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, several works and a dissertation by N.R. Golubev appeared concerning the plans of political figures for the reorganization of Russia. The legalists received almost no attention there⁹⁵. The role of the legalists in drafting the governmental projects of 1905 is examined in detail in S.S. Novoselsky's dissertation. This solid study is noteworthy, for example, because the author was the first to group the principal proposals concerning the organization of popular representation in Russia at the turn of the century⁹⁶. While agreeing with these models, we nevertheless cannot fail to note that the author omitted the fifth model (the legalist one): the formation of a legislative body as a separate chamber of the Senate.

Much has also been written by Z.D. Dinaeva concerning the constitutionalism of conservative-liberal scholars of the second half of the nineteenth century⁹⁷. Our own study on this topic may also be noted⁹⁸.

At present, S.V. Kulikov continues active work on publishing materials connected with the drafting of the empire's Fundamental Law during the years of the First Russian Revolution⁹⁹, and highlights the

⁹⁴ *Общественная мысль России: с древнейших времен до середины XX в. В 4 т. Т. 3: Общественная мысль России второй четверти XIX — начала XX в.* М.: РОССПЭН, 2020. 486 с.

⁹⁵ *Голубев Н.Р. Общественно-политическая мысль революционной России (1905–1907 гг.). Проблема переустройства страны.* Пермь: Изд-во Пермского ун-та, 2003; *Голубев Н.Р. Взгляды политических партий и общественных движений на проблемы настоящего и будущего России (конец XIX — начало XX в.).* Пермь: Изд-во Пермского ун-та, 1998. 331 с.

⁹⁶ *Новосельский С.С. Правительственные проекты преодоления революционного кризиса 1905 г. в России: автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук.* М., 2019. 35 с.

⁹⁷ *Рыбин Д.В. Конституционные проекты и идеи легалистов на рубеже XIX–XX веков // Вестник Оренбургского государственного педагогического университета. Электронный научный журнал. 2025. № 1 (53). С. 233–246.*

⁹⁸ *Рыбин Д.В. Конституционные проекты и идеи легалистов на рубеже XIX–XX веков // Вестник Оренбургского государственного педагогического университета. Электронный научный журнал. 2025. № 1 (53). С. 233–246.*

⁹⁹ *Куликов С.В. Бюрократическая элита Российской империи и великое княжество Финляндское в 1905–1906 гг.: дискуссии о государственно-*

role of the legalists in its development. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is his extensive article published in 2021, which offers perhaps the fullest analysis in contemporary scholarship of the process of drafting the constitutional laws of 1905–1906¹⁰⁰. In these works, the legalists — who constituted nearly half of the commissions and conferences — are abundantly represented by the author. The scale of Kulikov's research is such that one may reasonably expect a culminating dissertation study.

Regional Studies

In the new phase of development of Russian historical scholarship, regional historical studies continue to appear. In our work, we consider only those bearing the general title “liberalism in...” There are no specialized works on the history of the progressist movement in the provinces.

An important contribution is A.P. Tolochko's study of party genesis in Siberia at the beginning of the twentieth century, including liberal organizations. Interestingly, Tolochko did not note that Siberian researchers ignored all liberal parties except the Kadets¹⁰¹. A strong study by O.A. Kharus on liberalism in Siberia also appeared. In particular, while acknowledging the insufficient development of the topic of twentieth-century liberalism, she attempted to examine it in detail. Yet not a single word can be found about the Peaceful Renovationists or the Progressists in Siberia — even though they

правовом статусе Финляндии при подготовке основных государственных законов 1906 г. // Петербургский исторический журнал. 2017. № 1 (13). С. 126–141; Куликов С.В. Свобода совести в Российской империи начала XX века и конституционная реформа 1906 года // Научный диалог. 2023. Т. 12. № 9. С. 426–448.

¹⁰⁰ Куликов С.В. История создания основных государственных законов 1906 г.: предварительные итоги изучения // Проблемы истории общества, государства и права. Сб. науч. трудов Всерос. заоч. науч. конф. Екатеринбург: Издательский дом УрГЮУ, 2021. С. 255–391.

¹⁰¹ Толочко А.П. Современная отечественная историография партийно-политического движения в Сибири в начале XX в. Омск: ОмГУ, 2001. 139 с.

existed there¹⁰². Once again, she classified the Octobrists as right-wing liberals. Likewise, in N.V. Makarieva's work on the typology of Siberian liberalism, there was no place for the Progressists¹⁰³.

A similar situation developed in the studies of other regional scholars. For example, the Progressists are only briefly mentioned in P.I. Zhilyaev's dissertation on liberalism in the Southern Urals¹⁰⁴. In V.N. Lyusev's strong work on the liberal movement in the Volga region, the Party of Peaceful Renovation is not mentioned at all, although it was precisely in Samara and Saratov that the Party established its branches¹⁰⁵. In A.M. Semenenko's dissertation devoted to the liberal movement in the Upper Volga region between the two revolutions, the Progressists are only mentioned in passing, despite the fact that they had a considerable number of supporters in Nizhny Novgorod¹⁰⁶. A rare exception is I.N. Matvievsky's dissertation on liberalism in the Kostroma Governorate, in which he examined all liberal groups, including the Peaceful Renovationists and the Progressists¹⁰⁷. L.A. Karapetyan devoted some attention to the Progressists in the Caucasus¹⁰⁸.

Without mentioning the many regional dissertations individually, we can only note that in the overwhelming majority of works devoted to liberalism (covering the Kazan Governorate, the

¹⁰² Харусь О.А. Либерализм в Сибири начала XX века: идеология и политика. Томск: ТГУ, 1996. 226 с.

¹⁰³ Макарьева Н.В. Либерализм в Сибири 1890–1907 гг.: проблема типологии: автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Омск, 1999. 22 с.

¹⁰⁴ Жилиев П.И. Региональный аспект развития российского парламентаризма (на материалах Оренбургской губернии 1906–1917 гг.): автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Оренбург, 2003. 25 с.

¹⁰⁵ Люсев В.Н. Либеральное движение в Поволжье в 1905–1907 гг.: автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Пенза, 1998. 22 с.

¹⁰⁶ Семенов А.М. Общественно-политическая деятельность либерально-демократической интеллигенции в 1910 — феврале 1917 г. (По материалам Владимирской, Костромской, Тверской и Ярославской губерний): автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Иваново, 2004. 24 с.

¹⁰⁷ Матвиевский И.Н. Либеральное движение в российской провинции в начале XX века (на материалах Костромской губернии): автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Иваново, 2012. 26 с.

¹⁰⁸ Карпетян Л.А. Политические партии на Северном Кавказе: организация, идеология, тактика (конец 90-х гг. XIX в. — февраль 1917 г.): автореф. дисс. ... д-ра ист. наук. Краснодар, 2001. 43 с.

Governorates of Belgorod, Bryansk, Vladimir, Voronezh, Vyatka, Kursk, Mogilev, Orenburg, Chernigov, Penza, Perm, Saratov, Samara, Simbirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Orel, Tambov, Ufa, the Black Sea region, the entire Urals, Siberia, and others), there was not a single word about right-wing liberal parties — except that many dissertation authors classified the Octobrists as right-wing liberals. Yet in Tobolsk, Perm, Orenburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, Samara, Ufa, and other provinces there existed permanent and influential groups (branches) of the Peaceful Renovationists and later the Progressists. In elections these parties often won. Such neglect is highly strange and difficult to explain. At times the situation reaches the level of absurdity. Thus, the researcher Yu.V. Reyzvikh, while discussing the Duma activity of N.L. Skalozubov, conceals his party affiliation (Peaceful Renovationist)¹⁰⁹.

In 2019, the encyclopedic dictionary *Socio-Political Life of Siberia in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century* was prepared. This important publication contains a great deal of useful information about organizations and figures of late-imperial Siberia. However, it omitted such a prominent theorist of legalism and conservative liberalism as I.V. Mikhailovsky. Nor does it mention that N.L. Skalozubov, elected to the Third State Duma, was elected as a representative of the Party of Peaceful Renovation. Nothing at all is said about the branches and groups of Progressists that existed in certain Siberian cities, and so forth¹¹⁰.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be said that Russian scholars in the 1990s–2020s carried out extensive work collecting, processing, and studying new

¹⁰⁹ Рейзвих Ю.В. Взаимодействие депутатов Государственной Думы от Западной Сибири с населением региона в 1906–1914 гг.: дисс. ... канд. ист. наук. Омск, 2007. 172 с.

¹¹⁰ Шиловский М.В., Ноздрин Г.А., Кириллов А.К. Общественно-политическая жизнь Сибири в конце XIX — начале XX века. Энциклопедический словарь. Новосибирск: Параллель, 2019. 397 с.

archival materials connected with the liberal movement in Russia. Scholarship has made a substantial step forward. Many terms connected with conservative liberalism have been formulated. A division of intellectual labor emerged between “philosophers” and “historians”. The former carefully developed the terminology of conservative liberalism, while the latter thoroughly illuminated the practices of conservative liberals.

Scholars continued to develop older themes connected with right-wing liberalism: terminology and ideology, negotiations over the formation of a responsible ministry, the legalist press, and the liberals’ struggle with the government during the World War. New topics have come to the forefront: liberal constitutionalism, liberals and the national question, individual rights and freedoms in liberal thought and practice, party organization and tactics, parliamentary activity of the parties, and the activity of legalists in the State Duma and the State Council. Overall, the subject matter has broadened, and the studies themselves have become deeper. At the same time, a considerable number of scholarly works continue to appear that either repeat old commonplaces about liberalism or contain unscientific information.

The role of jurists in the liberation movement in the empire at the beginning of the twentieth century remains insufficiently explored, even though jurists are constantly mentioned in the majority of studies.

In contemporary scholarship, one can observe an undiminished interest in the topic of liberalism. A significant number of historical dissertations continue to be defended. Unfortunately, a number of studies continue to repeat older material, and in some cases judgments long disproven by scholarship are reintroduced. Old problems that affect a number of scholars also remain. Contentious assertions persist, such as classifying the Octobrists as liberals, associating the concept of “liberalism” exclusively with left-wing liberalism, or conflating conservative liberalism with liberal conservatism, and so forth. There remains a divergence in the understanding of right-wing liberalism within the scholarly literature. Philosophical literature carefully examines the essence of liberal doctrines, whereas historical scholarship concentrates on liberal practices. For unknown reasons, the two directions generally do not borrow one another’s scholarly discoveries.

Overall, however, we may speak of a high level of scholarly discussion. Several scholarly schools devoted to liberalism exist, numerous conferences are held, and collections and encyclopedias continue to be published.

It may be noted that while the legalist movement could be distinguished clearly in the period before 1905, after that date it becomes difficult to define its existence precisely. All elements of the liberation movement became mixed together and assumed new forms. Yet even then, individuals and organizations of a legalist orientation still existed. The ideas of legalism also continued to develop. The ideology of legalism exerted an enormous influence on the entire liberal movement. Scholars, however, have still not determined the precise role of the legalists within Russian liberalism. At the same time, in recent years, certain scholars have come closer to recognizing the existence of a distinct juridical movement in the late empire. We shall discuss this in another publication.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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Original paper



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Timar, Devshirme, and Millet: The Ottoman Model of Centralized Domination in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

The historiography of colonialism has traditionally been framed within the context of the overseas expansion of Western European powers. This article proposes a different starting point: exploitation is a normal condition of any centralized power, and therefore the question is not whether it existed, but what specific form it took. Using the data related to the Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the 19th centuries, this study comparatively analyzes three key administrative institutions — the timar, the devshirme, and the millet — in order to reconstruct the internal logic of a non-capitalist, state-centered model of domination structurally distinct from its Western colonial counterparts. The timar system is viewed as a mechanism for centralized control over land and labor, evolving into a regime of rent-based exploitation as fiscal discipline weakened at the center. The devshirme is analyzed as a targeted project of social engineering: the systematic extraction and transformation of human capital from Balkan societies

for the benefit of the imperial bureaucracy. The millet system is interpreted as a strategy for administrative "legibility" of the population, in which the rhetoric of religious tolerance served as a tool of governance rather than an end in itself. Taken together, these institutions formed a unified logic of domination through selective inclusion rather than exclusion: unlike some modern imperial models that resorted to the suppression of languages, the displacement of cultural structures, and forced assimilation, the Ottoman Empire preserved the identities of conquered societies, turning this preservation into an instrument of control. The structural limit of this model was that the institutionalization of differences over time gave rise to corporate identities that fueled nationalist mobilization. This article draws on the comparative sociology of empires and the theory of internal colonialism and contributes to overcoming the Eurocentric framework of colonial studies.

Keywords:

Ottoman Empire; Colonialism; Timar system; Devshirme; Millet system; Central government.

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Introduction

The historiography of colonialism has long been developed within the framework of studies of Western Europe's overseas expansion and the emergence of Atlantic capitalism. However, military, administrative, and social mechanisms of domination by one political center over other societies are not the exclusive prerogative of overseas empires. Across vast expanses from the Balkans to the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire also built centralized mechanisms of subordination through the institutions of timar, devshirme, and millet, integrating local societies into the sultan's system of authority. Based on the thesis that these institutions, while functioning through different methods, generated essentially similar relationships of dependence and exploitation, this article aims to rethink Ottoman administrative practices within the framework of colonial theory.

In Ottoman historiography, these structures are often described as pragmatic instruments of governance, while in Balkan national historiographies, they are interpreted as symbols of the "Turkish yoke" and "exploitation". This study seeks to transcend this dichotomy by proposing a triple analytical framework for interpreting these institutions as simultaneously pragmatic and colonial. In this context, "colonialism" is understood as the establishment of absolute control over productive resources and human capital by the central government, the deliberate reorganization of social structures in its own interests, and the elimination of local resistance, along with the parallel creation of an elite dependent on the center.

This article does not equate the Ottoman Empire with European colonialism or claim that any centralized power is automatically colonial. It examines the extent to which comparative colonial concepts can help describe the specific governance mechanisms applied by the Porte to Balkan societies — and, above all, how these mechanisms structurally differed from their Western counterparts. The analytical value of the concept of "colonialism" lies not in its universal scope, but in its ability to reveal what remains invisible within both Ottoman apologetics and Balkan nationalist critique.

This article first examines how the timar system established centralized control over land and labor, evolving over time into a mechanism for rent extraction. Second, it analyzes the function of the devshirme system as a project of social engineering that intentionally transformed the demographic and cultural fabric of Balkan societies. Third, it reveals the strategy of legibility and control hidden behind the rhetoric of religious tolerance in the millet system. This comparative analysis aims to support the thesis that the Ottoman Empire developed a non-capitalist, state-centered, and meritocratic model of colonialism and to contribute to our understanding of the structural vulnerabilities that predetermined the empire's ultimate collapse.

This study draws on several analytical traditions allowing to move beyond both Ottoman apologetics and Balkan nationalist critique. Dominance over peripheral societies does not necessarily require overseas expansion; it is reproduced through the differential distribution of resources and the administrative categorization of the population; it is precisely this mechanism that underlies all three institutions under consideration. Where the European imperialism was built on the exclusion of conquered people from metropolitan cultural categories, the Ottoman system operated through selective inclusion: the timar transformed local elites into functionaries of the center, the devshirme produced imperial officials from Balkan peasants, and the millet transformed confessional communities into manageable administrative units. This is not a coincidence of three practices; it represents a unified logic of domination, in which loyalty is ensured through personal dependence, not legal mechanisms¹.

¹ *Weber*. *Economy and Society: A New Translation*, ed. and trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 361–362, 397; *Hechter*. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 30–41; *Doyle*. *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 30–31, 108–109; *Mann*. *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 2–3, 14.

1. The Ottoman Empire's land system: timar in the Balkans

In order to understand the Ottoman colonial system, it is necessary to examine the empire's policy of conquest and resettlement in the Balkans. Through these processes, the Balkans eventually became an integral part of the Ottoman state. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire, in order to revive the Balkans, which were experiencing extreme poverty, political instability, a lack of social and political order due to ongoing conflicts, and a lack of arable land, employed the timar system. In order to increase the population depleted by wars, ensure stability, and create a sufficient population to cultivate the land, the Ottomans encouraged, and sometimes even forced the Turks migrating from Anatolia to move to the conquered territories². The Ottoman administration in the Balkans avoided direct intervention in the local ways of life and religious structures. The dominant tendency was to preserve productive populations; the local tax system was largely kept untouched. This approach facilitated the acceptance of Ottoman rule by a population exhausted by political instability and sectarian conflicts³.

The timar system, also called *dirlik*, "means of livelihood", was not alien to the population of the Balkans, as it resembled the Byzantine *pronoia*⁴. It allowed abandoned lands to be resettled, incorporated into economic activity, and ensured tax collection without additional central expenditure. As the foundation of administrative and military organization, the timar strengthened the sultan's authority: rebellious lords were eliminated, and those who recognized his authority were integrated into the system⁵. This case demonstrates that the Ottoman

² This practice can be regarded as a form of demographic engineering characteristic of classical colonialism: the ethnic and social structure of conquered territories was transformed in the interests of the metropole, and the resettlement of Turkic populations into conquered lands, similarly to classical colonialism, constituted a reorganization of the social structure in the interests of the center.

³ *Emecen Feridun M.* Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kuruluş ve Yükseliş Tarihi (1300–1600) (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 61–62.

⁴ The Turkish word "timar" fully corresponds to its Greek meaning: *Halil Inalcik*. «Timar» (DIA, 2012), No: 41, 169.

⁵ *Inalcik Halil*. «Türkler ve Balkanlar» (BAL-TAM Türklük Bilgisi, 2005) 27–29; *Emecen*. 2016, 61–63.

colonial style of governance implied a strategy based on assimilation and integration rather than outright conflict; in other words, in contrast to the destructive population transfer policies characteristic of Western colonialism, it was a system that functioned on the principle of "reward in exchange for loyalty"⁶.

One such method of rewarding in the Ottoman Empire was a system whereby lands called *ocaklık* or *yurtluk* were handed out on a hereditary basis to influential locals in remote regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Southeastern Anatolia, in order to consolidate the imperial power. Although this practice was intended to maintain local loyalty, over time it laid the foundations for primitive feudalism.⁷

The Ottoman Empire had two main classes: the *rayah* (subjects) and the military class. The military class included not only the army but also government officials and their families. This class was exempt from taxes and was directly subordinate to the sultan. According to Halil İnalcık (Halil İnalcık), the Ottomans sought to assimilate the local aristocracy and military class of conquered regions by incorporating them into the timar system. Christian sipahis and local nobles were integrated into the Ottoman timar system⁸ (particularly in the Balkans). This demonstrates the Ottomans' pragmatic approach to involving local populations in governance. For example, in the 15th century, many Christian sipahis served in the Ottoman army and became timar holders. This fact demonstrates the Ottomans' success in integrating local populations into the system.^{9,10}

⁶ Doyle characterizes this type of imperial expansion as a "tribal empire" that transforms into centralized bureaucratic control, in which the political integration of the periphery is achieved through the incorporation of local elites rather than through their destruction (Doyle. 1986, 108–109).

⁷ İnalcık. 2012, 168; Orhan Kilic. "Ocaklık" (DIA, 2007), No 33, 317; Kilic Orhan. "Yurtluk" (DIA, 2013), No 43, 614.

⁸ In Weber's typology, this corresponds to a strategy whereby a patrimonial ruler incorporates potentially competing elites into his own administrative apparatus, thereby neutralizing the threat of independent local power (Weber. 2019, 361–362, 364).

⁹ İnalcık Halil. The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy (Variorum Reprints, 1978), 114–116.

¹⁰ The integration of the Balkan nobility into the timar system simultaneously reflected the Ottoman Empire's pragmatic strategy of assimilation.

Following its conquests in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire established centralized control over land and labor. Continuity was ensured by preserving the agricultural production models inherited from Byzantium, particularly the *çift-hane*¹¹ system, which protected small farms and peasant labor. This approach was aimed at ensuring the continuity of production and maintaining social balance¹². Here, it didn't matter whether the family receiving the timar was Christian or not. The Ottomans focused on whether the population would obey them. Furthermore, the timar system, unlike other land systems, assumed that the peasant cultivating the land was merely a user of the land, while the land itself was considered *miri*¹³ — state property. The sole owner of the land was the sultan, representing the state. Lands could not be passed down from father to son. Therefore, a feudal system similar to the Western one could not arise in the Ottoman Empire. However, in addition to the lands controlled by the army and the state, there were private lands called *mülk*, as well as lands whose income directly supported religious or charitable purposes. Such lands were called *waqf* and were outside of state control. Private lands could be given as a kind of gift to relatives, friends, or slaves of the rulers. Such lands were often later converted into religious *waqfs*, remaining outside the timar system¹⁴.

¹¹ *Inalcik Halil*. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. (ed.) D. Quataert (Cambridge University Press, 1994). Vol. 1. 1300–1600, 145–146.

¹² Although this regulation appeared to be aimed at protecting peasant households, in reality it reflected a colonial logic of exploitation: peasants were bound to the land, their productive capacity was systematically controlled and directed toward the military-administrative needs of the empire. The attachment of peasants to the land through the *çift-hane* system was not so much a mechanism of protection as a colonial instrument that ensured the transfer of surplus product to the center through the fixation of labor power.

¹³ In the Ottoman Empire there was continuity in the cultivation of land, and all arable land consisted of *miri* lands, in other words, *dominium eminens* (*Adanir Fikret*. “The Ottoman Peasantries, c.1360–c.1860” (ed.) T. Scott. The Peasantries of Europe: From the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries (Longman, 1998), 278).

¹⁴ *Inalcik*. 1978, 113–115; *Adanir*. 1998, 279; *Inalcik*. 2005, 28–29; *Inalcik*. 2012, 170.

As for the situation in which the state is the sole owner of the land, this situation represents a form of colonial domination that goes beyond classical feudalism, in which the central government monopolized the land and directly controlled peasant labor. Thus, production became a mechanism of not only economic but also political dependence¹⁵.

Historians criticize Ottoman control over agricultural labor, noting its evolution into a system of exploitation. According to Dimitrije Djordjević and Stephen Fischer-Galati, after the Pax Ottomana, the empire faced a crisis that undermined its sociopolitical structure by the end of the 16th century. This crisis manifested itself in the weakening of central authority at the local level and the disruption of the balance of mutual obligations that underpinned the timar system¹⁶. The weakening of Ottoman authority in the 17th century led to the strengthening of local officials and landowners, resulting in increased tax burdens and the expansion of private estates (*çiftlik*s) to the detriment of the timars. This transformation undermined the principle of reciprocity in the "sipahi-peasant-center" triangle, transforming the timar into a rent-driven instrument of domination. Despite limited political awareness, these changes negatively impacted the daily security and economic viability of rural communities¹⁷.

As early as the second half of the 16th century, due to the changing times, the timar system began to transform, and these changes were detrimental to the Ottoman state. In fact, it is from this period that historians' main critical assessments of this institution begin. Its disintegration testifies to its departure from its original pragmatic functions and a transformation into a rent-seeking regime,

¹⁵ Mann describes a similar logic in early empires of domination, noting that the imperial state did not merely extract surplus from an existing economy but actively constituted it through coerced cooperation. The benefits of this system "were abstract" and were provided by the uniform and repressive services of the military state, rather than by productive exchanges among the population itself (Mann. 1986, 147–148, 153).

¹⁶ Djordjevic Dimitrije, Fischer-Galati Stephen. The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (Columbia University Press, 1981) 227.

¹⁷ Djordjevic—Fischer-Galati. 1981, 30.

increasingly reminiscent of colonial exploitation¹⁸. The connection between peasant security and production weakened, and surplus product began to be more directly extracted by local and central elites.

One of the key reasons for the system's disintegration was the Ottoman Empire's growing need for cash from the late 16th century. Some timar lands were transferred to *mültezim* (tax farmers) through the *iltizam* system in exchange for lump sum payments. Initially, this practice encouraged production and security, but over time it evolved into a rent-extraction mechanism for the bureaucratic elite. The increased tax burden fueled peasant discontent and accelerated the weakening of central authority in the provinces¹⁹. The *iltizam* deepened colonial domination by redistributing economic resources from producers to rent-seeking elites in the Ottoman provinces. This transformation increased the burden of exploitation on peasants, rather than their loyalty to the center, and altered the nature of the local population's relationship with the Ottoman administration. Essentially, the *iltizam* marked a shift from a rational tax system to a mechanism of colonial exploitation through rent-seeking intermediaries²⁰.

This observation is supported by comparative analysis. Inalcik notes that the sipahis gradually began to perceive tax revenues as personal income rather than public funds. It is noteworthy that it is precisely this trajectory — from rational governance to arbitrary rent extraction — that comparative sociology views as the structural inevitability of patrimonial systems: the fiscal pressure of wars creates the need for tax farmers, the tax farmers convert leased lands into private

¹⁸ Weber characterizes precisely this trajectory as structurally inevitable under sultanism: patrimonial rule financed in monetary form generates complete freedom and arbitrariness in the imposition of levies, duties, and monopolies, undermining the predictability of economic activity and accelerating the concentration of resource extraction in the hands of intermediaries (Weber. 2019, 370).

¹⁹ *Genç Mehmet*. "Iltizam" (DIA, 2000) No 22, 154–157; *Inalcık Halil*. The Ottoman Empire Classical Age: 1300–1600, (Phoenix, 2000) 47–49.

²⁰ Tilly traces the same dynamic directly in the Ottoman case: when military expenditures drove the sultans to rely on tax farmers, these tax farmers used their position to convert the lands from which they collected taxes into property, thereby unintentionally establishing a classic system of indirect rule, which ultimately worked against both the subjects and the rulers themselves (Tilly. 1990, 105–106).

property, and the system of indirect governance, which arose as a necessary measure, ultimately turns against those who created it — both the subjects and the center itself²¹.

The devastation caused by the wars, coupled with the tightening of financial practices in many regions, forced peasants to flee to the mountains and embrace the tradition of robbery and *armatol* activity; in periods when the Ottoman authorities could not pay the *armatols*, the guardians of order themselves turned to robbery, signaling the collapse of the balance between security and economics in the provinces²². This situation weakened the timar system's ability to ensure military-fiscal returns and made peasant labor more vulnerable to exploitation. After the devastation of the war of 1768–1774, although the center sought new reforms, the erosion of power continued, from the Janissary corps to provincial administrators; no lasting compromise with the *rayah*, which were making increasingly insistent demands, was achieved^{23,24}.

Meanwhile, the timar sipahis, seeking to maintain and increase their income, expanded the *chiftliks* and demanded more taxes from the peasants. Thus, the peasants found themselves firmly tied to the land; social mobility and commercial development were thus limited. This delayed the formation of capitalist relations and caused the Balkans to lag in the process of modernization. This process involved

²¹ Weber. 2019, 370; Tilly. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 105–106.

²² Djordjevic—Fischer-Galati. 1981, 31–32.

²³ Там же. 63–64.

²⁴ It should be emphasized here that the goal of rebellions in the Ottoman Empire was not the destruction of the state but a return to its framework. Every individual's authority and status derived from the state, and the state skillfully exploited this by setting elites against one another and implementing a strategy of “divide and rule”. Under such conditions, no one could unite and challenge the center (*Barkey Karen*. *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Cornell University Press, 1997) 56–59). The dynamics of Ottoman rebellions differed fundamentally from the logic of Western colonialism: whereas rebellions in Western colonies were directed against an externally imposed foreign power and its exploitation in pursuit of independence and autonomy, rebellions in the Ottoman Empire represented struggles to redefine relations with the center and gain access to privileges within the system.

not only the sipahis but also a new layer of Muslim nobility — the ayans — who also acquired chiftliks and utilized peasant labor. Growing international demand for grain, tobacco, and cotton intensified the exploitation of these lands and increased the burden of duties on the peasants. Michael Palaioret explicitly defines the timar system as "self-exploiting". It was based not on increasing productivity, but on increasing pressure on peasant labor and redistributing the existing surplus product²⁵. In his opinion, this has undermined the economic modernization of the Balkans in the long term and excluded the region from global capitalist development²⁶.

A more serious consequence for the central government was that the sipahis²⁷. Gradually, they began to perceive the state *ushr* tax as their own money. This reduced revenues from peripheral regions and weakened the state's authority in the provinces. The ayans, defending their interests, created private armed groups, which contributed to the establishment of a half-timbered architecture in the Balkans and the spread of banditry. Peasants, burdened by heavy taxes and the constant threat of robbery, retreated to mountainous regions, leaving the vast plains uncultivated²⁸.

At this stage, the Ottoman Empire's timar system began to be criticized in Western historiography as well, particularly by Balkan Marxist scholars. According to them, as Halil Inalcik noted, Ottoman peasants suffered under the "Turkish yoke", and the timar itself represented an archaic feudal order. These authors viewed it as an exploitative mechanism and argued that the economic backwardness of the Balkans in modern times was a direct consequence of the exploitative system created by the Ottomans. In Ottoman

²⁵ This conclusion is consistent with Weber's analysis of the economic consequences of patrimonial rule: sultanistic systems structurally suppress market-oriented capitalism because they make calculable economic activity impossible (Weber. 2019, 370–373).

²⁶ Palaioret Michael. The Balkan Economies c. 1800–1914: Evolution without Development (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 36–39.

²⁷ The sipahis were not merely military retainers but also an intermediary stratum that directed peasant labor toward the center; this is precisely what makes the Ottoman timar comparable to colonial labor regimes in the West.

²⁸ Palaioret. 1997, 38–44.

historiography, the timar is traditionally described as a "golden age of independent peasants"²⁹.

Karl Marx's direct analyses of the Ottoman Empire are limited, but his concept of the Asiatic mode of production provides a productive framework for understanding the system of miri land and timar. Land was legally owned by the state; peasants had only usage rights and were subject to taxes, which hindered the development of private property and capitalist relations. Thus, the Ottoman order reproduced key features of the Asiatic mode of production — communal property, the central role of the state, and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation — and retained its archaic structure until the abolition of the timar system³⁰.

Marx's framework is quite revealing when applied to the Ottoman context. The miri land system, where land legally belonged to the state and peasants had only the right to use it and the duty to pay taxes, limited the development of private property and hindered the transition to capitalist relations. Thus, the Ottoman order embodied key features of the Asian mode of production: communal ownership, the central role of the state, and pre-capitalist forms of exploitation³¹.

Historians such as Halil İnalcık and Feridun Emecen consider this interpretation limited, as the pragmatic context should not be ignored. After all, the Ottoman government acted primarily pragmatically, developing practical solutions appropriate to the conditions of the time. The empire created a form of government distinct from Europe, with a strong centralized principle, so it is incorrect to claim that the primary goal of the land system was to dispossess society. Feudal relations and notions of property were different in Europe; the granting

²⁹ *Adanir*. 1998, 269–270; *İnalcık*. 2005, 29.

³⁰ *Marx Karl*. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Progress Publishers, 1859) <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/index.htm>.

³¹ For example, the *çift-hane* system preserved the autonomy of peasant households oriented toward subsistence production; however, their resources were incorporated into the military and fiscal needs of the state through the timar system. This demonstrates that until the abolition of the timar system, the Ottoman Empire retained a primitive mode of exploitation and failed to develop it into a more complex form.

of individual land rights under those conditions was impossible. Although some feudal elements did emerge with the weakening of central authority in the Ottoman Empire, thanks to the strong center, this process did not take a form similar to that of Western Europe³².

2. Devshirme: Ottoman recruitment system

The Ottoman Empire used the devshirme system as one of the most important army recruitment mechanisms. This practice had a particularly strong impact on the Balkans and has sparked heated debate among historians in administrative, social, and colonial contexts. Devshirme was a complex process that shaped the military, administrative, and social structure of the Ottoman Empire. In Balkan historiography, the system continues to be seen as a key element in debates about the colonial nature of the Ottoman Empire. Balkan scholars interpret it as an extremely brutal method aimed at destroying cities, weakening local populations, and forcibly enslaving children, who were then used in wars against their own people. Moreover, the region's contemporary socioeconomic problems are often linked to human exploitation in the Ottoman Empire, and devshirme is interpreted as one form of this pressure³³.

During the Beylik period, the Ottoman Empire employed the *pencik* system, known in the Islamic world, whereby one-fifth of war captives (or their monetary equivalent) were transferred to Turkish-Muslim families in Anatolia. There, the captives absorbed the language and culture. Under Sultan Murad I (1362), this practice was legalized, leading to the emergence of special units directly subordinate to the padishah — the Kapikulu. The most famous of these were the Janissaries, a professional military unit. The most important reason for the establishment of the Kapikulu was the need to eliminate the threat posed by powerful Turkic aristocratic families and

³² Inacik. 2005, 26–27; Emecen. 2016, 56–57.

³³ Yılmaz Gulay. “The Devshirme System and the Levied Children of Bursa in 1603–4” (Belleten, 2015) 286: No. 79, 902–903.

thereby balance their influence. At the same time, the sultan was able to maintain the functioning of a meritocratic elite^{34,35}.

The devshirme formed a special stratum of Kapikulu, consisting of young men plucked from Balkan communities and transformed into absolute loyalists to the sultan. This system excluded the local aristocracy and created a direct colonial elite, tied exclusively to the center. The devshirme became an instrument for concentrating power and eliminating potential provincial autonomy.

After the defeat at Ankara (1402), the pencik system proved insufficient, and the devshirme was introduced to meet military needs. It was first used in the Balkans and was formalized by law under Murad II (1421–1451). According to the rules, Christian youths between the ages of eight and twenty were selected for the Kapikulu. They were first assigned to Turkish families, where they learned the language and Muslim customs, and then transferred to Istanbul for military or administrative service. Initially, recruitment was carried out by local beys and qadis, but due to abuses from the time of Mehmed II, control was transferred to central officials. The system existed for approximately 150 years, but by the end of the 16th century it began to collapse, and the needs of the Kapikulu were met by küloğlu and the students of the Agha³⁶.

A key feature of the devshirme was the systematic expropriation of young, able-bodied men from Balkan societies. This practice is reminiscent of compulsory labor service in colonial regimes: productive forces were separated from families, and the demographic potential of local communities was deliberately weakened. Thus, the devshirme served not only as a military resource for the empire but also as a tool for the long-term transformation of social structures in the periphery.

³⁴ Ozcan Abdulkadir. “Kapikulu” (DIA, 2001) No 24, 348; Ozcan Abdulkadir. “Pencik” (DIA, 2007) No. 34, 226–228; *Genc Mehmet*. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Devlet ve Ekonomi (Otuken Yayınları, 2014) 80.

³⁵ In Weber’s typology, this corresponds to the logic of a “patrimonial bureaucracy”: the ruler forms the administrative apparatus from dependent individuals rather than freely appointed officials precisely in order to prevent the accumulation of independent power and to ensure unconditional personal loyalty (Weber. 2019, 349, 361–362).

³⁶ Ozcan Abdulkadir. “Devshirme” (DIA, 1994) No. 9, 254–257.



Sultan Murad I.
From open sources

The devshirme system was implemented exclusively among children of Christian families and was subject to strict selection criteria. Children who were circumcised or spoke Turkish were not accepted, as it was assumed they might be Muslim or Jewish. The only son in a family was not removed, but in large families, the healthiest was chosen. Jews were also excluded from the system, as the Ottoman Empire used them as traders. This selectivity ensured that the Janissary corps was formed from the most physically fit individuals who were absolutely loyal to the Sultan^{37,38}.

³⁷ *Uzuncarsili Ismail Hakki*. Osmanli Devleti'nde Kapikulu Ocaklari 1 (Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1988) 17–18; *Akgunduz Ahmet*. Osmanli Kanunnameleri — I. Ahmed, I. Mustafa ve II. Osman Devirleri Kanunnameleri (Osmanli Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1996) 138–139.

³⁸ Within the devshirme system there were various selection rules. For example, if a child had no parents, it was believed that he was poorly raised and prone to greed, and therefore he was not taken. The son of a local village headman was likewise exempt from recruitment because it was assumed that he would be the worst member of the community. Shepherds, children with physical disabilities, people engaged in certain crafts, and those who had already been to Istanbul were also excluded, since such children were believed to be “too cunning” for service (*Uzuncarsili*. 1988, 17–18).



Sultan Murad II.
From open sources

These detailed criteria show that devshirme was not a random, but rather a specific project of social engineering³⁹. The Ottoman government systematically confiscated the healthiest and most productive sons of Balkan peasants, but did not touch groups such as Jews, who possessed significant tax potential in the cities, or Russians and Georgians, who lived in border territories outside the empire's direct control. Thus, the state preserved local sources of tax revenue while neutralizing potential competing aristocracies.

The inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, as in Western colonial empires, was determined by the economic interests and political goals of the ruling power. Like Western powers, the Ottoman Empire sought to categorize society and make it *legible*⁴⁰. This indicates the rational basis of the system.

³⁹ Foucault describes a similar logic in his analysis of disciplinary power: discipline acts upon the body not “en masse” but “individually, in detail”, seeking to seize it at the level of the mechanism itself — movements, gestures, attitudes, speed”, producing “docile bodies” whose usefulness increases in proportion to their obedience (Foucault. 1995, 137–139).

⁴⁰ Scott James. *Seeing Like a State*. (Yale University, 1998), 2–6.



Janissary with a musket. Engraving from Cesare Vecellio's
album «Costumes of All Ages and Nations». 1590.
From open sources

Since the end of the 16th century, significant changes took place in the functioning of the devshirme. Authors such as the compiler of *Kavânûn-i Yeniçeriyân* and Koçi Bey, linked the decline of the corps with the departure from the *Kanun-i Kadim*⁴¹ and, in particular, the admission of representatives of various ethnic groups from without. They believed this undermined uniformity and discipline. These complaints reflect not only a crisis in military organization but also a weakening of the center's ability to control the provinces⁴². Ottoman archival documents confirm this process. For example, during the 1603–1604 conscription in Bursa, more than 2,600 children were recruited, with the age range shifting from 8–15 to 15–20 years. This indicates a preference for more mature

⁴¹ Ottoman thinkers, reflecting on the causes of the state's decline, argued that the Ottoman Empire had lost the greatness of the age of Sultan Suleiman because it had departed from the old rules and institutions.

⁴² *Darusman Zuhuri*. Kocibey Risalesi (Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1972) 43; *Fodor Pal*. “Bir Nasihatname Olarak Kavanin-i Yeniceriyan”, *Besinci Milletlerarasi Turkoloji Kongresi* (Edebiyat Fakultesi Basimevi, 1985) 217–219; *Akgunduz*. 1996, 263; *Beydilli Kemal*. “Yeniceri” (DIA, 2013) No. 43, 458.



Janissary officer. *Drawing by Gentile Bellini.*
From open sources

and physically developed young men, which was linked to changes in military technology, particularly the spread of firearms, which required a shorter training period⁴³.

One of the most controversial issues in Ottoman historiography remains the question of whether devshirme should be considered a form of slavery. At first glance, this practice, not based on family consent, does resemble forced enslavement. However, the status of "slave of the sultan" (*kul*) was far more complex than the modern understanding of slavery: objects of devshirme could own land and even hold high positions, including that of vizier^{44,45}. This is why there are different interpretations among historians.

⁴³ Yilmaz. 2015, 918–925.

⁴⁴ Özcan. 1994, 256; Yilmaz. 2015, 904.

⁴⁵ Moreover, many of the "slaves of the Sultan" occupied the highest offices of state: one need only recall such grand viziers as Gedik Ahmed Pasha, Makbul Ibrahim Pasha, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, Ferhad Pasha, Lala Mehmed Pasha, Kara Murad Pasha, Kemankes Mustafa Pasha, and the members of the Köprülü dynasty. Despite such an outstanding role — especially that of Sokollu Mehmed in Ottoman history — the devshirme is portrayed extremely negatively in Serbian historiography.

Paul Wittek acknowledged that devshirme formally contradicted Sharia, but believed that the Ottomans justified the practice by citing certain provisions of Shafi'i law⁴⁶. Wittek also objected to accusations of "barbarism": in his view, the system offered the Christian population opportunities for career advancement, while family ties were not always completely severed, and some were granted special privileges. However, he also noted negative consequences: the removal of young males weakened the agrarian potential of Christian communities, and the incorporation of these men into the army reduced the likelihood of local resistance. Wittek's critics pointed out that his explanations were inconsistent with the facts of recruitment among Armenians and Greeks⁴⁷. Halil Inalcik⁴⁸, on the contrary, proposed to consider the devshirme not as a form of slavery, but as a type of extraordinary duty (*avariz-ı divaniye*⁴⁹), and did not see this as a direct conflict with Islamic law. According to the agreement (*ahd al-dhimma*), concluded with non-Muslims, their lives and property were protected by

Sokollu himself is often presented as an example of a figure who was "forcibly removed yet retained his Serbian identity" (*Hacisalihoglu Neriman Ersoy*. "Bulgaristan Tarih Algisinda ve Tarih Ders Kitaplarinda Devsirme Sistemi ve Yeniceriler" (Tarih Dergisi, 2017). Vol. 2. No. 66, 133–134.). Similar contradictions are evident in the perceptions of Western observers. Travelers and diplomats such as Gerlach and Busbecq, on the one hand, condemned the cruelty of the practice, yet on the other admired the Ottoman system of meritocracy, in which the Christian son of a peasant could become a pasha, beylerbeyi, or even grand vizier. Unlike the rigidly aristocratic structure of the Habsburgs, the Ottoman Empire placed personal qualities above lineage. Thus, in Christian sources the devshirme appeared as a symbol of oppression and forced assimilation, whereas in the eyes of Western travelers and diplomats it was an instrument of Ottoman military and political success grounded in principles of meritocracy (*Евстафьев Н.В.* «Взгляд христианских авторов на практику девширме в Османской империи XVI века» (Институт славяноведения Российской академии наук, 2024) № 4, 22).

⁴⁶ Wittek Paul. "Devshirme and Shari'a" (Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1955). Vol. 17. No. 2, 275–277.

⁴⁷ Wittek Paul. "Ankara Bozgunundan Istanbul'un Zaptina (1402–1455)" (trans.) Halil Inalcik. (Belleten, 1943). Vol. 7. No. 27, 588–590.

⁴⁸ Inalcik Halil. Osmanlılar–Futuh, Imparatorluk, Avrupa ile İlişkiler (Timas Yayinlari 2010) 186.

⁴⁹ This was a kind of extraordinary tax obligation applied in the Ottoman Empire under exceptional circumstances — during war, natural disasters, or famine. Moreover, the *avanz* tax was regarded in Ottoman society as a form of collective contribution and solidarity.



Devshirme for Sultan Suleiman I. 16th-century miniature.
From open sources

the state, and in exchange they paid the *jizya*, a tax that represented exemption from military service. According to Abdulkadir Özcan, in cases of extreme necessity, the state could waive this tax and instead require dhimmis to perform military service⁵⁰. This practice was seen as a completely legitimate demand that the empire could make of the population of conquered territories. These different interpretations demonstrate that the devshirme served not only as a source of military force but also as an expression of the Ottomans' legal and political pragmatism.

Neriman Ersoy Hacisalihoglu's study analyzes the representation of the devshirme system in modern Bulgarian historiography and school textbooks. According to her findings, since the 1980s,

⁵⁰ Özcan. 1994, 256.

educational materials in Bulgaria have typically defined the devshirme as a "blood tax" and presented it as one of the most negative practices of Ottoman rule. After the regime change in 1990, the terminology became less harsh, but devshirme continues to be described as "the confiscation of the strongest and healthiest Bulgarian children from their families" and is interpreted as a manifestation of the repressive nature of Ottoman rule. Although its emphasis in school curricula has gradually diminished, secondary literature and popular history continue to present the topic in detail and with illustrations, reinforcing the perception of the Ottoman Empire as a colonial power⁵¹.

Early Christian *vitae* also called the devshirme a "blood tax" and described it as "the most terrible oppression". The separation of children from their families and their conversion to Islam were presented in these sources as one of the most severe forms of pressure on Christian communities. This discourse contains the early beginnings of the negative interpretation of the devshirme characteristic of modern Balkan national historiography⁵².

At the same time, the families' perceptions of this practice remained controversial. Some tried to hide their children or passed them off as married to avoid conscription, while others voluntarily surrendered them in hopes of career advancement within government agencies⁵³. However, as Mustafa Nuri Pasha emphasized, the idea that all Christian families acquiesced to the system is untrue: the loss of a child meant serious economic and emotional damage. Thus, some regions — for example, Ioannina, Galata, Morea, and Chios — obtained special privileges that allowed them to avoid devshirme⁵⁴.

In this context, some Balkan historians view the devshirme as a forced Islamization of the Balkan population and a manifestation of the Ottoman Empire's religious exploitation. This perspective emphasizes that the devshirme functioned not only as a military but also as a colonial mechanism of domination. This cultural transformation

⁵¹ *Hacisalihoglu*. 2017, 135–142.

⁵² *Евстафьев*. 2024, 19.

⁵³ *Yilmaz*. 2015, 910–915.

⁵⁴ *Mustafa Nuri Pasha*. *Netayic ul Vukuat*, (ed.) Neset Cagatay. *Turk Tarih Kurumu*, 1979, 18–19.



Janissary company commander (sotnik). 1568.

From open sources

demonstrates that the devshirme served not only a military but also an ideological function. The raising of children in Turkish families and their conversion to Islam was a typical example of the assimilation policy characteristic of colonial regimes. The destruction of local identities and the formation of a new elite loyal to the center represented the most visible manifestation of Ottoman colonialism.

Although some families hoped that their children would rise to high positions, at its core, devshirme remained a mechanism of colonial subordination. Individual consent could not outweigh structural coercion: in the face of state power, families had virtually no genuine choice. Therefore, devshirme can be interpreted as "a colonial practice legitimized by the participation of the exploited".

The meritocratic promise of the devshirme, the opportunity for the son of a Balkan peasant to become a grand vizier, was not a concession to the governed, but a condition for the system's stability: the loyalty of a graduate was valuable precisely because it was constituted through obedience, not through free choice. The disciplinary logic

was already evident at the selection stage — strict physical and social criteria, assignment to Turkish families, years of military and administrative training — all of this was the purposeful production of a specific human type, whose usefulness increased with increasing obedience. A system based solely on coercion would have been structurally fragile: it was precisely the built-in meritocratic promise that transformed coercion into something legitimate — not only in the eyes of the center, but also in the eyes of those included in this system⁵⁵.

Ultimately, this transformation shows that the devshirme was not only a source of military power, but also an instrument of social engineering.

In summary, while the changes can be seen as a "decline", in reality, the Ottoman Empire attempted to pragmatically adapt to the challenges of the times. At the same time, the transformation of the devshirme revealed the internal contradictions of the Ottoman colonial order. While the devshirme initially served as an instrument for the demographic and cultural transformation of Balkan societies, by the 17th century it had become unsustainable even for the center itself. This demonstrates that colonial practices could be not only a mechanism of domination but also a factor accelerating the empire's disintegration⁵⁶.

3. The millet system in the Ottoman Empire

In 19th-century Balkan historiography, the Ottoman Empire's activities were typically viewed in the context of national struggle and exploitation, while Turkish historiography emphasized conquest

⁵⁵ Weber. 2019, 349, 361–362; Foucault. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 137, 149; Gramsci. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 57–58, 263.

⁵⁶ Hechter describes a similar logic with regard to nationalist mobilization: the cultural division of labor that sustains the dominance of the center eventually generates the very corporate identities upon which movements of resistance are built (Hechter. 1975, 40–43).

and the struggle against non-Muslims. As a result, both sides failed to objectively reflect the reality of the region⁵⁷. Before the Ottomans, each minor power established its own customs duties, which hindered trade. However, under Ottoman rule, centralized authority was in place and tariffs were low. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire, for pragmatic reasons, sought to ensure internal stability through religious tolerance. This approach was manifested in the policy of *istimalet*, which protected the Christian population in conquered territories, provided tax breaks, and guaranteed religious freedom. From 1453, the millet system was in effect, allowing religiously organized communities to enjoy autonomy and maintain institutional continuity. Under Ottoman patronage, the Orthodox Church received a special status, which helped prevent peasant uprisings until the 17th century. Moreover, political stability and low tariffs facilitated the development of trade and urbanization in the Balkans⁵⁸.

Although the *istimalet* policy is often interpreted as an expression of tolerance, in the colonial context it appears as a strategy of centralized power to integrate the local population. Tax breaks and religious freedoms were tools to win loyalty. Thus, *istimalet* can be interpreted not only as an expression of tolerance but also as a colonial mechanism for producing consent, strengthening the center's power in the Balkans⁵⁹.

After the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II Fatih saw himself as the heir to the Roman emperors and sought to create an order acceptable to various monotheistic religions⁶⁰. In 1454, he subordinated Orthodox Christians to the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, placing the church under the protection of the Ottoman Empire. Orthodox communities retained their ethnic diversity, and the languages of worship remained Greek and Old Church

⁵⁷ *İnalcık*. 2005, 27, 35.

⁵⁸ *İlgürel Mucteba*. "İstimalet" (DIA, 2001) No. 23, 362.

⁵⁹ Gramsci defines the state precisely as hegemony protected by the armor of coercion: tax privileges and religious freedoms within the framework of *istimalet* were instruments for organizing consent rather than ends in themselves or genuine manifestations of tolerance (*Gramsci*. 1971, 263).

⁶⁰ *Karpat Kemal*. *Balkanlarda Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusculuk*, (trans.) Recep Boztemur (İmge Kitabevi, 2004) 21; Ortaylı, 2020, 66.

Slavonic. Under the millet system, communities were governed by their own religious leaders and kept their education and religious practices⁶¹.

Similarly, the Ottomans recognized Armenian communities as separate millets: Gregorian, Catholic and later Protestant⁶². Already under Fatih, the Armenian Patriarch was proclaimed head of all Armenians in the empire. The Armenians enjoyed not only religious autonomy but also held significant positions in the economy and bureaucracy; in the 19th century, they earned a reputation of a "loyal millet" and earned the state's trust. Their work as translators at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their contributions to the arts cemented this position. Thus, both the Orthodox and Armenian communities gained a more institutionalized status compared to the Byzantine period⁶³.

Historian Machiel Kiel, who has studied the Ottoman Balkans, emphasizes that Christianity maintained an institutional existence in Bulgaria under Ottoman rule, and the construction of new churches at the local level was largely tolerated. In contrast, Bulgarian authors associated Ottoman rule with the decline of society and the degradation of art. Kiel, however, argues that the weakness of Bulgarian art was primarily due to political fragmentation and internal conflicts in the pre-Ottoman period⁶⁴, while the Ottoman rule, through the millet system, allowed the preservation of religious and cultural traditions⁶⁵.

⁶¹ *Karpat*. 2004, 22–23.

⁶² *Ortaylı İ.* Millet, in: *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*. No. 30. 2020. ss. 66–70.

⁶³ *Dadyan Saro.* Osmanlı'da Ermeni Aristokrasisi, Everest Yayınları. 2011, 45; *Halacoglu Yusuf.* Ermeni Tehciri (Babiali Kultur Yayıncılığı 2014) 17; *Celik Recep.* "Osmanli Burokrasisinde Ermeniler", *Tarihte Turkler ve Ermeniler Merkez ve Tasrada Ermeniler 6.* (eds.) Mehmet Metin Hulagu, Musa Sasmaz, Ibrahim Ethem Atnur and others (Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2014) 187–188.

⁶⁴ *Landau Jacob M.* "Machiel Kiel, Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: A Sketch of the Economic, Juridical and Artistic Preconditions of Bulgarian Post-Byzantine Art and Its Place in the Development of the Art of the Christian Balkans, 1370–1700. A New Interpretation" (*Van Gorcum*, 1985), 281–285.

⁶⁵ *Karpat*. 2004, 23–24.



Constantinople Greeks. *Drawing by Luigi Mayer.*
From open sources

The millet system, while formally recognizing the religious autonomy of various communities, was in fact a mechanism that redefined them within the framework of Ottoman control. In its colonial dimension, this meant that the empire governed its subjects by "naming" them according to its own categories. Communal autonomy existed only under state oversight, which allows us to view the millet system as a form of colonial "administrative regulation"⁶⁶.

After Greece gained independence in 1829, the millet system was challenged, and interventions by Western powers forced the Ottoman Empire to undertake new reforms. In the 19th century, in the wake of modernization efforts, the Tanzimat Decree of 1839 and the Islahat Decree of 1856 were proclaimed. These acts guaranteed security of life and property for all subjects and equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, but in practice, the traditional millet system continued to operate⁶⁷.

The Islahat Decree particularly expanded Christian rights in the areas of religious freedom, management of educational institutions,

⁶⁶ This corresponds to what Hechter describes as a "cultural division of labor": a system in which different communities are granted differentiated access to status institutions reproduces inequality by making it structurally organized and therefore durable (Hechter. 1975, 38–39).

⁶⁷ Akyildiz Ali. "Tanzimat" (DIA, 2011) No. 40, 1–5.

and access to public service. However, the introduction of a monetary ransom for military service sparked discontent among Muslims and increased social tensions. This process strengthened the position of the Armenian and Greek communities in the state apparatus, but simultaneously contributed to a growing sense of loss among Muslims and became a breeding ground for nationalist movements⁶⁸.

Aylin Kocunyan⁶⁹ examines the transformation of the Ottoman millet system in the 19th century in the context of inter-imperial competition. In her view, the institutionalization of the Armenian and Jewish communities in the Ottoman Empire was not only the result of internal dynamics, but also directly linked to the French model of the *régime des cultes* and Russian control over the Armenian Church. Thus, the modernization of the millet was not so much an expression of pragmatic "tolerance" as an instrument of international legitimization and the struggle for influence. The Tanzimat and Islahat, therefore, simultaneously maintained a strategy of control over communities and were presented to the outside world as a "sign of civilization" that guaranteed religious freedoms. Moreover, the Armenian Constitution of 1863 provided for the creation of a secular council under the Patriarch, which limited religious authority, while the Jewish Statute of 1865 curbed the powers of the hakham-bashi exclusively to the spiritual sphere. Thus, the millet system outwardly preserved the "autonomy" of the communities, but in fact subordinated them to modern bureaucratic oversight⁷⁰.


The 19th-century reforms did not encompass all religious groups, primarily affecting Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Moreover, although the Tanzimat and Islahat were declared acts of equality and modernization, from a colonial perspective, they were the result of pressure from Western powers and an attempt by the Ottoman Empire to discipline communities under the guise of "modern citizenship."⁷¹

⁶⁸ Gulsoy Ufuk. "Islahat Fermanı" (DIA, 1999) No. 19, 185–190.

⁶⁹ Kocunyan Aylin. "The Millet System and the Challenge of Other Confessional Models, 1856–1865" (*Ab Imperio*, 2017) No. 1, 1–6.

⁷⁰ Kocunyan. 2017, 15–23.

⁷¹ In Foucault's terminology, this describes the transition from sovereign power, which extracts rents and tribute, to disciplinary power, which seeks to consti-



Maronite monk and pilgrims. Late 19th-century image.
From open sources

In this sense, the reforms can be seen as being located simultaneously in the shadow of Western colonialism and within the logic of internal Ottoman colonial governance.

Salim Cevik⁷² views the management of religious pluralism in the Ottoman Empire as a strategy oscillating between the pluralistic Habsburg model and the assimilationist Romanov model. Nineteenth-century centralizing efforts were aimed, on the one hand, at overcoming the limitations of the millet system and creating a more egalitarian Ottoman identity, and on the other, at limiting the autonomy of non-Muslim communities. According to Cevik, the Ottoman Empire's final turn to the homogenizing Romanov model was a manifestation of exclusionary colonial logic. This legacy was also inherited by the secular Republic, which paradoxically led to the emergence of a less tolerant nation-state compared to the empire.

tute the population as governable subjects through administrative classification and normalization (Foucault. 2013, 35–38).

⁷² Cevik Salim. “From Empire to Nation: Management of Religious Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey” (Philosophy and Social Criticism, 2024) 50, No. 4, 6–9.

Conclusion

A comparative analysis of timar, devshirme, and millet systems in the Ottoman Empire demonstrates that these institutions formed the basis of a unique model of colonialism, structurally distinct from its Western counterparts. This model functioned not as an overseas expansion, but as a practice of domination established "internally", being state-centric, pragmatic, and meritocratic. The timar system established control over production relations through the concentration of land ownership at the center and the mobilization of peasant labor in the interests of the state; the devshirme systematically extracted and transformed the human capital of Balkan societies, creating a military-bureaucratic elite absolutely loyal to the center; the millet system, behind the façade of limited religious autonomy, legitimized Ottoman rule, making communities "legible" and, therefore, governable.

The common thread of this triad was ensuring the efficient collection of resources (taxes, soldiers, obedience) by the center while preventing the formation of traditional feudal or bourgeois classes. While this provided the empire with considerable stability in the early modern period, it ultimately led to structural stagnation, which hindered capitalist transformation and exacerbated dependence on absolute central control. The transformation of timar into iltizam, the disintegration of the devshirme, and the collapse of the millet system in the face of nationalist demands were indicators that this centralized colonial model became untenable in the face of changing realities.

Thus, labeling the Ottoman Empire as "colonial" does not equate it with European imperial powers. On the contrary, it allows for a more nuanced understanding of its methods — centralized, instrumental, and infiltration-oriented — developed to govern its multi-ethnic and multi-religious territories. Ottoman colonialism was more a prototype of an "economy of governance" than an "economy of plunder".

Comparative analysis allows us to explain the empire's resilience and subsequent collapse within a unified logic. The fundamental

difference of the Ottoman model is this: where Atlantic imperialism was built on the exclusion of conquered people from metropolitan cultural categories, the Ottoman system operated through selective inclusion, demanding loyalty rather than ethnic identity. This, however, reveals its structural limit: the cultural division of labor that supported Ottoman control simultaneously shaped the very corporate confessional identities that later underpinned nationalist mobilization. When the ruling group is capable only of coercion, having lost the ability to generate consent, disintegration becomes not an accident but a structural inevitability. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, this means that it was not military defeats or financial exhaustion, but precisely this loss — the transformation of the timar into an instrument of rent, the devshirme into a closed corporation, the millet into a source of separatism — that determined the structural failure of the centralized colonial model.

The key contribution of this study is not to equate the Ottoman Empire with European colonial powers, but rather to demonstrate the fundamental difference between them. Exploitation is the normal condition of any centralized power: it is present wherever there is a state, an army, and taxes. The question is not whether it existed — it has been present always and everywhere. The question is what form it took. A number of imperial models — in particular, modern European colonialism — resorted to the systematic displacement of conquered societies: the suppression of languages, the replacement of administrative structures, the forced transformation of cultural identities. The Ottoman Empire acted differently: it did not destroy languages — it preserved them; it did not exterminate religions — it institutionalized them; it did not erase identities — it fixed them and used them for the purposes of governance. This was exploitation without extermination, domination through inclusion, not displacement. This is precisely why the concept of "colonialism" as applied to the Ottoman Empire requires a significant caveat: it refers to a *sui generis* model in which the preservation of differences was not a matter of tolerance out of humanitarianism, but a condition of effective governance. To acknowledge this does not mean justifying the empire, but attempting to understand it.

Authors' contribution:

Enver Alper Demirci — conceptualization, formal analysis, data curation, research, methodology, writing (original draft), writing (review & editing), general supervision.

Daria A. Demirci — formal analysis, data curation, research, resources, writing (original draft), writing (review & editing).

Conflict of interests

The authors declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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“Zouaves Sont les Premiers Soldats du Monde”: The Role of Elite French Infantry in the Battle of the Alma River, 1854

Abstract

This article presents an in-depth critical reassessment of the established historiographical explanations for the Allied victory in the key Battle of the Alma during the Crimean War. The relevance of the study stems from the need to reconsider long-standing interpretations in Crimean War historiography, which tend to attribute the defeat of the Russian army at Alma primarily to its technological backwardness, especially the lack of widespread rifled firearms. Such technological determinism overlooks other crucial aspects of military confrontation, including tactical skill, training, and troop morale. The aim of the article is to critically analyze and reevaluate the principal factors behind the Allied victory, shifting the emphasis away from superiority in weaponry toward the comprehensive tactical superiority of elite French infantry units — the Zouaves and Chasseurs

à Pied. The research methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of a wide range of sources, including French, Russian, and British documents (among them military regulations), memoirs of direct participants in the battle from both sides, as well as materials from Russian and foreign historiography. The main findings of the study challenge the dominant viewpoint. The author attempts to demonstrate that the decisive factor in the success of General Bosquet's division and in the outcome of the battle as a whole was not rifled muskets, but rather the exceptionally high combat training, tactical flexibility, encouraged individual initiative among lower ranks, and refined bayonet-fighting skills instilled in the Zouaves through colonial campaigns in North Africa. Specific examples show that the Zouaves often deliberately refrained from exploiting their firepower advantage in favor of rapid close-combat assaults, which proved both unexpected and highly effective. At the same time, the article deconstructs the long-established stereotype of the unquestioned dominance of the Russian bayonet. The study concludes that it was precisely the tactical innovation and professional mastery of the “African” troops that determined victory at Alma.

Keywords:

Crimean War, Battle of the Alma, Zouaves, Tactics, Bayonet combat, Historiography.

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In Russian and foreign historiography, the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War of 1853–1856 has traditionally been explained by the technical and organizational backwardness of the Russian army. It has become an established axiom that the key factor behind the Allies' victory was their widespread use of rifled small arms, against which Russian smoothbore muskets and tightly packed columns proved powerless, while the principal strength of the Russian forces — their “trump card” — was the bayonet, whose effectiveness was often neutralized by the enemy's rifles. This thesis, rooted already in the testimony of contemporaries¹, memoir literature², and pre-revolutionary historiography³, was canonized in the works of the prominent Soviet historian Evgeny (Yevgeny) Tarle⁴, as well as — in a somewhat simplified form — by Mikhail Pokrovsky⁵, and, having retained its relevance after the collapse of the USSR, continues to dominate even the most modern school textbooks⁶.

¹ On September 24, reports were received from Flügeladjutant (Aide-de-Camp) Shenshin, who stated that the entire success of the allies at the Alma had been due to the rifles (ГА РФ. Ф. 722. Оп. 1. Д. 206. Л. 228). Сборник рукописей, представленных Его Императорскому Высочеству Государю наследнику Цесаревичу о Севастопольской обороне севастопольцами. СПб., 1872. Т. 1. С. 351; *Меньков П.К.* Записки. СПб., 1898. С. 241, 255; Собрание донесений о военных действиях и дипломатических бумаг и актов, относящихся до войны 1853, 1854, 1855 и 1856 годов. СПб., 1858. С. 241.

² *Adye J.* A review of the Crimean War to the winter of 1854–5. London, 1860. P. 128; *Ершов А.И.* Севастопольские воспоминания артиллерийского офицера. СПб., 1858. С. 84–85; *Алабин П.В.* Походные записки в 1849, 1853, 1854–56, 1877–78 гг. (Ч. 3: Защита Севастополя. (1854–1856)). Самара, 1892. С. 14; *Милошевич Н.С.* Из записок севастопольца. СПб., 1904. С. 14.

³ *Тотлебен Э.И.* Описание обороны г. Севастополя. Часть I. СПб., 1863. С. 434–437; *Тотлебен Э.И.* Описание обороны г. Севастополя. Часть II. Отдел II. СПб., 1872. С. 128; *Дубровин Н.Ф.* История Крымской войны и обороны Севастополя. СПб., 1900. Т. 2. С. 479; *Дубровин Н.Ф.* История Крымской войны и обороны Севастополя. СПб., 1900. Т. 3. С. 126.

⁴ *Тарле Е.В.* Крымская война. М., 1943. Т. 2. С. 109, 111, 178, 186–187.

⁵ *Покровский М.Н.* Дипломатия и войны царской России в XIX столетии. М., 1923. С. 128, 153–154.

⁶ *Мединский В.Р., Торкунов А.В.* История. История России. 1825–1914 гг. 9 класс. Учебник. М., 2025. С. 63.

Within the Marxist paradigm, both historians regarded military technology as a direct consequence and the clearest manifestation of the overall “rotteness” and backwardness of the serf-owning system. It was precisely their conclusions concerning the technological gap — emphasized by Tarle almost to the point of fatalism — that laid the foundation for what may be called “technological determinism” in the study of the Crimean War. Evgeny Tarle, observing that “almost the entire Allied army that entered battle at the Alma was armed with rifles, while we... had only 1,660 riflemen”⁷, concluded that for Russian soldiers “every [enemy] bullet reached its target”⁸. Notably, Pokrovsky himself, despite all his Marxist dogmatism, pointed to systemic problems deeper than mere technology, ironically mocking the command’s faith in the “fine fellow bayonet” and arguing that “the strength lay not in [the rifles], but in those who fired them”; however, he did not claim that the Russian soldier fought poorly with the bayonet or that the Frenchman or Englishman did so better⁹. Yet it was precisely the simplified interpretation — reducing a complex picture to technological superiority — that entered the historiographical canon.

Such a reduction of a complex and multifaceted problem to technological determinism, requires revision. It has pushed other aspects of the military confrontation to the margins of scholarly discourse, including the enemy’s tactical skill, combat training, and the role of elite units. The contribution of the French Zouaves, whose participation was not limited merely to superiority in weaponry, becomes secondary, if it is acknowledged at all.

Moreover, historiography has entrenched a contradictory stereotype regarding the unquestionable superiority of the Russian army in bayonet combat, a notion which also requires critical verification on the basis of sources. As will be demonstrated in this article, this stereotype — originating in pre-revolutionary historiography and reinforced during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods — finds no unequivocal confirmation in contemporary testimonies or in evidence

⁷ *Тарле Е.В. Крымская война. М., 1943. Т. 2. С. 106–107.*

⁸ *Ibid.* С. 108.

⁹ *Покровский М.Н. Дипломатия и войны царской России в XIX столетии. М., 1923. С. 130.*



*Zouave in Combat. Artist Alexander Rachinsky. Circa 1858.
From open sources*

concerning actual battlefield practice. As Prince Vasily Vasilchikov noted, the commander Alexander Menshikov “quite rightly feared the first clash with the superior Algerian troops, accustomed to a life of combat”¹⁰. These fears of the “African” veterans among the leadership of the Russian army indicate that professional military men perceived the elite French infantry as a qualitatively different opponent even before the first shot had been fired.

It is noteworthy that even a cursory outside glance was enough to appreciate the special qualities of these units. British officers observing the French troops immediately remarked upon their exceptional bearing and physical conditioning¹¹. The Zouaves in particular made a strong impression upon the Allies, who described them as “native Frenchmen in Algerian dress, the roughest-looking fellows one could possibly imagine”¹². An English corporal, while noting the excellent relations with the French, singled out the Zouaves in particular, who, according to him, “proved to be a very cheerful company, though

¹⁰ Gowing T. A soldier's experience: or, A voice from the ranks... A personal narrative of the Crimean Campaign. Nottingham, 1892. P. 16.

¹¹ Walker C.P.B. Days of a soldier's life. London, 1894. P. 60.

¹² Ibid.

later they demonstrated that they were a headache for the enemy”¹³. These descriptions, provided by Allied observers, eloquently testify that the outward appearance and conduct of the “African” troops immediately revealed their colonial experience and special system of training, visible even on the eve of battle.

Thus, the purpose of this article is to reassess the key factors behind Allied success in the Crimean War using the Battle of the Alma as a case study. The focus of the research is the role of elite French infantry (the Zouaves and Chasseurs à Pied), whose effectiveness is considered not to be the result of rifled weaponry, but rather as a complex phenomenon incorporating tactical innovation, individual initiative, and a high degree of skill in close combat. The study is based on comparative-historical and source-critical analysis of archival, memoir, and published sources of French, British, and Russian origin.

After the Allied landing in Crimea, the Russian army under the command of Alexander Menshikov occupied a favorable position on the Alma River, intending to give battle. Despite the numerical superiority of the Anglo-French corps, the Russians relied on the strength of their defensive position.

The Allied battle plan envisioned that the right flank of the Russian army would be attacked by the British, while the center would be assaulted by the 1st and 3rd Divisions under the command of Marshal Canrobert and Prince Napoleon. However, the main role was assigned to the left flank, where the 2nd Division of General Pierre Bosquet operated, consisting of veterans of the Army of Africa, including 2,200 Zouaves of the 3rd Regiment¹⁴. This sector was considered impregnable because of the steepness of the slope¹⁵.

On September 8 (20), 1854, with the outbreak of battle, Bosquet's Zouaves, to the astonishment of the enemy, forded the Alma and began rapidly climbing the steep slope “like goats”¹⁶, provoking ad-

¹³ Gowing T. A soldier's experience: or, A voice from the ranks... A personal narrative of the Crimean Campaign. Nottingham, 1892. P. 16.

¹⁴ Lettres du maréchal Bosquet à sa mère, 1829–1858. Pau., 1879. V. IV. P. 141.

¹⁵ Lecat Bazancourt C. L'expédition de Crimée jusqu'à la prise de Sébastopol. Paris, 1856. V. I. P. 208–209.

¹⁶ Canrobert F.C. Le Maréchal Canrobert, souvenirs d'un siècle. Paris, 1904. V. II. P. 250.



Pierre Joseph François Bosquet, Marshal of France. Artist Horace Vernet. 1857.
From open sources

miration even among their British allies¹⁷. Following them, French artillery was brought up onto the plateau and opened fire on the Russian positions.

This bold maneuver came as a complete surprise to Alexander Menshikov. The Russian command was forced urgently to redeploy troops to the threatened left flank, disrupting the original position and weakening the center. The powerful French blow that followed against the center — in which the French elite infantry also played a highly active role — proved fatal for the Russian army and led to its retreat.

The success of this combined strike — the flanking maneuver by Bosquet and the frontal assault — was obvious to contemporaries. As one British officer observed in summarizing the actions of the French: “On this front the battle was won; the French carried out a very difficult and gallant attack, for which their mobility and dashing élan made

¹⁷ Peard G.S. Narrative of a campaign in the Crimea: including an account of the battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann. London, 1855. P. 56.

them perfectly suited”¹⁸. This assessment, coming from an allied rival, precisely captures the essence of French tactical superiority: it was speed, flexibility, and determination — not merely superiority in armament — that determined the outcome of the battle on their sector.

The famous British war reporter William Howard Russell also drew attention to the tactical skill and initiative of the Zouaves in the center of the battle. He described in detail how “the Zouaves under Colonel Bourbaki immediately rushed forward, driving before them the chain of Russian riflemen and skirmishers... and making use of the branches... of the trees to cross the narrow stream”¹⁹. Even more revealing is the bayonet attack episode described by Russell: “Colonel Cler, at this critical moment... calling upon his men to charge, threw himself upon the tower, which after a short but bloody struggle they carried at the bayonet, driving the Russians from it in confusion...”²⁰ These outside observations are of particular value because, independently of French reports, they record the tactical pattern that became the leitmotif of the entire battle: the Zouaves did not passively rely upon the superiority of their weapons, but actively sought opportunities for decisive hand-to-hand combat.

These assessments, made by British allies who watched the French actions attentively and not without jealousy, are extremely important because they directly contradict the dominant historiographical tradition. Despite the evidence cited above, historiography has generally interpreted the root of Bosquet’s division’s victory — and of the Allies as a whole — not in tactical mastery, but in the superiority of rifled weapons and the outstanding marksmanship of Anglo-French troops. According to this view, Russian troops with their smoothbore muskets and tactics of tightly packed columns could oppose nothing to enemy fire, serving as a classic confirmation of the thesis concerning the technical backwardness of the Russian army²¹.

¹⁸ *Adye J.* A review of the Crimean War to the winter of 1854–5. London, 1860. P. 50.

¹⁹ *Russell W.H.* The British expedition to the Crimea. London, 1877. P. 102.

²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 103.

²¹ *Figes O.* Crimea: The Last Crusade. London, 2011. P. 209–210, 214–215; *Royle T.* Crimea: the great Crimean War, 1854–1856. Boston, 1999. P. 224, 227.

Without denying a certain influence of the armament factor, we believe that such an interpretation obscures another, at least equally important element — the bayonet fight. Russian sources abound with assertions about the superiority of the Russian bayonet at the Battle of Alma, superiority supposedly nullified only by the unwillingness of the Anglo-French troops to engage in close combat; any Russian attempt to launch a bayonet attack was futile because it was swept away by rifle fire, and often the Russians did not even manage to close with the enemy²². A vivid illustration of this view is provided by the words of A. A. Panaev: “The Anglo-French gave no thought to our bayonet, and even unfastened their own bayonets, placing — and quite rightly — all their hopes in firepower”²³. This position of the sources is confirmed by descriptions of other events of the Crimean War as well²⁴. This interpretation, shaped by the sources themselves, became the conventional view in historiography. The stereotype of the Russian bayonet as the army’s “trump card” and traditional strength found expression in pre-revolutionary historiography²⁵, subsequently “mi-

²² Материалы для истории Крымской войны и обороны Севастополя / Под ред. Н.Ф. Дубровина. Вып. II. СПб., 1871. С. 495; Сборник рукописей, представленных Его Императорскому Высочеству Государю наследнику Цесаревичу о Севастопольской обороне севастопольцами. СПб., 1872. Т. 1. С. 58; *Колчак В.И.* Война и плен. 1853–1855 гг. Из воспоминаний о давно пережитом // *Колчак В.И., Колчак А.В.* Избранные труды. СПб., 2001. С. 37; Сборник рукописей, представленных Его Императорскому Высочеству Государю наследнику Цесаревичу о Севастопольской обороне севастопольцами. СПб., 1873. Т. 3. С. 315–316, 327–328.

²³ *Панаев А.А.* Князь Александр Сергеевич Меншиков в рассказах бывшего его адъютанта А.А. Панаева. СПб., 1877. С. 27.

²⁴ *Андреанов А.* Инкерманский бой и оборона Севастополя. СПб., 1903. С. 59–60; *Урусов С.С.* Очерки Восточной войны 1854–1855 гг. М., 1866. С. 78; *Жандр А.П.* Материалы для истории обороны Севастополя и для биографии Владимира Алексеевича Корнилова, собранные и объясненные капитан-лейтенантом А. Жандром, бывшим его флаг-офицером. СПб., 1859. С. 229; Материалы для истории Крымской войны и обороны Севастополя / Под ред. Н.Ф. Дубровина. Вып. IV. СПб., 1872. С. 180.

²⁵ *Дубровин Н.Ф.* История Крымской войны и обороны Севастополя. СПб., 1900. Т. 1. С. 240; *Богданович М.И.* Восточная война 1853–1856 годов. СПб., 1876. Т. 3. С. 19, 36–37; *Тотлебен Э.И.* Описание обороны г. Севастополя. Часть I. СПб., 1863. С. 193–195; *Богданович М.И.* Описание экспедиции англо-французов в Крым, 1854–1855 гг. СПб., 1856. С. 44.

grating” into and becoming entrenched within Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship²⁶. It is precisely this established narrative, rooted in the testimony of one side of the conflict, that requires critical reconsideration.

To test this established point of view, let us turn to how the French participants themselves — from commanders to ordinary Zouaves — described the reasons for their success. Here we discover that the center of their attention was by no means superiority in weaponry. French sources describing the Battle of Alma rarely emphasize small arms, generally limiting themselves to the neutral *fusil* (“musket” or “rifle”) instead of specialized terms such as *fusil rayé* (“rifled musket”) or *fusil de précision* (“precision rifle”). A few examples may be given. Significantly, General Bosquet, commander of the 2nd Division, in his personal correspondence never once mentioned rifled weapons as a decisive advantage and did not even use neutral terms such as *fusil* to designate firearms; indeed, he remained entirely silent about small arms²⁷. Far more often the focus falls upon bayonet combat. Thus, the Zouaves in their memoirs directly emphasized their superiority in hand-to-hand fighting: “At once the Zouaves rushed forward, uttering their terrible cries; they fell upon the enemy like thunder, scattered them in an instant, and without stopping seized the village”²⁸.

Another example describes their actions even more vividly: “The Zouaves hurled themselves upon these stunned, stupid masses! They slashed, stabbed, scattered them”²⁹. Characterizing this chaos in expressive terms, General Bosquet declared: “When the Zouaves are

²⁶ Тарле Е.В. Крымская война. М., 1943. Т. 2. С. 109; Еремин С.П. Английская армия в Восточной войне 1853–1856 гг. дис. ... канд. ист. наук. М., 2004. С. 70, 75, 178, 235; Ченнык С.В. Крымская кампания (1854–1856). Кн. 2. Альма. Севастополь, 2011. С. 96–97, 193–194; Айранетов О.Р. Крымская война. Популярный очерк. М., 2017. С. 101–102.

²⁷ Lettres du maréchal Bosquet à sa mère, 1829–1858. Pau., 1879. V. IV. P. 189–192; Lettres du maréchal Bosquet à ses amis. 1837–1860. Pau., 1879. V. II. P. 157–159.

²⁸ Noir L. Souvenirs d'un simple zouave: campagnes de Crimée et d'Italie; mœurs militaires. Paris, 1872. P. 229.

²⁹ Ibid. P. 237.

among the Russians, those poor Russians resemble a flock into whose midst the shepherd has unleashed his dogs”³⁰.

This confidence in the irresistible power of the bayonet charge and the willingness to engage in hand-to-hand combat had been forged in countless clashes in North Africa. Descriptions of the war in Algeria abound with references to the bayonet as the principal instrument of victory. This involved not merely straightforward frontal assaults, but also complex tactical combinations. For example, Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud described in detail operations in which cavalry deliberately drove Kabyle detachments into the path of Zouaves waiting in ravines with fixed bayonets³¹. The bayonet was employed massively and ruthlessly: in one battle Saint-Arnaud, after “driving [the enemy] into the ravines”, pursued them specifically with the bayonet, which, according to him, provoked panic and flight³². Assaults on fortified settlements, such as the capture of Laghouat, were likewise decided by rapid, “avalanche-like” bayonet attacks, when the Zouaves, “finishing off all who attempted to resist”, surged forward irresistibly, inspiring terror in the enemy through their sheer ferocity³³. Thus, their actions at Alma were not the product of sudden bravery, but the natural continuation and practical embodiment of a principal mode of warfare transferred from the North African theater to Crimea.

A vivid illustration of French tactical preferences is provided by the episode in which Colonel Cler, commander of the 2nd Zouave Regiment within the 3rd Division, seeing that the attack was faltering under the devastating fire of Russian batteries, decisively led his soldiers into a bayonet assault: “To me, my Zouaves,” he said to his old jackals, spurring his horse into a gallop; ‘bayonets!’—and all rushed forward at a run”. This maneuver resulted in success and the capture of the enemy position³⁴. This offensive spirit was a systemic quality of the “African” troops, whereas the Russian regulations, by contrast, restrained such initiative. The rule prescribing that rifle units be sent into attack

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ *Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud*. Paris, 1855. V. II. P. 332.

³² Ibid. P. 26.

³³ *Cler J.J.G. Souvenirs d'un officier du 2e de Zouaves*. Paris, 1859. P. 41–42.

³⁴ Ibid. P. 154–155.



Armand Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, Marshal of France.

Artist Charles-Philippe Larivière. 1854.

From open sources

“only in the most important or unavoidable cases” demonstrates that doctrinally the Russian army regarded the use of elite riflemen as a shock force not as a norm, but as an exceptional measure³⁵.

An even more revealing case occurred in the battle for the village of Burliuk in the center of the battlefield. Prince Napoleon, seeing no progress, issued a paradoxical order from the standpoint of technological-superiority theory: “We must throw the Russians into confusion, and for this purpose immediately double our skirmishers... who must, without firing a single shot, crawl up to the very feet of the Russians; once there, they are not to fire, but to make use of their bayonets.” This tactic, deliberately ignoring the potential advantages of rifled weaponry, achieved complete success: the Russians “stood petrified on seeing our [French. - A. K.] men among them, who took advantage of this to attack them with bayonets”. As a result, the village of Burliuk was captured³⁶.

³⁵ ГА РФ. Ф. 672. Оп. 1. Д. 96. Л. 46.

³⁶ Chartier A. La 3e Division de l'armée d'Orient et le prince Napoléon. Paris, 1898. P. 186.

The success of this attack, founded upon a conscious rejection of firepower superiority, became perhaps the most convincing argument against technological determinism. This tactical device was not an improvisation born amid the heat of the Battle of Alma, but a direct consequence and culmination of combat experience accumulated in the colonial campaigns of North Africa. It represented a demonstrative reliance on surprise and psychological impact, on close combat — that element in which the Zouaves felt themselves absolute masters.

The psychological paralysis of the Russian soldiers, “petrified” by their appearance, clearly demonstrates that victory was achieved not by technology itself, but by the tactical culture that allowed it to be employed — or entirely discarded in favor of a proven colonial doctrine.

Already in Algeria, French commanders had deliberately refined tactics of approaching the enemy without firing a single shot in preparation for a devastating bayonet blow. Thus, Saint-Arnaud proudly described an operation in which his brigade advanced to within thirty paces of the enemy without opening fire and then attacked with bayonets — a maneuver he regarded as “completely ordinary” practice for his unit³⁷. A battalion under the command of Morand acted in a similar manner after receiving a categorical order from Lieutenant Colonel Cler not to respond to enemy fire and to attack in complete silence. This tactic, based on the absolute renunciation of firepower advantage, culminated in the capture of a fortified position with minimal losses — one killed and three wounded³⁸. Thus, the seemingly paradoxical order at Burliuk was not an isolated episode, but a logical application of a combat doctrine refined and repeatedly tested in North Africa, in which abandoning gunfire in favor of sudden bayonet attacks was a standard method. At its core lay a calculation based on psychological shock and the moral crushing of the enemy, achieved through surprise and the ferocity of close combat — that sphere in which the French “African” units acknowledged no equal.

³⁷ Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud. Paris, 1855. V. II. P. 53–54.

³⁸ Cler J.J.G. Souvenirs d'un officier du 2e de Zouaves. Paris, 1859. P. 35–36.



Military scene. The Battle of the Alma. Marshal de Saint-Arnaud on horseback and two dragoons. Artist Hippolyte Bellangé. 19th century.
State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg

It is noteworthy that, on the question of small arms, Allied sources often paid tribute to the accuracy of Russian marksmen. Significantly, the above-mentioned Colonel Cler, in his description of the Battle of Alma, uses the term denoting a rifle (“*carabine de précision*”) only once, and does so in reference to Russian riflemen, whereas for French weapons he employs the neutral term *fusil*³⁹. Even more revealing are the reports of Marshal Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, in which, while noting the massive and troublesome fire (“*un feu très-vif et très-incommode*”) of Russian riflemen armed with rifled carbines in the center, he identifies as the key reason for success not superior return fire in a shooting duel, but rather the effectiveness of the French bayonet attack carried out under precisely this devastating fire⁴⁰. Thus, French documents consistently emphasize the decisive role of bayonet combat, which enabled them to prevail despite the resistance of Russian riflemen equipped with rifles.

³⁹ Ibid. P. 147–157.

⁴⁰ Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud. Paris, 1855. V. II. P. 577, 581.

Moreover, tactical skill rather than technical superiority proved decisive in the actions of the French skirmishers (*tirailleurs*). As one participant observed: “all ours [French riflemen — A. K.] lay on the ground and concealed themselves so effectively that we ourselves could scarcely see them”, whereas the Russians, “on the contrary, all stood upright and arranged in line almost shoulder to shoulder”⁴¹. This observation finds a direct explanation in Russian military regulations. Although they permitted riflemen in rough terrain to seek cover, the principal rule for flat ground required the preservation of formation order — equal intervals “as they stood behind the front” — which in practice resulted in the formation of a linear skirmish chain⁴². French skirmisher tactics, by contrast, had been elevated into doctrine: the “Brief Instructions of the Marshal of France to Division Generals, Brigade Generals, and Corps Commanders” (“*Instructions sommaires*”), written by Saint-Arnaud for the Army of the East, explicitly forbade “degenerating” into useless exchanges of fire with enemy skirmishers, instead prescribing attacks upon enemy riflemen in small groups with the aim of rapidly destroying or dislodging them in hand-to-hand combat⁴³. This aggressive doctrine stood opposed to the defensive and passive logic of Russian regulations. Paragraph 797 of the Russian manual prescribed: “When the enemy approaches within ordinary musket range... [the riflemen] are immediately recalled from the skirmish line”⁴⁴. Thus, at the very moment of close engagement — when the accuracy of rifles might have proved useful in supporting their infantry — the Russian riflemen were by regulation removed from participation in the critical phase of battle, depriving the troops of their elite core of firepower. This body of evidence leads us to the conclusion succinctly formulated already in the nineteenth century

⁴¹ Masquelez M. Journal d'un officier de zouaves; suivi de Considérations sur l'organisation des armées anglaise et russe; et accompagné de l'Itinéraire de Gallipoli à Constantinople. Paris, 1858. P. 107.

⁴² ГА РФ. Ф. 672. Оп. 1. Д. 96. Л. 39.

⁴³ Masquelez M. Journal d'un officier de zouaves; suivi de Considérations sur l'organisation des armées anglaise et russe; et accompagné de l'Itinéraire de Gallipoli à Constantinople. Paris, 1858. P. 180.

⁴⁴ ГА РФ. Ф. 672. Оп. 1. Д. 96. Л. 39.

by Prince Vasily Vasilchikov: “The poor quality of our small arms is not the true cause of our defeat”⁴⁵.

A natural question nevertheless arises: to what extent can one trust these accounts, which portray elite infantrymen as masters of bayonet combat? To clarify this issue, let us turn to an analysis of the combat training system of the French elite infantry⁴⁶. Considerable attention was devoted to bayonet combat in the regulations governing the training of French Chasseurs à Pied. Significantly, these ordinances were issued in 1845 — that is, already taking into account the experience of the colonial war in Algeria. This becomes particularly evident when compared with the general infantry regulations of 1831, in which bayonet fighting was not treated as a subject of instruction at all⁴⁷. Thus, the combat experience of Algeria found its reflection in military regulations, emphasizing the important role of bayonet combat within an overall combat system that combined it with accurate fire and maneuver.

Against this background, the state of bayonet combat in the Russian army raises serious questions. Already in 1838, Rengau criticized the existing Russian system of bayonet training and proposed improvements. Given the well-known inertia of the military system under Nicholas I, there is every reason to believe that these recommendations were never properly implemented⁴⁸. As Sergei Andolenko correctly observed, under Nicholas I the Suvorovian traditions of troop training — which had devoted significant attention to

⁴⁵ Записки князя В.И. Васильчикова // Рус. архив. 1891. № 6. С. 181.

⁴⁶ Ordonnance du 22 juillet 1845 sur l'exercice et les manoeuvres des bataillons de chasseurs à pied. 1re partie. Ecoles de soldat, avec les modifications prescrites par décision ministérielle du 7 avril 1852. Paris, 1862. P. 64–71.

⁴⁷ An analysis of the content of the regulations (*Ordonnance sur l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie*. Du 4 mars 1831. Première partie. Ecole du soldat et école du peloton. Paris, 1839) shows that issues of bayonet fighting are absent from it. The main emphasis is placed on drill training, formations, and shooting, while techniques of hand-to-hand combat are not regulated.

⁴⁸ Ренгау. Правила для обучения пехоты драться штыком для употребления застрельщикам при одиночном бое во время войны, составленные учителем фехтования на всех холодных оружиях капитаном Ренгау и изданные с разрешения высшего начальства. СПб., 1838. С. 2–3, 5–6, 10–11, 113–116.



French Zouaves storm and capture
Telegraph Hill during the Battle of the Alma. 1854.
From open sources

hand-to-hand combat — had largely been forgotten⁴⁹. An English officer's observation concerning the quality of Russian bayonet combat is also revealing: he noted the poor quality of Russian bayonets, characterizing them as soft, thin, and fragile⁵⁰.

A comparative analysis of systems of training and armament therefore suggests that the superiority of French elite infantry in bayonet combat is a factor at the very least deserving the closest attention, and one that casts doubt upon the entrenched thesis of the unquestioned dominance of the Russian bayonet.

Another important but historiographically neglected aspect of Zouave tactics was their exceptional speed and tactical flexibility. Their style of fighting — which astonished opponents compared to the leaps of monkeys⁵¹ — differed radically from the tactics of Russian troops. The Zouaves skillfully employed varied forms of

⁴⁹ Андоленко С.П. История русской армии. Славные военные традиции российских и советских полководцев. М., 2022. С. 242.

⁵⁰ Peard G.S. Narrative of a campaign in the Crimea: including an account of the battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann. London, 1855. P. 68.

⁵¹ Figs O. Crimea: The Last Crusade. London, 2011. P. 209.

movement⁵², in contrast to the Russian army, whose tactical system was outdated by half a century⁵³. This difference in approaches often resulted in Russian units simply being unable to react adequately to the rapid and unexpected actions of the French elite infantry. A vivid example is provided by the episode described by Vasily Kolchak: “The second battalion of the Minsk Regiment, concealed in a ravine, suddenly found itself surrounded from the rear and flank by Zouaves”, forcing the Russians to retreat⁵⁴. The same disparity in tactical skill is vividly illustrated by the previously described maneuver of Prince Napoleon.

This “African” style of combat was a deliberate tactic developed during the colonial campaigns in North Africa. As one participant in the Battle of Alma wrote, the veterans of Africa operated “like jackals” (*opèrent à la chacal*): “crawling, they dragged themselves on all fours, wriggled, rolled along, and thus reached the Russians. The method has been found; it works splendidly. The enemy is astonished, terrorized; he does not dare take a step without looking beneath his feet; while he is distracted, we throw ourselves upon him in order to capture or shoot him”⁵⁵.

This vivid description reveals not merely physical actions, but an entire tactical doctrine founded upon psychological suppression. The “jackal tactic” was the direct antithesis of linear formations and passive firefights. Its purpose was not to outshoot the enemy, but to demoralize him through unpredictability, stealth, and the inevitability of sudden close combat. The reference to the enemy being “terrorized”, afraid “to take a step”, eloquently demonstrates that the Zouaves were winning the battle even before the first bayonet charge, paralyzing the will of Russian troops trained in entirely different, more rigid and formalized tactical traditions.

⁵² Материалы для истории Крымской войны и обороны Севастополя / Под ред. Н.Ф. Дубровина. Вып. II. СПб., 1871. С. 337.

⁵³ Rousset C. Histoire de la guerre de Crimée. Paris, 1894. V. 1. P. 193–194.

⁵⁴ Колчак В.И. Война и плен. 1853–1855 гг. Из воспоминаний о давно пережитом // Колчак В.И., Колчак А.В. Избранные труды. СПб., 2001. С. 37.

⁵⁵ Chartier A. La 3e Division de l'armée d'Orient et le prince Napoléon. Paris, 1898. P. 185.

The key condition that enabled the development and effective application of such a flexible “African” style of warfare was a system of command unique for its time, founded upon an exceptionally high degree of trust in junior officers and the encouragement of intelligent initiative. In Algeria, a battalion commander with seven hundred men could be entrusted with the independent task of controlling a vast territory, and carried it out effectively, being in essence “master within a radius of four leagues”⁵⁶. In critical situations — for example, during a sudden attack upon the rearguard — Zouave officers, without waiting for orders from above, independently decided upon counterattacks, often saving the situation⁵⁷. This system was cultivated not merely through orders, but through the personal example of senior officers (“I ... showed them how it was done by acting personally”⁵⁸) and created a unique atmosphere of “absolute community of fatigue and dangers”, where strict subordination did not prevent mutual assistance or the exercise of personal initiative⁵⁹. It was precisely this culture of tactical independence, instilled in Algeria, that formed the foundation of Zouave superiority in maneuver and close combat.

This doctrine of initiative and maneuver differed radically from the official prescription for the elite riflemen of the Russian army. The drill regulations required that riflemen in skirmish formation act “entirely independently from the other skirmishers, so that they may be sent into the line or recalled from it at the discretion of the commander”⁶⁰. The key tactical decisions — whether to occupy a position or retreat — were therefore not made on the spot, but “at the discretion of the commander,” which under the conditions of rapidly evolving combat effectively paralyzed any private initiative on the part of Russian riflemen. Another example of Zouave tactical training was the maneuver perfected to the point of automatism known as “ventre à terre” (“belly to the ground”) — the instantaneous dropping

⁵⁶ Lettres du maréchal de Saint-Arnaud. Paris, 1855. V. II. P. 201.

⁵⁷ Ibid. P. 342.

⁵⁸ Derudder G. Un soldat d'Afrique: vie du commandant Clemmer. Calais, 1899. P. 70.

⁵⁹ Ibid. P. 100.

⁶⁰ ГАПФ. Ф. 672. Оп. 1. Д. 96. Л. 38.

flat before a grapeshot volley. Its effectiveness is illustrated by the following episode: “The Russians, seeing us lying down, decided that we were all dead and let out a loud cry of triumph. But immediately afterward the column rose up and, with one swift rush, captured the guns and the telegraph”⁶¹.

It is noteworthy that the Zouaves’ preference for hand-to-hand combat was reflected even in their soldiers’ slang. The expression “travailler à la fourchette” (“to work with the fork”), a direct reference to bayonet fighting, eloquently indicates that the bayonet was perceived not as a last resort, but as a favored and effective instrument of close combat⁶².

Even those authors who recognized French tactical superiority were often unable completely to abandon the entrenched paradigm that attributed success primarily to firepower. Thus, Nikolai Gersevanov, despite the perceptiveness of his observations, continued to insist upon the decisive role of rifles⁶³. This perspective, which reduces tactical mastery merely to the quality of weaponry, also finds echoes in modern historiography: for example, Gutman argues that during the ascent the Zouaves “kept the Russians at a distance thanks to the accurate fire of their rifled muskets”⁶⁴. Yet such an interpretation, as well as Gersevanov’s position, overlooks the essential fact that this firing served merely as a tactical means for occupying advantageous ground, whereas victory itself was achieved by the subsequent bayonet attacks, to which the Russian troops — contrary to the prevailing myth — proved unable to offer an adequate response. Thus, even while recognizing the marksmanship of the Zouaves, it should be regarded not as an independent factor of victory, but as one element within the broader tactical superiority of the “African” troops.

⁶¹ *Noir L.* Souvenirs d’un simple zouave: campagnes de Crimée et d’Italie; mœurs militaires. Paris, 1872. P. 235.

⁶² *Pick E.* Les fastes de la grande armée d’Orient: histoire politique, militaire et maritime des campagnes de Crimée et de la Baltique. Paris, 1858. P. 152.

⁶³ *Герсеванов Н.Б.* Несколько слов о действиях русских войск в Крыму в 1854 и 1855 гг. Париж, 1867. С. 86–87.

⁶⁴ *Gouttman A.* La guerre de Crimée: 1853–1856: la première guerre moderne. Paris, 2006. P. 217.

In this connection, it is necessary to examine the thesis — present in a number of English sources and some modern Russian studies — that colonial warfare in Algeria negatively affected the combat qualities of French troops⁶⁵. The analysis conducted here, however, suggests the opposite conclusion. The experience, tactical flexibility, and close-combat skills acquired by the Zouaves and Chasseurs à Pied in North Africa constituted not a negative factor, but rather the key positive element determining their success at the Battle of Alma.

Another indirect but highly revealing argument in favor of the high combat effectiveness of the French Zouaves, and of the considerable psychological impression they made upon their opponents, is the little-known story of attempts in Russia to duplicate these units — the so-called “Russian Zouaves” (“zouaves russes”). This episode, which has thus far remained outside the attention of researchers, was initiated by Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich. Having visited Algeria in April 1846, he was deeply impressed by the Zouaves, which he immediately communicated in a letter to Emperor Nicholas I⁶⁶. The impression he formed makes it possible to advance the hypothesis not only of the Grand Duke’s personal interest, but also of his subsequent initiative in creating Russian counterparts to the Zouaves.

French memoirists directly point to the possibility of such a project’s realization, noting with surprise that Russian troops attempted to employ against them their own “African” tactics. Moreover, these memoirs contain a curious mention of a French instructor who allegedly disappeared precisely in 1846, shortly after Konstantin Nikolayevich’s visit, and later participated in the Battle of Alma on the Russian side⁶⁷.

⁶⁵ The Panmure papers. London, 1908. V. I. P. 188–189; Кривоналов А.А. Фельдмаршал И.Ф. Паскевич и русская стратегия в 1848–1856 гг. М., 2019. С. 216–217.

⁶⁶ Воронин В.Е. Великий князь Константин Николаевич на православном востоке и арабском западе в середине 1840-х гг. // Российская история. 2019. № 2. С. 96.

⁶⁷ Noir L. Souvenirs d'un simple zouave: campagnes de Crimée et d'Italie; mœurs militaires. Paris, 1872. P. 229.

A number of participants on both sides, including an English officer, recorded forms of combat uncharacteristic of the Russian army in the center of the position—in particular, the actions of riflemen concealed in trees⁶⁸. A French officer, and following him the Russian historian Ivan Bestuzhev, wrote of Russian riflemen who skillfully used vineyards for concealment⁶⁹. Such effective exploitation of terrain and cover — one of the defining features of the Zouaves’ “African” tactics — was observed precisely in the central sector where, according to this hypothesis, the experimental units operated. This hypothesis undoubtedly requires further archival investigation for definitive confirmation. Yet the very fact of its emergence, based upon concrete observations by the enemy, constitutes a powerful argument in favor of the central thesis of this study: it was the tactical superiority of the Zouaves, rather than their rifles, that made such a profound impression upon the Russian army that it inspired attempts at the direct imitation of their unique “African” style of warfare.

The image of the Zouaves as exceptionally dangerous and skillful opponents, formed at the Alma, was only reinforced during the subsequent battles for Sevastopol. Russian memoirists unanimously noted their ferocity and skill. A.P. Khrushchov directly called them “elite French troops”, whose attacks were “extraordinarily rapid” and “brave”⁷⁰. Significantly, a commander who had encountered the Zouaves in battle emphasized not their rifles, but their speed and courage — precisely those qualities forged in Algeria and decisive at Alma.

In descriptions of the assault on the Gervais Battery (6 June 1855), the Zouaves appear as fearless close-combat fighters: “...the Zouaves twisted like snakes with their knives — slashing, stabbing, falling themselves, yet not yielding a single step...”⁷¹

⁶⁸ *Lysons D.* The Crimean War From First to Last. London, 1895. P. 102–103.

⁶⁹ *Herbé J.F.J.* Français et Russes en Crimée, lettres d'un officier français à sa famille endant la campagne d'Orient. Paris, 1892. P. 85; *Бестужев И.В.* Крымская война 1853–1856 гг. М., 1956. С. 91.

⁷⁰ *Хрущов А.П.* История обороны Севастополя. Зап. ген.-адъютанта Хрущова. СПб., 1889. С. 68–69.

⁷¹ *Погосский А.Ф.* Старики: Рассказ из Крымской войны / [Соч.] А. Погосского. СПб., 1871. С. 72.



Zouaves at Malakoff. Artist Horace Vernet. 1856.
From open sources

This assessment was echoed by their British allies. After the Battle of Inkerman, the Zouaves were described as fighters who “fight extraordinarily well and handle themselves like a skilled fencer”⁷² and who “fought magnificently; they were the admiration of all”⁷³. Even the appearance of the “African” troops — their “savage dark faces” and “ferocious features”, in the words of V.I. Kolchak — produced a profound psychological impact⁷⁴, giving rise to seemingly strange practices: there are recorded cases of Russian soldiers wearing captured Zouave uniforms, believing them capable of granting invulnerability⁷⁵. These assessments, made during the prolonged siege itself, eloquently demonstrate that the tactical superiority and

⁷² Windham C.A. The Crimean diary and letters of Lieut.-General Sir Charles Ash Windham. London, 1897. P. 56.

⁷³ Stephenson F.C.A. At home and on the battlefield; letters from the Crimea, China and Egypt, 1854–1888. London, 1915. P. 109.

⁷⁴ Колчак В.И. Война и плен. 1853–1855 гг. Из воспоминаний о давно пережитом // Колчак В.И., Колчак А.В. Избранные труды. СПб., 2001. С. 74.

⁷⁵ Chartier A. La 3e Division de l'armée d'Orient et le prince Napoléon. Paris, 1898. P. 450.

fighting spirit of the French elite infantry were constant factors rather than a one-time phenomenon at Alma.

The present study makes it possible to reconsider the established historiographical views on the causes of the Allied success at the Battle of the Alma and, more broadly, in the Crimean War. An analysis of a wide range of sources — including French, British, and Russian documents and memoirs — convincingly demonstrates that the key factor behind the victory was not so much the technical backwardness of the Russian army or the superiority of rifled weapons, but rather the comprehensive tactical superiority of the elite units of French infantry, above all the Zouaves.

This superiority manifested itself in several respects. First, contrary to the entrenched stereotype of the dominance of the Russian bayonet, it was the French elite infantry that demonstrated superior skill and initiative in close combat, deliberately relying upon it, as confirmed both by examples of bayonet attacks at Alma and by the testimony of contemporaries. At the same time, Russian doctrine, as can be seen from the regulations, not only failed to prepare riflemen for active close combat, but explicitly prescribed withdrawing them from the firing line when approaching the enemy, demonstrating a fundamentally different, passive approach to the use of elite infantry⁷⁶. A French sailor who visited the battlefield therefore did not accidentally call the bayonet “a truly French weapon”⁷⁷. Second, decisive importance belonged to the tactical flexibility, speed of maneuver, and individual training of the “African” troops, all developed during colonial campaigns. Their ability to exploit terrain, operate in dispersed order, and deliver unexpected strikes differed radically from the tactics of Russian units and paralyzed their capacity for effective resistance.

The positive influence of Algerian experience on the combat qualities of the French army is also confirmed by the assessments of Russian military men. As A.P. Khrushchov rightly observed, the French troops “had acquired great skill in military affairs in Africa” and were commanded by “experienced generals knowledgeable in

⁷⁶ ГА РФ. Ф. 672. Оп. 1. Д. 96. Л. 39.

⁷⁷ *Leusse P. de. Souvenirs d'un aspirant de marine. Paris, 1867. P. 70.*

the art of war”⁷⁸. Later, during the defense of Sevastopol, he gave the Zouaves perhaps their most vivid characterization, directly calling them “elite French troops” whose attacks were “extraordinarily rapid” and “brave”⁷⁹. This testimony, coming from a participant in the events, eloquently demonstrates that French tactical superiority was not an isolated occurrence, but a persistent factor exerting a significant psychological impact on the enemy.

Thus, Marshal Saint-Arnaud’s ambitious phrase, placed in the article’s title — “The Zouaves Are the First Soldiers of the World” — though highly ostentatious, was not without foundation. In the context of the Battle of the Alma and the Crimean campaign as a whole, it was precisely the Zouaves and the other units of the “Army of Africa” that became the bearers of a new, more effective military doctrine, combining accurate fire, unconventional maneuver, and decisive bayonet assault. Their advantage lay not merely in superior weaponry, but in tactical innovation, which ultimately determined one of the Allies’ key successes in the Crimean War.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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⁷⁸ Хрущов А.П. История обороны Севастополя. Зап. ген.-адъютанта Хрущова. СПб., 1889. С. 18.

⁷⁹ Ibid. С. 68–69.

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Original paper



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“Tarrakion Islamiya” Society: Truth or Fiction?

Abstract

The relevance of this study lies in the growing interest in the modernization processes within the Tatar Muslim community at the beginning of the twentieth century, which stirred the Tatar intellectual elite. Tatar intellectuals actively examined both foreign experience and the experience of countries undergoing catch-up modernization. Particular attention was paid to the Ottoman Empire, which, in their opinion, blindly copied European models, and to Japan, which managed to preserve its cultural identity while pursuing active technological modernization. The intellectual discourse of Tatar modernists was reflected in the liberal newspaper *Waqyt*, which was closely monitored by officials of the Gendarmerie Directorate of Russia. In their perception, concepts of “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism” were being formed with agents recruiting members of Tatar charitable and educational societies into branches of the Turkish organization “Tarrakion Islamiya” (“Progress of Islam”). The purpose of this



article is to determine, on the basis of materials produced by Tatar journalists working in Istanbul in 1912–1913, whether the claims made by gendarmerie officials regarding the existence of an extensive network centered in Istanbul — the organization “Tarrakion Islamiya” (“Progress of Islam”) — had any real foundation, and whether the individuals mentioned in the memorandum of the Directorate were in fact connected with this organization. The study demonstrated that officials of the Gendarmerie Directorate closely observed the activities of liberal Young Turk organizations. At times, informants seeking favor exaggerated the threat posed by the ties between the Tatar intelligentsia and the Young Turks. In an effort to demonstrate active work in their “exposure”, they constructed imaginary networks and agents, presenting these fabrications as genuine intelligence activity. This resulted in increased surveillance of “politically unreliable” Tatar intellectuals in areas of concentrated Muslim settlement throughout Russia.

Keywords:

Tarrakion Islamiya (Progress of Islam); Möselman Täräqqiypärwärläge (Muslim Progress); Türk Ocağı/Ocakları (Turkic Hearth(s)); Ottomanism; Turkism.

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Introduction

In November 1913, a document emerged from the Gendarmerie Directorate of the Orenburg Governorate of Russia indicating that a certain organization called “Tarrakion Islamiya” was allegedly operating actively within the territory of the Russian Empire, with its center located in Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

A certain “Sheikh ul-Islam Mahmud Askhada” was identified as the leader of this organization, who allegedly traveled to Russia for the purpose of establishing branches of the aforementioned Society¹. However, biographical references concerning this statesman (Mahmud Esad Efendi, 1856–1918) do not mention that he ever headed an organization called “Tarrakion Islamiya”, nor is there any evidence that he ever held the office of Sheikh ul-Islam. In the summer of 1913, while serving as Minister of the Cadastral Department, Mahmud Esad did indeed travel to Russia, visiting a number of cities. It should also be noted that, while meeting with representatives of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia, he remained under close surveillance by the authorities, including high-ranking police officials². Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that he could have engaged in unlawful activities directed against the foundations of the Russian state.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that a number of publications treat information from gendarmerie documents of both the Orenburg and Kazan administrations concerning the activities of the “Tarrakion Islamiya” organization as indisputable fact³. Did an extensive network centered in Istanbul truly exist within the territory of Russia? Or were the scale and scope of its activities exaggerated? It should also be noted that the gendarmerie document dated Novem-

¹ Государственный архив Оренбургской области (ГАОрО). Ф. 21. Оп. 2. Д. 618. Л. 341–342.

² Сибгатуллина А.Т. Контакты тюрок-мусульман Российской и Османской империй на рубеже XIX–XX вв. М.: 2010. 257 с.

³ Сенюткина О.Н. *Тюркизм как историческое явление (на материалах истории Российской империи 1905–1916 гг.): Монография / Под общ. ред. акад. О.А. Колобова. Н. Новгород: Изд-во НГЛУ, Изд. дом «Медина», 2007. 520 с.; Ахтямов К.Ш. О некоторых проблемах становления ислама в Поволжье // Вестник ОГУ. 2012. № 5 (141). С. 135–141.*



One of the first issues of the «Vakyt» newspaper, 1906.
 From open sources

ber 14, 1913 contains no information regarding any specific criminal activity carried out by this organization against the Russian state.

In this article, we compare the data contained in the gendarmerie document with materials produced by Tatar journalists working in the Ottoman Empire shortly before the appearance of the aforementioned document concerning “Tarrakion Islamiya”. One of the active Tatar public figures who maintained close contact with Turkish liberal politicians was Fatikh Karimi, editor of one of the most influential publications among Russian Muslims — the newspaper *Waqyt* (*Time*). The newspaper was published in Orenburg from February 1906 to January 1918. During this period, Ottoman-Turkish themes occupied a leading place in the Tatar press. Newspapers and journals



Fatih Karimi. Photo from the 1880s.
From open sources

published in the Tatar language vividly covered events taking place in the Ottoman Empire. In 1908–1909, Tatar intellectuals enthusiastically welcomed the Young Turk Revolution. During the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912, when Italy launched a military campaign to seize the last Ottoman possessions in Africa — Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (present-day Libya) — Tatar publications wrote sympathetically about the Turkish side. However, the events connected with the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 generated the greatest resonance in the Tatar press. The First Balkan War began with a series of severe defeats for the Ottoman army. The Tatar public followed developments at the front with great concern as the allies (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro) inflicted one blow after another upon Turkey.

Some of the most widely read publications decided not to limit themselves to reprints and references from Russian and foreign newspapers, but instead sent their own correspondents to the combat zone. The Tatar journalists who arrived in Turkey began describing not only military operations. They found themselves immersed



Galiasgar Kamal.
From open sources

in the turbulent social and political life of the Ottoman Empire. For example, Ğaliäsğar Kamal — Editor-in-Chief of one of Russia’s leading Muslim newspapers, *Yoldyz*, and the founder of Tatar dramaturgy — presented his own interpretation of events. Like Fatikh Karimi, he was in Istanbul from November 1912 to January 1913. Thus, the two editors of the leading Tatar liberal newspapers became witnesses both to the confrontation among Turkish elites and to the development of socio-political thought during the final years of the Ottoman Empire.

Materials and Methods

The principal methodological approach employed in this study is the principle of **historicism**, which made it possible to examine events and processes within their historical context. This approach enabled the introduction of archival materials into scholarly

circulation and allowed for an objective assessment of their representativeness. The **biographical method** was applied in analyzing facts reflected in narrative sources such as Fatikh Karimi's *Istanbul Letters*. This method made it possible to compare information from gendarmerie documents with independent sources in order to identify possible falsifications or erroneous interpretations of facts. The **analysis of archival documents** included the examination of gendarmerie materials relating to the Tatar intelligentsia and their alleged connections with Ottoman and Japanese modernization projects. **Critical source analysis** made it possible to evaluate the reliability of gendarmerie reports and to identify possible distortions associated with the construction of the concepts of "Pan-Islamism" and "Pan-Turkism".

Taken together, these methods enabled the authors to conduct a comprehensive study and to draw conclusions regarding the nature and reliability of the accusations directed against Tatar intellectuals.

The topic of the activities of Tatar journalists in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars has repeatedly been addressed in the works of Tatar scholars. In the introductory article to the scholarly biographical collection dedicated to Fatikh Karimi, Academy member M.A. Usmanov, assessing his *Istanbul Letters*, emphasized that as early as 1913 the Tatar journalist had recognized the bankruptcy of the imperial ideology of "Ottomanism"⁴. In recent years, the subject of Tatar newspapermen in Istanbul has also been examined by Alfiina Sibgatullina: "People such as Fatikh Karimi were considered 'their own' in Turkey, yet at the same time they possessed a distinctive 'outside perspective' on the events taking place in the Ottoman Empire. These were people who knew Turkey from within, but who were nevertheless capable of viewing it from the outside—that is, more objectively and broadly, taking into account the international position of the country during an era of wars and uprisings. This explains the originality of F. Karimi's *Letters*"⁵.

⁴ Фатих Карими: Научно-биографический сборник. Казань, 2000. С. 12.

⁵ Сибгатуллина А.Т. Контакты тюрок-мусульман Российской и Османской империй на рубеже XIX–XX вв. М.: Исток, 2010. С. 146.



Discussion

At the beginning of the First Balkan War in November 1912, Fatikh Karimi was sent to Istanbul by the publisher of the newspaper, the prominent industrialist Muhammadzakir Rameev, in order to report on the military events. Karimi remained in Istanbul until March 1913 and, later that same year, published a book entitled *Istanbul Letters* based on the materials he had sent to the newspaper⁶.

When Fatikh Karimi was in Istanbul, Ottoman Turkey was experiencing one of the most dramatic episodes in its history. The severe defeats suffered in the first days of the Balkan War were compounded by an extremely tense domestic political situation. Several months earlier, taking advantage of the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the war with Italy, the political opponents of the Young Turks (the Committee of Union and Progress, *Ittihad ve Terakki*) carried out a coup in July 1912. The coup was led by the party Hürriyet ve İtilaf (Freedom and Accord Party), established in November 1911, which united many opposition parties and groups. Hürriyet ve İtilaf represented a rather complex phenomenon and included representatives of a wide variety of political views: nationalists, liberals, Westernizers, secularists, and others. In addition, its ranks included not only Muslim Turks but also representatives of the non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire⁷.

In August 1912, supporters of Hürriyet ve İtilaf also succeeded in dissolving parliament, where the Young Turks had previously held the majority. Having suffered defeat, the Young Turks began preparing for political struggle under new conditions. Their opponents exploited the wartime situation and unleashed repressions against their political adversaries. Many active members of the Unionists (Young Turks) were arrested⁸. However, the Young Turks did not reconcile themselves to political defeat and continued the struggle for political

⁶ Ахсанов К.Г. Балканская война 1912–1913 гг. и татарская общественно-политическая мысль / Ученые записки Казанского государственного университета. Т. 149. Серия: Гуманитарные науки. Кн. 4. Казань, 2007. С. 181.

⁷ Genel Türk tarihi. Cilt 7. Osmanlı. 2002. Ankara. S. 352s.

⁸ Петросян Ю.А. Османская империя: могущество и гибель. Исторические очерки. М.: Эксмо, 2003. С. 375.

survival. Taking advantage of the failures of the new government during the Balkan War, they succeeded in regaining power at the beginning of 1913.

As already mentioned, Fatikh Karimi, Editor-in-Chief of the Orenburg-based Tatar-language newspaper *Waqyt*, stayed in the Ottoman capital from the autumn of 1912 until the beginning of spring 1913. During this period, he met and conducted interviews with many politicians, statesmen, and writers. With regard to the question of the existence of “Tarrakion Islamiya”, special attention should be paid to Karimi’s meeting with Hilmi Bey, editor of the Istanbul newspaper *Hükümet* (*Government*) and at the same time a lecturer at the Darülfünun (Istanbul University).

In his *Istanbul Letters*, Fatikh Karimi reports that the editor of the newspaper *Hükümet*, Hilmi Bey, intended to found a new party called “Muslim Progress” (Möselman Täräqqiypärwärlege). He had already begun publishing the party program in the form of serialized articles. Karimi provides a detailed description of the politician. He writes that Hilmi Bey was a man who had received an excellent European education while also being well acquainted with the Muslim scholarly tradition. He was highly knowledgeable in matters of religion, philosophy, and Sufism, and taught philosophy at the Darülfünun. “He looks like the philosophers of Ancient Greece. His hair is cut short at the back. A shining bald spot is visible in front. His mustache merges into his beard”⁹.

Fatikh Karimi openly writes that he visited Hilmi Bey in order to ask him about the “Muslim Progress” party he intended to establish and that he was received at the editorial office of the newspaper *Hükümet* in Cağaloğlu.

According to Hilmi Bey, Muslims could achieve progress and civilization only through the unity of faith and education. “European education and culture are excellent, but they must be merged with our Islamic faith; otherwise, the desired result will not be achieved. Mere imitation of Europe will bring no benefit. The fault of the Unionists (the Young Turks. — K.A.) was that they acted without understanding

⁹ Кәримми Ф. Истамбул мәктүпләре. Оренбург, 1913. С. 119.

the moral condition of the people. Anyone who wishes to spread enlightenment and culture among the contemporary Muslim population and acts in this direction must necessarily possess deep knowledge of Islam and, when needed, be able to deliver sermons like imams and mudarrises in mosques. Otherwise, it is extremely difficult to lead the Muslim people toward culture and explain to them the importance of educational reform”, the politician believed¹⁰.

Thus, Hilmi Bey thought that the combination of the high morality provided by Islam with European education would make Muslim peoples civilized and rescue them from the deadlock in which they had found themselves. As he himself explained to Fatikh Karimi, he preferred engaging in science and education rather than politics, but in a country where there was no place for scholarly and legal thought, it was impossible to abandon politics entirely and devote oneself solely to intellectual life. For this reason, he decided to establish a political party: “Turkey, the Turks, and the Islamic world as a whole have found themselves in a dangerous and ruinous situation; all our hopes for progress and advancement are collapsing. Therefore, setting aside scientific and educational pursuits for a while, it became necessary to engage in politics”¹¹.

It should be noted that the name of the party in Fatikh Karimi’s text, “Möselman Täräqqiypärwärlege” (“Muslim Progress”), is not completely identical to the name “Tarrakion Islamiya” found in the gendarmerie document. Nevertheless, the very idea of introducing Muslims to progress — understood specifically as the adoption of the achievements of European civilization — is clearly evident.

An important event that attracted the attention of the Muslim public and the press was the return from Tripolitania, which had been seized by the Italians, of one of the leaders of the Young Turks, Enver Bey. Literally one month later, he would lead a military coup, restore his party to power, and subsequently become one of the de facto rulers of the Ottoman Empire as the powerful Minister of War, Enver Pasha. Both Fatikh Karimi and Ğaliäsğar Kamal attempted to

¹⁰ Ibid. C. 120.

¹¹ Ibid.



Enver Bey (also known as Enver Pasha).
From open sources

meet him and conduct an interview. Fatikh Karimi met with Enver on December 14, 1912. Ğaliäsğar Kamal, however, was unable to do so; he only managed to visit Enver's home in his absence and speak with his father. Kamal described the interior of the apartment and noted the abundance of images of Napoleon Bonaparte. Apparently, as Kamal writes, Enver Bey admired this historical figure¹².

The document from the Orenburg Gendarmerie Directorate mentions the prominent religious and socio-political figure among Russian Muslims, Abdurreshid Ibrahim (Rus. *Abdurashid Ibragimov*), who was in Istanbul during the same period as Fatikh Karimi, as one of the active supporters of "Tarrakion Islamiya"¹³.

We shall focus on two episodes in which the paths of Fatikh Karimi and Abdurreshid Ibrahim intersected. In Istanbul, Karimi met with a prominent Young Turk leader, Mehmed Said Halim Pasha.

¹² Йолдыз. 1912 (newspaper in Old Tatar language, Arabic script).

¹³ ГАОРО. Ф. 21. Оп. 2. Д. 618. Л. 342.



Abdurashid Ibragimov.
From open sources

Halim Pasha, the grandson of the ruler of Egypt Muhammad Ali Pasha (an Albanian by origin), was known as a wealthy and influential man who owned numerous palaces along the Bosphorus. Later, after the Young Turks returned to power, Said Halim Pasha would even become Grand Vizier. Fatikh Karimi describes him as an “Egyptian prince”, although Muhammad Ali himself was not Egyptian, much less an heir to the throne. Accompanied by Abdurreshid Ibrahim, who was acquainted with Halim Pasha, Fatikh Karimi visited his luxurious mansion in Yeniköy.

During the meeting, Halim Pasha showed interest in the lives of Russian Muslims, asking questions about their education and social conditions. He also expressed his views on the political situation in Turkey, considering the party Ittihad ve Terakki to be the only force capable of saving the country. In his opinion, the party had originally acted for the good of Turkey but encountered resistance from both internal and external enemies who used material and ideological means to weaken it. Halim Pasha emphasized that the lack of



Said Halim Pasha.
From open sources

education and national consciousness among the Turkish people made them vulnerable to manipulation. Had the Turks possessed sufficient education and patriotism, they would have been able to resist hostile forces, but unfortunately this had not occurred. During the meeting, Fatikh Karimi and Halim Pasha also discussed the causes of the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the Balkan War and the consequences of the overthrow of Ittihad ve Terakki. Halim Pasha stressed that external powers had played a significant role in these events, while also pointing to internal problems such as the absence of qualified leadership and the incompetence of the new authorities. He argued that the overthrow of the party had undermined public confidence in the government and weakened the morale of both the army and the civilian population. Unlike during the Tripolitanian War, when the people had been inspired by the leaders of Ittihad ve Terakki, the Balkan War was marked by apathy and hopelessness, which, in Halim Pasha's opinion, became one of the causes of failure. He emphasized the importance of political stability and public trust for the successful



Yusuf Akchura.
From open sources

conduct of war and also pointed to the negative effects of internal intrigues and foreign interference on the fate of the state.

Thus, Said Halim Pasha, one of the leaders of the Young Turks, criticized the Ottoman government for its inability to inspire the people and the army during wartime, which he regarded as one of the reasons for defeat. He saw the future of Turkey only in the return of the Young Turks to power, believing that they alone could correct past mistakes and save the country from collapse. Fatikh Karimi highly regarded Said Halim Pasha as a patriot and a devoted supporter of the Young Turk movement.

As for the role of Russian Muslims such as Abdurreshid Ibrahim and Yusuf Akçura in the events of the Ottoman Empire, the question of their participation in political struggle remains open. The text of the *Istanbul Letters* indicates that they were well acquainted with the leaders of the Young Turks and may even have enjoyed their trust. However, it remains unclear whether they were merely observers or active participants in these events. The degree of involvement of

Russian Muslims in the political struggle within the Ottoman Empire requires further study. It is possible that their presence in Istanbul in 1912–1913 was connected not only with observation but also with attempts to establish ties between the Muslim communities of Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, a precise answer to this question requires the study of additional sources, including archival materials and correspondence among the participants in these events.

In the *Istanbul Letters*, Fatikh Karimi also reports that Turkish youth organized an official public association called “Türk Ocakları” (“Turkish Hearths”). The aim of this society was to promote the national upbringing of the Turks: their advancement in science and education, the development of the economy and culture, and the cultivation of the Turkish language. One of the aims of the society was to make the Turks prosperous and economically independent. To achieve this, members of the organization intended to meet and establish contacts with representatives of crafts and industry, encourage and motivate the people toward trade and agriculture, and assist in the creation of new partnerships (companies) and commercial enterprises among the Turks. In its program, Türk Ocakları declared that, as a purely public organization, it would never interfere in political affairs and would not serve political parties. According to its charter, only Turks could become members of the organization. As Fatikh Karimi writes, many representatives of the youth and intelligentsia responded very positively to the society. Within a year, membership had grown to nearly seven hundred people. Among them were many doctors, lawyers, editors, and writers — people of different views, convictions, and social backgrounds.

Due to the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars, the activities of the society were suspended for a long period. In December 1912, it resumed its work by organizing scientific and literary gatherings and conferences. Fatikh Karimi reports that a tea reception was arranged in support of the Hilal-i Ahmer (“Red Crescent”). Representatives of the Crimean Muslims, who brought donations for the Hilal-i Ahmer, were invited. Among the respected representatives of the northern Turks living there was Abdurreshid Efendi (Ibragimov); Ahmet Ağaoğlu was also present at the gathering. Among the correspondents

of Tatar newspapers invited were Ğaliäsğar Kamal and Fatikh Karimi himself¹⁴. In total, about thirty people attended the meeting. The hosts were the chairman of the Türk Ocakları (manager of the newspaper *Efham*), Ferid Bey, and his deputy Yusuf Akçura.

At the gathering, discussion turned to the physical education of children. It was argued that the physical improvement of the nation was the primary necessity, after which the cultivation of a healthy spirit could follow. The efforts of the state and society in the sphere of physical education were said to bring significant benefits in Europe, especially in England.

In response, Abdurreshid Efendi presented his own arguments: although physical education was indeed necessary for children, such societies and organizations should not be established merely in imitation of Europe and England, but rather in accordance with the national consciousness of the Turks and the foundations of their own way of life. Such ideas, he maintained, must be developed by Turkish thinkers themselves. Up to the present time, he continued, because the Turks had attempted to evaluate everything according to its conformity with Europe, nothing truly beneficial had resulted. He then spoke about how the Japanese, having independently calculated and understood everything for themselves — without constantly looking toward Europe — had achieved far greater progress in improving their condition¹⁵.

The discussion at the gathering then turned to the pressing issue of the time, one that may still remain relevant today: the opposition between “Ottomanism” and “Turkism”. Ahmet Ağaoğlu declared that in the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars, it was not the Turks who had lost, but Ottomanism itself.

He believed that what had been called “Devlet-i Osmaniye” and “Millet-i Osmaniye” consisted of peoples and confessions as diverse as Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Albanians, Kurds, Greeks, Laz, Muslims, Christians, pagans, or even mixed “collections”: a father who was Albanian and a mother who was Circassian, or a father who was

¹⁴ Кәримми Ф. Истамбул мәктүпләре. Оренбург, 1913. С. 175.

¹⁵ Ibid. С. 177.

English and a mother who was Arab. The entity defeated in this war, he argued, was the Ottoman government, which had been unable to govern the country and had brought calamities upon the fatherland — not the government of the Turks. The Turks themselves were a healthy people; they had not decayed. Had they governed the state independently, such disasters would certainly not have befallen it. As soon as genuinely Turkish troops from Anatolia began arriving toward the end of the war, they demonstrated success against the Bulgarians at Çatalca. The principal mistake of the Turks, according to Ağaoğlu, was that they gave the name of one state and one nation to a “collection of life” (a conglomerate) made up of so many peoples who neither loved nor understood one another, nor wished to do so, and then, trusting them, entered into war. Experience, however, showed that only the Turks themselves were capable of safeguarding Turkey’s interests¹⁶.

He continued: “The Turks have a brilliant future ahead of them! The great vitality of the Turks can be seen in the progress of the northern Turks [that is, the Turks of Russia, or the Volga-Ural Tatars] in trade and enlightenment. As a result of the current situation, the political life of Turkey will undoubtedly experience many shortcomings and defects. But this will not harm the Turks themselves. Having awakened through bitter experience, their life will undoubtedly enter a path more worthy than before. Therefore, the Turks must not lose hope or fall into despair; rather, they must take up their work with even greater diligence than before”¹⁷. After Ahmed Bey Ağaoğlu concluded his speech, those present expressed the opinion that the Turks needed national love (love for their own nation) and the spirit of Turkism, and that it was because they lacked patriotism that they were losing the war. Fatikh Karimi further notes that in previous years there had been attempts in the governance of Turkey to introduce the principles of Islamism (Islamiyat), Ottomanism, and Turkism. However, none of these succeeded in taking root as the foundation of state administration.

¹⁶ Ibid. C. 180–181.

¹⁷ Ibid. C. 181.

Conclusion

Thus, the study revealed that some contemporary researchers accept information from gendarmerie documents as indisputable fact, even though the documents themselves contain no concrete evidence of criminal activity on the part of “Tarrakion Islamiya”.

Most likely, gendarmerie officials, seeking to justify their activities and strengthen control over the Muslim intelligentsia, exaggerated or even constructed the threat allegedly posed by “Tarrakion Islamiya”. The absence of concrete evidence of criminal activity and the inconsistency between Mahmud Esad’s biographical data and the claims contained in the documents point to the possibility of falsification or erroneous interpretation of facts.

As for the very idea of progressive Islam reflected in the name of the alleged organization, it is evident that this theme developed actively in the early twentieth century both in the Ottoman Empire and among the Muslims of Russia. The ideas of Hilmi Bey, described by Fatikh Karimi, are important for understanding the context of modernization processes in the Muslim world at the beginning of the twentieth century. They also demonstrate how Tatar intellectuals such as Fatikh Karimi actively studied and adapted the Ottoman experience in order to address the problems facing Russian Muslims.

With regard to the organization “Tarrakion Islamiya”, the mention of Hilmi Bey’s plans to create a party called “Muslim Progress” may indeed be connected with this theme. However, as the study demonstrates, gendarmerie officials in Russia often constructed images of “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism”, exaggerating threats and creating imaginary networks. Thus, the actual existence of “Tarrakion Islamiya” in Russia remains questionable, while the accusations directed against Tatar intellectuals may have formed part of the political rhetoric of the time.

Moreover, the materials contained in the *Istanbul Letters* show that representatives of the Russian Muslim intelligentsia were deeply immersed in the intellectual and socio-political life of the Ottoman Empire. When Tatar journalists interviewed opposition politicians — the leaders of the Young Turks at that time — their interlocutors

themselves began asking questions about the lives of Russian Muslims. This indicates the profound interest of the Young Turk leaders in social processes taking place in the Muslim regions of the Russian Empire.

Thus, the reality of “Tarrakion Islamiya” as an active and extensive organization operating within the territory of Russia remains uncertain, and its activities were likely exaggerated or even fabricated. In order to clarify the situation more fully, it is necessary to examine both Ottoman sources and materials from Tatar publications relating to the year 1913 and the subsequent period.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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Original paper



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Yemen Under the Rule of the Sasanids. Article Two. The Rule of Iranian Governors

Abstract

This article is the concluding part of a study on Sasanid dominion over Yemen (571/2–630s CE). The period under examination begins with the first months of 576 CE, when the South Arabian ruler of the Yaz'an family, an appointee of, and subordinated to, the Sasanids, perished. Thereafter, the Sasanid king Khusrō I Anōšag-ruwān (531–579), distrusting the Yaz'ans' ability to govern Yemen, for the first time transferred the authority over it to an Iranian governor. Based on available sources, the sequence and chronology of these governors' tenures can be reconstructed approximately, although the reading of certain names remains problematic. Their succession is as follows: Wehrēz (died at the end of Khusrō I's reign) — Zarēr / ???-Burzēn — Zarrēn (dismissed by King Hormuzd IV


(579–591) — Marzbān / Mard-ōzan / Anōshagān (appointed by Hormuzd IV, died in the reign of Khusrō II Abarwēz (591–628)) — Wēnāgān (?) — Khwarrah-Khusrō — Bādān (appointed by Khusrō II before the beginning of the seventh century) all belonging to the noble family of Mihrān. The governors controlled key military and economic sites, while leaving local authority in the hands of the South Arabian elite and suppressing any attempts at insubordination. Relations with Arab tribes were conducted on the basis of treaties. This system enabled the Sasanids to maintain control over Yemen, but apparently collapsed in 631 CE, when Bādān, seeking to avoid the anti-Mihrān reprisals of Queen Bōrān (630–631), converted to Islam and sided with the Muslim state.

Keywords:

Arabs; Pre-Islamic Arabia; Sasanids; Yemen

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The present study concludes the examination of the history of the Sasanid dominion over Yemen in the late sixth to early seventh centuries, initiated by the present author in his previously published works, *The Sasanid Conquest of Yemen* and *Yemen Under the Rule of the Sasanids. Article One. The Reign of Yaz'an*. It seems useful to give here a brief summary of the events studied there and preceding those to be examined

here. In response to the attempt by the Byzantine Emperor Justin II (565–578) to orchestrate an offensive against the Sasanid territories from the northeast, with the help of the Turks, and from the southwest, through the efforts of the Ethiopian governor of South Arabia (which culminated in the well-known failed ‘Campaign of the Elephant’), the Sasanid king Khusrō I Anōšag-ruwān (531–579) undertook a naval expedition to Yemen in the winter of 571/72 and conquered it. Initially, a model of indirect governance was implemented in Yemen, a pattern employed by the Sasanids in other regions, including Arabia. A man belonging to the South-Arabian aristocratic family of Yazʿan, appearing in the extant sources under the name of Sayf or Maʿdīkarib, who had previously fled to the Sasanids and assisted them in the conquest, was appointed governor. Having ascertained that the South Arabian elite would accept Yazʿan’s rule, Khusrō I granted him the title of King of Yemen, and he thus became one of the local rulers subject to the Sasanids. Yazʿan’s rule lasted four years, from early 572 CE until the first months of 576 CE, when he was assassinated by his Ethiopian bodyguards. Thereafter, an Ethiopian rebellion broke out, which prompted the Sasanids to make another expedition to Yemen to suppress the the mutiny (576/577 CE). Having lost his confidence in the ability of the Yazʿan dynasty to maintain Yemen under the Sasanid power, and lacking alternative candidates for vassal rulers, Khusrō I transferred the authority to Iranian governors, the first of whom was Wehrēz, the commander who had led the campaigns of 571/72 and 576/77.

At this point begins the period which the present work is devoted to. The Iranian governors bore the title of *marzbān*, or ‘border-guard’, usual for such offices.¹ Muslim authors, whose

¹ This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of a verse by the Arab poet from Hīrah, ʿAdī Ibn Zayd (late sixth century CE), which includes, *inter alia*, the line: ‘After the descendants of the Tubbaʿ, the great men, *marzbāns* (*marāzīb*) were established among them (i.e., the inhabitants of Yemen)’ (*Dīwān ʿAdī bin Zayd al-ʿIbādī*. Ed. M.Dj. al-Muʿayyid. Baghdad: Sharikat Dār al-Djumhūriyya li-l-nashr wa-i-ṭabʿ, 1965. P. 47). Importantly, Abū al-Baqāʾ al-Ḥillī (fl. in the late eleventh to first half of the twelfth century) states that Bādān (on whom see below) was called king, ‘but in fact he was one of their (i.e., the Persians’) *marzbāns*’ (*Kitāb al-manāḳib al-mazyadiyya fī akhbār al-mulūk al-asadiyya*.

accounts form the basis on which the history of this period is re-constructed (given the lack of earlier sources), supply several lists of the Sasanid governors of Yemen:

— Ibn Ishāk (d. 760s CE): Wahriz² — his son al-Marzubān — his son al-B.i.n.djān³ — his son Khurrakhusraw — Bādhān⁴.

— Ibn Hishām (d. 828/29 or 833 CE): Wahriz — his son al-Marzubān — his son al-T.i.n.djān — his son (name missing) — Bādhān.⁵

— Hishām al-Kalbī (b. ca. 738, d. 819/20 or 821/22 CE): Wahriz — Zīn — al-Marwazān — Khurrakhusraw — Bādhān.⁶

— al-Masūūdī (d. 956/57 CE): Wahriz — his son al-Nūshadjān — S.bḥān — Khurrazād⁷ — son of S.bḥān — al-Marwazān — Khurrakhusraw.⁸

Taʾlīf ... al-Hillī. Ed. S.M. Darādika, M.^sA. Kharīsāt. Amman: Maktabat al-risāla al-ḥadītha, 1984. P. 46). al-Hillī's statement that Bādhān was called king should, it seems, be understood in the sense that the Arabs transferred to the Sasanid governors the designation they had previously used for Yazʾan.

² *Wahriz* is the Arabic form of the name *Wehrēz*. Since the lists in question occur in sources written in Arabic, the governors' names are written here as in the sources, i.e., in the Arabic manner. How the initial Persian names are re-constructed from those forms, is discussed below.

³ Here and below, a dot in the middle of a name in each instance indicates that it is not known which vowel, if any, should be placed above the next preceding consonant. For example, *n.* may be read as *n*, *na*, *ni*, or *nu*.

⁴ *Annales quos scripsit Abu Djafar Mohammed Ibn Djarir at-Tabari*. Ed. M.J. De Goeje. Prima series. II. Rec. J. Barth, Th. Nöldeke. Lugduni Batavorum, 1881–1882. P. 957. The name written in Arabic sources as Bādhān (with the interdental *dh* representing Persian *d*) should be the Middle Persian Bādān.

⁵ *Sīrat al-Nabī li ... Ibn Hishām*. Ed. M.F. al-Sayyid. Tanta: Dār al-ṣaḥāba li-l-turāth bi Ṭanṭā. 1995. T. 1. P. 112.

⁶ *Annales ...* 1881–1882. P. 1039–1040. This list is similar to the report given by al-Ṭabarī (838/39–923 CE), from whose work we know the accounts of Ibn Ishāk and Hishām al-Kalbī concerning the Sasanid rule in Yemen slightly above, but without reference to Hishām (*Annales ...* 1881–1882. P. 988). This similarity, together with the fact that in his narrative of Sasanid rule in Yemen al-Ṭabarī relies on the information of Ibn Ishāk (whose list is quoted above) and Hishām al-Kalbī, suggests that the fragment on p. 988 of the quoted edition derives from the latter.

⁷ In Middle Persian pronunciation, rather Khwarrazād.

⁸ al-Masūūdī. *Murūdj al-dhahab wa maʿādin al-djawhar*. Ed. Ch. Pellat. Beirut: al-Djāmiʿa al-lubnāniyya. Pts. 1, 2, 1966. Pt. 2. P. 210.

— Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī (d. after 960/61 CE): Wahriz — W.l.i.s.djān — Ḥ.r.zādān-shahr — al-Nūshadjān — Marwazān — his son Khurrahusraw — Bādhān⁹.

The similarity of certain of those forms suggests that they denote same persons. It is probable that *al-B.i.n.djān* (البينجان) of Ibn Ishāk is identical to *al-T.i.n.djān* (التينجان) of Ibn Hishām, to *S.b.hān* (سبحان) of al-Mas'ūdī, and to *W.l.i.s.djān* (وليسان) of Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī, the last of these forms seeming the most distorted.¹⁰ Similarly, it seems highly likely that the names *al-Marwazān* (المروزان), *al-Marzubān* (المرزبان), and *al-Nūshadjān* (النوشجان) denote the same individual. The idea that the three names in question are interconnected is supported by the fact that both al-Marzubān and al-Nūshadjān are identified in the sources as sons of Wehrēz. The simplest explanation is that Wehrēz's son, while governing Yemen, bore the title of *marzbān* which the Arabs for some reason regarded as his personal name. In this case, it is to be assumed that in certain cases the form *al-Marzubān* (*marzbān*) transformed, in pronunciation, into *al-Marzuwān* which, due to a minor fault consisting in a single diacritical point being misplaced, was transformed into *al-Marwazān*. However, alternative possibilities cannot be ruled out either, such as *mard-ōzan* (literally, 'slayer of valiant men', in Arabic script: نازدرم) or *anōš agān* (literally, 'son of the immortal one').

⁹ *Kitāb tārikh sunī mulūk al-arḍ wa al-anbiyāʾ. Taʾlīf Ḥamza ... al-Aṣfahānī*. Berlin: Kaviani GmbH, 1921/22. P. 91.

¹⁰ The most plausible is the form *al-B.i.n.djān* which, as noted in the scholarly literature, is analogous to Βγγάνης, the name of a Sasanid military commander mentioned by Menander the Guardsman (fl. in the late sixth century) who in 578 CE was the garrison commander of the fortress of Chlomarōn (modern Kilimli in Turkey) and defended it against Byzantine troops (Justi F. *Iranisches Namenbuch*. Marburg, 1895. S. 68; *The History of Menander the Guardsman*. [Ed.] R.C. Blockley. Liverpool: Francis Cairns (Publications) Ltd., 1985. P. 202–203). This name is apparently similar to the Middle Persian *wēnāg* in the sense of '[clearly] seeing' (Farrehwāshī B. *Farhang-i-pahlawī*. [Tehran:] Muʾassasa-i-intishārāt wa chāp-i-Dānishgāh-i-Tehrān, 1973. P. 463). If this is accepted, the governor's name should be reconstructed as *Wēnāgān*. However, the reconstruction of the original form of the name is a question that belongs rather to the field of Iranian linguistics and therefore lies beyond the scope of the present study.



Coin of Hormuzd IV.
From public resources

The identifications above suggest that the lists of al-Masʿūdī and Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī, in which some individuals are mentioned twice, probably due to some error in compilation (al-Nūshadjān and Marwazān; Khurrazād / Ḥ.r.zādānshahr¹¹ — Khurrakhusraw) cannot be considered as fully reliable.

The first three lists, which are seemingly more trustworthy, are not completely identical. The most apparent difference between them is that Hishām al-Kalbī names Zīn¹² as Wahriz's successor.

¹¹ Both of these forms are absent from the earlier lists of governors in Ibn Ishāk, Ibn Hishām, and Hishām al-Kalbī; consequently, they must be regarded as graphic distortions of the original *Khurrakhusraw*.

¹² Zīn (زین) is a conjecture of the editors of al-Ṭabarī's text, who, since this name has come down to them in a distorted form, marked it as 'extremely unclear' (*incertissimum*, *Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 988). Prior to that, C. Tornberg, who published the text of Ibn al-Athīr containing the account of these events borrowed from al-Ṭabarī, proposed reading زرين (evidently *zarrēn*, 'golden') (*Ibn-el-Athiri Chronicon quod perfectissimum inscribitur*. Ed. C.J. Tornberg. Vol. I. Lugduni Batavorum, 1867. P. 327; cf. Justi F., 1895. S. 386). The fact that the orthography of the name is distorted makes it impossible to select a single conjecture from among all possible ones. It seems that the most likely conjectures are *Zarēr* (زریر), the name of a legendary Iranian hero, and *Burzēn* (برزین), part of the name of one of the three sacred fires most venerated in the Sasanid Empire. This element could also form part of personal names; known, for example, is the *spāhbed* of the eastern regions of the Sasanid Empire, Čīhr-Burzēn (*Gyselen R. The Four Generals of the Sasanid Empire: Some Sigillographic Evidence*. Roma: Istituto Italiano per Africa e l'Oriente, 2001. P. 35). Since the office of *spāhbed* was introduced only under Khusrō I Anōšag-ruwān, this Čīhr-Burzēn could

The extant sources do not provide enough grounds to explain that. Hypothetically, the lists of Ibn Ishāk and Ibn Hishām may present a kind of a ‘dynasty’ of governors descending from Wehrēz. The sole exception is Bādhān, i.e., Bādān, yet he could not have been omitted from the list, since he was well known to Muslim authors (as the last Sasanid governor of Yemen) from accounts of his conversion to Islam. It is possible that the list of Ibn Ishāk and Ibn Hishām derives from transmitters who specifically narrated the rule of Wehrēz’s ‘dynasty’ and therefore excluded Zēn, who did not belong to it.

al-Ṭabarī states, on the authority of Hishām al-Kalbī, that Wehrēz died toward the end of Khusrō I’s reign, whereupon the latter dispatched Zēn to Yemen. Zēn acted tyrannically, and Khusrō’s successor, Hormuzd IV (579–591), dismissed him and appointed al-Marwazān as governor.¹³ This is generally consistent with what is known of Hormuzd IV. A number of mediaeval accounts depict Hormuzd as a king who severely curtailed the abuses of the nobility;¹⁴ it is also known that he executed several high-ranking officers of Khusrō I.¹⁵ Further details concerning the relations between the governors and the Sasanid kings are scarce. Through his actions in expanding Sasanid

have been a contemporary of Wāhriz’s successor, although, of course, it is not possible to regard them as one and the same person merely because of that. Anyway, the Middle Persian equivalent for Arabic *Zīn* should be *Zēn*.

¹³ *Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 988, 1039.

¹⁴ *al-Akhlāq al-ṭiwāl. Taʿlīf ... al-Dīnawarī*. Ed. ʿA. ʿĀmir. Cairo: Wizārat al-thaqāfa wa al-irshād al-ḵawmī (al-Iḵlām al-djanūbī), al-Idāra al-ʿamma li-l-thaqāfa, 1960. P. 75–78; *Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 988–990; *Histoire des rois des Perses par ... al-Thaʿ ālibī*. Pub. et tr. H. Zotenberg. Paris, 1900. P. 637–638; al-Maʿūdī, 1966. Pt. 1. P. 312; *Muğmal at-tawārīḥ wa-l-qīṣaṣ: eine persische Weltgeschichte aus dem 12. Jahrhundert*. Hrsg. S. Najmabadi, S. Weber. Edingen-Neckarhausen: Deux mondes, 2000. S. 62; C. 75–78; *Ni-bāyat al-arab fī akhlāq al-furs wa al-ʿarab*. Ed. M.T. Dānishpezhūh. Tehran: Andjomani-āthār wa mafākhīr-i-farhangī, 1996/97. P. 349–350. According to one author, Hormuzd, in protecting his subjects from the abuses of the grandees, surpassed his father Khusrō I who was famous for his justice (Sadīd al-dīn Muḥammad ʿAwfī. *Djawāmiʿ al-ḥikāyāt. Tārīkh Irān wa Islām*. Ed. Dj. Shīʿār. Tehran: Mahārat, 1995/6. P. 151).

¹⁵ The issue of Khusrō I’s justice is examined by the present author in an earlier work (Mishin D.E. *Khusraw I Anushirwan (531–579), his epoch, and his biography and admonition in Miskawayh’s history*. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014 (in Russ.). P. 376–377).



Coin of Hormuzd IV.
From public resources

authority over Yemen (to be discussed below), al-Marwazān earned the favour of Khusrō II Abarwēz, son of Hormuzd IV (591–628; *Kisrā bin Hurmuz* of Hishām al-Kalbī's text), who summoned him to his court. al-Marwazān set out for the king but died on his way to the court, according to the sources, in the land of the Arabs.¹⁶

Nothing is known of the rule of al-B.i.n.djān. Hishām al-Kalbī does not even mention him among the governors. This suggests that his tenure was hardly a long one.

On Khurrahkhusraw (whose name should rather be written in its Middle Persian form as *Khwarrah-Khusrō*) it is reported that the Sasanid king became enraged with him and wished to execute him; however, the intercession of an influential aristocrate enabled the governor to escape death. He retained his life but was dismissed. In his place, Bādān was appointed governor of Yemen.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Annales ...* 1881–1882. P. 1039–1040; *Kitāb ʿuyūn al-akhbār. Taʿlīf ... Ibn Ẹutayba al-Dīnawarī*. Cairo: Dār al-kutub wa al-wathāʾiq al-ḵawmiyya, 1996. Vol. 1. P. 179. That the king was favourably disposed toward al-Marwazān is evidenced by the clearly legendary but perhaps historically revealing continuation of the account given in these sources. According to it, the Sasanid king ordered the sarcophagus with the remains of al-Marwazān to be placed in the treasury, and then (according only to Ibn Ẹutayba) each year displayed the sarcophagus to the nobles, telling them of the governor's achievements.

¹⁷ According to the account of Ibn Ishāḵ (as transmitted by al-Ṭabarī), when the Yemeni nobles brought Khwarrah-Khusrō to the palace, one of those designated as *ʿuẸamāʾ* threw upon him a sword that had previously belonged to the father of the Sasanid king. Thereafter, the king decided not to execute Khwarrah-Khusrō and limited himself to dismissing him (*Annales ...* 1881–

Nowhere in the sources is Bādān referred to as the son of Khwarrah-Khusrō, although there are grounds for supposing that he belonged to the same house as Wehrēz and his descendants — namely, the Mihrāns.¹⁸ Thus, Khusrō II terminated the rule of the dynasty of

1882. P. 958). The term *‘uṣamā’* in Arabic texts designates nobles belonging to the highest Sasanid aristocracy (*wuzurgān*). Balʿamī, who in the second half of the tenth century made a Persian translation of al-Ṭabarī's history, presents this episode differently: King Hormuzd (and not Khusrō II, who, as shown above, is said to have been a contemporary of al-Marwazān and would, therefore, better suit for an identification with the Sasanid king of the fragment in question) sent a man to Yemen, ordering him to put Khwarra-Khusrō in chains. Then (apparently already at court) the king ordered the envoy to execute Khwarra-Khusrō. Thereupon the envoy took a garment that had previously been granted to him by Khusrō I Anōšag-ruwān and cast it over the governor's head. Because of the inviolable nature (*hurma*) of this garment, the king revoked the execution order (*Tārīkh-nāmeḥ-i-Ṭabarī. Gardānideh-i-mansūb be Balʿamī*. Ed. M. Rowshan. Tehran: Soroush, 1995. P. 732). Thus, the nobleman who saved Khwarra-Khusrō performed a symbolic act, presenting the matter as if some privilege granted by Khusrō I extended to the governor. It is natural to assume that this nobleman belonged to the same house as Khwarra-Khusrō, namely the Mihrāns, who at that time constituted the highest military aristocracy in the Sasanid Empire.

¹⁸ As shown below, in the account of the alliance with the Hamdānites, Bādān is called the son of Sāsān (but not of Khwarra-Khusrō). In some other sources Bādān is referred to as Abū Mihrān (*Aʿlām al-nubuwwa li ... al-Māwardī*. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1986. P. 89; *Manāqib al Abī Ṭalīb. Taʾlīf ... Ibn Shahr-ashūb al-Sarawī al-Māzandarānī*. Ed. Y. al-Bakāʿī. Beirut: Dār al-aḍwāʾ, 1991. Pt. 1. P. 113). Strictly speaking, Abū Mihrān (literally ‘father of Mihrān’) is not an indication of belonging to a particular house, but an agnomen (*kunya*) primarily given after the name of a man's eldest son. Meanwhile, the custom of giving a *kunya* was current only among the Arabs and was absent among the Persians. Therefore, the name Abū Mihrān was evidently given to Bādān by the Arabs. This can be explained by the fact that, according to one account (quoted by al-Ṭabarī on the authority of Ibn Ishāq), Bādān had a son named Mihrān, who in 634 CE participated (as part of the Sasanid army) in the battle against the Muslims at al-Buwayb and was killed (*Annales ...* 1890. P. 2200–2201). At the same time, it cannot be excluded that Bādān's son, like many other Sasanid nobles, was known by a family name which Muslim transmitters took as a personal name. The identification of Bādān with the Mihrāns is supported mainly by the historical context: among the highest Sasanid nobility, military affairs were entrusted to the Mihrāns. Under Khusrō I, the Sasanid Empire was divided into four great military districts, each comprising several provinces. Several seals of the commanders of such districts, called *spāhbeds*, are known. Of these, three seals belong to the Mihrāns (Gyselen R. *The Four Generals ...* 2001. P. 41, 44, 45), while on the remaining



Coin of Hormuzd IV.
From public resources

governors descending from Wehrēz and transferred authority over Yemen to another branch of the same family.

According to al-Masʿūdī, the rule of Khwarrazād, who as the successor of S.bḥān (identified above with al-B.i.n.djān or Wēnāgān) can be reliably identified with Khwarrah-Khusrō, lasted six months¹⁹. If this statement is accepted as accurate, which would not be at variance with the chronological framework set out in the following paragraph), it follows that the king dismissed the governor shortly after the latter's appointment. Consequently, something significant must have occurred (or come to light) that caused Khusrō II to reverse his attitude toward Khwarrah-Khusrō so abruptly. The extant sources tell us that the reason for Khwarrah-Khusrō's dismissal was his excessively favourable (in the king's view) treatment of the local elite²⁰.

seals the house to which the seal owner belonged is not indicated. Thus, generally speaking, a Mihrān would more likely have been appointed governor of Yemen than a member of any other family.

¹⁹ al-Masʿūdī. *Murūdj* ... Pt. 2, 1966. P. 210.

²⁰ According to Hishām al-Kalbī's text known through al-Ṭabarī's transmission, Khwarrah-Khusrō loved the Arabic language, recited Arabic poetry, and 'became arabized'; in the source this 'Arabization' is denoted by the Arabic word *taʿarrub* (*Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 1040). This explanation is clearly legendary in nature, yet it should be considered in comparison with the parallel version of Ibn Ishāq, according to which the Sasanid king swore that the Yemenis would bring Khwarrah-Khusrō to him on their necks, and they did so (*Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 958). These accounts are best interpreted to mean that the governor treated the local elite with excessive (in the king's view) leniency, thereby winning their sympathies.

No further indications are found in the sources, rendering any alternative hypothesis rather speculative.

Returning to Bādān, one finds that according to a number of medieval accounts, including those transmitted via the renowned medieval scholar and collector of antiquities Abū 'Ubayda Ma'smar ibn al-Muthannā (b. 728/9, d. 824/5 or 828/9), it was Bādān who dispatched from Yemen to Khusrō II a caravan which, while passing through the lands of northeastern Arabia, was plundered by the Arab tribe of Banū Tamīm²¹. Determining the date of the attack on this caravan lies beyond the scope of the present study. The present author therefore considers it appropriate merely to reiterate his previously expressed view, according to which the attack on the caravan and the subsequent reprisals against Banū Tamīm occurred at the very end of the sixth or the beginning of the seventh century.²² Consequently, the death of al-Marzubān (al-Marwazān), the governance of Wēnāgān and Khwarrah-Khusrō, as well as the appointment of Bādān, all took

²¹ *Dīwān 'Āmir bin al-Tufayl. Riwāyat Abī Bakr Muḥammad ... al-Anbārī 'an ... Tha'lab*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1979. P. 62–63; *al-Kāmil fī-l-tārīkh li ... Ibn al-Athīr*. Vol. 1. Ed. A.ṢA. al-Kādī. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1987. P. 492; *Kitāb al-ʿafw wa al-ʿitidhār li Abī-l-Ḥasan ... al-ʿAbdī al-maʿrūf bi al-Rakḳām al-Baṣrī*. Ed. ʿA. Abū Ṣāliḥ. Riyadh: Djamīʿat al-Imām Muḥammad bin Saʿūd al-islāmiyya, 1981. P. 430 (citing Abū 'Ubayda); *Kitāb al-aghbānī li-l-imām Abī-l-Faradj al-Aṣbahānī*. Ed. A. al-Shinkīṭī. Cairo, 1905. Pt. 16. P. 75 (citing Abū 'Ubayda and Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb, d. 860 CE); *Kitāb djumal min Ansāb al-asbrāf šan-nafa-hu ... al-Balādhurī*. Ed. S. Zakkār, R. Zarkalī. Beirut: Dār al-fuikr, 1996. Pt. 11. P. 374; *Muḍjam al-buldān li ... Yāqūt*. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977. T. V. P. 291; *The Mufaḍḍalīyāt*. Ed. Ch. J. Lyall. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. P. 708; *Thimār al-kulūb fī al-muḍāf wa al-mansūb li ... al-Thaʿālībī*. Ed. M.ṢA. Ibrāhīm. Cairo: Dār al-maʿārif, 1985. P. 140). In contrast, Hishām al-Kalbī believed that the caravan from Yemen had been dispatched by Wehrēz (*Annales ... 1881–1882*. P. 984). However, this version is not supported by historical context. In the events surrounding the caravan, a notable role was played by one of the chiefs of the Arab tribe of Banū Ḥanīfa named Hawdha ibn 'Alī. He died in 629 or 630 CE (Mishin D.E. Hawdha Ibn 'Alī al-Ḥanafī. *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Series 13. Vostokovedenie*. 2022;(2) (in Russ.). P. 113), whereas Wehrēz, as noted above, died toward the end of the reign of Khusrō I and could therefore have dispatched the caravan only in the period from 576/77 CE to approximately the end of 578 CE. Since the active career of Hawdha, judging by the date of his death, fell in a later period, it is more likely that the caravan was sent by Bādān to Khusrō II, rather than by Wehrēz to Khusrō I.

²² Mishin D.E. Hawdha ... 2022. P. 110.



Coin of Khusrō II.
From public resources

place within a relatively short period, from 592 CE (when Khusrō II, having defeated the rebellious general Bahram Čōbēn, consolidated his power) — to approximately the end of the sixth century. This agrees with the considerations above that Wēnāgān and Khwarrah-Khusrō did not rule long.

The extant sources allow for re-constructing the most significant aspects of the Sasanid military commanders and governors' activities. In the initial period, they appear to have concentrated their efforts on consolidating their military position in Yemen. According to one source, Wehrēz, following the initial conquest of Yemen and his victory over the army of the Ethiopian ruler, proceeded to the Aden region and there, between two mountains and near a river, founded a city which gave rise to the Aden of later times²³. This action by Wehrēz should presumably be explained as an attempt to establish a coastal stronghold where troops to be transported by sea could potentially land.

According to one account, at the time of the Sasanid conquest of Yemen, the sea in the vicinity of Sanaa had become greatly shallowed: on the eastern side (toward Šīra) the seabed was dry, while on the other side the ground was imbued with water. The account then continues as follows:

The kings of Persia, having taken possession of Aden, saw the dry seabed and feared that a force greater [than their own] would lay siege

²³ *The Fārsnāma of Ibnū'l-Balkhī*. Ed. G. Le Strange, R.A. Nicholson. London: Luzac & Co., 1921. P. 96.

to the city (*al-balad*). Therefore, they established themselves there, opened a passage [for water] from the direction of Djabal ʿImrān, and let seawater flow toward the city. The water spread and rose, so that it flooded all the dry seabed around Aden, and Aden became an island.²⁴

Whether this account is true, can hardly be verified today; yet it is entirely plausible that the Sasanid governors sought to fortify their most important naval base, Aden, as effectively as possible, including by making a natural defence in the form of water barriers.

Another important piece of evidence is found in al-Ṭabarī's treatise, yet not in his quoting of Ibn Ishāq and Hishām al-Kalbī, but in a brief enumeration of Khusrō I's achievements of. According to al-Ṭabarī, Khusrō set out toward Aden, and blocked off the part of the sea lying between two mountains, on the side of the land of the Ethiopians, with large ships, rocks, iron supports, and chains.²⁵

Since no source tells that King Khusrō I ever visited Yemen, the reference to the king's personal involvement should probably be understood as Arab story-tellers' assumption that those constructions were his accomplishment. The works described by al-Ṭabarī most likely consisted in the restoration of what was called the 'Mandeb Chain' (*sʿlt Mdbn* of South Arabian inscriptions).²⁶ It should be noted that the author (or at least the co-author) of all the inscriptions *Ja* 1028, *Ry* 507, *Ry* 508 was the prince (*kayl*) Sharahʿīl Yaḳbul (*Sʿrh ʿl Yḳbl* in

²⁴ Ibn al-Muḡawir. *Descriptio Arabiae Meridionalis*. Ed. O. Löfgren. Pars prior. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1951. P. 115–116.

²⁵ *Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 898.

²⁶ A detailed description of the Mandeb Chain is contained in the *Martyrdom of Arethas*. According to this source, King Yūsuf Asʿar Yathʿar, in order to prevent the invasion of the Ethiopian Negus' forces, stretched across the strait separating the lands of the Ethiopians and the Himyarites a chain made of iron links and floating because of wooden blocks inserted between them (*Acta SS. Arethae et Rumae et sociorum martyrum Negranae in Arabia felice*. Ed. E. Carpentier. Bruxelles, 1861. P. 88 (Greek version); *Historia dos martyres de Nagan. Versão ethiopica*. Pub. F.M. Esteves Pereira. Lisboa, 1899. P. 69 (Ethiopic version)). Mentions of Yūsuf Asʿar Yathʿar having fortified the chain are found in South Arabian inscriptions from his reign (*Ja* 1028, *Ry* 507, *Ry* 508). When the Negus's fleet set out on a campaign against Yemen in 525 CE, the chain proved a serious obstacle for it; however, the current carried the first ships across it. Then a storm arose, and the chain broke (*Acta* ... 1861. P. 88; *Historia* ... 1899. P. 69).



Coin of Khusrō II.
From public resources

the inscriptions) of the Yazʿan family. It is probable that the work of restoring the chain, which al-Ṭabarī in effect describes, was undertaken on the advice of one of the Yazʿans, perhaps Sayf / Maʿdīkarīb, who might well draw the attention of the Sasanid officers to the useful experience of their predecessors.

Another sources in which the presence of Persians in Sanaa and Aden is also mentioned is a description of the fairs (*aswāk*) of pre-Islamic Arabia, attributed to Hishām al-Kalbī. According to the surviving transmissions of this text, such fairs were periodically held at certain times of the year in Yemen, in Aden and Sanaa, and the descendants of the Sasanid conquerors (whom the Arabs called *abnāʾ*²⁷, i.e., ‘descendants’) levied a tithe from merchants for the right to trade.²⁷ The tenth-century Muslim geographer al-Hamdānī mentions a silver mine at al-Raḍrāḍ²⁸ and reports that among those who worked there were descendants of Persians who had settled in that region in pre-Islamic times.²⁹ It may

²⁷ *Ibn-Wāḍhibh qui dicitur al-Jaʿqubī Historiae*. Ed. M.Th. Houtsma. Lugduni Batavorum, 1883. Pars prior. P. 314; *Kitāb al-amkina wa al-azmina. Taʿlīf ... al-Marzūqī*. Ed. Kh. Al-Manṣūr. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1996. P. 384 (citing Hishām al-Kalbī); *Kitāb al-muḥabbar li ... Muḥammad bin Ḥabīb*. Ed. I. Lichtenstädter. Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya, 1942. P. 266.

²⁸ Approximately 50 km northeast of Sanaa.

²⁹ al-Hamdānī. *Kitāb al-ḡauharatain al-ʿatīqatain al-māʾiʿatain aṣ-ṣafrāʾ waʾlbaidāʾ*. *Die beiden Edelmetalle Gold und Silber*. Hrsg. und übers. Chr. Toll. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells boktryckeri aktiebolag, 1968. S. 144–145. In those fragments, as well as in his other work, *Description of the Arabian Peninsula (Ṣifāt Djazīrat al-ʿarab. Taʿlīf ... al-Hamdānī*. Ed. M. al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥiwālī. Sana: Maktabat al-irshād, 1990. P. 321), al-Hamdānī

be concluded that the exploitation of the silver deposits was already taking place under the Sasanid governors, who probably provided military protection for the mine. These data suggest that the governors kept under their control not only military, but also economic sites.

Another task of each Sasanid governor was to provide for the collection of tribute (including both taxes and the trade fees discussed in the previous paragraph). As demonstrated in the article *Yemen Under the Rule of the Sasanids. Article One. The Reign of Yaz'an*, that task had previously fallen to Yaz'an (as the ruler of Yemen, subordinated to the Sasanid king). Following Yaz'an's death, the task passed to the new ruler, i.e., the Sasanid governor. According to Ibn Ishāq, Wehrēz, having been appointed governor after his second campaign to Yemen, collected tribute for the Sasanid king.³⁰ Bal'amī reports that Marzbān (identified above with Hishām al-Kalbī's al-Marwazān) annually sent the Sasanid king a tribute designated in the source by the term *kharādj*³¹. The main burden of the caravan dispatched by Bādān to Khusrō (see above) consisted of the goods which the governor had collected from the merchants.³² How exactly the collection of tribute was organized, is difficult to say due to the almost complete lack of information. The accounts of the fairs indicate that the Iranians collected the levies themselves; that was undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that their presence in both Aden and Sanaa was substantial. The episode discussed in the following paragraph shows that the Himyarite

calls the al-Raḍrād mine the foremost among silver mines and asserts that there is none like it.

³⁰ *Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 958.

³¹ *Tārīkh-nāmeḥ* ... 1995. P. 735. In Bal'amī's times, *kharādj* meant land tax.

³² According to the sources, the booty of the Tamīmites who plundered the caravan consisted of: swords, vessels, gold belts, precious stones, perfumes (*Dīwān* ... 1979. P. 63; *The Mufaḍḍalīyat*, 1921. P. 708), Yemeni garments, musk, ambergris, and ornamented belts (*Kitāb al-aghbānī* ... 1905. Pt. 16. P. 75), valuable curiosities, precious stones, and ambergris (*Kitāb ḍjūmal* ... 1996. Pt. 11. P. 374), musk, ambergris, and jewels (*Kitāb al-ṣiḳd al-farīd. Ta'līf* ... *Ibn 'Abd Rabbih al-Andalusī*. Ed. A. Amīn, A. al-Zayn, I. al-Abyārī. Pt. 5. Cairo: Maṭba'at Ladjnat al-ta'līf wa al-tardjama wa al-nashr, 1965. P. 224; *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār li Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-ʿUmarī*. Part 25. Ed. M. al-Nadjm. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2010. P. 117), perfumes and curiosities (*Kitāb al-ʿafw* ... 1981. P. 430; *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab. Ta'līf* ... *al-Nuwayrī*. Vol. 15. Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1949. P. 407).



Coin of Khusrō II.
From public resources

and Sabaean noble families subordinate to the Sasanid governor paid tribute, collecting it as taxes from their own subjects.

The governors relied mainly on the Sasanid troops stationed in Yemen. The aforementioned ‘descendants’ (*abnāʾ*³³) were also an important supporting force. In Hishām al-Kalbī's description of the pre-Islamic Arabian fairs, he states that the ‘descendants’ collected duties for the right to trade at the fair of Aden, but ‘neither bought nor sold in their markets.’³³ Such information best applies to soldiers or officers. When necessary, workers could also be called to war, for instance, those who were engaged in the above-mentioned mine at al-Raḍrāḍ.

After the death of Yazʿan, when, as shown above, the families of the highest Yemeni nobility became at least *de facto* independent, the Sasanid governors were compelled to contend with them. In this regard, the account of al-Marwazān is instructive, the final part of which (concerning how Khusrō II summoned him to court) has been examined above. According to that account, the inhabitants of al-Maṣānīʿ rebelled against al-Marwazān, ceased to pay tribute and barricaded themselves in a certain stronghold in the mountains. The governor boldly rode on horseback up to the walls and the defenders, seeing that, took him for a demon. al-Marwazān addressed them in Persian, ordering them to bind one another, which they did. He led them out of the fortifications, put some to death, and took others captive. According to the account, it was precisely

³³ *Kitāb al-amkina* ... 1996. P. 384; *Kitāb al-muḥabbar* ... 1942. P. 266.

this feat that earned al-Marwazān the admiration of Khusrō³⁴. If the clearly legendary elements are set aside, it may be imagined that the words spoken by the governor (likely, a guarantee of safe conduct for those who surrendered) caused discord among the defenders of the fortress, and the proponents of capitulation prevailed and opened the gates; those who continued to resist were put to death by al-Marwazān. The lack of information makes it impossible to determine against whom and where al-Marwazān fought in that manner. It can only be said that he was opposed by one of the families of the highest Yemeni nobility which, judging by the statement concerning the cessation of tribute payments, attempted to rid itself of Sasanid suzerainty and of their governor, and to rule its domains independently.³⁵

³⁴ *Annales* ... 1881–1882. P. 1039–1040; *Kitāb ʿuyūn* ... 1996. Vol. 1. P. 178–179.

³⁵ The name *al-Maṣānīʿ*, which is in fact the sole historical detail from which any further inquiry can proceed, denoted various objects. M. al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥiwālī, a recognized expert on the history of medieval Yemen and editor of a number of sources, states that [al-Maṣānīʿ meant] castles (*ḥuṣūn*), fortresses (*kilāʿ*), sources of water (*birak*), and mountain peaks; what is called *al-Maṣānīʿ* in Yemen is innumerable due to its abundance' (*Kitāb al-iklāl li ... al-Hamdānī*. Pt. 2. Ed. M. al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥiwālī. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-sunna al-muḥammadiyya, 1966. P. 4, note 2). The authoritative medieval scholar al-Aṣmaʿī (8th–early 9th century) asserted that the Arabs used the word *maṣānīʿ* to designate villages (*kurā*) in general (*Sharḥ ḍiḥwān Imrīʿ-il-Qays bin Hudjr al-Kindī li ... al-Aʿlam al-Shantamaʿī*. Ed. Ibn Abī Shanab. Algiers: al-Sharika al-waṭaniyya li-l-nashr wa al-tawzīʿ, 1974. P. 499). The encyclopedic geographer Yāqūt (b. 1178–1180, d. 1229) knows in Yemen a district (*mikhlāf*) of al-Maṣānīʿ and a fortress of al-Maṣānīʿ in the district of Sanaa (*Muʿdjam* ... 1977. T. V. P. 136). If one sets out to identify the al-Maṣānīʿ where the events under consideration took place, primary attention should be paid to places related to events of the pre-Islamic period. Proceeding in this manner, we find two possible solutions. The geographer of the mid- to second half of the ninth century, Ibn Khurdādhbih (Ibn Khurradādhbih), lists, among the places located in Yemen, Shibām, Bayt Aqyān, and al-Maṣānīʿ, and notes that they are inhabited by people of the clan of dhū Ḥawāl (the vocalization with *fathā* over the initial *ḥāʾ* belongs to the editor of the source text; however, the reading *Ḥiwāl* is more likely, since Muḥammad al-Akwaʿ called himself *al-Ḥiwālī*), descendants of dhū Maḳār, to whom belonged Yaʿfur Ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Kurayb al-Ḥawālī (*Kitāb al-masālik waʾl-mamālik (Liber viarum et regionum) auctore ... Ibn Khordādhbeh et excerpta e Kitāb al-kharāj auctore Kodāma ibn Djaʿfar*. Ed. M.J. De Goeje. Lugduni-Batavorum, 1889. P. 142; cf. *Muʿdjam* ... 1977. T. V. P. 136). The clan of dhū Maḳār frequently appears in the lists of the eight families of the highest Yemeni nobility (*mathbāmīna*) in Muslim authors. al-Hamdānī, recounting a place called Shibām bayt Aqyān, writes: 'Shibām is the kingdom of the clan

Another noteworthy episode is known from the treatise *Division of Truth and Falsehood Regarding Objects of Pride of the Kaḥṭānites and Yemenites*. According to this source, at a certain stage a conflict arose between a party of Himyarites (*kawm min ḥimyar*) and the Persians. The latter left Sanaa and took refuge in al-Bawn,³⁶ where they

of Yaʿfur, the Ḥiwālīs (*al-ḥiwāliyyīn*); it is further stated that its walls were built by Yaʿfur ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥiwālī (*al-Ikṭl. al-Djuzʿ al-thāmin. Taʿlīf ... Ibn al-Ḥāʾik al-Hamdānī*. Ed. N.A. Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-ʿawda, Sana: Dār al-kalima, s.a. P. 85). It may be concluded that the place called al-Maṣānīʿ by Ibn Khurdādhbih was located in the region of Shibām bayt Aqyān, i.e., Shibām Kawkabān. If one assumes that Shibām bayt Aqyān was located in the area of present-day Shibām and Kawkabān, the place where the fortress captured by al-Marwazān stood is likely to have been in the mountains to the northwest of Sanaa, known as Maṣānīʿ Ḥimyar.

Alternatively, in the recently published treatise by an unknown author, *Division of Truth and Falsehood Regarding Objects of Pride of the Kaḥṭānites and Yemenites*, mention is made of the 'king of al-Maṣānīʿ', dhū-l-Rumḥayn, who is described as a descendant of the clan of dhū Ruʿayn — one of the families of the highest Yemeni nobility. In the list of noble clans descended from Ruʿayn in this passage, immediately before dhū-l-Rumḥayn, mention is made of dhū Tarkham, king of Khāw (*al-Fāṣil bayna al-ḥakḥ wa al-bāṭil min mafākhīr abnāʾ Kaḥṭān wa al-yaman li muʿallif madjhbūl*. Ed. M.ʿA. Džāzim, M. ʿArbash. Sanaa: al-Maʿhad a-faransī li-l-āthār wa-l-ʿulūm al-idjtimāʿiyya bi Ṣanʿāʾ, al-Maʿhad alalmānī li-l-āthār bi Ṣanʿāʾ, 2009. P. 51–52). This fragment seems to be related to al-Hamdānī's words about Yarīm dhū-l-Rumḥayn, the father of dhū Tarkham. In a note to this, M. al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥiwālī remarks that a fortress and a mountain in the region of Qāʿ al-Ḥaql are named after that dhū al-Rumḥayn (*Kitāb al-ikṭl li ... al-Hamdānī*. Pt. 2. Ed. M. al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥiwālī. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-sunna al-muḥammadiyya, 1966. P. 324). The geographical localization best suited to this statement is Yarīm located 4.5 km from Khāw, in the mountains between Ibb and Dhamār on the road from Taʿizz to Sanaa, to the south of the latter. It is not easy to prefer either of these identifications, since the fragments examined in this note contain no mention of either al-Marwazān, or his campaign. It may only be concluded that al-Marwazān was opposed by one of the families of the highest Yemeni nobility (in the above hypotheses, dhū Maḳār or one of the branches of dhū Ruʿayn).

³⁶ The name al-Bawn was applied to a region (see, e.g., *Descriptio imperii moslemici auctore ... al-Moqaddasi*. Ed. M.J. De Goeje. Lugduni Batavorum, 1906. P. 88, 103; *Kitāb al-masālik ...* 1889. P. 137) located on the road from Sanaa northward to the Tihāmah (*Ṣifat ...* 1990. P. 303). However, the Sasanid garrison would hardly have left Sanaa to disperse into the countryside north of it. Rather, this detachment fortified itself in some settlement. In this respect, it is likely that al-Bawn here means Rayda. The possibility of this may be proven by the following example. Ibn Khurdādhbih relates that in Rayda, which he includes in the region of al-Bawn, there were a dried-up well and a raised castle, mentioned in verse 44(45) of Sura 22 *al-Ḥadjdj* of the Qurʾān (*Kitāb al-masālik ...* 1889. P. 137). Yāḳūt, citing unnamed individuals, writes the same about al-Bawn,



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were well received by the Arabs of the tribal confederation of Banū Hamdān, who had condemned the actions of Sayf Ibn dhī Yazʿan and the Himyarites and were hostile to the latter. According to the author of the account, the Banū Hamdān and the Persians agreed upon mutual assistance and adhered to that agreement at the time when the account was being written.³⁷

The report examined in the previous paragraph shows that the Sasanid governors did not always prevail in their confrontations with those elements of the Yemeni elite who sought independence. It may be conjectured that such reverses led to the replacement of governors, as discussed above. Unfortunately, owing to the general lack of information, it is impossible to trace the course of those events; it is not even known how the episode of the Sasanid troops withdrawing to al-Bawn actually ended. Therefore, the course of events can only be re-constructed on the basis of their general pattern. The rule of the Sasanid governors continued, and there is no evidence of the expulsion of the Persians from Yemen or of the restoration, in any form, of the state of Himyar, Sabaʿ. The Yemeni elite apparently never united against the

calling it 'a town in Yemen' (*Muʿ djam ...* 1977. Vol. I. P. 511). The presence of Banū Hamdān in al-Bawn / Rayda is attested by Hishām al-Kalbī, who calls al-Bawn a town of Banū Hamdān (*Nasab Maʿadd wa al-Yaman al-kalbī li Abī-l-Mundhir Hishām ... al-Kalbī*. Ed. N. Ḥasan. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1988. P. 545). According to a legend, once, in pre-Islamic times, the Hamdānites, having decided to attack Sanaa, set out from al-Bawn (*Tārīkh madīnat Ṣanʿāʾ li al-Rāzī*. Ed. Ḥ. al-ʿUmarī. Damascus: Dār al-fikr, Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-muʿāṣir, 1989. P. 92).

³⁷ *al-Fāṣil ...* 2009. P. 191–192.



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Sasanids; the episodes we see were rather the actions of individual families. On the whole, there seems to have existed a consensus whereby the Sasanid governors held under their authority the most important sites (see below) and controlled the collection of tribute and its dispatch to the king, while not interfering (or interfering only to a limited extent) in the affairs of the local elite. The latter were to collect tribute from the population (as is evident from the example of the inhabitants of al-Maṣānīʿ), maintain order, and address other matters of daily life.

A description of the state of affairs in Yemen under the Sasanid governors is found in the late author Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Djundī (d. 1331/32 CE), who states:

Authority over Sanaa was in the hands of the Persians and the Himyarites, the descendants of Sayf Ibn dhī Yazʾan, for he had perished by that time; thus, the Persians held sway, while the Himyarites governed the provinces, delivered the tribute (*kharāj*), and averted evil.³⁸

The relations between the Sasanid governors and the Arab tribes deserve a separate study. Most of the extant information on this matter concerns the tribal confederation of Banū Hamdān. As shown above, the Hamdānites at least once sided with a Sasanid governor against the Himyarite elite. A detailed account of the alliance between the Hamdānites and Bādān is provided by Aḥmad al-Rāzī (d. ca. 1068 CE) in his ‘Narrative of the Alliance between the Hamdānites and the

³⁸ *al-Sulūk fī ṭabaqāt al-ʿulamāʾ wa al-mulūk. Taʾlīf ... al-Djundī al-Saksakī al-Kindī.* Pt. 1. Ed. M. al-Akwaʿ al-Ḥiwālī. Sana: Maktabat al-irshād, 1993. P. 161–162.

Persians at the Time of Bādān, Son of Sāsān, during the Reign of Khusrō, Son of Hormuzd':

It happened that several chieftains gathered and, after deliberation, decided to make war on Bādān, son of Sāsān; [that occurred] during the reign of Khusrō, son of Hormuzd. They assembled at Mudhāb, in the [region of] al-Djawf.³⁹ Among them were 'Amr ibn Ma'dīkarib al-Zubaydī, 'Anbasa Ibn Zayd al-Khawlānī, al-Ḥuṣayn Ibn Kinān Ibn Yazīd al-Ḥārithī, Yazīd Ibn 'Abd al-Madān, and Shihāb Ibn al-Ḥuṣayn, with a number of horsemen and notables. They encamped as a vast army and gathered a dense host [of warriors]. They took their stand in the land of ⁴⁰... seeking his support, but he did not give his consent to them. When this reached Bādān, he advanced against them with a cavalry force of horsemen from Sanaa. Then the Hamdānites came out to meet him with approximately ten thousand fighters, both horse and foot, in full armour. At that time, they were the most powerful of the inhabitants of Yemen, possessing more equipment and weapons, and being more valiant and stronger than all the others. Their leaders were 'Amr Ibn al-Ḥārith Ibn al-Ḥuṣayn al-Shākiri and 'Amr Ibn Yazīd Ibn al-Rabi' al-Hāshidī. So, they offered Bādān assistance and alliance. That pleased him and he hastened to them⁴¹ and concluded an alliance with them. On that day, all the chieftains of the Hamdānites, their noblemen, and their horsemen assembled. It was a day of great significance, with far-reaching consequences, impressive in appearance, with a large number of those present. When they gathered for the [completion of the] pact, their orators stood up, and each orator from both armies delivered a speech with beautiful and magnificent words which came to him, calling for alliance and concord and condemning disunity and discord. All aspired to that, rejoiced in it, and consented

³⁹ Mudhāb is mentioned in the sources, yet its exact location is difficult to ascertain. Notably, the encyclopedic geographer Abū 'Ubayd al-Bakrī (b. ca. 1010, d. 1094) knows Mudhāb only as a place (*mawḍi'*) (*Mu'djam mā ista'djam min asmā' al-bilād wa al-mawāḍi'*. *Ta'liḥ... al-Bakrī*. Ed. M. al-Sakḳā. Beirut: 'Ālam al-kutub, 1983. P. 1202). Mudhāb should seemingly be associated with Wādī Mudhāb in the province of al-Djawf in modern Yemen.

⁴⁰ The name of the person in question is omitted from the text.

⁴¹ In the source text, here stands an evidently erroneous form of 'hastened to him' (*sara'a ilay-hi*).



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to it with their whole souls, feeling relief that their cause was united. This was because the Hamdānites had continually sided with the Persian horsemen and aided them. Now, when the Arabs wrote, they would begin a letter with ‘In Thy name, O God!’ The Persians, when they wrote a letter, would begin with ‘In the name of the Merciful, the Guide [to the right path]!’ So, when they (the Hamdānites and the Persians. — D.M.) gathered to write, they combined both invocations and wrote one document in Arabic and one in Persian. They wrote as follows:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Guide [to the right path]! This is a document setting forth what the Hamdānites and the Persians in Yemen decided in the presence of the *marzbān* Bādān, son of Sāsān, before the leaders ʿ Amr Ibn al-Ḥārith and ʿ Amr Ibn Yazīd from the [tribes of] Bakīl and Ḥāshid, with the consent of those present, and that they (the Hamdānites and the Persians) gave assurances to one another concerning all those absent from both peoples, that they swore to each other, making promises before Almighty God, to unite their efforts and make them correspond to one another, to fight the enemy and keep away from him, and also that if any of us, from either of the nations, violates that which he has agreed upon and sworn to the other, or departs from that by which he has bound himself strongly and firmly, then upon him shall fall what has been promised by Almighty God, repeated, promised, confirmed, eternally strong, as long as there are father and child, forever, as ordained and confirmed, as long as the sky is covered by clouds which give shade, dust rises, water flows, rain falls, trees grow green, fruits are eaten, and humans

exist, and as long as there are turbulent water in the seas, leaves on the trees, life does not cease in time, as long as high mountains remain in their place, stars appear in their rising places, livestock grazes freely in pastures abounding with green grass; [this is] a promise confirmed by all promises, a covenant strengthened by all agreements, a firm, unshakeable, strong compact that will not disappear, and whose news will not perish.⁴²

It appears useful to compare this account to the extant information on the relations of the Hamdānites with the rulers of Yemen in earlier times. From the South Arabian inscriptions *Ja* 1028, *Ry* 507, and *Ry* 508, it is evident that the Hamdānites constituted a significant portion of the army of the Yazʿanite Sharahʿīl Yaḳbul (on whom see above), dispatched by Yūsuf Asʿar Yathʿar against the inhabitants of Najrān. After the establishment of Abraha's authority, the Hamdānites, seemingly perceiving him as an enemy, withdrew to the mountains and declared that they would submit to no one but the Himyarites.⁴³ However, in the South Arabian inscription *CIH* 541 (548 CE), mention is made of dhū Hamdān, apparently a tribal chief who was among the companions of Abraha. Even more indicative is inscription *Ja* 547+*Ja* 546+*Ja* 544+*Ja* 545, in which the chiefs of Banū Hamdān (*d-Hmdn* in the inscription) and, in particular, the tribes of Bakīl (*Bklm*) and Ḥāshid (*Ḥsʿdm*), mentioned in the account above, call Abraha their lord. From this it is evident that the Hamdānite chiefs acted pragmatically and in various ways came to terms with the rulers of Yemen, obtaining an acceptable position in exchange for recognition of their authority or for service. The aforementioned discontent of the Hamdānites with the actions of Sayf Ibn dhī Yazan (Yazʿan) should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence against this conclusion, for it is possible that Yazʿan and his partisans did not forgive the Hamdānites for recognizing Abraha's authority, and, perhaps, for having sided with the latter's successors. Thus, an alliance with the Sasanid governors as the rulers of Yemen was a step which could well be expected from the tribal leadership of the Hamdānites.

⁴² *Tārīkh* ... 1989. P. 92–94.

⁴³ *al-Ansāb li ... al-ʿAwtāl al-Ṣuḥānī*. Ed. M.I. al-Naṣṣ. Muscat: Wizārat al-turāth al-ḳawmī wa al-thakāfa, 2006. P. 240.

The lack of information makes it impossible to determine how other tribes behaved toward the Sasanid governors. In the above account of Aḥmad al-Rāzī, a coalition of chieftains belonging to various tribes, mainly from the tribal confederation of Madhḥij but also from the confederation of Khawlān, is arrayed against Bādān. The account does not specify what prompted those chieftains to decide to make war on the governor (strictly speaking, it is not even known whether the campaign they intended to undertake actually took place), but it may be admitted that conflicts occurred from time to time. Meanwhile, it seems that as a general rule the Sasanid governors and the Arab tribal chieftains came to terms rather than fought. As shown above, al-Marwazān, setting out for the king, died in the land of the Arabs. This implies that the governor travelled not by sea but overland, which would hardly have been possible if there had been a serious threat of attack from the Arab tribes. Bādān subsequently acted in much the same manner, sending valuables to Khusrō II not by sea but with a caravan overland. The caravan was attacked and plundered, but that occurred at a considerable distance from Yemen. It may therefore be assumed that the Sasanid governors were able to come to terms with Arab tribes, and that the latter ensured the safe passage of caravans. It is also noteworthy that, despite the large number of sources on medieval Yemen, none of them contains reports of bloody reprisals similar to accounts of the Lakhmid king ʿ Amr III (554–569), who reportedly burned one hundred people alive out of vengeance, or of the massacre arranged, in response to the seizure of the caravan (see above), by the Sasanid governor in the fortress of al-Mushakkar.

The Arab tribes, in their turn, would also have had to make some sort of arrangement with the Sasanid governors in order to be able to trade at the fairs that were under the latter's control. The terms of those agreements remain unclear. In the account of Aḥmad al-Rāzī, the Hamdānites and the Persians become equal allies, which likely reflects how such agreements were understood by the Hamdānites and by later transmitters. Such agreements were probably concluded primarily to address specific pressing tasks, such as repelling attacks by various tribes, ensuring the passage of caravans, and the like. It is possible that broader agreements on general principles of relations



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were also concluded (similar to those for which Arab embassies traveled to Yazʿan), within the framework of which certain tribes recognized the supremacy of the Sasanid king and undertook to pay tribute. However, at the present stage, this remains a hypothesis still not confirmed by convincing evidence.

The end of Sasanid governance in Yemen is usually linked to Bādān's conversion to Islam. In the sources, that is presented somehow ambiguously. A widespread account transmitted by Ibn Ishāk states that Muḥammad sent a letter to Khusrō II Abarwēz, calling upon him to accept Islam. Khusrō tore up the message but ordered Bādān to dispatch envoys to Muḥammad to bring him to the Sasanid court. When the envoys arrived before Muḥammad in Medina, he initially sent them away. According to Muslim authors, having received a revelation during the night, Muḥammad declared to Bādān's envoys the following day that Khusrō had been overthrown and put to death by his son, specifying the hour when that occurred. Upon returning to Bādān, the envoys reported that to him. Some time later Bādān received a letter from Kawād II Shērōe (Khusrō's son who overthrew him and was proclaimed king), announcing the latter's accession and the death of Khusrō II. Taking that as a proof of the truthfulness of Muḥammad's prophecies, Bādān recognized Muḥammad as a prophet, converted to Islam, and wrote to inform him of that.⁴⁴ The accounts

⁴⁴ *Aʿlām* ... 1986. P. 89; *Annales* ... 1882–1885. P. 1571–1575; *Dalāʾil al-nubuwwa li ... Abī Nuʿaym al-Aṣḥabānī*. Ed. M.R. Ḳalʿatdī, ʿA. ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-naṣāʾis, 1986. P. 349–351; *al-Iktifāʾ bi-mā taḍammāna-hu min maghāzī Rasūl Allāh wa*



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of how Muḥammad sent a letter to Khusrō are a topic of a separate study; for the purposes of this work, it is important that, if this version is accepted, Bādān's conversion to Islam should be dated to the months following the conspiracy against Khusrō and his assassination which occurred on the night of 28–29 February 628 CE.

According to other statements, found *inter alia* with Ibn Saʿd (b. ca. 784/85, d. 845 CE) and al-Ṭabarī, Bādān converted to Islam later, in the tenth year of the Hijra (631/32 CE).⁴⁵

Preference for one dating over the other can only be given on the basis of the historical context. In this respect, the following fragment found in al-Ṭabarī's historical treatise, is to be considered:

According to what has come down to us, the Messenger of God — may God bless him and grant him peace! — united under the authority of Bādhām (Bādān. — D.M.), when he converted to Islam and the

al-thalātha al-khulafāʾ. *Taʾlīf ... al-Kalāʾ al-Andalusī*. Ed. M.K.ʿI. ʿAlī. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1997. Vol. 1. Pt. 2. P. 388; *Kitāb al-ṭabakāt al-kabīr li Muḥammad bin Saʿd*. Ed. ʿA.M. ʿUmar. Cairo: Maktabat al-Khāndjī, 2001. Pt. 1. P. 223–224; *Nihāyat ...* 1996/97. P. 426–427; *Sīrat al-Nabī li ... Ibn Hishām*. Ed. M.F. al-Sayyid. Tanta: Dār al-ṣaḥāba li-l-turāth bi Ṭantā, 1995. Vol. 1. P. 113; *Tārīkh-nāmeḥ ...* 1995. P. 227–229; *al-Wafāʾ bi aḥwāl al-Muṣṭafā li ... Ibn al-Djawzī*. Ed. M.Z. al-Nadjdār. Riyadh: al-Muʾassasa al-saʿdiyya, 1976. Pt. 2. P. 460–463.

⁴⁵ *Annales ...* 1890. P. 1763; *Kitāb al-ṭabakāt ...* 2001. Pt. 8. P. 92; *al-Miṣbāḥ al-muḍīʿ fī kuttāb al-Nabī al-ummī wa rusulī-hi ilā mulūk al-arḍ min ʿarabī wa aʿdjamī li ... Ibn Hudayda*. Ed. M. ʿAzīm al-dīn. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1985. Pt. 2. P. 156; *al-Rawḍ al-unuf fī sharḥ al-sīra al-nabawīyya li Ibn Hishām li ... al-Suhaylī*. Ed. ʿA. al-Wakīl. Part 1. Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-islāmiyya, 1967. P. 315; *Tārīkh al-khamīs fī aḥwāl anfas al-naḥīs. Taʾlīf ... al-Diyārbakrī*. Cairo, 1884/5. Pt. 2. P. 170.



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Yemenis converted to Islam, the whole of Yemen, and appointed him governor over all the districts (*makhbālīf*) of it (Yemen. — D.M.) And he (Bādān) remained the governor of the Messenger of God for the rest of his life, and the Prophet did not dismiss him from governance over Yemen nor over any part of it, nor did he associate anyone with him in governing Yemen, [and so it was] until Bādān died.⁴⁶

This passage indicates the existence of an agreement between Muḥammad and Bādān, pursuant to which the latter retained his authority over Yemen, but at the same time converted to Islam and recognized the supreme authority of the former. For Bādān, that undoubtedly was a very serious step, because both abandoning the Zoroastrian religion and betraying the king were considered crimes punishable by death. It would be natural to assume that Bādān would have taken such a step in a critical situation, when circumstances offered no other way out. If this is taken as a criterion and the conditions prevailing in 628 CE and in the 10th year of the Hijra (i.e., the period from 20 April 631 CE to 8 April 632 CE) are put to a comparison, the latter of those two periods would win. As Bādān, as shown above, belonged to the family of Mihrāns, the greatest danger for him arose during the sole rule of Queen Bōrān (630–631 CE), i.e., from the beginning or middle of June 631 CE to October of that same year, when nobles of his family suffered a persecution.⁴⁷ It may be assumed that Bādān received

⁴⁶ *Annales* ... 1890. P. 1851.

⁴⁷ Mishin D.E. The last Sasanids: Struggle for power (628–635). *Vostok (Oriens)*. 2025;(3) (in Russ.). P. 23.

news leading him to conclude that those persecutions would soon and inevitably affect him as well, and, deeming his situation hopeless, saw salvation in defecting to the camp of Muḥammad's supporters. If, on the other hand, one relies on the account in which Bādān converts to Islam upon receiving a message from Kawād II Shērōe (628 CE) announcing his accession, the governor's actions are more difficult to explain, since Kawād II did not carry out reprisals against the nobility and especially against the Mihrāns, who enjoyed great influence during his reign.

After Bādān thus seceded from the Sasanids, the history of Sasanid governors in Yemen effectively came to an end. It was definitively terminated with the death of Bādān, which most likely occurred at the beginning of 632 CE.⁴⁸ Thereafter, there are no further reports of the Sasanids appointing governors to Yemen.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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⁴⁸ The date of Bādān's death is approximately reconstructed on the basis that, according to one account of al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad appointed the governors of Yemen after performing the Farewell Pilgrimage (*ḥadjjat al-tamām*), which took place in March 632 CE; by then, according to al-Ṭabarī, Bādān was no longer alive (Annales ... 1890. P. 1852).

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Traditional Self-Administration vs. Modernization of Town Administration (Nakhichevan-on-Don, Mid-19th Century)¹

Abstract

The preparation of the reform of town administration in Russia was carried out with consideration for local peculiarities and the opinions of local authorities. The town elite of Nakhichevan-on-Don, referring to the Charter of Catherine II and the City Statute created in 1795 by Archbishop Iosif Argutinsky, sought to preserve the ethnic organization of municipal authority. Instead of reforming it, they proposed restoring the Board of 24 Trustees, which had “fallen into decline” by the middle of the nineteenth century, as an analogue of the general City Duma. Modernization processes in local administration overlapped with one another (police reform, the introduction of the institution of judicial investigators, the abolition of magistracies and town halls, etc.), while correspondence concerning

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
their implementation continued for quite a long time. Ultimately, the appeals of the inhabitants of Nakhichevan to the authorities — from the Taganrog Town Governor up to the Emperor, although they somewhat delayed the changes, proved futile. Despite the central government's promise to take into account the privileges of 1779, Nakhichevan was drawn into the general course of transformations characteristic of the “Era of Great Reforms”. The reestablished Board of 24 Trustees ultimately became only an intermediate structure on the path toward the all-Russian model of municipal self-government.

Keywords:

Armenian self-administration; Nakhichevan Magistrate; Board of 24 Trustees; Preparation of reform in Russia; Town commission projects; General and Executive Dumas; Deputy Assembly; Mayor.

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he reform of town administration became an important part of the complex of liberal transformations in Russia during the 1860s–1870s. Its preparation and the results of its implementation have always attracted the attention of historians and legal scholars in the pre-revolutionary²,

² *Дитятин И.И.* Устройство и управление городов России. Т. 1: Города России в XVIII столетии. СПб.: Тип. П.П. Меркульева, 1875. 508, III с. Т. 2. Городское самоуправление в настоящем столетии. Ярославль: В тип. Г.В. Фальк, 1877.

Soviet³, and post-Soviet⁴ periods alike. Nevertheless, researchers have traditionally noted that the history of city/town administration in Russia remains one of the insufficiently studied aspects of Russian history⁵. Thus, the well-known specialist in the history of municipal self-administration, V.A. Nardova, pointed out the virtual absence of studies devoted to specific, narrow issues and the very limited number of works based on materials from individual towns⁶. Contemporary scholar A.I. Kupriyanov described the period between Catherine II's Charter to the Cities of 1785 and the Municipal Statute (City Regulation/Municipal Provisions) of 1870 as the greatest "blank spot" in the history of self-government in the Russian Empire⁷.

In recent years, numerous works have appeared — textbooks, scholarly articles, monographs, and dissertations — devoted to the organization and activities of municipal self-government in individual Russian towns, the mere listing of which would take up too much

IV, 565 с.; *Градовский А.Д.* Начала русского государственного права. Т. III. Органы местного управления. СПб.: Тип. М.М. Стасюлевича, 1883. VII, 384 с.; *Коркунов Н.М.* Русское государственное право. Т. 2. Часть особенная. 4-е изд., без перемен. СПб.: Тип. М.М. Стасюлевича, 1903. VI, 596 с.; *Семенов Д.Д.* Городское самоуправление. Очерки и опыты. СПб.: Электро-типография Н.Я. Стойковой, 1901. 387 с.; *Джанишиев Г.А.* Городовое положение 1870 года (справка к 25-ти летию) / *Джанишиев Г.А.* Эпоха великих реформ. Исторические справки. 9-е изд. СПб.: Типо-лит. Б.М. Вольфа. 1905. LXXXIX, [3], 859, IX с.

³ *Рындзюнский П.Г.* Городское гражданство в России. М.: Изд-во Академии наук СССР, 1958. 559 с.; *Нардова В.А.* Городское самоуправление в России в 60-х — начале 90-х годов XIX века. Правительственная политика. Л.: Наука, Ленинградское отделение, 1984. 260 с.; *Рабцевич В.В.* Сибирский город в дореформенной системе управления. Новосибирск: Наука, Сибирское отделение, 1984. 197 с.

⁴ Великие реформы в России. 1856–1874: Сб. / Под ред. Л.Г. Захаровой, Б. Эклофа, Дж. Бушнелла. М.: Изд-во Московского ун-та, 1992. 336 с.; *Писарькова Л.Ф.* Развитие местного самоуправления в России до Великих реформ: обычай, повинность, право // Отечественная история. 2001. № 3. С. 25–39; *Куприянов А.И.* Культура городского самоуправления русской провинции. М.: Институт российской истории РАН, 2009. 325 с. URL: https://statehistory.ru/books/Aleksandr-Kupriyanov_Kultura-gorodskogo-samoupravleniya-russkoj-provintsii--1780-1860-e-gody/1 (accessed: 24.04.2025)

⁵ *Нардова В.А.* Op. cit. С. 3–4; *Писарькова Л.Ф.* Op. cit. С. 25, 39; *Куприянов А.И.* Op. cit.

⁶ *Нардова В.А.* Op. cit. С. 4.

⁷ *Куприянов А.И.* Op. cit.

space in this article. However, Nakhichevan-on-Don has been less fortunate in this respect. Even in the fundamental monograph by V.B. Barkhudaryan, this topic received only limited attention⁸. Some aspects of the problem have been examined by the author of the present article⁹.

Nakhichevan-on-Don — a town founded in 1779 by Armenians resettled in an organized manner from the Crimean Khanate to the Lower Don as the center of an Armenian colony — enjoyed internal autonomy granted by Catherine II. The administration of the town and five adjacent Armenian villages was carried out, according to their “rights and customs”, by the Armenian magistrate, which concentrated economic, policing, and judicial powers in its hands¹⁰. The purpose of this article is, on the basis of previously unknown archival materials, to reconstruct the processes that preceded the modernization of the archaic, ethnically based system of administration in Nakhichevan-on-Don and its full integration into the all-Russian legal space during the “Era of Great Reforms”.


As is well known, work on the municipal reform in Russia officially began on March 20, 1862, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs “received the Highest decree of His Imperial Majesty ... in accordance with the opinion of the State Council” to proceed without delay to the improvement of public administration in all cities/towns of the Empire¹¹. The first stage of the work consisted in

⁸ Бархударян В.Б. История Армянской колонии Новая Нахичевань (1779–1917). Ереван: Айастан, 1996. С. 333–337.

⁹ Батиев Л.В. Трансформация органов самоуправления Нахичевани-на-Дону в 1860-е годы // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: История России. 2020. Т. 19. № 1. С. 155–173. <https://doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2020-19-1-155-173> ; Батиев Л.В. От центра армянской колонии до заштатного города (из истории самоуправления Нахичевани-на-Дону). Ростов н/Д; Таганрог: Изд-во ЮФУ, 2022. 312 с.

¹⁰ Жалованная грамота вышедшим из Крыма христианам армянского закона 14 ноября 1779 г. / Полное собрание законов Российской империи. Собрание первое. СПб.: Тип. II Отделения Собственной Его Императорского величества канцелярии, 1830 (ПСЗ-I). Т. 20. № 14942.

¹¹ Материалы, относящиеся до нового общественного устройства в городах Империи. (Городовое положение 16 июня 1870 г.). Т. I. СПб., 1877. С. VIII; Шпейдер Г.И. *Op. cit.* С. 1.



Map of the city of Rostov. Map of the city of Nakhichevan.
From open sources

“collecting historical, statistical, and everyday-life materials on the condition of Russian cities”¹². For this purpose, by a circular letter of the Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Valuev dated April 26, 1862, governors were instructed to establish special commissions in provincial and other cities/towns “from among the most experienced and knowledgeable persons” in order to provide the necessary information and considerations concerning the proposed transformations in the internal organization of city/town communities¹³. As guidance for these commissions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared and distributed throughout the Russian governorates a *Program for the Preparation of Considerations on the Improvement of Public Administration in Cities*¹⁴. Having been published in the

¹² Джанишиев Г.А. *Op. cit.* С. 540.

¹³ Материалы... Т. 1. С. 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* С. 3–30.

central and provincial press¹⁵, the *Program...* elicited responses in Russian journalism, particularly from the well-known writer and publicist N.S. Leskov¹⁶. The information and opinions received from 509 local commissions were processed, supplemented with materials from the files and publications of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, systematized, and published in the form of special studies¹⁷.

For Nakhichevan-on-Don, however, the story of reforming public administration had begun not in 1862 but eight years earlier. In January 1854, the Taganrog City Governor Nikolay Adlerberg informed the Mayor and magistrate of Nakhichevan that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was “conducting proceedings concerning the transformation of city administration in certain cities of the Novorossiysk Krai and the Bessarabian Oblast”. The authorities of the Kyiv and Volhynian Governorates proposed the establishment of city dumas, “with the division of their staffs into three categories: a) for principal provincial towns; b) for district state-owned towns; and c) for district privately owned/proprietary towns”¹⁸. Therefore, the Nakhichevan authorities were instructed to immediately submit their views on this matter¹⁹. However, the residents of Nakhichevan, who were not inclined toward change, declared on May 17, 1854, that they had no opinion regarding the proposed administrative reforms, while also noting the insufficiency of town revenues to finance the proposed дума²⁰.

Three years later, on May 7, 1857, the Taganrog City Governor, acting in accordance with the directive of the Minister of Internal

¹⁵ Северная почта. 1862. № 99. 8 мая; Северная почта. 1862. № 100. 9 мая; Северная почта. 1862. № 101. 11 мая; Плотникова М.М. Городское общественное управление в 60-х гг. XIX в.: коммуникация правительства с регионами (на примере Иркутска) // Известия Иркутского государственного университета. Серия «История». 2018. Т. 23. С. 43–54; Асанов Р.Ф. Политико-правовая характеристика реформ Городского самоуправления второй половины XIX века // Юридическая наука и правоохранительная практика. 2 (5). 2008. С. 21–27.

¹⁶ Лесков Н.С. Городское общественное управление в России / Лесков Н.С. Статьи. М.: Директ-Медиа, 2014. С. 12–16.

¹⁷ Материалы... Т. 1. С. IX.

¹⁸ Национальный архив Армении (НАА). Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 87. Л. 4.

¹⁹ Ibid. Л. 4–4 об.

²⁰ Ibid. Л. 18–18 об.

Affairs, once again instructed the Nakhichevan authorities, “for the purpose of proper administration of the municipal economy”, to immediately convene the town community in order to answer the question of whether a *duma* should be established in Nakhichevan on the general legal basis. If this were deemed possible and necessary, a staffing proposal was to be submitted²¹. In its resolution of June 28, 1857, the town community expressed its desire to continue enjoying the privileges granted by Catherine II’s Charter of November 14, 1779, and petitioned for the permanent preservation of the existing order. In addition, the assembly considered it necessary to restore the Board of 24 Trustees to assist the Mayor and to appoint four assistants to the Mayor for various assignments²². The decision of the Nakhichevan community, forwarded to the City Governor, had no consequences, and the proposals of the Nakhichevans were not implemented²³.

The *Program for the Preparation of Considerations...*, accompanied by a directive from the head of Yekaterinoslav Governorate to immediately submit recommendations for improving municipal administration, was received by the Nakhichevan Magistrate on September 6, 1862²⁴. Acting on the Magistrate’s instructions, the Mayor submitted the resolution of the Nakhichevan community as early as September 15, 1862. Its essence was that the shortcomings identified in the *Program...* did not apply to the administration of Nakhichevan, “and therefore the community... does not perceive any substantial need or benefit in changing the existing institution.”²⁵ No response from the higher authorities followed the community resolution sent to the Yekaterinoslav Governor on September 15, 1862, just as none had followed the resolution of June 28, 1857²⁶. Since the Nakhichevan authorities also failed to provide the requested statistical information about the town, the official publication prepared by the Ministry of

²¹ Ibid. A. 23–23 o6.; Ibid. A. 112.

²² Ibid. A. 87. A. 33–37, 45–45 o6.

²³ Ibid. A. 48 o6.

²⁴ Ibid. A. 48 o6.–50; Ibid. A. 153. A. 3–4;

²⁵ Ibid. A. 87. A. 50 o6.

²⁶ Ibid.



Yekaterinoslav Governorate, 1860

From open sources

Internal Affairs for the municipal reform, as its authors noted, compiled information about Nakhichevan-on-Don from the reports of the Governorate statistical committee for 1861 and other sources²⁷.

Simultaneously with the general reform of town administration, a project was discussed concerning the transformation of the police administration in “the towns of Mariupol and Nakhichevan with their districts in accordance with the general principles of the state”²⁸. Judicial authority was to be separated from police authority, and the town police were to be organized on a uniform basis, “with the appointment to the towns of special police masters or Crown *gorodnichies*”²⁹.

At the beginning of 1860, the Nakhichevan community submitted a “most humble petition” to the monarch, setting forth

²⁷ Экономическое состояние городских поселений Европейской России в 1861–62 г. Ч. 1. СПб.: Тип. К. Вульфа, 1863. С. 37.

²⁸ НАА. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 131; Келле-Шагинов И.М. Моя единственная жизнь. Дневники и воспоминания. Ростов н/Д.: Старые русские, 2015. С. 297.

²⁹ НАА. Ф.139. Оп.1. Д. 131. Л. 2. See also: Келле-Шагинов И.М. Op. cit. С. 297.

arguments in favor of preserving the existing order. According to the Nakhichevan authorities, this appeal resulted in the suspension of the implementation of the police reform decision³⁰.

In practice, however, the work on these reforms continued. A new conflict arose in connection with the establishment of the institution of judicial investigators at district (uyezd) courts³¹ and the persistent unwillingness of the Nakhichevan Armenian Magistrate to relinquish its powers. Accused by the Yekaterinoslav Governor, Count A.K. Sivers, “of resisting the appointment of a judicial investigator, of forging and distributing counterfeit banknotes, of committing the terrible murder of a woman, and generally of concealing the crimes of their compatriots”, the Nakhichevans appealed on September 6, 1863, to the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia for a fair judgment. The authorities of Nakhichevan pointed out that: 1. the production of counterfeit banknotes had been carried out outside Nakhichevan for more than ten years, but as soon as the criminals settled in Nakhichevan, “they were discovered on the fourth day after their arrival by members of the Armenian Magistrate”; 2. the case of the “terrible murder” had been initiated by the judicial investigator, but the “investigation conducted by him revealed nothing in reality”; 3. “in criminal cases arising in Nakhichevan, it is rare that only Armenians are involved”. Cases involving non-Armenians were decided not by the Armenian Magistrate but by the Rostov District (Uyezd) Court. Consequently, the magistrate could not grant any leniency to criminals; 4. regarding the judicial investigator, “if our community did not wish to have one, it was guided by the granted right to administer justice according to its own customs through leaders elected from among themselves...”³²

³⁰ Российский государственный исторический архив (РГИА). Ф. 1286. Оп. 21. Д. 1085. Л. 30 об.

³¹ Высочайше утвержденное «Учреждение судебных следователей» от 8 июня 1860 г. Именной указ, данный Правительствующему сенату 8 июня 1860 года, опубликованный 16 июня / Полное собрание законов Российской империи. Собрание второе. СПб.: Тип. II Отделения Собственной Его Императорского величества канцелярии, 1862. (ПСЗ-II). Т. 35. Отд. 1. № 35890.

³² РГИА. Ф. 1286. Оп. 21. Д. 1085. Л. 28 об.—29.



General Map of the Taganrog City Administration and Rostov Uyezd, 1816
From open sources

Therefore, the Nakhichevans requested that they be preserved “under the form of administration as it currently exists” and that a strict investigation be appointed in order to eliminate any doubts regarding their law-abiding conduct and the effectiveness of the town administration³³. No investigation was conducted, but M.K. Katakazi, State Councillor for Special Assignments under the Governor-General, who had been sent from Odessa to Nakhichevan, informed the townspeople that the aforementioned accusations had not served as grounds for the proposed reforms and that the government had no intention of violating the rights most graciously granted to them by the sovereign³⁴. “Having gathered all information concerning the condition of the town and its inhabitants, and concerning the existing customs and institutions in all aspects of municipal administration”, M.K. Katakazi departed from the town. Encouraged by the official’s assurances, the Nakhichevan Armenian community once

³³ Ibid. А. 28 об.—30.

³⁴ Ibid. А. 30.

again petitioned the Governor-General on March 27, 1864, through deputies sent to Odessa. The petitioners stated that public administration in Nakhichevan had originally been established by Archbishop Argutinsky according to a statute similar to the new institution of the general duma then being introduced in the capitals and other cities. However, they noted that this institution “had over time lost its force”. Therefore, “feeling more acutely each day the shortcomings of the present municipal public administration”, they recognized the need to strengthen it³⁵. To this end, the Nakhichevans requested the Governor-General, first, since no decision had yet been made regarding their earlier petition on the police question, to preserve their rights inviolate; and second, to permit the establishment of a special commission composed of local “practical” citizens, under the guidance of an experienced official trusted by the Governor-General, for the drafting of a project for municipal public administration³⁶.

However, the Nakhichevan deputies in Odessa “exceeded the authority granted to them by submitting, in addition to the petition, a separate memorandum on their own behalf, claiming that our community itself fully recognizes the benefits of establishing a police administration on general principles and requests its implementation, being weary of the almost nonexistent administration in Nakhichevan and of the arbitrary and unrestricted actions of the town authorities”³⁷. In the opinion of said authorities, the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia “accepted this as truth and, not without surprise at such a rapid change in our opinions and wishes, hastened to draw his conclusions from it”³⁸. As a result, the unfounded accusations supported by the Governor of Yekaterinoslav Governorate before the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia, together with the unauthorized actions of the Nakhichevan deputies, led the Governor-General to “recognize as final and irreversible the appointment among us not only of judicial investigators, but also the establishment of police administration on general principles and

³⁵ Ibid. А. 31; HAA. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 173. А. 41.

³⁶ РГИА. Ф. 1286. Оп. 21. Д. 1085. А. 31; HAA. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 173. А. 41–41 об.

³⁷ РГИА. Ф. 1286. Оп. 21. Д. 1085. А. 31 об.

³⁸ Ibid.

foundations, even if such a measure should violate the rights most graciously granted to us by the sovereign”³⁹.

In addition to the aforementioned petition, on April 11, 1864, the deputies of the Nakhichevan Armenian community submitted a memorandum to the Governor-General in which they described in considerable detail the organization, procedures, and functions of Nakhichevan’s analogue to the city дума — the Board of 24 Trustees⁴⁰. The memorandum noted that the foremost concern after re-settlement and secure establishment in the new location had been the creation of a public administration based on national customs. Accordingly, the Nakhichevan community, under the leadership of Archbishop I. Argutinsky, established in 1795 a system of administration according to a statute which “in its principal foundations corresponds to the new institution of the general дума now being introduced in the capitals and other major cities of the empire”⁴¹.

Under this statute, “for deliberation on matters of public concern... twenty-four of the most respected citizens, who had earned the trust and esteem of the people, are invited”, and they were called the town trustees. These Trustees, “assembling once a week under the chairmanship of the Mayor together with five members of the Magistrate in the public building, deliberate on the improvement of the town and the welfare of its inhabitants, on the improvement of educational and other public institutions, on the revenues and expenditures of the town, the construction of roads and bridges, and other needs of the town, not excluding even spiritual matters”⁴². When necessary, for the discussion of complex issues, the Board could decide to convene a special assembly to which, on behalf of the Mayor, estate and guild elders together with their assistants would be invited, and in more important cases also other authorized representatives of the estates, “as well as certain citizens distinguished by service or other merits”⁴³. If the matter under discussion did not entail fundamen-

³⁹ Ibid. А. 28.

⁴⁰ HAA. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. А, 173. А. 42–50.

⁴¹ Ibid. А. 41.

⁴² Ibid. А. 42 о6.

⁴³ Ibid. А. 42 о6.–43.

tal changes, the Board's resolution was implemented under the supervision of the same trustees or several authorized representatives. In more important cases, the decision of the expanded Board was transmitted by the Mayor for approval by the higher authorities⁴⁴.

The Board of Trustees also exercised auditing functions in the financial sphere: within it, "the reports of mayors upon completion of their three-year term of service, as well as of other persons entrusted with the expenditure of public funds, were reviewed". In judicial matters, in accordance with the Armenian Law Code⁴⁵, nine members of the Board of Trustees constituted a special collegium "for the verification and review of magistrate decisions"⁴⁶.

Interestingly, the members of the commission themselves not only acknowledged the "complete oblivion" into which the Board of 24 had fallen after forty years, they also attempted to explain the reasons for this decline. "On the one hand, as a private institution not confirmed by the government, it was not perceived by the authorities as fully lawful"; on the other hand, "the community itself, having ceased to replenish the members of this Board that had diminished over time, was unable to establish another administration and remained almost under the influence of arbitrariness in the administration of community affairs by the single person of the Mayor acting on community resolutions"⁴⁷. Therefore, the Nakhichevans once again petitioned for permission to establish a commission for drafting a statute on the public administration of the town based on the principles of their former statute, adapted to the contemporary requirements of the government⁴⁸.

In 1864, Nakhichevan once again returned to the ministerial *Program...* of 1862. Following authorization from the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia, granted in response to the Nakhichevans' request, the Yekaterinoslav Governor, Rear Admiral G.A. Krieger,


⁴⁴ Ibid. Л. 43.

⁴⁵ Государственный архив Саратовской области. Ф. 660. Оп. 1. Д. 477. Л. 223–226; Батиев Л.В. Армянский (Астраханский) судебник в Нахичевани. М.: Юрлитинформ, 2025. С. 206–208.

⁴⁶ НАА. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 173. Л. 43 об.

⁴⁷ Ibid. Л. 43 об. — 44.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Л. 44; РГИА. Ф. 1286. Оп. 21. Д. 1085. Л. 31.




NAA. F. 139. Op. 1. D. 173. L. 27.

From open sources

ordered the Mayor of Nakhichevan on April 21, 1864 (received in Nakhichevan on May 2), to establish a special commission composed of local citizens for drafting a statute on public administration in the town of Nakhichevan, in accordance with the circular of Ministry of Internal Affairs of April 21, 1862⁴⁹. In execution of this order, on May 7 a “town assembly of all estates, consisting of no fewer than two-thirds of the householders present, together with the rural communities of the five Armenian villages... under the chairmanship of the Acting Mayor, merchant of the first guild Savely Kayalov”⁵⁰, was convened. In total, 111 townspeople participated in the assembly, together

⁴⁹ HAA. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 153. Л. 11–11 об.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Л. 19.




F. 139. Op. 1. D. 112. L. 3.
From open sources

with peasants elected by the rural communities: 8 from Chaltyr, 7 from Crimea, 5 from Bolshiye Saly, 3 from Sultan Saly, and 3 from Nesvetay⁵¹.

The assembly adopted a public resolution approving 24 deputies from all estates to serve on the newly established commission: three from the nobility (Nikita Morozov, Daniil Karakash, and Artem Avakov), eight from the merchant class (Semyon Aladzhalov, Yegor Khatranov, Yakov Khlytchiyev, Grigory Saltykov, Sergey Chorchopov, Ilya Shaginov, Matvey Eritspokhov, and Yegor Saltykov), six from the town petty bourgeoisie (Meryan Popov, Krikor Nalbandov, Minas Shaposhnikov, Lusegen Popov, Khacheres Khazyzov, and Kaspar Podoshev), and six from the peasantry: Khacheres Torosov representing the town settlers, and one representative from each of the five Armenian villages — Lusegen Peglivanov from Chaltyr, Melkon Srabionov from Crimea, Isai Magdasi from Saly, Babuk Opkarov from Sultan Saly, and Lukyan Kakhartov from Nesvetay. The hereditary honorary citizen

⁵¹ Ibid. A. 20–22, 26–28.



F. 139. Op. 1. D. 112. L. 3 ob.

From open sources

Karp Gayrabetov (the Mayor) had received a four-month leave of absence and therefore declined the duty of commission member offered to him, reducing the commission to 23 members. “For the editing of the draft statute”, Senior Secretary of the Governorate administration, titular councillor K.A. Drizhenko, was dispatched from Yekaterinoslav⁵².

The opening and first meeting of the Commission took place on May 12, 1864, under the chairmanship of Acting Mayor S. Kayalov. Having heard the first three points of the *Program*...⁵³, the Commission resolved to request the necessary information and to hold meetings three times a week — on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. — during which the remaining points would also be considered⁵⁴. Already on May 13, the most important fourth point of the *Program* was discussed, concerning “what institutions and offices

⁵² Ibid. A. 11.

⁵³ Ibid. A. 173. A. 2, 13.

⁵⁴ Ibid. A. 13, 29.

should be established for the administration of public affairs”⁵⁵. In accordance with the principles of the *Program*, the Commission considered it necessary to separate deliberative matters from executive matters and to establish for the former a General Duma and for the latter an Executive Duma. The Advisory Duma was to consist of 45 councilors, elected with 15 representatives from each estate, under the chairmanship of the Mayor, who would be elected by all estates of the community, together with estate elders — one from each estate. In addition, for resolving estate-related matters, it was proposed “to establish alongside the General Duma a municipal Deputy Assembly composed of two deputies elected from each estate”⁵⁶.

For conducting elections to all public offices and discussing public affairs, each estate was to appoint 35 electors, for a total of 105 persons. (According to statistical data for 1863–1864, the population of Nakhichevan numbered between 9,387⁵⁷ and 10,481⁵⁸ Armenian-Gregorians of both sexes). The Executive Duma, formed from part of the members of the General Duma — two from each estate — was likewise to function under the chairmanship of the Mayor. For the preparation of matters for presentation and the drafting of protocols, a town secretary was to be elected by the General Duma. To supervise the proper conduct of trade, a commercial police force composed of two commercial deputies was to be established, assisted by two market inspectors chosen primarily from persons engaged in market trade⁵⁹. A proposal “to establish a special board for handling matters concerning hired servants and, generally, persons arriving from various places for work” apparently was not approved, and the corresponding entry in the Commission’s records was crossed out⁶⁰. Thus, “outsiders” remained outside the jurisdiction of the Armenian Magistrate.

⁵⁵ Ibid. Л. 1, 12.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Л. 4–4 об.

⁵⁷ Памятная книжка для Екатеринославской губернии на 1864 год. Екатеринослав: Тип. Я. Чаусского, 1864. С. 73.

⁵⁸ Новороссийский календарь на 1865 год. Одесса: Тип. Л. Нитче, 1864. С. 120.

⁵⁹ НАА. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 173. Л. 4 об.—5.

⁶⁰ Ibid. Л. 5.

By June 1864, the Commission was already preparing to submit the draft of the new Statute to the head of Yekaterinoslav Governorate⁶¹. However, on June 5 it received a thoroughly reasoned “opinion” from Commission member Nikita Morozov criticizing both the collected information and the prepared proposals. As a result, in July 1864 all Commission members came to the conclusion that it was necessary: 1. to unite the Nakhichevan nobility, officials, honorary citizens, and merchants into a single estate category due to their small numbers; and 2. likewise to unite guild members and petty bourgeois into a second category — “although according to the revision lists there are 1,350 guild members, of which only 132 are actually engaged in crafts, while the remainder pursue occupations similar to those of the petty bourgeoisie”⁶². Accordingly, the General Duma was to consist “of 20 councilors from each estate, for a total of 40 persons, together with one estate elder from each estate”⁶³. The electoral assembly was also modified: the nobility, honorary citizens, and merchants would provide 40 electors, while the petty bourgeoisie, guild members, and craftsmen, due to their greater numbers, would provide 60 electors, for a total of 100 persons.

Other changes and additions were also proposed: the municipal Deputy Assembly of six deputies would be formed by electing three deputies from each category; the Executive Duma under the leadership of the Mayor would consist of four members — two from each estate; in addition to the commercial police, it was planned to establish an economic police force of two commissioners (*pristavs*) “for the collection of town revenues and, in general, for executive affairs relating to the town treasury”; two inspectors were to be appointed for oversight of municipal property, two sworn appraisers for property valuation, and two trustees for the care of the poor⁶⁴.

Simultaneously with the consideration of the *Program...* and the preparation of a draft for a new system of public administration in Nakhichevan, the town elite, which had not abandoned hope

⁶¹ Ibid. A. 20.

⁶² Ibid. A. 27 о6.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid. A. 27–28.

of preserving the old order (with the restoration of the Board of 24 Trustees), submitted a petition to the Minister of Internal Affairs on September 30, 1864 (received in St. Petersburg on October 15)⁶⁵. In their appeal to the Minister, they outlined the correspondence cited above with the Governor-General and evaluated the actions of the Nakhichevan deputies, which, in the opinion of the town authorities, had resulted in the violation of the rights most graciously granted by the sovereign⁶⁶. Therefore, the Nakhichevan authorities requested that the Minister transfer the matter for consideration by the State Council, seeing in this the only way to preserve the Nakhichevan police system in its former form⁶⁷.

However, as is evident from a memorandum prepared in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, “with respect to these requests of the Nakhichevan Armenian community, no orders whatsoever were issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs; only a repeated instruction was sent to the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia demanding the prompt submission of the requested information regarding the proposed transformations in Nakhichevan generally” (November 12, 1864)⁶⁸. The Nakhichevan Armenians also appealed with similar requests to the Minister of Justice, asking that their town not be subjected to the authority of judicial investigators. However, the Minister did not find it possible to satisfy their petition, of which he informed the Governor-General⁶⁹.

The results of the work of the Nakhichevan commission on the *Program...* of 1862 were submitted to St. Petersburg in December 1864. The position of the Nakhichevans was interpreted unequivocally by the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “it is evident that the Armenian community wishes to preserve for itself the exclusive right to participate in public affairs, excluding all other inhabitants of Nakhichevan of non-Armenian origin; the Nakhichevan Armenians even rejected all transformations in their public administration, recognizing

⁶⁵ РГИА. Ф. 1286. Оп. 21. Д. 1085. Л. 28–35 об.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Л. 36–38 об.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Л. 32–32 об.

⁶⁸ Ibid. Л. 39.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

such changes as a violation of their privileges”⁷⁰. The conclusion of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cited above emphasized a matter of fundamental importance for the Nakhichevan Armenians (as well as for the Mariupol Greeks): the ethnic principle underlying the organization of administration, based on Clause 5 of Catherine II’s Charter of November 14, 1779⁷¹. However, the Ministry also noted the position of the Yekaterinoslav Governor, who considered it possible, without violating the privileges of the Greek and Armenian populations of the towns of Mariupol and Nakhichevan, “to reform their public administration while allowing some degree of participation in this administration on the part of local Russian inhabitants and foreign guests”⁷². The Ministry of Internal Affairs regarded as unfounded the claims of the Armenian and Greek populations of Nakhichevan and Mariupol to the exclusive right to participate in public affairs. Furthermore, the Ministry held that the decision of the Governing Senate in favor of the Armenians and Greeks concerning their exclusive right to use municipal lands had no bearing whatsoever on the right of other inhabitants of these towns to participate in public administration, since those inhabitants contributed equally to all municipal obligations through ownership of immovable property and the conduct of trades and businesses⁷³.

The implementation of the reforms was clearly stalling, though it did not come to a complete halt. On February 14, 1864, M.K. Katakazi took an interest in the execution of the public resolution regarding the reestablishment in Nakhichevan of the Board of 24 Trustees and the appointment of four assistants to aid the Mayor. Having learned that no action had been taken, he submitted a corresponding proposal to the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia and obtained his consent, pending the introduction in Nakhichevan of a new form of public administration, to appoint “up to 24 trustees

⁷⁰ Материалы, относящиеся до нового общественного устройства в городах Империи: (Городовое положение 16 июня 1870 г.) / Хозяйственный департамент Мин-ва внутр. дел. Т. 2. СПб.: Тип. Мин-ва внутр. дел, 1877. С. 48–49.

⁷¹ ПСЗ-I. Т. 20. № 14942.

⁷² Материалы... Т. 2. С. 49.

⁷³ Ibid. С. 51.

to assist the Mayor, with consultative voting rights in matters of municipal economy, and up to four citizens to assist him in managing municipal leasehold revenues, collecting assessed taxes, and similar affairs”⁷⁴. The Board of 24 Trustees was elected on February 26, 1866⁷⁵, and continued to function until the introduction of the new municipal administration in Nakhichevan in 1872⁷⁶.

On April 13, 1866, Alexander II approved the *Regulations Abolishing Magistracies and Town Halls (Ratushas)* in Russia and ordered their implementation during the course of 1866⁷⁷. All attempts by the Nakhichevan elite to preserve Armenian self-government were doomed. The *Regulations...* were sent to Nakhichevan-on-Don on May 20, and from that date, according to the provisions of the *Code of Fundamental Laws* (Articles 58, 59, 63, and 65) and Article 716 of the *General Provincial Administration*, the law “acquired full binding force here and must be executed according to its exact and literal meaning, without any alteration or extension”⁷⁸.

On July 1, 1866, by order of the Yekaterinoslav Governorate Administration (No. 4600 of June 20), elections were still organized in Nakhichevan and a six-member дума was elected (six members and four alternates)⁷⁹. However, this body never became operational, because the Minister of Internal Affairs, in response to an inquiry from the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia, permitted the retention of the “temporary public administration for the management of municipal affairs”⁸⁰, especially since in the near future the

⁷⁴ НАА. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 197. Л. 2.

⁷⁵ Ibid. Д. 191. Л. 82–84.


⁷⁶ Ibid. Д. 207. Л. 17–21; Д. 223. Л. 29–29; Д. 249. Л. 16; Батиев Л.В. Двадцать четыре попечителя Нахичевани-на-Дону (из истории одного полузабытого органа) // Научные ведомости Белгородского университета. Серия: История. Политология. 2020. Т. 47. № 2. С. 318–326.

⁷⁷ Высочайше утвержденные Правила об упразднении магистратов и ратуш. Именной указ 13 апреля 1866 г. / ПСЗ-II. Т. 41. СПб, 1868. № 43183.

⁷⁸ НАА. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 207. Л. 2.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Д. 197. Л. 4–25; The Six-Voice Duma was first established in 1788 and existed until 1795, when the self-government project of Archbishop Argutinsky was implemented. See: Патканян Г. История Новой Нахичевани. Нахичевань, 1917 (in Armenian). С. 53.

⁸⁰ Simplified administration (without a city дума), as a temporary measure,



F. 139. Op. 1. D. 153. L. 19.
From open sources

introduction of a new form of public administration in this town is expected”⁸¹.

The final liquidation of the remnants of the Nakhichevan self-administration took place on July 1, 1871⁸². The transition to the all-Russian model of municipal administration occurred after the approval of the new Municipal Statute on June 16, 1870, and its implementation in Nakhichevan in 1872⁸³.

was permitted by the decree on the abolition of magistrates. In Nakhichevan-on-Don, it consisted of the Mayor with four assistants and a Board of 24 Trustees.

⁸¹ HAA. Ф. 139. Оп. 1. Д. 197. Л. 26–26 об.

⁸² Ibid. Д. 249. Л. 50–51.

⁸³ Ibid. Оп. 1. Д. 255.

The modernization of administration in Nakhichevan-on-Don was inevitable due to a number of circumstances. As the Nakhichevans themselves were compelled to admit, the existing organization of administration in the town had in practice departed significantly from the model prescribed in 1795 by Iosif Argutinsky. The “complete oblivion” into which the Board of 24 Trustees had fallen, together with the actual decline in the role of the magistrate, had transformed the Mayor into something close to an absolute ruler. Evidently, dissatisfaction with this state of affairs burst forth from the Nakhichevan deputies in Odessa when they spoke of the nonexistent administration in Nakhichevan and the unrestricted arbitrariness of the “officials governing the town”. The ethnic principle underlying the organization of administration, which had been reasonable when the colony with its homogeneous Armenian population was established in 1779, came in the second half of the nineteenth century into conflict with the rapid growth of the town’s Russian population, which possessed no right to participate in administration. Government circles paid particular attention to this circumstance, emphasizing that the Armenians of Nakhichevan, in the proposals they submitted regarding the reform, insisted upon an exclusive right to participate in public affairs, to the exclusion of other nationalities. The autarkic character of Nakhichevan could not remain unchanged under conditions of rapid regional development and the massive influx of non-resident populations.

The incorporation of the center of the Armenian colony, with its elements of internal autonomy, into the process of all-Russian transformations, and the conversion of Nakhichevan into an ordinary provincial South Russian town, was an inevitable logical consequence of the state policy of liberal reforms and the formation of a unified system of local administration. The reforms of the 1860s in Nakhichevan — the establishment of judicial investigators, the separation of the police from the Armenian magistrate, and the creation of the Council of 24 — became intermediate stages that facilitated the transition from an archaic form of urban self-government, based on privileges granted to Armenian settlers from Crimea, to the all-Russian model of municipal self-government.

Conflict of interests

The author declares no relevant conflict of interests.



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